State v. Johnson , 825 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 ( 2016 )


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    2016 UT App 223
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee,
    v.
    KEN MONTEY JOHNSON,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20141155-CA
    Filed November 10, 2016
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Katie Bernards-Goodman
    No. 141907022
    Alexandra S. McCallum, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Christopher D. Ballard, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in
    which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JILL M. POHLMAN
    concurred.
    CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
    ¶1     Defendant Ken Montey Johnson appeals his convictions
    for burglary, damage to/interruption of a communication device,
    and theft.1 He contends that the district court’s instructions to
    the jury were inadequate and misleading, that prejudicial
    1. Defendant’s opening brief appeals from these three
    convictions. However, the same brief also notes that he pled
    guilty to the latter two charges. He did not, and does not seek to,
    withdraw his guilty pleas. As a result, and because his brief
    focuses on the burglary conviction, we review only that
    conviction.
    State v. Johnson
    portions of a voicemail recording were improperly admitted into
    evidence, that the judge and bailiff had improper contact with
    the jury, and that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted at
    trial. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     ‚On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the evidence and
    all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to that
    verdict and recite the facts accordingly.‛ State v. Dozah, 
    2016 UT App 13
    , ¶ 2, 
    368 P.3d 863
    . ‚We include conflicting evidence as
    relevant and necessary to understand the issues on appeal.‛ 
    Id.
    ¶3     Victim and Defendant divorced in 2010. Victim was
    awarded the marital residence, but was required to pay
    Defendant $25,000. Victim initially executed a promissory note
    in favor of Defendant for the full amount, but Defendant later
    agreed to a reduced note of $15,000 due to Victim’s financial
    situation. Nevertheless, by the spring of 2014, Victim had yet to
    make any payment on the note and the debt had become a point
    of dispute between them.
    ¶4     On March 30, 2014, Defendant called Victim and left a
    voicemail stating that he was coming over to talk about the
    money. Victim claimed that, in the voicemail, Defendant
    ‚sounded extremely drunk‛ and was ‚slurring his words.‛
    When he arrived at her house and started kicking at the back
    door, Victim threatened to call the police. While she dialed 911
    on her cell phone, Defendant broke open the back door and
    entered the house. Victim accidentally hung up while Defendant
    was ‚screaming and yelling‛ because she was scared and
    ‚shaking like crazy.‛ When the 911 operator returned the call,
    Defendant ‚grabbed‛ the phone, feigned punches toward
    Victim, and continued to yell in slurred words that he wanted to
    talk to Victim. Victim attempted to retrieve the phone but
    Defendant grabbed her wrist, saying, ‚I should throw you down
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    State v. Johnson
    the stairs right now.‛ Eventually Victim retreated, and
    Defendant fled the house with the phone and later destroyed it.
    ¶5      At trial, the central issue was whether Defendant had
    entered or remained in the house with the intent to commit theft
    or assault. Defendant argued that he lacked the intent to commit
    a theft because he did not enter or remain in the house with the
    intent to permanently deprive Victim of her phone. In support of
    this claim, Defendant presented his own testimony that he had
    taken the phone only to ‚keep her from calling the police‛ and
    that he did not intend to assault Victim or steal her phone while
    he entered and remained in the house. Defendant also presented
    testimony from his friend that he went to the friend’s residence
    after fleeing from Victim’s house and had expressed a desire to
    ‚get back‛ to Victim’s house to ‚give the phone back‛ to her.
    According to Defendant, he had no intent to destroy the phone
    until he returned to Victim’s house and saw that the police had
    arrived whereupon he smashed the phone, ‚‘cause I was mad
    the police were there.‛
    ¶6     During the trial, the State sought to enter into evidence a
    recording of a voicemail Defendant left on Victim’s phone about
    a week after the incident. The garbled but obscenity-laden
    recording was almost four minutes long. In one of the intelligible
    portions of the voicemail, Defendant used the phrase ‚arrest me
    for breaking and entering,‛ which the State characterized as an
    admission. Over Defendant’s objection, the court admitted a 41-
    second portion and allowed it to be played for the jury.
    ¶7     The State also sought to admit Victim’s written witness
    statement, which she had made immediately after the incident.
    The district court initially admitted the statement over
    Defendant’s hearsay objection. After Defendant moved for a
    mistrial due to admission of the witness statement, the district
    court determined that the witness statement was hearsay and
    excluded it. However, the district court denied the motion for a
    mistrial. Later, while cross-examining Victim, Defendant
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    State v. Johnson
    repeatedly questioned her credibility by pointing out that her
    testimony at trial included details not present in her written
    witness statement. Defendant also implied that Victim’s $15,000
    debt to Defendant gave her a motive to fabricate her allegations
    against him. The State again sought admission of the witness
    statement, and the district court agreed it should be admitted in
    its entirety.
    ¶8     During a recess in the trial, the judge informed counsel
    that she wanted to visit the jurors to explain the reasons for a
    delay; counsel acquiesced. When the judge returned, she stated
    on the record that she had done so in order to tell the jury that
    the recess had run longer than planned due to the preparation of
    jury instructions and that the State was deciding whether to put
    on any rebuttal. The judge also mentioned that the jurors had
    asked if they were going to be able to listen to the recordings of
    the voicemail and a 911 call2 or have access to transcripts of them
    during deliberations. The judge reported that she had responded
    that there were no transcripts and that the judge and counsel
    would discuss whether the jurors would get to hear the
    recordings.
    ¶9       The court permitted the jury to hear the recording of the
    voicemail as well as the recording of Victim’s 911 call during the
    jury’s deliberations. The court explained that the prosecutor
    would have to show the bailiff how to play the recordings for
    the jury. Defense counsel did not object; rather, he merely asked
    that he be allowed to observe the prosecutor’s instruction to the
    bailiff. The bailiff then played the recordings for the jury.
    ¶10 The jury convicted Defendant of burglary and acquitted
    him of a threat of violence charge. Defendant appeals.
    2. This was apparently a reference to a recording of a 911 call
    Victim made after Defendant fled the house.
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    State v. Johnson
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶11 Defendant first contends that the district court’s burglary
    instruction was inadequate and misleading. ‚We review
    challenges to jury instructions under a correctness standard.‛
    State v. Davis, 
    2013 UT App 228
    , ¶ 15, 
    311 P.3d 538
     (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶12 Defendant next contends that the district court violated
    rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence when it admitted a
    portion of a recording of a voicemail that he left for Victim about
    a week after the incident. We review a district court’s ‚decision
    to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
    Evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, and will not
    overturn a lower court’s determination of admissibility unless it
    is beyond the limits of reasonability.‛ State v. Williams, 
    2014 UT App 198
    , ¶ 10, 
    333 P.3d 1287
     (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). ‚*L+ike any other evidentiary ruling, an
    erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence based on rule
    403 cannot result in reversible error unless the error is harmful.‛
    
    Id.
