State v. Wright ( 2013 )


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    2013 UT App 142
    _________________________________________________________
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    JUSTIN GEORGE WRIGHT,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20090643‐CA
    Filed June 20, 2013
    Third District, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Paul G. Maughan
    No. 081908349
    Lori J. Seppi, Attorney for Appellant
    John E. Swallow and Jeanne B. Inouye, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR. concurred.
    ROTH, Judge:
    ¶1     Justin George Wright challenges his conviction for
    aggravated sexual abuse of a child on three grounds. First, Wright
    contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in
    investigating and presenting his defense. Wright next argues that
    the district court erred when it permitted the jury to hear
    inadmissible expert testimony. Finally, he asserts prosecutorial
    misconduct during closing statements. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2    Wright was charged by information with two counts of
    aggravated sexual abuse of a child after his daughter (Daughter)
    State v. Wright
    reported that Wright “put his hands down her pants and touched
    her buttocks and vaginal area” while they were lying on a couch.
    She also reported that Wright sometimes “put his hand down her
    shirt and touched her breast area.” According to Daughter, this
    conduct began when she was six or seven years old and continued
    until August or September 2007, when she was nine years old, at
    which time Wright moved to Las Vegas to attend school. Daughter
    did not report the abuse until July 2008, approximately ten months
    after it had ended. She first told her eleven‐year‐old cousin but
    made her cousin promise not to tell because she did not want them
    to get in trouble if they were not believed and because she was
    afraid that Wright might go to jail and then kidnap her once he was
    released. In August 2008, Daughter disclosed the abuse to her
    mother (Mother) and Mother’s fiancé.
    ¶3     Wright was tried by jury on May 5–6, 2009. At the trial,
    Daughter testified that when she visited Wright at his apartment,
    they would watch television while lying on the couch. Wright
    would lie behind Daughter and move the telephone behind him.
    Wright would then put his hands down her pants, under her
    underwear, touching her vagina and her buttocks, and, on
    occasion, under her shirt, placing his hand over her heart. Daughter
    reported that Wright touched her in this way “[m]aybe more than
    10” times with the last incident occurring “a few weeks before he
    moved.” Daughter further testified that she did not tell Mother
    right away because Daughter “was afraid she wouldn’t believe
    [her].” Nevertheless, Daughter explained that she was able to
    disclose the abuse to her cousin because she “felt like [she] could
    trust her” but that she still feared what might happen if the cousin
    revealed the abuse, including that Wright might kidnap her.
    Daughter testified that her fear of being kidnapped stemmed from
    a television episode of America’s Most Wanted that she had viewed
    sometime in 2007 or early 2008, in which the “dad . . . was touching
    his daughter . . . inappropriately” and “went to jail[, then] he got
    out and he kidnaped her.” In response to defense counsel’s
    questions about her visits with Wright after he moved to Las
    Vegas, Daughter testified that he did not touch her sexually during
    those visits and that she had “a pretty good time visiting him.”
    20090643‐CA                      2               
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    State v. Wright
    Daughter also confirmed that her relationship with her father was
    “physically affectionate” and that Wright never threatened her or
    told her not to report the touching to anyone.
    ¶4       Mother and her fiancé each testified about the circumstances
    that led to the disclosure and what Daughter had told them.
    According to them, Mother, her fiancé, and Daughter were out to
    dinner when Daughter told them that Wright had threatened to sue
    Mother for custody. Daughter seemed “nervous” about the
    situation, but Mother told Daughter not to worry about it because
    “[i]t’s an adult situation” that Wright “shouldn’t be bringing . . . up
    with [Daughter] in the first place.” Mother told Daughter that she
    would “talk to [Wright] about it” and “just kind of let it go.” The
    next morning, however, Mother “felt bad” because she typically
    “tr[ied] to keep the communication open” by “mak[ing Daughter]
    talk to [her] about what she was feeling” when she was upset.
    Fearing that she may have been too dismissive with Daughter and
    noticing that Daughter was “still a little quiet,” Mother assured
    Daughter that she could “tell me things,” even if someone had
    made a threat, and analogized the situation to when they had
    discussed the difference between good and bad touching and why
    Daughter should tell Mother if someone touched her
    inappropriately. Daughter then disclosed the abuse. Mother called
    the Division of Child and Family Services, which referred her to
    Detective Peggy Faulkner, an investigator assigned to the Family
    Crimes Unit of the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Office Investigations
    Division.
    ¶5      Detective Faulkner interviewed Daughter as part of the
    investigation that ensued from the sexual abuse Daughter reported.
    Detective Faulkner also testified at trial. In the course of its direct
    examination, the State asked Detective Faulkner, “Is it uncommon
    for you to have cases involving a disclosure that comes years after
    an initial event of touching?” Detective Faulkner responded, “No.
    No.” Wright’s counsel did not object to this question. But when the
    State followed up by asking how many cases Detective Faulkner
    had handled where the disclosure occurred a significant period of
    time after the abuse, Wright’s counsel did object, arguing that
    20090643‐CA                       3                 
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    State v. Wright
    Detective Faulkner was never designated as an expert witness and
    that the question seemed to require expert testimony. He also
    objected on grounds of “relevance.” The court overruled Wright’s
    objections. Detective Faulkner then answered, “I would be willing
    to say that at least a third of my cases . . . are victims where they
    have either become 18 and are [o]lder or they’ve endured the abuse
    living with the suspect without telling anyone for years.”
    ¶6     The defense called Wright’s mother, his sister, and Wright
    himself. Wright’s mother testified that Wright and Daughter were
    “very affectionate,” “[a]lways” “snuggling on the couch, watching
    TV” with Wright lying behind Daughter. Wright also testified
    about the “affectionate” nature of his relationship with Daughter.
    Wright explained that his family was physically “[v]ery loving[,
    v]ery affectionate” and that he raised Daughter the same way. In
    particular, Wright described how he would “lay [on] his
    [grandfather’s] lap and have him scratch [his] back[].” Wright drew
    a comparison between that activity and his lying on the couch with
    Daughter and tickling her stomach and back. Wright also testified
    about how he had planned to “gain partial custody” of Daughter
    once he moved back to Utah. According to Wright, he told Mother
    about his plan shortly before he moved and “it caused a big fight.”
    He also explained that while he was living in Las Vegas, his phone
    contact with Daughter became less frequent.
    ¶7      Wright’s mother described her own relationship with
    Daughter as “very close” and explained that they would regularly
    engage in “girl talk,” during which Wright’s mother had talked to
    Daughter about inappropriate touching and Daughter told her
    “private things.” Daughter never disclosed that Wright was
    inappropriately touching her during these talks. Wright’s sister
    testified that Daughter was “like [her] little sister” and they too
    were “really close.” Wright’s sister explained that Daughter was
    comfortable talking to her and sometimes talked to her about boys
    she liked, but Daughter had never reported or even hinted that
    Wright was sexually abusing her.
