Mower v. Nibley , 819 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 ( 2016 )


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    2016 UT App 174
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    THOMAS MOWER,
    Appellant,
    v.
    RICHARD MCBRIDE NIBLEY,
    Appellee.
    Memorandum Decision
    No. 20150410-CA
    Filed August 18, 2016
    Fourth District Court, Provo Department
    The Honorable Claudia Laycock
    No. 120401924
    Douglas B. Thayer and Jordan K. Cameron,
    Attorneys for Appellant
    Mark F. James and Mitchell A. Stephens, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Memorandum Decision, in
    which JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and SENIOR JUDGE PAMELA T.
    GREENWOOD concurred.1
    TOOMEY, Judge:
    ¶1     Thomas Mower appeals the district court’s dismissal of
    his suit against Richard McBride Nibley, a resident of Japan, for
    lack of general personal jurisdiction. Mower sought
    compensatory and punitive damages for the destruction of
    thousands of copies of a self-published book, titled ‚Straight
    Talk from an American Cowboy: How to Achieve Business
    1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment
    as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-
    201(6).
    Mower v. Nibley
    Success in MLM,‛ committed to Nibley’s possession. On appeal,
    we must determine whether Nibley waived his right to object to
    personal jurisdiction and whether Nibley is subject to general
    personal jurisdiction as a result of his contacts with the state. As
    to the first question, we conclude that he did not. And because
    he is not domiciled in Utah and lacks sufficient contacts with the
    state, we conclude Utah cannot exercise general personal
    jurisdiction over Nibley. We therefore affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     In 2006, Mower wrote and self-published his book.2 He
    then paid for its translation into Japanese and entrusted Nibley
    with tens of thousands of copies to sell in Japan on Mower’s
    behalf. At that time Nibley was employed by SISEL
    International, LLC, a Utah company Mower owned, but at some
    point before Mower began this action, Nibley’s employment was
    terminated.
    ¶3     Shortly after Mower arranged for Nibley to sell his book,
    Mower was sentenced to serve a thirty-three-month sentence in
    federal prison for tax fraud. See United States v. Thompson, 
    518 F.3d 832
    , 838–49 (10th Cir. 2008). During his prison term, Mower
    did not communicate with Nibley regarding the books. Nibley
    continued selling the books, purportedly using the revenue to
    fund the operating costs of selling them. As a favor, one of
    Nibley’s friends in Japan agreed to store the books free of
    charge. But by 2009, the proceeds from book sales were no
    2. ‚‘When determining whether the trial court correctly granted
    a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the
    complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable
    inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to
    the nonmoving party.’‛ Hunsaker v. American HealthCare Capital,
    
    2014 UT App 275
    , ¶ 9, 
    340 P.3d 788
     (quoting Fenn v. Mleads
    Enters., Inc., 
    2006 UT 8
    , ¶ 2, 
    137 P.3d 706
    ).
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    Mower v. Nibley
    longer enough to support operations, and the next year sales had
    slowed to a trickle, if not to a complete stop. Nibley’s friend then
    informed Nibley that he could no longer store the books without
    charge, and Nibley allowed the warehouse owner to destroy the
    remaining books in March 2010.
    ¶4     Nibley has lived in Japan for more than thirty years, and
    has visited Utah only twice in the past ten years: once in 2008 for
    his father’s funeral and again in 2011 for the birth of his
    granddaughter. He had no direct personal contact with Mower
    during either visit, but SISEL International served process on
    Nibley for an unrelated legal action while he was in Utah for his
    father’s funeral.
    ¶5      As relevant to Mower’s arguments, Nibley owned a
    partial interest in a rental property in Utah until it was sold at a
    sheriff’s sale shortly after Mower filed his complaint in 2013.
    Nibley’s wife retains her own partial interest in the property.
    According to Nibley’s wife, ‚*T+here is no formal written
    agreement‛ regarding rent, and the renters pay a portion of the
    ‚rent money into *Nibley’s+ bank account on a monthly basis.‛
    ¶6      In January 2013, Mower served Nibley in Japan, through a
    process server operating under the auspices of the United States
    Consulate, suing under theories of conversion, unjust
    enrichment, accounting, and constructive trust. Specifically, he
    alleged that Nibley profited and continues to profit from the sale
    of Mower’s books and demanded that Nibley return any books
    still in his possession. Nibley did not respond or appear to
    defend himself, and the court clerk entered default. See Utah R.
    Civ. P. 55(a). Nearly twenty months later, Mower filed a motion
    to enter judgment for the amount of $629,200, with post-
    judgment interest.
    ¶7      In November 2014, Nibley responded with a pro se fill-in-
    the-blank opposition form, in which he laid out his inability to
    sell the books and the events leading up to their destruction. He
    denied any wrongdoing and any responsibility for the
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    Mower v. Nibley
    destruction of the books. He did not raise a personal jurisdiction
    objection, but did ask the court to deny Mower’s motion to enter
    judgment and asked to dismiss the case.
    ¶8     Before a scheduled hearing on Mower’s motion to enter
    judgment, Nibley filed two documents through counsel. In one,
    he moved the court to set aside entry of default and to dismiss
    Mower’s action for lack of personal jurisdiction. In the other, he
    explained that his counsel’s appearance was limited to
    challenging jurisdiction in order to void the entry of default, and
    was not a general appearance.