     (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶13 Defendant also contends that both the trial judge and the
    bailiff had improper contact with the jury during the trial. We
    review the propriety of communications between district court
    personnel and deliberating jurors for correctness, disturbing the
    verdict only if the error is ‚substantial or prejudicial such that
    the result would have been different had it not taken place.‛
    Board of Comm’rs of Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 
    937 P.2d 1263
    , 1267
    (Utah 1997) (ellipsis, citation, and internal quotation marks
    omitted). Here, because defense counsel agreed to both the
    judge’s and the bailiff’s contact with the jury and did not later
    object, we consider Defendant’s argument that defense counsel’s
    assistance was constitutionally ineffective. ‚When a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on
    appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must
    decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective
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    State v. Johnson
    assistance of counsel as a matter of law.‛ State v. Beckering, 
    2015 UT App 53
    , ¶ 18, 
    346 P.3d 672
     (brackets, citation, and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    ¶14 Defendant further contends that the district court erred by
    admitting hearsay evidence in the form of Victim’s witness
    statement. ‚In reviewing the admissibility of hearsay, legal
    questions are reviewed for correctness while the ultimate ruling
    on admissibility is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.‛ State v.
    Burke, 
    2011 UT App 168
    , ¶ 16, 
    256 P.3d 1102
    . We review for an
    abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to admit evidence
    pursuant to rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v.
    Montgomery, 2007 UT App 24U, para. 4; see also United States v.
    Lopez-Medina, 
    596 F.3d 716
    , 734–35 (10th Cir. 2010) (considering
    the analogous federal rule).
    ¶15 Finally, Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of
    the alleged errors warrants reversal. Under the cumulative error
    doctrine, we apply the ‚standard of review applicable to each
    underlying claim of error‛ and ‚reverse only if the cumulative
    effect of multiple errors undermines our confidence that a fair
    trial was had.‛ Davis, 
    2013 UT App 228
    , ¶ 16 (citations and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    ANALYSIS
    I. Adequacy of Jury Instructions
    A.    Instructions 25, 28, and 32 correctly and sufficiently stated
    the law.
    ¶16 Defendant first contends that the district court ‚gave
    inadequate and misleading instructions on burglary’s ‘intent to
    commit theft’ element.‛ Specifically, he asserts that the jury
    instructions ‚were insufficient and confusing because they failed
    to distinguish between the general and specific intent elements
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    State v. Johnson
    of the offense and failed to explain that ‘intent to commit theft’
    requires proof that the defendant entered/remained with the
    purpose to permanently deprive.‛ Defendant concedes that the
    burglary instruction ‚correctly told the jury that burglary
    required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant]
    entered/remained with the ‘specific intent to commit a theft,’‛
    but argues that the burglary and theft instructions, read
    together, ‚did not explain that this intent encompassed both the
    intent to unlawfully take and the purpose to permanently
    deprive.‛
    ¶17 ‚We review jury instructions in their entirety to
    determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly
    instructed the jury about the applicable law.‛ State v. Liti, 
    2015 UT App 186
    , ¶ 12, 
    355 P.3d 1078
    . As relevant here, ‚[a]n actor is
    guilty of burglary who enters or remains unlawfully in a
    building . . . with intent to commit: . . . (b) theft [or] (c) an assault
    on any person*.+‛ 
    Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
    (1) (LexisNexis
    2012); see also 
    id.
     § 76-6-202(2) (explaining that a burglary
    committed in a dwelling is a second-degree felony). Considering
    burglary by theft, ‚*a+ person commits theft if he obtains or
    exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with
    a purpose to deprive him thereof.‛ Id. § 76-6-404. ‚‘Purpose to
    deprive’ means to have the conscious object: (a) To withhold
    property permanently or for so extended a period or to
    use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
    economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be
    lost*.+‛ Id. § 76-6-401(3).
    ¶18 ‚Instructions should be read in their entire context and
    given meaning in accordance with the ordinary and usual
    import of the language as it would be understood by lay jurors.‛
    State v. Kennedy, 
    2015 UT App 152
    , ¶ 28, 
    354 P.3d 775
     (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court
    instructed the jury on intent (Instruction 25), the elements of
    burglary applicable to the charges against Defendant
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    State v. Johnson
    (Instruction 28), and definitions relevant to burglary generally
    (Instruction 32). Instruction 25 described intent:
    A person engages in conduct intentionally or with
    intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
    conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
    conscious objective or desire to engage in the
    conduct or cause the result.
    Instruction 28 then listed the elements the jury would have to
    find beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting Defendant of
    burglary:
    1. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant
    KEN JOHNSON;
    2. Knowingly, intentionally or recklessly;
    3. Entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling
    of another; and
    4. With the specific intent to commit:
    a. A theft; or
    b. An assault on any person.[3]
    Finally, Instruction 32 provided definitions relevant to
    burglary:
    Theft. A person commits theft if he obtains or
    exercises unauthorized control over the property of
    another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
    3. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the jury instructions
    as to burglary by assault. The jury acquitted Defendant on a
    charge of making a violent threat, which suggests, but does not
    conclusively prove, that the burglary conviction was based on a
    theory of burglary by theft rather than burglary by assault.
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    State v. Johnson
    ‚Purpose to deprive‛ means to have the conscious
    object:
    (a) To withhold property permanently or for
    so extended a period or to use under such
    circumstances that a substantial portion of
    its economic value, or of the use and benefit
    thereof, would be lost[.]
    ¶19 As explained above, Defendant claims that the jury could
    have believed that, if it found the ‚specific intent to commit [a]
    theft‛ element of the burglary instruction was satisfied, the
    ‚purpose to *permanently+ deprive‛ element of the theft
    instruction was also satisfied. He asserts, ‚Consequently, the
    instructions might have led the jury to believe that ‘intent to
    commit theft’ could be satisfied by mere proof of the intent to
    unlawfully take.‛
    ¶20 Defendant’s argument in this regard reverses the logical
    chain of the instructions. Instruction 28 told the jury that, to
    convict Defendant of burglary by theft, it had to find that he
    entered or remained in the house with the ‚specific intent‛ of
    committing theft. Therefore, the starting point of the jury’s
    consideration of this issue must have been whether Defendant
    intended to commit a theft as defined by Instruction 32.