    20090643‐CA                      4                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    ¶8      In his closing statement, defense counsel suggested that
    Daughter’s testimony could be the product of her imagination
    based on events that occurred on age‐inappropriate television
    programs that Daughter watched, such as America’s Most Wanted.
    According to counsel, the abuse was not real, but Daughter had
    recast an event she had seen on television as something that had
    happened to her by transforming, over time, Wright’s innocent and
    affectionate touching into something inappropriate. Defense
    counsel attributed this to Daughter’s recent decision to call
    Mother’s fiancé, “Dad,” and her resulting guilt from “turning her
    back on [Wright] for another father. But if over time she has
    convinced herself that he’s a pedophile, that he’s abused her from
    an emotional perspective[,] it makes it easier and it makes it okay.”
    Counsel also argued that “[i]t worked” because Daughter “has
    gotten exactly what she wants. She is with the family she wants to
    be with[ and s]he doesn’t have to see [Wright].” The prosecutor
    responded,
    [T]here is absolutely no reason not to believe
    [Daughter], who, as I told you before gave you every
    single piece of evidence that you need for the
    elements of this crime. [Daughter] doesn’t want to
    hurt her father. She loved him even after he did
    horrible things to her. She just wants him to stop
    hurting her. You have the power to make that stop.
    ¶9    The jury convicted Wright on one count of aggravated
    sexual abuse of a child and acquitted him on the other count.1
    1. Wright was tried on two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a
    child for the first and the last times that he purportedly sexually
    touched Daughter. During deliberation, the jury sent a note to the
    court, inquiring,
    “We would like some clarification on the different
    counts. We take the separate counts to mean separate
    instances of the alleged crime. If so, we feel the
    (continued...)
    20090643‐CA                      5                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    Wright appealed, and on his motion, this court remanded the case
    to the district court to conduct a hearing pursuant to rule 23B of the
    Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the claims that trial counsel
    had been ineffective because he had not reasonably investigated or
    pursued a fabrication defense and he did not effectively use
    available witnesses and evidence at trial. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a)
    (“A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the [appellate]
    court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of
    fact, necessary for the appellate court’s determination of a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel.”). The district court on rule 23B
    remand concluded that Wright’s trial counsel had not been
    ineffective. The court supported its decision with detailed factual
    findings.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶10 Wright makes three claims on appeal. First, he argues that
    trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to
    adequately investigate the merits of both the defense urged by
    Wright (fabrication) and the defense trial counsel pursued
    (mistake). Wright also asserts that counsel underutilized available
    evidence and witnesses at trial. “In ruling on an ineffective
    assistance claim following a Rule 23B hearing, [appellate courts]
    defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, but review its legal
    1. (...continued)
    evidence may support different conclusions for each
    count.
    For instance the evidence of the incident
    happening in August 2007 [as opposed to the
    incident occurring in March 2005] is stronger.
    Therefore, if we conclude guilty for this date, which
    count, (Count I or II) would this apply?”
    Upon the advice of counsel, the court instructed the jury, “Count
    one applies to the earlier date. Count two applies to the later date.”
    The jury convicted Wright on count two.
    20090643‐CA                       6                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    conclusions for correctness.” State v. Bredehoft, 
    966 P.2d 285
    , 289
    (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
    first time on appeal presents a question of law.” State v. Clark, 
    2004 UT 25
    , ¶ 6, 
    89 P.3d 162
    .
    ¶11 Next, Wright asserts that the district court erred in allowing
    Detective Faulkner to testify about the incidence of delayed
    reporting in sexual abuse cases when Detective Faulkner had not
    been designated or qualified as an expert witness. Ordinarily, we
    review evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of witness
    testimony for abuse of discretion. State v. Tarrats, 
    2005 UT 50
    , ¶ 16,
    
    122 P.3d 581
     (“[W]e will not reverse the trial court’s ruling on
    evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the trial court so abused
    its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted.”
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The State,
    however, argues that this issue was not preserved and that our
    review is accordingly limited to determining whether the court
    committed plain error or counsel provided ineffective assistance.
    To make out a claim of plain error, “a defendant must demonstrate
    that [1] an error exists; [2] the error should have been obvious to
    the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error,
    there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.” State
    v. Sellers, 
    2011 UT App 38
    , ¶ 8, 
    248 P.3d 70
     (alterations in original)
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish
    ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that counsel’s
    performance was deficient and prejudicial “to the degree that but
    for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable
    probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
    different.” 
    Id. ¶ 9
     (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
    accord Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 694 (1984) (explaining
    that “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
    undermine confidence” in the verdict).
    ¶12 Finally, Wright claims prosecutorial misconduct during the
    State’s closing statement. Because Wright did not object to the
    prosecutor’s statements in the district court, we review the claim
    20090643‐CA                       7                 
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    under the doctrines of plain error and ineffective assistance of
    counsel. See Sellers, 
    2001 UT App 38
    , ¶¶ 7–9.
    ANALYSIS
    I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    ¶13 Wright argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he
    received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. To establish
    ineffective assistance, “a defendant must . . . demonstrate that
    counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an
    objective standard of reasonable professional judgment[,] . . . [and]
    show that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e.,
    that it affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Litherland, 
    2000 UT 76
    , ¶ 19, 
    12 P.3d 92
    . To show that his counsel performed
    inadequately, a defendant must “rebut the strong presumption that
    under the circumstances the challenged action might be considered
    sound trial strategy.” 
    Id.
     (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). This presumption “may be overcome only if there is a
    lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.” State v.
    King, 
    2012 UT App 203
    , ¶ 14, 
    283 P.3d 980
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). “Additionally, because both deficiency
    and prejudice must be shown, a reviewing court can dispose of an
    ineffectiveness claim on either ground.” State v. Bair, 
    2012 UT App 106
    , ¶ 49, 
    275 P.3d 1050
     (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    ¶14 Wright claims that his counsel was ineffective because he
    failed to adequately investigate Wright’s preferred defense of
    fabrication, failed to adequately investigate the mistake defense
    counsel advocated, and failed to make effective use of the available
    witnesses and evidence at trial. On Wright’s motion, we remanded
    the case to the district court to make findings necessary to the
    determination of whether trial counsel failed to reasonably
    investigate a fabrication defense and to make appropriate use of
    20090643‐CA                       8                 
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    the available witnesses and evidence.2 Wright has raised the failure
    to investigate a mistake defense for the first time on appeal. In this
    section, we will first address Wright’s claims that counsel failed to
    investigate the two possible defenses, including his claim that a
    complete investigation of the fabrication defense would have
    caused counsel to “realize[] that his reasons for doubting the
    viability of the defense were unfounded.” We will then consider
    counsel’s decisions not to use the exhibits Wright provided him
    and not to call certain witnesses at trial. Finally, we will evaluate
    Wright’s claim that counsel did not effectively examine Wright’s
    mother and sister at trial.
