In re A.S. (F.V. v. State) , 2014 UT App 226 ( 2014 )


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    2014 UT App 226
    _________________________________________________________
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH , IN THE INTEREST OF A.S. AND I.V., PERSONS UNDER
    EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE .
    F.V.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF UTAH ,
    Appellee.
    Per Curiam Decision
    No. 20140338-CA
    Filed September 25, 2014
    Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
    The Honorable Jeffrey J. Noland
    No. 1048751
    Jason B. Richards, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
    Before Judges JAMES Z. DAVIS, STEPHEN L. ROTH , AND
    JOHN A. PEARCE.
    PER CURIAM:
    ¶1    F.V. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating
    her parental rights in A.S. and I.V. We affirm.
    ¶2     Mother asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
    support the termination of her parental rights, and that the juvenile
    court erred by terminating her reunification services. “[I]n order to
    overturn the juvenile court’s decision, the result must be against
    In re A.S. and I.V.
    the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with
    a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re
    B.R., 
    2007 UT 82
    , ¶ 12, 
    171 P.3d 435
     (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). We “review the juvenile court’s factual findings
    based upon the clearly erroneous standard.” In re E.R., 
    2001 UT App 66
    , ¶ 11, 
    21 P.3d 680
    . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
    when, in light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is against
    the clear weight of the evidence. See 
    id.
     Therefore, “[w]hen a
    foundation for the court’s decision exists in the evidence, an
    appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.”
    In re B.R., 
    2007 UT 82
    , ¶ 12.
    ¶3      The juvenile court determined that there were multiple
    grounds supporting the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
    Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-6-507, the finding of a single
    enumerated ground will support the termination of parental rights.
    See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012). Therefore, it is
    sufficient if the evidence supports any of the grounds for
    termination found by the juvenile court. In this case, the juvenile
    court determined that Mother is an unfit parent under Utah Code
    section 78A-6-507(1)(c). In determining whether a parent is unfit,
    the juvenile court shall consider the habitual or excessive use of
    controlled substances, or dangerous drugs, that renders the parent
    unable to care for a child. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-508(2)(c).
    ¶4      The record supports the juvenile court’s determination that
    Mother is an unfit parent. Mother has an extensive history of
    substance abuse. At the time of the termination trial, Mother had
    not successfully completed a substance abuse program to address
    her drug use. Mother was discharged from substance abuse
    programs after she missed long periods of treatment, or she simply
    stopped attending her treatment program. Mother was required to
    participate in drug testing, but she missed the majority of her drug
    tests, and she also continued to test positive for illicit drugs. Mother
    fails to demonstrate that the juvenile court erred by determining
    that she is an unfit parent. Because finding any single ground
    under Utah Code section 78A-6-507 is sufficient to terminate
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    In re A.S. and I.V.
    parental rights, we do not address Mother’s additional challenges
    to the alternative grounds supporting the termination of her
    parental rights.
    ¶5     Mother next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
    support the juvenile court’s determination that it was in the
    children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. If the
    juvenile court determines that there are sufficient grounds to
    terminate parental rights, in order to actually do so, the court must
    next find that the best interests and welfare of the child are served
    by terminating the parent’s parental rights. See In re R.A.J., 
    1999 UT App 329
    , ¶ 7, 
    991 P.2d 1118
    . Furthermore, “when a foundation for
    the [juvenile] court’s decision exists in the evidence, an appellate
    court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R.,
    
    2007 UT 82
    , ¶ 12.
    ¶6      In conducting the best interest analysis, the juvenile court
    determined that Mother has an extensive history of substance
    abuse, which renders her to be an unfit parent. The juvenile court
    found that A.S. has special therapeutic needs, which have resulted
    from Mother’s choices. These therapeutic needs necessitate that
    A.S. live in a structured, safe environment. In the children’s current
    foster placement, the children are loved, and they receive the
    structured, safe environment that they require. The children’s
    foster parents are committed to caring for the children’s needs.
    Mother fails to demonstrate that the juvenile court erred by
    determining it was in the children’s best interests to terminate her
    parental rights.
    ¶7     Mother next asserts that the juvenile court erred by
    terminating reunification services without making sufficient
    findings under Utah Code section 78A-6-314(2). Section 78A-6-
    314(2) provides that when reunification services were ordered, at
    the permanency hearing, the juvenile court shall determine
    whether the child may safely be returned to the custody of the
    parent. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314(2). A child may not be
    returned to a parent if the juvenile court finds, by a preponderance
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    2014 UT App 226
    In re A.S. and I.V.
    of the evidence, that return of the child to the parent would create
    a substantial risk of detriment to the minor’s physical or emotional
    well-being. See 
    id.
     § 78A-6-314(2)(b). Prima facie evidence that
    return of the minor to a parent would create a substantial risk of
    detriment to the child is established if the parent fails to comply
    with a child and family plan, in whole or part, or fails to meet the
    goals of a court approved child and family plan. See id. § 78A-6-
    314(2)(c). With regard to Mother’s assertion that the trial court
    failed to make explicit findings prior to terminating further
    reunification services, a trial court’s failure to make explicit
    findings supporting its decision does not, alone, warrant reversal
    so long as the basis for the trial court’s ruling is readily apparent
    from the record. See generally State v. Ruiz, 
    2012 UT 29
    , ¶ 24, 
    282 P.3d 998
    . Although the juvenile court did not make explicit
    findings pertaining to each element set forth in Utah Code section
    78A-6-314(2), it is readily apparent from the record that the juvenile
    court considered the appropriate statutory factors prior to
    terminating Mother’s reunification services.
    ¶8      Mother next asserts that the juvenile court erred by taking
    judicial notice of its earlier status adjudications. A trial court may
    take judicial notice on its own at any stage of a proceeding. See
    Utah R. Evid. P. 201(c). A trial court “must take judicial notice if a
    party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary
    information.” 
    Id.
     This court has previously determined that a
    juvenile court may rely upon previously adjudicated facts in child
    welfare proceedings. See In re J.B., 
    2002 UT App 267
    , ¶ 17, 
    53 P.3d 958
    . The record demonstrates that the Guardian ad Litem moved
    the juvenile court to take judicial notice of its prior findings and
    orders, and that the juvenile court did so. Mother fails to
    demonstrate that the juvenile court erred by taking judicial notice
    of its prior adjudicative facts.
    ¶9     Lastly, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred when it
    admitted the Division of Child and Family Services’s (DCFS) case
    logs as an exhibit. Specifically, Mother argues that DCFS’s activity
    logs contained hearsay statements or lacked adequate foundation.
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    In re A.S. and I.V.
    However, the record indicates that the juvenile court specifically
    acknowledged that portions of the activity logs may present
    evidentiary issues, such as hearsay. The juvenile court ruled that it
    would not consider any information contained in the logs unless
    such statements were corroborated by independent, reliable
    sources. Mother fails to demonstrate that the juvenile court erred
    by admitting DCFS’s activity logs.
    ¶10    Affirmed.
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    2014 UT App 226
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20140338-CA

Citation Numbers: 2014 UT App 226

Filed Date: 9/25/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2021