    Instruction 32 plainly informed the jury that theft required the
    ‚*p+urpose to *permanently+ deprive.‛ Accordingly, only if the
    jury first found that Defendant had the purpose to permanently
    deprive Victim of her property could it proceed to the question
    of whether Defendant entered or remained with the specific
    intent to carry out that purpose. When considered together, the
    instructions correctly informed the jury that (1) without the
    purpose to permanently deprive, there could be no theft, and (2)
    without the intent to commit theft, there could be no burglary-
    by-theft conviction. In other words, because the instructions
    conditioned a burglary-by-theft conviction upon a finding that
    Defendant had the specific intent to commit a theft (as
    Defendant concedes they did), the elements of theft (including
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    State v. Johnson
    the purpose to permanently deprive) were necessarily part of the
    jury’s consideration of the burglary instruction.
    ¶21 Defendant also argues that ‚the instructions failed to
    adequately explain that the intent to permanently deprive had to
    exist contemporaneously with the entering/remaining.‛ But
    Instruction 28 explains that a burglary-by-theft conviction
    required the jury to find that Defendant ‚[e]ntered or remained
    unlawfully in the dwelling of another‛ ‚*w+ith the specific intent
    to commit‛ a theft. And Instruction 32 defines the intent element
    of theft as having ‚the conscious object . . . [t]o withhold
    property permanently.‛ As explained above, Instruction 32’s
    definition of ‚theft‛ logically must be read into Instruction 28’s
    use of the term ‚theft.‛ See Kennedy, 
    2015 UT App 152
    , ¶ 28
    (explaining that instructions are given the ordinary and usual
    import of their language). Therefore, reading these instructions
    ‚in their entire context‛ and giving them ‚meaning in
    accordance with the ordinary and usual import of the language,‛
    
    id.,
     the only reasonable interpretation is that a burglary-by-theft
    conviction required a finding that, while entering or remaining
    in the dwelling, the defendant had the conscious object of
    withholding property permanently.
    ¶22 In a similar vein, Defendant refers us to a question sent by
    the jury to the court during deliberations. That note asked, with
    the jury’s emphasis, ‚Does the person need to have intent before
    they enter the home to commit theft OR can intent happen after
    they are in the home?‛ The court responded, without consulting
    counsel,4 ‚See instruction #31[.] Intent can be formed before
    4. A court is not required to consult counsel before responding to
    a jury’s question by simply referring the jury back to instructions
    already approved by counsel. See State v. Dozah, 
    2016 UT App 13
    ,
    ¶ 25, 
    368 P.3d 863
    . However, such a course of action is risky
    because the court’s response to a jury question may be construed
    as a new instruction. See also id. ¶¶ 26, 29, 31 (vacating a
    (continued<)
    20141155-CA                    10               
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    State v. Johnson
    entry or while remaining in the home.‛ Instruction 31, approved
    by counsel, had informed the jury that ‚a person commits
    Burglary if that person enters or remains unlawfully in a
    dwelling or any portion of a dwelling with intent to commit a
    felony or theft or to commit an assault on any person.‛ (Strikeout
    in original.) Defendant complains that the response ‚failed to
    explain that the requisite intent must be contemporaneous with
    the entering/remaining, instead advising the jury that it can be
    present at the time of the entering/remaining.‛ (Emphasis in
    original.) He argues that, ‚[b]y including this non-mandatory
    language, the court’s response suggested that intent could be
    formed after leaving the home.‛
    ¶23 However, there is no likelihood that the jury shared this
    interpretation of the note and response. The jury’s note
    described two scenarios separated by the emphasized word
    ‚or.‛ This indicates that the jury understood that one of those
    two scenarios must have existed before they could find that
    Defendant intended to commit theft. And the court’s response
    referred the jury to an instruction previously given and clarified
    that either of the two scenarios would be sufficient for the jury to
    reach that finding. Given the phrasing of the note and the
    instructions before the jury, there is no reasonable possibility
    that the jury could have interpreted the court’s response as
    modifying the initial jury instructions so as to make intent to
    commit theft while unlawfully entering or remaining an
    optional, rather than required, finding.
    (2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    ¶24 We conclude that the instructions on burglary and theft,
    when considered together, fairly instructed the jury about the
    applicable law and that Defendant has not shown a reasonable
    likelihood that the jury misinterpreted the court’s response to the
    jury’s note.
    B.    Instruction 33 did not fatally cloud the jury instructions.
    ¶25 Defendant next argues that the ‚significance of
    Instruction 33 was not clear, and when considered with
    Instruction 32, it suggested that intent to temporarily deprive
    was sufficient to sustain a conviction.‛ Instruction 33 was
    included in the court’s instructions at the request of defense
    counsel. As initially proposed, the instruction first defined the
    offense of wrongful appropriation and then related that
    definition to Defendant’s defense theory:
    A person commits wrongful appropriation if he
    obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
    property of another, without the consent of the
    owner or legal custodian and with intent to
    temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the
    property or to temporarily deprive the owner or
    legal custodian of possession of the property.
    Therefore, if at the time [Defendant] unlawfully
    entered or remained in the building [Defendant]
    took the cell phone from [Victim] but acted with
    the intent to temporarily deprive her of the item,
    under the law he would be acting only with the
    intention to [temporarily] deprive and not to
    commit a theft. In such a circumstance [Defendant]
    could not be found guilty of burglary based on a
    theory of theft because burglary under a theory of
    theft requires that the defendant act with intent to
    permanently deprive the person of the property.
    An intention to temporarily deprive the person of
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    State v. Johnson
    the property is not sufficient to support a burglary
    charge.[5]
    ...
    If [Defendant] did not, while entering or remaining
    in the building, have the intent to commit a theft or
    an assault you must vote not guilty on the burglary
    charge[.]
    ¶26 The district court did not give this instruction in full.
    Specifically, it declined to include the portion explaining
    Defendant’s ‚theory of the case‛ and stated that counsel would
    ‚have to make your own arguments‛ to the jury about the
    relevance of wrongful appropriation. Accordingly, the court
    gave only the first paragraph of Defendant’s proposed
    instruction, defining wrongful appropriation. Defense counsel
    did not seek to withdraw the shortened version of Instruction 33.
    ¶27 Defendant now complains that ‚Instruction 33 defined
    ‘wrongful appropriation’ in the abstract without relating it to the
    legal principles relevant to burglary.‛ Defendant asserts that
    Instruction 33 ‚did not tell the jury what really mattered:
    entering/remaining with the intent to temporarily deprive is not
    sufficient to satisfy burglary’s intent element.‛
    ¶28 ‚Jury instructions require no particular form so long as
    they accurately convey the law.‛ State v. Maama, 
    2015 UT App 5
    . But see 
    Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
     (LexisNexis 2012)
    (explaining that theft requires a ‚purpose to deprive‛); 
    id.