    A. Counsel Did Not Fail To Investigate the Potential Defenses, and
    His Pursuit of a Mistake Defense Was a Reasonable Tactical
    Decision.
    ¶15 Wright claims that counsel failed to reasonably investigate
    either Wright’s preferred defense of fabrication or the mistake
    defense that counsel actually presented. With regard to the
    fabrication defense, Wright argues that counsel, having heard
    Daughter’s and Mother’s testimonies at the preliminary hearing,
    did not fully consider all of the testimony about the acrimony
    between Mother and Wright as well as the circumstances leading
    to Daughter’s disclosure that Wright’s witnesses were prepared to
    provide in response at trial. In particular, the witnesses could have
    explained that Mother had recently insisted that Daughter call
    Mother’s fiancé, “Dad,” and that Mother had told Daughter that
    Wright was planning to seek custody of Daughter. Wright claims
    that had counsel conducted such an investigation, counsel not only
    would have seen the viability of a fabrication defense but also
    would have viewed it as superior to the mistake defense. With
    respect to his claim that counsel failed to conduct an adequate
    investigation of the mistake defense, Wright asserts that counsel
    2. We commend the district court for the care and detail with which
    it entered its findings and conclusions.
    20090643‐CA                       9                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    did not research the defense sufficiently to be able to effectively
    explain to the jury why Daughter was mistaken.
    ¶16 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that “counsel can make
    a reasonable decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for
    tactical reasons” in presenting a defense “only after an adequate
    inquiry” into “the underlying facts of a case, including the
    availability of prospective defense witnesses.” State v. Templin, 
    805 P.2d 182
    , 188 (Utah 1991). Wright contends that because testimony
    from several potential defense witnesses would have supported his
    claim that Daughter had been induced to lie, his counsel must have
    inadequately investigated a fabrication defense. On remand,
    however, the district court determined that counsel “knew of the
    substance of the testimony” of available defense witnesses and
    “adequately investigated their potential testimony,” although it
    recognized that counsel “only spent a minimal amount of time
    preparing” one witness who had information pertinent to the
    fabrication defense. Wright has not contested the court’s findings
    that counsel was adequately aware of the testimony supporting a
    fabrication defense. Wright has therefore failed to demonstrate that
    counsel’s investigation fell outside the “wide range of reasonable
    professional assistance.” See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    689 (1984).
    ¶17 Wright also claims that counsel’s investigation of the
    mistake defense was incomplete because he relied on Daughter’s
    exposure to “adult content” in age‐inappropriate television
    programs and books without researching their contents. According
    to Wright, had counsel investigated, he would have learned that
    the television programs Daughter may have been exposed to
    covered the topics of sexuality, family discord, and use of abuse
    allegations to alienate an accused parent and that Daughter was
    reading books that contained sexual content “too graphic for a ten‐
    year‐old child.” The State counters that Wright’s claim requires
    speculation that the contents of the television shows and books
    would have bolstered the defense. We agree. Wright’s claim is
    based on the premise that additional research into the content of
    the media to which Daughter might have been exposed would
    20090643‐CA                      10               
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    have provided information useful to the mistake defense. While
    there is evidence in the record that Daughter “loved” watching
    Oprah and also watched America’s Most Wanted and Dr. Phil on
    occasion, Wright has failed to support, with specific facts, his
    contention that counsel’s failure to look further into this subject
    would likely have provided substantial additional evidence to
    support a mistake defense. For example, Wright identifies the
    suggestive titles of several episodes of Dr. Phil (e.g., “Is there a
    Predator in the House?,” “Family Court Battles,” “Controversial
    Love Affairs,” and “You’re a Liar!”). He fails, however, to show
    either that Daughter actually watched the specific episodes he
    identifies, which he claims would have provided her with
    information helpful to the fabrication of her abuse allegations or
    may have caused her to misinterpret innocent touching as sexual
    and inappropriate, or that she watched the programs frequently
    enough that her exposure to specific programs could reasonably be
    inferred. Nor has Wright adequately identified what he claims to
    be the graphic sexual content of the books she read or analyzed
    how the content of such books might be shown to have affected her
    disclosure. As a consequence, his contentions are too vague to
    support more than speculation that counsel was deficient in not
    further investigating either the television or book matters. Cf. Allen
    v. Friel, 
    2008 UT 56
    , ¶ 27, 
    194 P.3d 903
     (affirming the dismissal of an
    ineffective assistance claim on a petition for postconviction relief
    because the claim was “vague and speculative”). See generally State
    v. Garrett, 
    849 P.2d 578
    , 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that
    without specific facts to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to object
    was due to deficiency rather than trial strategy, the defendant’s
    claim amounted to speculation, and mere speculation is insufficient
    to overcome the presumption of sound trial strategy).
    ¶18 Furthermore, the evidence counsel actually presented at trial
    to portray Daughter as confused or mistaken about appropriate
    and inappropriate touching indicates that he was reasonably
    informed of Daughter’s potential exposure to the subject matter.
    For example, he established that Daughter sometimes watched
    Oprah, Dr. Phil, and America’s Most Wanted and followed up on
    Daughter’s admission that her fear about disclosing the abuse
    20090643‐CA                       11                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    stemmed from an episode of America’s Most Wanted, in which the
    father had been touching his daughter inappropriately and
    kidnapped her after she reported it; he elicited testimony from
    Detective Faulkner that when asked if “anyone else touched you in
    a way that made you uncomfortable,” Daughter had reported
    innocent touching of her chest and buttocks by other children while
    they were playing; and he pointed out that Mother “specifically . . .
    brought up the good touch/bad touch analogy” in the context of a
    discussion with Daughter about Wright seeking custody that
    ultimately led to Daughter’s disclosure.
    ¶19 Wright’s claim that counsel’s investigation of the mistake
    defense was deficient therefore amounts merely to speculation
    about what more counsel might have done. Furthermore, his use
    of the available information to pursue such a defense otherwise
    appears appropriate. As a result, Wright’s claim that counsel was
    ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the mistake defense
    is unpersuasive.
    ¶20 Finally, Wright asserts that the mistake defense was
    strategically “inferior” to the fabrication defense “because it is
    incomplete: It explained how [Daughter] could manufacture false
    allegations of abuse, but not why she would.” Wright’s attack on
    trial counsel’s strategic decision at this stage in the proceeding,
    however, is made with the benefit of hindsight. Even if Wright’s
    proposed approach to his defense might actually have amounted
    to a better strategy than the one his counsel chose, we will not
    conclude that trial counsel was ineffective unless “there is a lack of
    any conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions,” State v. King,
    
    2012 UT App 203
    , ¶ 14, 
    283 P.3d 980
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). See Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 690
    (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and
    facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”);
    State v. Graham, 
    2013 UT App 72
    , ¶ 15, 
    299 P.3d 644
     (explaining that
    once counsel has investigated the underlying facts, strategic
    decisions regarding those facts cannot be deemed deficient except
    where there is no reasonable basis for them). In reviewing a claim
    of ineffective assistance,
    20090643‐CA                      12                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    “judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
    highly deferential” because “it is all too easy for a
    court, examining counsel’s [performance] after it has
    proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act
    or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Therefore,
    the court must “eliminate the distorting effects of
    hindsight . . . and . . . evaluate the conduct from
    counsel’s perspective at the time.”
