In re M.W. , 2016 UT App 217 ( 2016 )


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    2016 UT App 217
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF M.W.,
    A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
    M.W.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee.
    Memorandum Decision
    No. 20150359-CA
    Filed November 3, 2016
    Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Kimberly K. Hornak
    No. 1113251
    Monica Maio and Robert L. Donohoe, Attorneys
    for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and John J. Nielsen, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Memorandum
    Decision, in which JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH and JILL M.
    POHLMAN concurred.
    MORTENSEN, Judge:
    ¶1    M.W., a minor, challenges the juvenile court’s order
    adjudicating him delinquent for committing one count of
    sodomy on a child, an offense that would be a first degree felony
    if committed by an adult. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1
    (LexisNexis Supp. 2016). We affirm.
    In re M.W.
    ¶2      In the summer of 2013, A.B. (ten years old) and M.W.
    (thirteen years old) were playing soccer on a field near A.B.’s
    home. 1 When the ball left the field of play, A.B. went to get it.
    After A.B. picked up the ball, M.W. grabbed him and pulled him
    down a nearby alleyway. Once in the alley, M.W. pulled down
    A.B.’s pants, forced him onto the ground, and inserted his penis
    into A.B.’s anus for about fifteen seconds. Afterward, M.W. told
    A.B. that if he told anyone, M.W. would “rape [A.B.] harder.”
    A.B. ran home, but reported nothing to his father because he
    feared he would not be believed.
    ¶3     Before the assault, A.B. was a happy, well-adjusted boy
    inclined toward cuddling and giving hugs to his family, playing
    with friends, and often going to the nearby field to play soccer.
    But afterward, he was not the same. He started wetting his bed,
    complaining of anal pain, and withdrawing from family and
    friends. He seemed sad, thought that he could not “live any
    longer,” and expressed suicidal thoughts. Whenever A.B. saw
    M.W., A.B. would act paranoid. A.B. thought M.W. was looking
    in the windows of his home and feared that M.W. was going to
    come in and grab him at night.
    ¶4     In the spring of 2014, in the presence of one or more peers,
    A.B. accused M.W. of raping him. M.W. confronted the issue by
    going to A.B.’s home to speak with A.B.’s parents about the
    accusation. At the door of A.B.’s home, M.W. appeared very
    nervous with his arms crossed and one of his legs constantly
    shaking. M.W. told A.B.’s father that A.B. was accusing him of
    rape. A.B. also came to the door, was visibly upset, pointed his
    finger at M.W., and repeated that M.W. “pulled down his pants
    and stuck his wiener in [A.B.’s] butt.”
    1. On appeal from a delinquency adjudication, we recite the facts
    in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s decision. See In
    re J.F.S., 
    803 P.2d 1254
    , 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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    In re M.W.
    ¶5     The day after the front door confrontation, A.B.’s parents
    took him to Primary Children’s Medical Center where A.B. was
    examined by a doctor (Doctor) certified in child-abuse pediatrics,
    which focuses on diagnosing and treating victims of sexual
    abuse. The examination included a medical interview of A.B. “to
    hear about what happened to guide [Doctor’s] diagnosis and
    treatment.” Doctor asked A.B. the reason for the visit, and he
    responded that he “was raped.” When asked for more details,
    A.B. responded that it happened “[o]ne summer ago” and that a
    “kid named [M.W.]” “stuck his wiener in my butt.”
    ¶6     The State filed a petition accusing M.W. of sodomy on a
    child. The juvenile court held a bench trial at which five
    witnesses testified. A.B. gave his personal account of the rape
    and identified M.W. as the perpetrator. A.B.’s father testified that
    M.W. came to their front door and told him about A.B.’s
    allegation. Both A.B.’s father and A.B.’s mother related
    additional information about the confrontation at the front door,
    including A.B.’s statement that M.W. “raped me.” A detective
    who investigated the incident (Detective) testified that M.W. told
    her multiple times that A.B. had accused him of rape. M.W. does
    not appeal the admission of any of this testimony.
    ¶7    Additionally, Doctor testified concerning A.B.’s interview
    responses:
    Q. And as part of that medical history what did he
    tell you?
    A. Well, when I asked him that question he said, “I
    was raped.” That was his answer.
    Q. Did you ask him any questions about that
    answer?
    A. I did. I asked him when this had happened. And
    he said, “One summer ago.” And the meaning was
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    In re M.W.
    the summer of 2013. And I asked him who had
    done that. And he said, “A kid named [M.W.]”
    [M.W.’s counsel]: Objection, your Honor, hearsay.
    Motion to strike.
    The Court: Overruled. A doctor can rely upon out-
    of-court statements or inadmissible evidence in
    forming her opinion. Go ahead.
    ¶8     Doctor also opined that the changes in A.B.’s behavior,
    including bedwetting, mood changes, and the desire for self-
    harm, were consistent with a child who had been sexually
    abused. She confirmed that she did not find any physical
    evidence of abuse, but did not find this absence unusual given