     § 76-6-
    401(3) (defining ‚‘*p+urpose to deprive’‛ as having the conscious
    object to ‚withhold property permanently or for so extended a
    period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of
    its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost‛
    (emphasis added)).
    20141155-CA                      13                
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    State v. Johnson
    235, ¶ 29, 
    359 P.3d 1272
    . The fact that one instruction, considered
    alone, is not as accurate as it could have been does not constitute
    reversible error so long as the instructions as a whole fairly
    instruct the jury on the applicable law. State v. Kennedy, 
    2015 UT App 152
    , ¶ 32, 
    354 P.3d 775
    ; State v. Lucero, 
    866 P.2d 1
    , 3 (Utah
    Ct. App. 1993).
    ¶29 There can be no question that Instruction 33 correctly
    stated the law on wrongful appropriation; as given, it recited the
    wrongful appropriation statute verbatim. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5
    (1) (LexisNexis 2012). And the law relating to
    burglary was already correctly stated by Instruction 28, which
    conditioned a burglary conviction on one of two intent
    findings—either ‚the specific intent to commit: a. A theft; or b.
    An assault on any person.‛ Given the restrictive wording of
    Instruction 28, the jury could not have mistakenly read into the
    instructions a third route to a burglary conviction based on the
    intent to wrongfully appropriate. As a result, while the relevance
    of Instruction 33 could have been more thoroughly explained,
    the court did not err in giving the shortened version of
    Defendant’s proposed instruction, because the jury instructions
    as a whole fairly instructed the jury on the applicable law. See
    Kennedy, 
    2015 UT App 152
    , ¶ 32; Lucero, 
    866 P.2d at 3
    .
    ¶30 Defendant also points to a second note that the jury sent
    to the court during its deliberations, which asked about the
    reason Instruction 33 was included at all: ‚Jury is confused about
    the reason for the addition of p.33. Is there a specific reason it is
    included?‛ Without consulting counsel, see supra ¶ 22 note 4, the
    court responded ‚Use your collective memory of counsel’s
    argument[6] and testimony to determine its significance. See
    6. Defense counsel ultimately did not make an argument to the
    jury that, while entering or remaining in the house, Defendant at
    most possessed the intent to commit wrongful appropriation,
    which would fall short of an intent to commit theft. Defendant
    (continued<)
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    State v. Johnson
    Instruction #11.‛7 Defendant relies on State v. Couch for the
    proposition that, ‚‘[w]hen a jury makes explicit its difficulties a
    trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy.’‛ 
    635 P.2d 89
    , 94 (Utah 1981) (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 
    326 U.S. 607
    , 612–13 (1946)). He argues that, here, the court could
    only have done so by responding that ‚the intent to temporarily
    deprive was insufficient to support a conviction.‛
    ¶31 This argument stretches Couch beyond its holding. There,
    in a sexual abuse and kidnapping case, the Utah Supreme Court
    held that a court’s failure to instruct the jury upon its request as
    to the legal definition of the term ‚genitals,‛ when that term had
    not been defined in the jury instructions given, was reversible
    error. Specifically, the supreme court explained that, ‚where a
    jury at its own instance requests the definition of a term whose
    understanding is essential to a proper application of the law, the
    trial judge must provide the requested definition.‛ Couch, 635
    P.2d at 95. In contrast, the jury’s confusion here was not related
    to the meaning of a term in a statute but rather to the relevance
    of an instruction included at Defendant’s request. The court
    responded that (1) the relevance of Instruction 33 might be
    found by reviewing the arguments made by Defendant’s counsel
    and (2) if the jury’s other findings made Instruction 33 irrelevant,
    it could ‚disregard that instruction.‛ Accordingly, by reminding
    (2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    the jury that irrelevant instructions should be disregarded, the
    court cleared away ‚with concrete accuracy‛ the jury’s confusion
    regarding the inclusion of an instruction whose relevance was
    suspect. Moreover, nothing in the note or response can plausibly
    be read as setting aside or loosening the restrictions of
    Instructions 25 and 32. As noted, those instructions correctly
    stated the law, see supra ¶¶ 24, 29; see infra ¶ 32, and Defendant
    was not ‚entitled to further instruction regarding the defense’s
    theory of the case when the other instructions already fairly
    instruct*ed+ the jury on the law applicable to that theory,‛ see
    Kennedy, 
    2015 UT App 152
    , ¶ 32; Lucero, 
    866 P.2d at 3
    .
    ¶32 We conclude that Instruction 33 did not cloud the
    meaning of the instructions given to the jury, particularly in light
    of the district court’s response, which reminded the jury that not
    every instruction was necessarily relevant.
    II. Admission of Voicemail Evidence
    ¶33 Defendant contends that the district court ‚violated
    evidence rule 403 by admitting an unfairly prejudicial recording
    of a message that *Defendant+ left on *Victim’s+ voicemail about
    a week after the alleged offense.‛
    ¶34 The State sought admission of the entire recording, which
    was almost four minutes long. Defendant objected to the
    admission of the whole recording, arguing that it was unfairly
    prejudicial because it contained obscenities, but conceded that a
    4-second portion, in which he stated ‚arrest me for breaking and
    entering [or] whatever the fuck they think,‛ was admissible. He
    also offered to stipulate that he had kicked in Victim’s door and
    forcibly entered the house. Nevertheless, the State sought
    admission of the recording, and the district court ruled that it
    would admit into evidence the 4-second portion ‚where he
    discusses coming into the house.‛ The State explained that it
    would be difficult to cue the recording to that exact point. The
    court ended up admitting and playing a 41-second clip for the
    20141155-CA                     16               
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    State v. Johnson
    jury, which included the 4-second portion. The 41-second clip
    was generally unintelligible but included fragmentary
    statements such as ‚there’s nothing I owe you,‛ ‚you’re fucking
    me,‛ and ‚[you’re] stealing my house from me.‛ Defendant
    moved for a mistrial on the ground that the State had played
    more than the 4-second portion and had exposed the jury to
    Defendant’s use of the words ‚fuck‛ and ‚fucking.‛ The court
    denied the motion after deciding that a mistrial was not
    warranted merely ‚because the f-word might have been heard
    along with *Defendant’s+ statements about kicking the door in.‛
    ¶35 The district court ‚may exclude relevant evidence if its
    probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
    or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
    misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
    presenting cumulative evidence.‛ Utah R. Evid. 403. ‚[U]nfair
    prejudice results only where the evidence has an undue
    tendency to suggest decision upon an improper basis.‛ State v.