    Menzies v. Galetka, 
    2006 UT 81
    , ¶ 89, 
    150 P.3d 480
     (alteration and
    omissions in original) (quoting Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 689
    ).
    Consequently, a reviewing court “will not second‐guess trial
    counsel’s legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those
    choices might appear in retrospect.” State v. Tennyson, 
    850 P.2d 461
    ,
    465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 689
    ).
    ¶21 The district court’s findings on this subject, which Wright
    does not challenge, demonstrate that there were legitimate bases
    for counsel’s decision to rely on a mistake defense at trial. The
    court explained that although at least one available witness had
    information with which counsel could have formulated a
    fabrication defense, “the theory that [Daughter] was induced [by
    Mother] to lie or decide on her own to falsify the allegations in
    order to prevent her father from obtaining custody is at odds with
    the evidence of [Daughter’s] disclosure to her cousin” in July 2008,
    in which she urged the cousin not to tell anyone else, and with
    Mother’s failing to “suspect[] abuse, allow[ing Daughter] to go on
    trips to visit [Wright] unsupervised, and believ[ing Wright] to be
    a good and loving father.” Rather, the court reasoned, counsel
    judged that a mistake defense would be more persuasive to jurors,
    who would want an explanation for “how a child who came across
    as credible and intelligent would make up allegations against her
    father.” The court concluded that, given the totality of the available
    evidence, counsel’s decision to pursue a mistake defense rather
    than a fabrication defense was a “reasonable trial strategy.”
    ¶22 We conclude that the district court’s conclusion was
    supported by the evidence. The district court found that trial
    20090643‐CA                      13                
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    State v. Wright
    counsel interviewed all but one of the available defense witnesses
    and was aware of the information to which each witness was
    prepared to testify. From this available information, counsel elected
    to pursue a mistake defense rather than a fabrication defense.
    While a fabrication defense appears viable, the exercise of
    professional judgment in choosing one approach over another is an
    endeavor that often involves a complex weighing of benefits and
    risks, and the decision counsel made in this instance amounted to
    a reasonable trial strategy given the totality of the evidence.
    Because there was a “conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s
    action,” State v. King, 
    2010 UT App 396
    , ¶ 31, 
    248 P.3d 984
     (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted), we “will not second‐guess”
    his decision, see Tennyson, 
    850 P.2d at 465
    .
    B. Counsel’s Decision Not To Call Additional Witnesses or Present
    Documentary Evidence Falls Within the Scope of Legitimate Trial
    Strategy.
    ¶23 Wright next contends that trial counsel had no legitimate
    strategic reason for not calling additional defense witnesses or
    presenting certain photographs, videos, and phone (audio and text)
    messages that documented his and Daughter’s loving and
    appropriate relationship. At the rule 23B hearing, the trial court
    concluded that counsel did not perform deficiently in choosing not
    to call certain additional defense witnesses because, although those
    witnesses appeared to be credible, they were on balance unlikely
    to have added substantively to the defense. For example, the court
    found that if Wright’s brother had been called at trial, his testimony
    would have been much the same as that of Wright’s mother and
    sister. Yet calling him posed some risk because he “was ambivalent
    about being a witness in light of his divided feelings” for Daughter,
    his niece, and Wright, his brother. Wright’s aunt may have “added
    some information” about Daughter and Wright’s relationship, but
    she was so focused on defending the family’s practice of physically
    showing affection (specifically through back scratching) that she
    became “non‐responsive to questions and seemingly very
    defensive” as soon as this issue was raised. A third witness offered
    information that was largely inadmissible.
    20090643‐CA                      14                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    ¶24 With respect to the documentary evidence, the court
    concluded that counsel acted reasonably in not presenting
    photographs, videos, and phone messages from Daughter,
    provided to him by Wright and his family, which Wright contends
    showed that Daughter was happy and loving with him. The court
    found that counsel had explained that most of the photographs
    were of Daughter “smiling” “in the course of some fun or happy
    event” with Wright. Counsel did not want to admit too many of
    these photographs because he believed that the jury found
    Daughter to be both credible and compelling and was concerned
    that “the jury would look at the cute photos of [Daughter] in the
    jury room” and be “remind[ed of] . . . how much they believed
    her.” Furthermore, many of the photographs were of Daughter’s
    visit with Wright in Las Vegas after the abuse had stopped. And
    there was no dispute that Daughter had positive interactions with
    Wright after he moved to Las Vegas and the abuse stopped.
    Daughter even testified at trial that she “ha[d] a pretty good time
    visiting [Wright] in Vegas.”
    ¶25 Counsel omitted the remaining documentary evidence for
    similar reasons. The court found that the videos and phone
    messages showing Wright and Daughter interacting positively did
    “not carry much weight” because Daughter herself had testified
    that she loved Wright and that they usually did fun activities
    together. The court also noted that counsel was reluctant to use a
    video “where [Wright] said, ‘Tell me you love me’” to Daughter
    because he thought it “could be perceived as creepy by the jury”
    when viewed in the context of the abuse allegations. Wright has not
    challenged these findings. Therefore, we accept the facts as the
    district court found them. See State v. Bredehoft, 
    966 P.2d 285
    , 289
    (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
    ¶26 These facts support the district court’s conclusion that trial
    counsel’s decision to exclude the documentary evidence did not
    amount to ineffective representation. For example, trial counsel
    determined that a fabrication defense would be unlikely to be
    successful because, among other things, it was “at odds with the
    evidence of [Daughter’s] disclosure to her cousin. . . . [and] urg[ing]
    20090643‐CA                       15                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    her cousin not to tell anyone.” Counsel therefore decided to present
    a defense that Daughter had mistaken innocent touching and
    manifestations of affection as sexual and inappropriate—a
    misperception fueled by her growing relationship with Mother’s
    fiancé and exposure to age‐inappropriate media. Counsel’s
    decisions about which witnesses to call and the scope of the
    testimony he sought from them were thus intended to be consistent
    with a mistake defense. Counsel’s decision not to use the
    photograph and video exhibits of Daughter was based on a similar
    rationale: counsel judged Daughter’s testimony to be “very
    compelling” and “[h]e didn’t want to inject her into the jury room
    . . . because the jury would look at the cute photos of [Daughter] . . .
    and the photos would remind them how much they believed her.”
