In re O.F. and L.F. (P.F. v. State) ( 2013 )


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    2013 UT App 18
    _________________________________________________________
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF O.F. AND L.F.,
    PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE
    ____________
    P.F.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee.
    Per Curiam Decision
    No. 20120953‐CA
    Filed January 25, 2013
    Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Kimberly K. Hornak
    No. 1036945
    Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellant
    John E. Swallow and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
    Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
    Before JUDGES DAVIS, VOROS, and ROTH.
    PER CURIAM:
    ¶1     P.F. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights.
    He asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the
    juvenile court’s conclusions that he had abandoned his children
    and that he had made only token efforts to support or
    communicate with his children.
    In re O.F. and L.F.
    ¶2     “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to
    terminate a person’s parental rights] ‘the result must be against the
    clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with a firm
    and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’” In re B.R.,
    
    2007 UT 82
    , ¶ 12, 
    171 P.3d 435
     (citation omitted). We “review the
    juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous
    standard.” In re E.R., 
    2001 UT App 66
    , ¶ 11, 
    21 P.3d 680
    . A finding
    of fact is clearly erroneous only when, in light of the evidence
    supporting the finding, it is against the clear weight of the
    evidence. See 
    id.
     Further, we give the juvenile court a “‘wide
    latitude of discretion as to the judgments arrived at’ based upon
    not only the court’s opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but
    also based on the juvenile court judges’ ‘special training,
    experience and interest in this field.’” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    Finally, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the
    evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the
    evidence.” In re B.R., 
    2007 UT 82
    , ¶ 12.
    ¶3    The juvenile court found that there was sufficient evidence
    to demonstrate that Father had abandoned the children. The
    evidence supports such a determination. See Utah Code Ann.
    § 78A‐6‐507(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2012).
    In determining whether a parent or parents have
    abandoned a child, it is prima facie evidence of
    abandonment that the parent or parents:
    ...
    (b)    have failed to communicate with the
    child by mail, telephone, or otherwise for six
    months; [or]
    (c)    failed to have shown the normal
    interest of a natural parent, without just cause.
    Id. § 78A‐6‐508(1). In this case there is no question that Father failed
    to communicate with his children for over six months. Further, the
    evidence also demonstrates that Father failed to show the normal
    interest of a natural parent.
    20120953‐CA                        2                  
    2013 UT App 18
    In re O.F. and L.F.
    ¶4      Father testified that the last time he communicated with his
    children via telephone was in January of 2012. The termination trial
    took place on October 16, 2012. Thus, more than six months went
    by without any communication between Father and the children.
    Father complained that the foster parents cut off any
    communication with the children. However, he never explained
    how or when those attempts at communication occurred. Further,
    he never voiced any concerns to DCFS about his alleged inability
    to contact the children despite caseworkers’ repeated efforts to
    contact him. In fact, Father stopped communicating with DCFS in
    January of 2012, and did not communicate with DCFS again, with
    the exception of one call to inquire as to the time of a hearing that
    occurred shortly before the termination trial. Thus, from January
    of 2012 until the time of trial, Father made no effort to inquire as to
    his children’s well‐being. Further, during the children’s time in
    State custody, Father never sent them letters, cards, or gifts. Father
    never offered any reasonable explanation to explain this lack of
    contact and interest. These failures to inquire as to the well‐being
    of his children, to attempt to be part of their lives, or to express his
    concerns about his alleged inability to contact his children,
    demonstrate that he has failed to show the normal interest of a
    natural parent, without just cause. Accordingly, the evidence was
    sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination that Father
    abandoned the children.1
    ¶5     Affirmed.
    1. Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A‐6‐507, the finding of any
    single ground for termination is sufficient to warrant termination
    of parental rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A‐6‐507(1) (LexisNexis
    2012) (providing that the court may terminate all parental rights if
    it finds any one of the grounds listed); In re F.C., 
    2003 UT App 397
    ,
    ¶ 6, 
    81 P.3d 790
     (noting that any single ground is sufficient to
    terminate parental rights). Accordingly, there is no reason to
    review the other ground relied upon by the juvenile court to
    support the termination of Father’s parental rights.
    20120953‐CA                        3                  
    2013 UT App 18
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20120953-CA

Filed Date: 1/25/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2021