    Lucero, 
    2014 UT 15
    , ¶ 32, 
    328 P.3d 841
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). Consequently, there is a
    ‚presumption in favor of admissibility.‛ 
    Id.
     (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    ¶36 Defendant asserts that the recording was substantially
    more prejudicial than probative. According to him, the probative
    value was low because he had stipulated that he had broken into
    the house and because he later testified to that effect. And on the
    other side of the equation, Defendant claims that the danger of
    unfair prejudice was high due to his use of obscenities and the
    fact that his statements were ‚directed against *Victim+,
    exhibited extreme animosity and the jury could have believed
    that [Defendant] was indifferent to the impact of his unlawful
    entry upon her.‛ (Citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted.)
    ¶37 We agree with the State that the recording had
    ‚substantial probative value‛ beyond Defendant’s stipulation
    20141155-CA                    17               
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    State v. Johnson
    that he had broken into the house. The recording was relevant to
    show why Defendant broke into Victim’s house, as well as his
    general state of mind toward Victim and her property, albeit a
    week after the event. Cf. Utah R. Evid. 401 (explaining that
    evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact that is
    of consequence to the action more or less probable than it would
    be without the evidence). Defendant’s apparent animosity to
    Victim, as revealed by his demeanor and use of obscenities in the
    recording, was therefore probative to central issues in both the
    assault and theft theories of burglary with which he was
    charged. Furthermore, stipulating to a fact does not cut off the
    State’s right to present evidence depicting the context of that
    fact. See State v. Verde, 
    2012 UT 60
    , ¶ 28, 
    296 P.3d 673
     (explaining
    that the State ‚retains wide discretion to reject‛ a defendant’s
    offer to stipulate in lieu of presenting evidence to a jury ‚to
    preserve the right to present evidence with broad ‘narrative
    value’ beyond the establishment of particular elements of a
    crime‛); see also Old Chief v. United States, 
    519 U.S. 172
    , 189 (1997)
    (‚People who hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction
    may be puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors asked to rest
    a momentous decision on the story’s truth can feel put upon at
    being asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be
    said than they have heard.‛).
    ¶38 Turning to prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court has
    emphasized that ‚the probative value of the evidence must be
    substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.‛
    Lucero, 
    2014 UT 15
    , ¶ 32 (emphasis in original) (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant asserts that his use
    of ‚coarse language could have caused the jury to convict based
    on a generalized assessment of character rather than the
    evidence.‛ (Internal quotation marks omitted) (Citing State v.
    Maurer, 
    770 P.2d 981
    , 985–87 (Utah 1989)). In Maurer, the
    defendant wrote a letter to his victim’s father in which he
    graphically described her cries during her murder and referred
    to her using a coarse slur. Maurer, 770 P.2d at 982. That letter was
    20141155-CA                      18               
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    State v. Johnson
    introduced into evidence; on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
    reversed the defendant’s conviction because the letter ‚could
    have provoked an emotional response from the jury and
    provoked its instinct to punish or otherwise divert[ed] the jury
    from its task.‛ Id. at 987. Defendant relies on State v. Alzaga for
    the proposition that the ‚core concern‛ identified by Maurer in
    an unfair prejudice analysis is ‚what the defendant’s words
    revealed about his character.‛ But in Alzaga, this court noted that
    ‚the core concern with the letter in Maurer was not so much the
    letter’s language but what it revealed about the defendant’s
    character: he wrote it to inflict additional emotional pain upon
    the victim’s father, literally to add insult to injury.‛ State v.
    Alzaga, 
    2015 UT App 133
    , ¶ 51, 
    352 P.3d 107
     (emphasis added).
    Here, the import of the voicemail message was not that it was
    calculated to insult Victim or inflict emotional pain but rather
    that it showed Defendant’s state of mind and cast light on the
    likelihood that he might have tried to assault Victim or to steal
    from her. And to the extent that Defendant worries that the jury
    might have convicted him for using coarse language, we note
    that such words ‚have lost much of their shock value in
    contemporary culture.‛ See 
    id.
     (affirming a district court’s
    decision to admit into evidence a recording of a telephone call,
    between the defendant and his girlfriend, in which the
    defendant referred to his murder victim using several
    obscenities).
    ¶39 Defendant has not convinced us that the district court
    abused its discretion by deciding that the probative value of the
    41-second recording was not substantially outweighed by the
    danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the district
    court’s resulting denial of Defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
    III. Jury Contact
    ¶40 Defendant next contends that there was improper contact
    between the judge and the jury as well as between the bailiff and
    the jury. Specifically, he asserts that the judge ‚engaged in an
    20141155-CA                    19               
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    State v. Johnson
    off-the-record conversation with the jury, without counsel
    present, about matters directly related to trial.‛ He further
    asserts that the court ‚allowed the bailiff to remain in the jury
    room during deliberations.‛ According to Defendant, these
    events create a ‚rebuttable presumption of prejudice that was
    not rebutted below.‛
    ¶41 Because defense counsel acquiesced to both contacts and
    did not object to them even after they occurred, we turn to
    Defendant’s argument that defense counsel’s assistance was
    constitutionally ineffective. To establish ineffective assistance of
    counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that defense counsel’s
    performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
    prejudiced the defense. Burke v. State, 
    2015 UT App 1
    , ¶ 16, 
    342 P.3d 299
     (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984)).
    ‚Because both deficient performance and prejudice are requisite
    elements of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to
    prove either element necessarily defeats the claim.‛ State v.
    Garcia, 
    2016 UT App 59
    , ¶ 29, 
    370 P.3d 970
    . Defense counsel’s
    performance is not deficient so long as there is a conceivable
    tactical basis for counsel’s action or inaction. Id.; State v. King,
    
    2010 UT App 396
    , ¶ 31, 
    248 P.3d 984
     (‚*B+efore we will reverse a
    conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we must be
    persuaded that there was a lack of any conceivable tactical basis
    for counsel’s actions.‛ (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    A.     The judge–jury contact did not address substantive trial
    matters.
    ¶42 Defendant states that the judge’s ‚improper contact‛ with
    the jury ‚surfaced after-the-fact when the judge returned from a
    recess,‛ and she explained what she had talked to the jury about:
    I went in and told the jury that it had been longer
    than a 15 [minute] break because we were copying
    all the jury instructions and putting in the ones that
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    State v. Johnson
    you had all brought this morning that I had given
    you the opportunity to bring and the State was
    deciding whether to do rebuttal and all that and
    they said, ‚Well, when we get this case are we
    going to be able to listen to the tapes? Is there a
    transcript of the tapes?‛ So I said there’s no
    transcripts of the tapes, we will discuss whether
    you get to hear the tapes.