    Further, multiple photographs of Daughter enjoying the time she
    spent with Wright might undermine his theory that Daughter was
    simply mistaken or confused about the abuse, while the video
    evidence could cause the jury to view Wright’s relationship with
    Daughter as “creepy.” The court concluded that these exhibits had
    “limited evidentiary value” in that they “were not exculpatory
    because they “did not establish that the abuse did not occur” but
    instead “were, at best[,] cumulative of other exhibits and testimony
    that showed that [Wright] and [Daughter] appeared to have a
    loving and affectionate relationship” and, at worst, could be
    perceived negatively by the jury, as counsel feared. Counsel’s other
    decisions regarding which evidence to present were also based on
    his concern that Daughter’s credibility not be inadvertently
    enhanced by evidence that was of only limited value to the
    defense.3 Therefore, the court’s conclusion that counsel had a
    plausible strategic basis for declining to call additional defense
    witnesses or to introduce the additional documentary evidence
    3. For instance, the court concluded that counsel had a “legitimate
    strategy” in “not want[ing] to dwell on the back‐scratching”
    because although it served to corroborate Wright’s description of
    his family members as physically affectionate with one another, it
    could also raise questions about their understandings of
    appropriate boundaries.
    20090643‐CA                       16                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    Wright provided appears to be well founded. When there is a
    conceivable trial strategy for counsel’s decision, his performance is
    not deficient. State v. King, 
    2012 UT App 203
    , ¶ 14, 
    283 P.3d 980
    .
    C. Counsel Was Not Deficient in Limiting the Use of Wright’s
    Mother’s and Sister’s Testimonies.
    ¶27 Finally, Wright contends that counsel was ineffective for
    failing to fully utilize the defense witnesses on direct examination.
    Specifically, he asserts that counsel failed to question his mother
    and sister about their knowledge of information that could rebut
    the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies. For example, Wright
    contends that his mother and sister could have countered
    Daughter’s testimony that she did not love her dad and was scared
    during the time the abuse was occurring with specific examples of
    instances when Wright and Daughter demonstrated love and
    affection toward one another. He further claims that his mother
    and sister would have offered testimony to show that Daughter
    was visibly distressed during a visit with Wright in August 2008,
    which was very close in time to her disclosure to Mother. Wright
    explains that Daughter’s visit was immediately preceded by a
    vacation with Mother and her fiancé, during which Mother insisted
    that Daughter call the fiancé, “Dad.” Wright’s sister could also
    have testified that Daughter had disclosed during the visit that
    Mother had told her that Wright was trying to get custody so as to
    take her away from Mother. According to Wright, testimony about
    the circumstances surrounding that visit with Daughter would
    have demonstrated Daughter’s “motive to misinterpret innocent
    touches as abuse” because she was confused about how her
    relationships with Wright and Mother’s fiancé could co‐exist and
    she was worried that Wright might take her away from Mother.
    Wright further contends that the evidence could have shown that
    Mother had “a motive to encourage [Daughter] to allege abuse” to
    ensure that Wright would not receive custody of Daughter.
    ¶28 The district court determined, however, that trial counsel
    knew that Wright’s mother and sister were prepared to testify to
    these things but that this “additional testimony would not have
    20090643‐CA                      17               
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    advanced [trial counsel]’s theory of the case,” which was mistake.
    The court reiterated that pursuing a mistake defense was a
    reasonable trial strategy that “the Court must sanction . . . , even if
    it appears flawed in retrospect.” Wright has not challenged the
    district court’s finding that counsel was aware that this testimony
    was available. And because counsel knew about this information
    but elected not to elicit it at trial based on his judgment that it
    would not further the mistake defense, Wright has failed to
    overcome the presumption that counsel’s performance “fell below
    an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment” that
    would render his performance ineffective. See State v. Litherland,
    
    2000 UT 76
    , ¶ 19, 
    12 P.3d 92
     (explaining that in order for a
    defendant to show that counsel performed inadequately, a
    defendant must “rebut the strong presumption that under the
    circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound
    trial strategy” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    ¶29 The district court, however, did criticize one decision that
    trial counsel made regarding the scope of Wright’s sister’s
    testimony. As discussed above, the sister was prepared to testify
    that, in August 2008,4 Daughter told her and Wright’s mother about
    a conversation in which Mother had told Daughter that Wright was
    trying to get custody of her and take her away from Mother.
    Apparently based on his decision to pursue a defense of mistake
    rather than fabrication, counsel did not present this testimony. The
    court concluded that “[t]here was no legitimate trial strategy that
    would have allowed [counsel] to fail to put on this evidence.” This
    conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the court’s earlier
    determinations that the underlying decision not to pursue a
    fabrication defense was a legitimate strategic approach and that
    counsel was not deficient in failing to elicit this very testimony
    4. In its findings, the court stated that this disclosure occurred in
    August 2010. Based on other portions of the record, it appears that
    the conversation must have occurred in 2008. We therefore treat the
    2010 date as a typographical error.
    20090643‐CA                       18                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    from Wright’s sister because it would not have supported the
    mistake defense counsel chose.
    ¶30 After carefully reviewing the district court’s entire decision
    regarding counsel’s trial performance, we have concluded that the
    apparent inconsistency results from the format of the court’s
    decision. When we remanded for a rule 23B hearing, we asked the
    district court to make findings and conclusions about counsel’s
    decisions regarding three specific categories of evidence:
    documentary exhibits, uncalled defense witnesses, and utilized
    defense witnesses. The court set up its written findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in this same arrangement. An overarching issue,
    however, in both the motion to remand and the arguments made
    at the rule 23B hearing was whether trial counsel adequately
    investigated the fabrication defense before he elected to pursue a
    mistake defense. As a result, the court made determinations in the
    context of each category of evidence about counsel’s investigation
    of the fabrication defense and his decision to instead defend on the
    basis of mistake. In all but this one instance regarding the sister’s
    testimony about Wright seeking custody, the court determined that
    counsel had a legitimate strategic reason for his decision to use
    only the evidence supporting a mistake defense. When the court
    evaluated counsel’s decisions regarding the sister’s testimony, it
    again stated that “counsel’s strategy of not maligning [Mother] and
    to try to present [Daughter] as confused was a legitimate strategy.”
    Yet it then went on to say that counsel was deficient for precluding
    sister’s testimony about Daughter’s statement because “this
    evidence could have provided a basis to believe that [Daughter]
    and/or [Mother] had a motive to falsify the allegations.”
    ¶31 The court appeared to be stating that in this category of
    evidence—the use of Wright’s mother’s and sister’s
    testimonies—there was some factual basis for a fabrication defense.