    the time between the event and the exam.
    ¶9    M.W. did not testify at trial. However, the juvenile court
    allowed M.W. to play a recording of his interview with Detective
    wherein M.W. repeatedly denied A.B.’s accusation. In that
    recording the detective explained the story that A.B. had told:
    [Detective]: And he says that you grabbed him and
    took him into the alley next to the school and that
    you did rape him. And that’s what he’s telling me,
    and that’s what he’s telling his parents.
    ...
    Well, I just - - I’m just wondering why he’s telling
    me this.
    [M.W.]: I’m actually impressed by his ability to
    describe something that didn’t, you know.
    [Detective]: Because he’s, I guess he had an exam
    with the doctors. And also . . . it’s a forensic exam
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    In re M.W.
    that we ask for. And he told the doctor[2] the same
    thing that he’s told me.
    With Detective having just informed M.W. what A.B. had told
    her, it is clear that the “same thing” means that M.W. raped him.
    ¶10 The juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that
    M.W. had committed sodomy on a child and entered a
    disposition order. M.W. appeals, arguing that the juvenile court
    erred by admitting and relying on Doctor’s statement that A.B.
    told her that M.W. had raped him. We review the juvenile
    court’s ruling on evidence for abuse of discretion. We “will not
    reverse the [juvenile] court’s ruling[s] on evidentiary issues
    unless it is manifest that the [juvenile] court so abused its
    discretion that there is a likelihood that an injustice resulted.” In
    re G.C., 
    2008 UT App 270
    , ¶ 9, 
    191 P.3d 55
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    ¶11 M.W. further asserts that without Doctor’s testimony,
    there was insufficient evidence to find him delinquent. “When a
    challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is raised, ‘[w]e
    review the juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the
    clearly erroneous standard.’” In re J.C., 
    2016 UT App 10
    , ¶ 13, 
    366 P.3d 867
     (quoting In re S.O., 
    2005 UT App 393
    , ¶ 12, 
    122 P.3d 686
    ) (alteration in original). Under that standard, we will set
    aside the juvenile court’s decision only if the decision is against
    the clear weight of evidence or we form “a definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re S.L., 
    1999 UT App 390
    , ¶ 20, 
    995 P.2d 17
     (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). Because of the advantaged position of the juvenile
    court in assessing credibility and personalities, and also due to
    the juvenile court judges’ special training, experience, and
    2. It is unclear from the record whether the doctor referenced by
    Detective was Doctor or another medical professional.
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    In re M.W.
    interest in their field and devoted attention to cases within their
    jurisdiction, we defer to the juvenile court and afford it wide
    latitude. In re E.R., 
    2001 UT App 66
    , ¶ 11, 
    21 P.3d 680
    .
    ¶12 Even if we were to determine that the juvenile court erred
    in admitting the evidence, we will not disturb an adjudication if
    we conclude that the error was harmless. In re P.N., 
    2011 UT App 221
    , ¶ 5, 
    262 P.3d 429
     (citing State v. Ramsey, 
    782 P.2d 480
    ,
    485 (Utah 1989)). M.W.’s appeal fails because admission of the
    challenged evidence was harmless for two reasons.
    ¶13 First and foremost, M.W. offered essentially the same
    evidence himself. While claiming it was error for the juvenile
    court to allow Doctor to relate the person A.B. identified as the
    perpetrator, M.W. offered the recorded statement of Detective,
    which indicated that a doctor had told her that A.B. identified
    M.W. as the perpetrator. In other words, M.W. advances the
    argument that Doctor cannot testify as to the hearsay statement
    of A.B., yet in a different hearsay statement (a recording no less)
    of Detective, Detective can relate the hearsay statement of a
    doctor describing the same hearsay statement of A.B. The end
    result remains. M.W. put into evidence the same statement he
    now claims the juvenile court erroneously admitted elsewhere in
    the record.
    ¶14 Second, every other witness related the exact same
    information—that A.B. identified M.W. as the perpetrator. And
    M.W. himself provided the same information through other
    evidence. Therefore, the testimony of Doctor was merely
    cumulative and any error in its admission was harmless. See In re
    J.M., 2006 UT App 158U, para. 2 (“[E]ven if the statements were
    inadmissible hearsay, their admission was harmless because the
    evidence was cumulative.”).
    ¶15 Our determination that Doctor’s testimony was harmless
    also resolves the question of whether sufficient evidence existed
    outside Doctor’s testimony to support M.W.’s adjudication. The
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    In re M.W.
    testimony of Doctor disclosing that A.B. identified M.W. as the
    perpetrator was hardly the keystone of the State’s case. And
    because identical evidence from other witnesses identified M.W.
    as A.B.’s assailant, there was sufficient evidence to adjudicate
    M.W. delinquent even if Doctor’s testimony is ignored.
    ¶16   Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 20150359-CA

Citation Numbers: 2016 UT App 217

Filed Date: 11/3/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2021