    However, immediately before going to speak to the jury, and
    recorded on the same page of the transcript, the judge had
    announced to counsel that ‚I’m going to tell the jury that we’re
    working on all this, that there’s no rebuttal. That we’re going to
    be copying jury instructions so it may take a few minutes more
    than 15 so they don’t blame it on you.‛ Defense counsel
    responded, ‚Okay.‛ Thus, defense counsel did not object to the
    judge–jury contact either when the judge announced her intent
    to talk to the jury or when the judge reported on the contents of
    that discussion.
    ¶43 With regard to judge–jury contact, the Utah Supreme
    Court has stated that ‚it may be appropriate to presume
    prejudice in some instances, such as where the judge discusses
    substantive matters with jurors.‛ State v. Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    ,
    ¶ 70, 
    299 P.3d 892
    . This is because, ‚*i+n such cases, the judge’s
    communication may have influenced the jury in unknown ways
    that could potentially affect the outcome of the case.‛ 
    Id.
     But in
    Maestas, the supreme court declined to presume prejudice
    because ‚the interaction was brief and dealt with the timing of
    the jury’s dismissal for the day.‛ 
    Id.
     ‚Further, to the extent that
    this communication could be considered related to some aspect
    of the trial, the judge appropriately disclosed the communication
    and neither [the defendant] nor his counsel objected to the
    interaction.‛ 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    ¶44 Here, Defendant asserts, ‚The judge’s off-the-record
    conversation with the jury involved ‘substantive matters,’ not
    20141155-CA                    21               
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    State v. Johnson
    mere trial logistics . . . .‛ But the matters the judge talked to the
    jury about were exactly trial logistics. The judge explained to the
    jury why the break was longer than planned and that the State
    had not decided whether to offer rebuttal, and she responded to
    a jury question about what exhibits they would have access to by
    telling them that the judge and counsel had not yet decided that
    issue. See, e.g., Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 70 n.62 (giving as an
    example of discussing substantive matters with jurors a case
    where the foreman of a deadlocked jury discussed the jury’s
    deadlock with the judge and ‚carried away from the meeting an
    impression that the judge wanted a verdict one way or the
    other‛ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The term
    ‚substantive‛ refers to the merits or outcome of a legal claim or
    case, as opposed to timing or procedural matters. See, e.g., id.;
    Beehive Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 
    2004 UT 18
    , ¶ 30, 
    89 P.3d 131
    ; Allen v. Friel, 
    2008 UT 56
    , ¶¶ 23–24, 
    194 P.3d 903
    . And the
    judge here did not discuss the merits of the issues or the case
    with the jury.
    ¶45 Defendant argues that ‚the discussion concerning the
    State’s decision whether to do rebuttal—coupled with the fact
    that the State did not put on a rebuttal—conveyed the
    impression that the State’s case was a ‘slam dunk’ and the
    defense was weak and not worthy of a rebuttal.‛ But the ‚slam
    dunk‛ danger Defendant highlights could only have arisen if the
    judge had informed the jury that the State would not be
    presenting rebuttal, rather than simply explaining that the State
    had not yet decided whether it would. And even if the judge had
    so informed the jury, identifying possible prejudice would be
    difficult where there is no indication that the judge expressed
    any opinion as to whether it was a wise decision. Moreover, the
    fact that the State ultimately did not present a rebuttal argument
    spoke volumes more to the jury than the judge’s earlier comment
    that the State was still deciding whether or not to do so.
    ¶46 Defendant also argues that the judge–jury contact ‚could
    have ‘bre*d+ a sense of familiarity’ with the judge‛ as evidenced
    20141155-CA                     22               
    2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    ‚from the various notes the jury sent to the court during
    deliberations.‛ (Alteration in original) (Citing State v. Pike, 
    712 P.2d 277
    , 281 (Utah 1985)). However, juries often send notes to
    judges seeking clarification of their instructions and conveying
    their logistical concerns; we cannot presume that whenever this
    occurs, the jury has an improper sense of familiarity with the
    judge. See Rushen v. Spain, 
    464 U.S. 114
    , 118 (1983) (‚There is
    scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have
    occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it
    relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the
    trial.‛). Moreover, in Pike, the Utah Supreme Court expressed
    discomfort at the potential for ‚breeding a sense of familiarity‛
    when jurors and ‚an important prosecution witness,‛ who was
    also the arresting officer, engaged in conversation during a
    recess. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280–81. Because a jury must evaluate the
    credibility of witnesses during deliberations, a sense of
    familiarity with a particular witness is ‚sufficient to warrant a
    presumption of prejudice.‛ Id. at 281. But because a jury’s charge
    does not encompass evaluating the credibility of the judge, the
    likelihood of the dangers posed by a sense of a familiarity with
    the judge, should one arise, is much less clear. Thus, the Pike
    standard for presuming prejudice on the basis of possible
    familiarity between witnesses and juries has little bearing here.8
    ¶47 Defendant further argues that the judge’s use of the
    phrase ‚and all that‛ ‚demonstrates that the conversation
    encompassed more than an incidental conversation related to
    scheduling.‛ We cannot divine such detail from an everyday
    informalism and therefore reject this argument without further
    discussion.
    8. We reiterate that the best practice for a court is to minimize
    any contact or communication between the judge and the jury
    outside the presence of counsel. See supra ¶ 22 note 4.
    20141155-CA                    23               
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    State v. Johnson
    ¶48 We do not agree with Defendant’s assertion that the
    judge–jury      contact     encompassed     substantive   matters.
    Accordingly, no presumption of prejudice arose. Defense
    counsel did not perform deficiently by agreeing to the contact,
    especially in light of its purpose—to ensure that the jury did not
    blame counsel for the delay. And because substantive matters
    were not discussed, defense counsel did not perform deficiently
    by failing to raise an objection when the judge reported back.
    B.     The bailiff–jury contact did not create a presumption of
    prejudice.
    ¶49 Defendant claims that the ‚bailiff’s contact with the jury
    also raises a presumption of prejudice that cannot be rebutted.‛
    Specifically, he notes that the court asked the prosecutor to show
    the bailiff how to play the 911 call and voicemail recordings and
    that the court stated ‚probably just the bailiff will go in.‛
    Defense counsel did not object. Defendant asserts that the
    ‚bailiff’s contact with the jury was more than incidental because
    the record reveals that the bailiff was present while the jury
    actually deliberated.‛9
    ¶50 Defendant points us to State v. Jonas, 
    793 P.2d 902
     (Utah
    Ct. App. 1990), in which this court addressed a somewhat
    similar situation. There, after the close of evidence but before the
    jury was instructed and before closing arguments, a juror was
    excused from the panel. 