    The court went on to conclude, however, that when viewed in the
    context of the evidence as a whole, a fabrication defense still would
    have been unlikely to succeed because even if the jury believed the
    sister’s testimony, an event the court deemed unlikely, there was
    a dearth of other evidence to corroborate a claim that the abuse
    20090643‐CA                      19               
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    allegations had been fabricated. This assessment of the relative
    strength of the fabrication defense thus seems consistent with the
    court’s earlier statement that “[a]lthough the testimony offered by
    . . . [Wright’s sister] may have been material to a jury, counsel’s
    strategy . . . to try to present [Daughter] as confused was a
    legitimate strategy.”
    ¶32 As previously discussed, we agree that the district court’s
    uncontested findings regarding the substance and content of
    available witness testimony and documentary evidence support a
    conclusion that it was reasonable trial strategy for trial counsel to
    pursue a defense of mistake rather than fabrication. And based on
    our view of the totality of the evidence and the court’s decision as
    a whole, we do not see the court’s isolated criticism of trial
    counsel’s performance to undermine its overarching decision that
    counsel did not perform deficiently in deciding on a defense
    strategy, even when the potential value of Wright’s sister’s
    testimony is taken into account. See State v. Bredehoft, 
    966 P.2d 285
    ,
    289 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (“In ruling on an ineffective assistance
    claim following a Rule 23B hearing, [appellate courts] defer to the
    trial court’s findings of fact, but review its legal conclusions for
    correctness.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Because Wright has not demonstrated that counsel’s performance
    in choosing a strategic approach to the defense was deficient, his
    ineffective assistance claim regarding counsel’s use of his mother’s
    and sister’s testimonies must also fail.
    ¶33 In summary, we agree with the district court’s conclusions
    that trial counsel’s investigation provided him with sufficient
    information about available witnesses and exhibits to allow him to
    make an informed decision about whether to pursue a fabrication
    defense or a mistake defense at trial. Counsel had a legitimate basis
    for choosing the mistake defense and making decisions about what
    evidence to present. Because his decisions not to present the
    documentary exhibits or the testimony of Wright’s brother, aunt,
    and friend and to limit the scope of the testimony of Wright’s
    mother and sister were based on this strategic decision and tactical
    considerations about credibility and effectiveness of particular
    20090643‐CA                      20                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    evidence, they did not amount to deficient performance.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in
    determining that counsel provided effective assistance in
    investigating possible defenses and defending Wright at trial.
    II. Detective Faulkner’s Testimony
    ¶34 Wright next challenges Detective Faulkner’s testimony
    regarding the prevalence of delayed reporting of sexual abuse.
    Wright’s challenge involves two statements: (1) Detective
    Faulkner’s response, “No. No.” when the State asked, “Is it
    uncommon for you to have cases involving a disclosure that comes
    years after an initial event of touching?” and (2) Detective
    Faulkner’s statement, in response to the State’s inquiry about how
    many of the cases she had investigated involved a significant delay
    in reporting, that “at least a third of my cases . . . are victims where
    they have either become 18 and are [o]lder or they’ve endured the
    abuse living with the suspect without telling anyone for years.”
    ¶35 Utah courts have recognized that “‘[d]elayed discovery and
    reporting are common in [child sexual abuse] cases.’” State v. Bair,
    
    2012 UT App 106
    , ¶ 47, 
    275 P.3d 1050
     (alterations in original)
    (quoting State v. Hoyt, 
    806 P.2d 204
    , 209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). In
    Bair, for example, a detective testified that “‘[b]ased on the
    probably hundreds of [abuse] cases [he has] investigated, it’s not
    uncommon for a victim not to disclose initially.’” 
    Id. ¶ 7
     (alterations
    in original). The defendant sought reversal on appeal because such
    testimony “invaded the province of the jury” to assess credibility.
    
    Id. ¶ 44
    . We observed that “[s]imply noting that abuse victims often
    delay reporting did not” vouch for the victim’s veracity because
    that testimony reflected “a fact already recognized by Utah courts.”
    
    Id. ¶ 47
    . As in Bair, Detective Faulkner’s negative response to the
    question about whether it was uncommon to have cases where the
    abuse went unreported for a period of time simply relayed a
    common fact to the jury and did not convey any information about
    how it should view the testimony or other evidence in the case.
    20090643‐CA                       21                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    ¶36 Detective Faulkner’s testimony, however, went a step
    beyond recognition of the general principle that delayed reporting
    is common when she reported that one‐third of the “[h]undreds”
    of “child sex abuse” cases that she has investigated over five years
    involved delayed reporting of the abuse. According to Wright, this
    kind of quasi‐statistical information falls within the realm of
    “knowledge [that] is not within the ken of the average bystander,”
    State v. Rothlisberger, 
    2006 UT 49
    , ¶ 34, 
    147 P.3d 1176
    , and is
    therefore governed by evidence rules dealing with expert
    testimony, 
    id. ¶¶ 11
    –12 (“Expert testimony, which is treated under
    rule 702 [of the Utah Rules of Evidence], is opinion or fact
    testimony based on scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized
    knowledge” and is subject to “various qualification and advance
    disclosure requirements.”). Wright further contends that this quasi‐
    statistical information “encouraged the jury ‘to focus upon a
    seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to analyze
    the evidence before it and decide where the truth lies.’” (Quoting
    State v. Rammel, 
    721 P.2d 498
    , 501 (Utah 1986).) The State counters
    that even if Detective Faulkner’s testimony regarding the
    percentage of her cases that involved delayed reporting was
    inadmissible, its admission did not prejudice Wright’s case and
    thus was harmless error not requiring reversal. See generally State
    v. Otterson, 
    2010 UT App 388
    , ¶ 11, 
    246 P.3d 168
     (“Utah appellate
    courts have long required a showing of harm to warrant reversal
    in the face of an erroneous evidentiary ruling.” (citing State v. Kohl,
    
    2000 UT 35
    , ¶ 17, 
    999 P.2d 7
    ; State v. White, 
    880 P.2d 18
    , 21 (Utah Ct.
    App. 1994))).
    ¶37 We agree with the State. Even assuming for purposes of
    appeal that Detective Faulkner’s testimony about the percentage of
    cases involving delayed reporting was inadmissible, Wright has
    not demonstrated any harm that resulted from its admission.
    Wright argues that because the jury acquitted him of one charge of
    aggravated child sexual abuse, it likely would have acquitted him
    of the second charge had it not heard Detective Faulkner’s
    testimony. Wright does not, however, contend that Detective
    Faulkner lacked the knowledge or experience to offer such
    information, even conceding that she had investigated
    20090643‐CA                       22                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    “[h]undreds” of sexual abuse cases. Nor does he contest the
    accuracy of her statement. Indeed, an incidence of “one‐third”
    appears to be generally consistent with her testimony that delayed
    reporting is not uncommon—testimony that the jury could
    properly hear—and the increment of precision it adds to the more
    general statement seems too small to undermine the defense in any
    material way.5 Without any showing that the admission of
    Detective Faulkner’s statement was likely to have unfairly affected
    the outcome of the proceedings, we will not disturb the jury’s
    verdict, even if the testimony was erroneously admitted.
    III. Prosecutor’s Closing Remarks
    ¶38 Finally, Wright contends that the State engaged in
    prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument. Specifically,
    Wright takes issue with the prosecutor’s response to trial counsel’s
    contention that Daughter transmuted an innocent touch into an
    inappropriate one to help her justify referring to Mother’s fiancé as
    “Dad” and to eliminate Wright from her life. Wright’s counsel
    argued that Daughter “has gotten exactly what she wants. She is
    with the family she wants to be with[ and s]he doesn’t have to see
    [Wright].” The prosecutor responded directly to this argument in
    rebuttal:
    [T]here is absolutely no reason not to believe
    [Daughter], who, as I told you before gave you every
    single piece of evidence that you need for the
    elements of this crime. [Daughter] doesn’t want to
    hurt her father. She loved him even after he did
    horrible things to her. She just wants him to stop
    hurting her. You have the power to make that stop.
    5. The statement that only one‐third of the cases involved delayed
    reporting, a relatively low percentage, could even be seen as
    somewhat helpful to the defense because it eliminated any
    speculation that “not uncommon” might be a significantly greater
    proportion.
    20090643‐CA                      23               
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    Wright argues that these remarks were improper because they
    “divert[ed] the jury from its duty to decide the case on the
    evidence.” See State v. Todd, 
    2007 UT App 349
    , ¶ 18, 
    173 P.3d 170
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). He further
    contends that the final statement is the most damaging because it
    was “‘designed to appeal to the jurors’ sentiments by charging the
    jury to convict [Wright] in order to ensure [Daughter’s] safety.’”
    (First alteration in original.) (Quoting State v. Tosh, 
    91 P.3d 1204
    ,
    1212 (Kan. 2004).) The State counters that Wright opened the door
    to such remarks by attributing a specific motive to Daughter that
    provoked what amounted to a “fair reply” from the prosecutor. See
    United States v. Schwartz, 
    655 F.2d 140
    , 142 (8th Cir. 1982) (“It is well
    settled that prejudicial error does not result from the improper
    remarks made during closing argument when such remarks were
    provoked by the opposing counsel. When the defense counsel
    chose to open the door on the issue . . . , the counteracting
    statement made by the prosecutor fell within the doctrine of fair
    reply.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Daniels, 
    617 F.2d 146
    , 150
    (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
    ¶39 “Generally speaking, in argument to the jury, counsel for
    each side has considerable latitude and may discuss fully from
    their viewpoints the evidence and the inferences and deductions
    arising therefrom.” State v. Tillman, 
    750 P.2d 546
    , 560 (Utah 1987).
    However, “[a] prosecutor’s actions and remarks constitute
    misconduct that merits reversal if the actions or remarks call to the
    attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified in
    considering in determining their verdict and, under the
    circumstances of the particular case, the error is substantial and
    prejudicial . . . .” 
    Id. at 555
    . “In determining whether a given
    statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must
    be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.”
    State v. Longshaw, 
    961 P.2d 925
    , 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶40 We agree with the State that the first four sentences of the
    prosecutor’s response fall within the fair reply doctrine. Wright
    encouraged the jury to view the facts and inferences from the
    20090643‐CA                        24                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    evidence in a manner that supported his theory that Daughter was
    mistaken about how Wright had touched her, and in closing
    suggested that her mistake had an aspect of calculation to it in that
    it furthered her goal of getting Wright out of her life so she could
    be “with the family she wants to be with.” In response, the State
    was entitled to argue from the evidence at trial that Daughter had
    a different motivation for the accusations than simply eliminating
    Wright from her life, that is, to protect herself from abuse.
    ¶41 We agree with Wright, however, that the prosecutor’s final
    statement—“You have the power to make that [(the abuse)]
    stop.”—is beyond the scope of a fair reply. It does not rebut any
    statements made by Wright; instead, the statement calls on the jury
    to assume the responsibility of ensuring Daughter’s safety. Such a
    statement appeals to the jurors’ emotions by contending that the
    jury has a duty to protect the alleged victim—to become her
    partisan—which diverts their attention from their legal duty to
    impartially apply the law to the facts in order to determine if
    Wright had committed the crimes of aggravated sexual abuse of a
    child for which he was on trial. See generally Tosh, 91 P.3d at 1212
    (noting that asking the jury to protect the victim of sexual abuse
    “fell outside the wide latitude afforded a prosecutor” because such
    comments are “designed solely to inflame the passions of the jurors
    and divert their attention” from the evidence that is intended to
    help them decide guilt or innocence). Yet, despite the impropriety
    of the prosecutor’s remark, it does not require reversal. As the Utah
    Supreme Court stated in State v. Ross, 
    2007 UT 89
    , 
    174 P.3d 628
    ,
    The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are
    so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal
    case is, did the remarks call to the attention of the
    jurors matters which they would not be justified in
    considering in determining their verdict, and were
    they, under the circumstances of the particular case,
    probably influenced by those remarks.
    . . . . If prosecutorial misconduct is established, the
    State must show that the error was harmless beyond
    a reasonable doubt.
    20090643‐CA                      25               
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    
    Id. ¶ 54
     (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (setting
    forth this standard in context of plain error review).6
    6. Whether the defendant or the State bears the burden of showing
    harm and what the standard of proof is if the burden shifts to the
    State (whether harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or some lesser
    standard) are questions that we do not resolve because the issue
    has not been briefed in a meaningful way and the questions are not
    readily resolvable under our current precedent. The Utah Supreme
    Court in State v. Ross, 
    2007 UT 89
    , 
    174 P.3d 628
    , sets forth the
    general burden‐shifting principle in a case that involves an instance
    of prosecutorial misconduct that did not implicate the defendant’s
    fundamental constitutional rights. But without disavowing Ross, a
    recent case, State v. Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , 
    299 P.3d 892
    , seems to call
    into question the breadth of Ross’s application. Whereas in Ross, the
    prosecutor’s misconduct involved a closing argument that
    distorted the evidence related to the question of whether the
    defendant’s two charges were part of a single criminal episode,
    
    2007 UT 89
    , ¶ 56, in Maestas, the prosecutor had commented on the
    defendant’s right to remain silent at trial, a significantly deeper
    intrusion on the defendant’s fundamental rights, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 161.
    And in Maestas, the supreme court seemed to suggest that the
    requirement that the state show that the prosecutorial misconduct
    was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt applied only when the
    error amounted to the infringement of a defendant’s fundamental
    rights: “‘[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if
    the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that
    the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
    
    Id. ¶ 162
     (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting State v.
    Tillman, 
    750 P.2d 546
    , 555 (Utah 1987), a case also involving a
    prosecutor’s remark on the defendant’s choice to remain silent).
    Nor does our own precedent simplify the issue. In State v.