    Id. at 907
    . The juror asked the bailiff to
    9. Despite Defendant’s assertion, the record on appeal does not
    reveal whether the bailiff remained in the room during the
    playing of the recordings. Nor does it reveal whether the jury
    discussed the case during the playing of the recordings. Given
    the short length of the recordings, as well as the need to prevent
    the jury from hearing unadmitted portions, we will assume
    arguendo that the bailiff remained in the room while the
    recordings were played.
    20141155-CA                     24               
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    State v. Johnson
    explain his absence to the remaining jurors, which the bailiff did.
    
    Id.
     The defendant appealed on the ground of improper bailiff–
    jury contact. Id. at 903. This court determined that no
    presumption of prejudice arose, because the bailiff ‚did not
    mingle with the jurors or converse with them about the trial
    itself; nor did he interrupt their deliberations.‛ Id. at 909.
    Defendant contrasts the instant case, asserting that ‚this is not a
    case where the bailiff simply entered the deliberation room,
    performed the ministerial task of cuing up the audiotape, and
    exited.‛ (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) But see
    supra ¶ 49 note 9.
    ¶51 We find United States v. Freeman instructive. See 
    634 F.2d 1267
     (10th Cir. 1980). In Freeman, the Tenth Circuit Court of
    Appeals reversed a defendant’s conviction after an FBI agent
    was allowed into the jury room to ‚operate the sound
    equipment‛ necessary to replay certain recordings previously
    admitted into evidence. 
    Id.
     at 1269–70. That decision turned on
    the fact that the FBI agent was an adversary because his
    investigation had led to the prosecution of the defendant. 
    Id.
     at
    1268–69; see also id. at 1269 (‚*A+ccess to the jury during its
    deliberative process by any adversary simply cannot be
    tolerated.‛ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). But
    see United States v. Florea, 
    541 F.2d 568
    , 571–72 (6th Cir. 1976)
    (holding that the presence of an adversary party performing a
    similar function in the jury room was harmless error because he
    ‚was never alone with the jury and was in its presence only long
    enough to replay the tapes‛).
    ¶52 Here, there is no evidence that the bailiff remained in the
    jury room after playing and stopping the recordings. Nor is there
    any evidence that the bailiff mingled with the jurors, conversed
    with them about the trial, or interrupted their discussions. And a
    bailiff, unlike an FBI agent, is a member of the court’s personnel
    and not an adversary party in the proceeding. For these reasons,
    20141155-CA                    25               
    2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    we will not presume prejudice.10 Defense counsel thus did not
    perform deficiently by acquiescing to the plan of having the
    bailiff play the recordings for the jury.11
    ¶53 Because defense counsel did not perform deficiently with
    regard to either the judge–jury contact or the bailiff–jury contact,
    we conclude that there was no reversible error.
    IV. Admission of Hearsay Evidence
    ¶54 Defendant next contends that the district court
    inappropriately admitted Victim’s written witness statement
    into evidence. Specifically, Defendant argues that the witness
    statement was hearsay and was not a prior consistent statement,
    because it was written after Victim had formed the motive to
    fabricate her allegations against Defendant. Defendant further
    argues that the rule of completeness did not apply to allow the
    admission of hearsay, because no portion of the witness
    statement had previously been entered into evidence.
    ¶55 During Victim’s testimony, the State sought to enter into
    evidence the written witness statement Victim gave to police on
    the day of the incident. Defense counsel objected on hearsay
    grounds, but the court overruled the objection after determining
    that rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Utah Rules of Evidence applied. See
    generally Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (providing that a statement
    is not hearsay if it ‚is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony
    10. We note that an automatic presumption of prejudice in such
    circumstances would hinder the ability of court personnel to
    assist juries with technical matters.
    11. Indeed, he likely had a tactical reason for accepting the plan;
    if the jurors had simply been given the recordings, they might
    have listened to the portions defense counsel had succeeded in
    excluding from evidence.
    20141155-CA                     26               
    2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    or the declarant denies having made the statement or has
    forgotten‛). The witness statement was then published to the
    jury. However, after a recess, the district court realized it had
    misread rule 801(d)(1)(A) as requiring consistency rather than
    inconsistency and therefore reversed itself. Accordingly, the
    district court retracted the written statement from the jury but
    declined to declare a mistrial because the jury only had the
    statement ‚for two minutes.‛
    ¶56 While cross-examining Victim, defense counsel asked her
    several times about the written statement in an attempt to
    impeach Victim’s credibility by highlighting discrepancies
    between Victim’s direct examination testimony and the
    statement she gave on the day of the incident. For example, after
    Victim testified that Defendant had ‚grabbed‛ her, defense
    counsel asked, ‚[I]sn’t it true that there’s not one word in your
    report about him grabbing you?‛ After Victim stated that she
    could not recall, defense counsel refreshed her memory by
    showing her the written statement and asked, ‚[I]sn’t it true that
    the word grab, grabbing, grabbed, none of those words appear
    in that statement . . . ?‛ Defense counsel then got Victim to agree
    that the police detective had instructed her to ‚write down what
    happened‛ and to ‚tell him everything.‛ Similarly, after Victim
    testified that Defendant had ‚throw*n+ punches in the air
    towards my face, like he was going to punch me but stopped,‛
    defense counsel asked her, ‚And that doesn’t appear anywhere
    in your report there either, does it?‛ Victim admitted it did not,
    explaining that she had not remembered that portion of the
    incident until later.
    ¶57 After Victim was excused from the witness stand, the
    State again sought to have the written statement admitted into
    evidence. The court admitted it into evidence pursuant to rule
    801(d)(1)(B). See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (providing that a
    statement is not hearsay if it ‚is consistent with the declarant’s
    testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
    that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent
    20141155-CA                    27               
    2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    improper influence or motive in so testifying‛). Defense counsel
    objected that only the portions of the statement that were
    consistent with the challenged elements of Victim’s testimony
    were admissible under that rule. Then the court admitted the
    entire written statement into evidence because defense counsel
    had ‚referred too much to the statement‛ and could not ‚keep
    pulling bits and piece*s+ of it out and expect that it’s not going to
    go into evidence.‛ See Utah R. Evid. 106. The court also
    expressed concern that the cross-examination had taken ‚a
    bunch of stuff out of context.‛
    ¶58 Victim’s witness statement was then introduced into
    evidence as an exhibit:
    My ex husband came to my home drunk. I did not
    want to answer the door. He started kicking the
    back door. I grab[b]ed my phone and was yelling
    at him to leave. He broke the door in. I called 911
    and he took my phone and would not give it back.
    He was still yelling at me telling me I owe him
    money and I will not get it back. We got to the
    front door and I was still trying to get my phone
    back to call 911. He pushed me and said he should
    just push me down the stairs. He got in his truck
    and I ran to [my] neighbors house.
    ¶59 The basis for applying rule 106 here was not that elements
    of the witness statement were admissible pursuant to rule
    801(d)(1)(B). Rather, the beachhead was defense counsel’s
    extensive reliance on portions of the witness statement to
    impeach Victim’s credibility. Thus, regardless of whether the
    witness statement properly fell within the ambit of rule
    801(d)(1)(B), the question before us is whether the district court
    20141155-CA                     28               
    2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    abused its discretion in determining that rule 106 required the
    admission of the remainder of the witness statement.12
    ¶60 Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides, ‚If a
    party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement,
    an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of
    any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—
    that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.‛ This
    rule is often referred to as the rule of completeness, and is
    designed ‚to prevent a misleading impression created by taking
    12. ‚At least seven circuits have held . . . that if a remainder
    [portion of a statement] passes the fairness test, no other rule of
    evidence should exclude it from being entered under Rule 106.‛
    Michael A. Hardin, This Space Intentionally Left Blank: What To Do
    When Hearsay and Rule 106 Completeness Collide, 
    82 Fordham L. Rev. 1283
    , 1308 (2013) (considering the federal rule of evidence
    analogous to rule 106). ‚These *circuits are+ the D.C., First,
    Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.‛ 
    Id.
     Hardin
    goes on to point out that of the five circuits that have appeared
    to hold that the rule of completeness does not trump other
    restrictions on the admissibility of evidence, at least four have
    done so only in dicta. Id. at 1312 (‚A particular pattern emerges
    in these cases. Courts of this view often state that Rule 106
    cannot render inadmissible remainders admissible, but then go
    on to find other reasons not to admit the remainder*.+‛).
    Moreover, ‚*t+he Supreme Court *has+ ducked this issue by
    holding that whether or not it was usable under Rule 106 [of the
    Federal Rules of Evidence], a party could introduce the
    remainder of a truncated letter as part of his own case under the
    common law completeness doctrine.‛ 21A Charles Alan Wright
    & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure
    § 5078.1 (2d ed. 2016) (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 
    488 U.S. 153
    , 170–73 (1988)). See also State v. Sanchez, 
    2016 UT App 189
    , ¶ 24 n. 4 (collecting cases).
    20141155-CA                    29               
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    State v. Johnson
    matters out of context.‛ See State v. Jones, 
    2015 UT 19
    , ¶ 40, 
    345 P.3d 1195
     (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ‚The
    rule establishes a fairness standard that requires admission of
    those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify, explain,
    or place into context the portion already introduced.‛ 
    Id.
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore
    consider whether rule 106’s fairness standard required the
    admission of the entirety of Victim’s witness statement.
    ¶61 Defendant asserts that the written statement is not
    admissible in its entirety even in light of rule 106. He argues that
    rule 106 only renders admissible those portions of the written
    statement that were directly relevant to the precise items of
    testimony impeached by defense counsel’s cross-examination.
    ¶62 The State responds that ‚*f+airness required admission of
    *Victim’s+ entire witness statement.‛ The State explains that the
    thrust of defense counsel’s cross-examination was to suggest that
    Victim’s ‚entire testimony was unreliable because she could not
    accurately report the events‛ and to suggest ‚that she was
    embellishing her testimony with events that did not happen
    because her witness statement alone did not fully support
    Defendant’s charges.‛ (Emphasis added.) According to the State,
    in light of defense counsel’s attempts to impeach Victim’s overall
    credibility, the only way to ‚rebut these suggestions‛ was to let
    the jury ‚see exactly how *Victim+ had described the events in
    her written statement.‛
    ¶63 We agree with the State. The intent behind rule 106 is ‚to
    prevent a misleading impression,‛ not simply to correct a specific
    misleading instance. See Jones, 
    2015 UT 19
    , ¶ 40 (emphasis
    added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Applying rule 106’s fairness standard here required allowing the
    State to introduce enough of the written statement to not only
    counter defense counsel’s tactical attacks on specific elements of
    Victim’s testimony but also to fairly respond to his strategic aim
    of impeaching Victim’s credibility generally.
    20141155-CA                     30               
    2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    ¶64 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion when it determined that rule 106’s fairness standard
    required admission of the entirety of Victim’s written witness
    statement. See 
    id.
     (‚The rule establishes a fairness standard that
    requires admission of those things that are relevant and
    necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion
    already introduced.‛ (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    V. Cumulative Error
    ¶65 Defendant contends that the cumulative error doctrine
    requires reversal here due to the aggregated prejudicial effects of
    the errors alleged. ‚Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will
    reverse only if the cumulative effect of the several errors
    undermines our confidence that a fair trial was had.‛ State v.
    Davis, 
    2013 UT App 228
    , ¶ 106, 
    311 P.3d 538
     (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted). We have determined that the
    district court did not err or abuse its discretion with regard to
    the claims in Parts I, II, and IV.13 We have also determined that
    no presumption of prejudice arose with regard to the improper
    jury contact claims in Part III, and that defense counsel did not
    perform deficiently with respect to those claims. Accordingly,
    there are not multiple instances of prejudice to cumulate, and
    Defendant’s cumulative error claim necessarily fails. See State v.
    Glasscock, 
    2014 UT App 221
    , ¶ 34, 
    336 P.3d 46
    .
    13. Given our resolution of each of these contentions on its
    merits, we need not and do not address the parties’ subsidiary
    arguments as to whether those contentions were preserved or
    whether an exception to the preservation requirement applies.
    20141155-CA                    31               
    2016 UT App 223
    State v. Johnson
    CONCLUSION
    ¶66 The jury instructions given by the district court were
    neither inadequate nor misleading, when considered in their
    entirety. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
    admitting the voicemail recording, because the recording was
    not substantially more prejudicial than probative. Defense
    counsel did not perform deficiently with regard to the contacts
    between the judge and the jury and between the bailiff and the
    jury. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in
    determining that Utah Rule of Evidence 106 required the
    admission of the entirety of Victim’s written witness statement.
    And the cumulative error doctrine has no application in the
    absence of error, abuse of discretion, or ineffective assistance of
    counsel.
    ¶67   Affirmed.
    20141155-CA                    32               
    2016 UT App 223