    King, 
    2010 UT App 396
    , 
    248 P.3d 984
    , we required the defendant to
    shoulder the burden of establishing prejudice from a prosecutor’s
    misconduct because the defendant had not objected to the
    prosecutor’s remarks at trial, even though Ross itself involved a
    similar preservation problem. 
    Id. ¶ 26
    . In State v. Koslov, 2012 UT
    (continued...)
    20090643‐CA                      26                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    ¶42 “In reviewing whether the jury was influenced by the
    [prosecutor’s] statement, we consider the circumstances of the case
    as a whole.” State v. Koslov, 
    2012 UT App 114
    , ¶ 43, 
    276 P.3d 1207
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Wright’s claim on
    appeal that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct is
    based on an argument that all five of the contested statements were
    improper. Yet, we have concluded that all but one statement
    amounted to a fair reply to defense counsel’s own remarks. The
    prosecutor’s improper remark was thus only a single sentence
    during a closing argument and rebuttal that fills fifteen transcript
    pages of otherwise appropriate remarks. But see Tosh, 91 P.3d at
    1210–13 (concluding that the prosecutor’s plea to the jury to protect
    the victim from further sexual abuse by her father was “intentional
    and not done in good faith” when the closing statement also
    included a suggestion that the defendant would essentially “‘rape
    [the victim] again’” if his version of the events were believed and
    a statement that implied that the burden of proof had shifted to the
    defendant). And although the misconduct occurred at the close of
    6. (...continued)
    App 114, 
    276 P.3d 1207
    , on the other hand, we acknowledged the
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard discussed in Ross
    and assumed for purposes of appeal that the burden shifted even
    where the defendant did not preserve the issue in the trial court.
    
    2012 UT App 114
    , ¶ 42 n.9.
    In our decision here, in deference to the language of Ross, we
    take Koslov’s approach, assuming that the harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt standard applies, even though the challenge to
    the error was unpreserved and does not involve a violation of a
    fundamental constitutional right, on the basis that “if the State can
    show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
    Defendant would be unable to establish that the error was
    prejudicial” enough to make out a showing of plain error or
    ineffective assistance of counsel, in any event. 
    Id.
     (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). The questions of when burden‐
    shifting occurs in a prosecutorial misconduct case and the
    applicable standard for showing harmlessness if it does, however,
    remain unsettled and should be addressed in an appropriate case.
    20090643‐CA                       27                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    the State’s rebuttal, when Wright had no opportunity to respond,
    the court immediately reminded the jury of the importance of the
    jury instructions, particularly emphasizing the fact that “lawyers
    are advocates and they do represent their clients. And they are
    trying to persuade you of their views of the case, what they
    advocate. What they tell you, as was just done in opening and
    closing, is not evidence.” The court also reiterated that its other
    instructions, which included an admonition that the jurors not
    allow themselves “to be influenced by sentiment, conjecture,
    sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling,” are “all
    important” and should be followed by the jury. In the absence of
    any circumstances suggesting otherwise, courts presume that the
    jury follows such instructions. State v. Menzies, 
    889 P.2d 393
    , 401
    (Utah 1994). See also, e.g., Carrasco v. Horel, No. C 07‐5666 MMC
    (PR), 
    2011 WL 6181447
    , at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2011) (concluding
    that although the prosecutor’s statement that the jury has “‘to stand
    up to these gangs’” “urged the jury to convict for reasons unrelated
    to [the defendant]’s guilt or innocence,” it was not prejudicial
    because it was an isolated remark in a “lengthy and otherwise
    proper closing argument,” the jury was instructed not to consider
    the attorneys’ arguments as evidence, and the other evidence of the
    defendant’s guilt was strong); People v. Vigil, No. C037810, 
    2003 WL 1985221
    , at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2003) (concluding that the
    defendant was not prejudiced by prosecutor’s plea for the jurors to
    “‘protect [the victim] in your verdicts. . . . [a]nd . . . tell [defendant]
    it’s over. You are not going to hurt this child anymore’” because the
    jury was instructed to base its rulings on the facts, not “‘sentiment,
    conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public
    feeling’” (first and last alteration in original)).
    ¶43 Accordingly, we are persuaded that the prosecutor’s
    isolated statement to the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Wright’s prosecutorial misconduct claim therefore fails.
    IV. Cumulative Error
    ¶44 Wright contends that even if the errors by the court and
    counsel were individually harmless, they cumulatively require
    reversal of his conviction. “Under the cumulative error doctrine,
    20090643‐CA                         28                 
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    [appellate courts] will reverse only if the cumulative effect of the
    several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was
    had.” State v. Dunn, 
    850 P.2d 1201
    , 1229 (Utah 1993) (omission in
    original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In
    assessing a claim of cumulative error, we consider all the identified
    errors, as well as any errors we assume may have occurred.” 
    Id.
     But
    “[i]f the claims are found on appeal to not constitute error, or the
    errors are found to be so minor as to result in no harm, the doctrine
    will not be applied.” State v. Gonzales, 
    2005 UT 72
    , ¶ 74, 
    125 P.3d 878
     (declining to apply the cumulative error doctrine where the
    claims on appeal did not constitute error or were harmless); State
    v. Kohl, 
    2000 UT 35
    , ¶ 25, 
    999 P.2d 7
     (determining that there was no
    cumulative error where the defendant’s claims either did not
    amount to error or were so minor that they did not result in harm);
    see also State v. Colwell, 
    2000 UT 8
    , ¶ 44, 
    994 P.2d 177
     (stating that
    because it had determined that all of the claimed errors had been
    properly cured at trial and were therefore not harmful to the
    defense, “the cumulative errors d[id] not undermine [the court’s]
    confidence that the defendant [had] received a fair trial”).
    ¶45 We have rejected each of Wright’s numerous claims of error,
    concluding that either no error occurred or any error was harmless.
    Our assessment does not change when we view the one error and
    the one presumed error (the detective’s anecdotal evidence of the
    incidence of late reporting and the prosecutor’s statement on
    rebuttal) in conjunction with one another. The errors were
    relatively minor in the context of the trial as a whole and do not
    take on significance when considered together. Accordingly, we do
    not find Wright’s cumulative error argument persuasive.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶46 The district court correctly determined that Wright did not
    receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney
    legitimately decided to pursue a mistake defense rather than one
    based on fabrication and commensurately limited the evidence and
    witnesses he presented. Although we concluded that the
    prosecutor’s final remark in closing argument was error and we
    20090643‐CA                      29                
    2013 UT App 142
    State v. Wright
    assumed, without deciding, that the admission of Detective
    Faulkner’s testimony on the percentage of cases which involved
    delayed reporting was error, neither was sufficiently prejudicial to
    require reversal, whether considered alone or together.
    Accordingly, we affirm Wright’s conviction for aggravated sexual
    abuse of a child.
    20090643‐CA                     30               
    2013 UT App 142