    ¶9      At the hearing on the motions, Mower argued Nibley had
    waived his right to challenge personal jurisdiction by
    ‚participating in this case‛ and by failing to raise the defense in
    his initial response. The court determined that Nibley’s filing of
    his pro se opposition and sending emails to Mower’s counsel
    and court clerks did not amount to the degree and type of
    participation sufficient to waive Nibley’s right to challenge
    personal jurisdiction. Mower conceded that Utah could not
    exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Nibley, and the court
    rejected Mower’s claim that Nibley’s contacts with Utah were
    sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction. Accordingly,
    the court granted Nibley’s motion to set aside entry of default
    and dismissed Mower’s complaint for lack of personal
    jurisdiction. Mower appeals.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶10 On appeal, Mower argues the district court erred in
    dismissing his suit for lack of general personal jurisdiction. We
    first address his argument that Nibley waived the right to
    challenge personal jurisdiction. If Nibley did not, we must then
    decide whether Nibley’s contacts with Utah are sufficient to
    establish general personal jurisdiction.
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    Mower v. Nibley
    ¶11 Waiver presents a mixed question of law and fact. Pledger
    v. Gillespie, 
    1999 UT 54
    , ¶ 16, 
    982 P.2d 572
    . ‚*W+hether the trial
    court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal
    question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or
    events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and
    should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give
    a district court deference.‛ 
    Id.
    ¶12 ‚‘*A+n appeal from a pretrial jurisdictional decision made
    only on documentary evidence presents legal questions which
    we review for correctness.’‛ Hunsaker v. American HealthCare
    Capital, 
    2014 UT App 275
    , ¶ 9, 
    340 P.3d 788
     (quoting Fenn v.
    Mleads Enters., Inc., 
    2006 UT 8
    , ¶ 7, 
    137 P.3d 706
    ). Further, ‚if the
    trial court proceeds on documentary evidence alone to
    determine whether personal jurisdiction is proper, ‘the plaintiff
    is only required to make a prima facie showing of personal
    jurisdiction.’‛ 
    Id.
     (quoting Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 
    950 P.2d 420
    , 422 (Utah 1997)).
    ANALYSIS
    I. Waiver
    ¶13 Mower contends Nibley’s chance to challenge jurisdiction
    ended when Nibley began participating in the suit by filing the
    November 2014 opposition to Mower’s motion to enter
    judgment without objecting to the court’s jurisdiction.3
    3. On appeal, Nibley contends Mower’s waiver argument is
    unpreserved. We disagree. ‚An issue is preserved for appeal
    when it has been presented to the district court in such a way
    that the court has an opportunity to rule on *it+.‛ Patterson v.
    Patterson, 
    2011 UT 68
    , ¶ 12, 
    266 P.3d 828
     (alteration in original)
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, although
    Mower did not raise the issue in his written opposition to
    (continued<)
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    Mower v. Nibley
    ¶14 Parties can waive an objection to jurisdiction by expressly
    waiving or by participating in the litigation without timely
    raising an objection or defense in a responsive pleading, such as
    an answer or reply. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (h). But the Utah
    Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances a
    defendant’s pro se response does not equate to a responsive
    pleading. See, e.g., Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 
    779 P.2d 659
    ,
    661 (Utah 1989) (determining that the defendant ‚did not waive
    its jurisdictional claim through its pro se response‛ because it
    had not asked for affirmative relief from the court); Fibreboard
    Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 
    475 P.2d 1005
    , 1005–06 (Utah
    1970) (concluding that the defendant’s pro se letter denying
    responsibility for the bill sued upon did not constitute an answer
    or a general appearance). Indeed, even when the defendant
    captions his pro se response ‚answer,‛ if the defendant merely
    denies responsibility for the injury or fails to ask for affirmative
    relief, the court has ruled that such a response cannot be
    construed as an answer or general appearance. See Parry, 779
    P.2d at 661; cf. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 
    884 P.2d 1306
    , 1310
    n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (‚*T+he substance, not caption, of a
    motion is dispositive in determining the character of the
    motion.‛). Thus, if the defendant’s only participation in the
    litigation before objecting to personal jurisdiction is a pro se
    response that does not amount to a pleading or answer, the
    defendant has not waived a jurisdiction objection. See 
    id.
    ¶15 Here, for nearly two years after Mower filed this action,
    Nibley did not respond or communicate with the court. Between
    January and June of 2014, Nibley exchanged emails with
    Mower’s counsel and corresponded with court clerks. But the
    only document he filed with the court was his pro se
    opposition—a typewritten boilerplate opposition form. In his
    (id.
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    Mower v. Nibley
    opposition, Nibley denied responsibility for the destruction of
    the books and emphasized that all activities regarding the book
    occurred in Japan. He did not request a hearing. Rather, in one
    line, he merely asked the court to deny Mower’s motion for
    entry of judgment. Furthermore, Nibley never made an
    appearance with the court. Thus, we conclude that the district
    court did not err when it found that Nibley’s pro se opposition
    did not constitute a responsive pleading under rule 12 of the
    Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that Nibley did not waive his
    personal jurisdiction objection.
    II. Personal Jurisdiction
    ¶16 Mower argues that ‚*w+hen taken together, *Nibley’s+
    foregoing contact with Utah has been, and continues to be,
    systematic and continuous, even though he is physically located
    in Japan.‛
    ¶17 ‚The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
    constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to
    a judgment of its court.‛ Walden v. Fiore, 
    134 S. Ct. 1115
    , 1121
    (2014). ‚Although a nonresident’s physical presence within the
    territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the
    nonresident generally must have ‘certain minimum contacts . . .
    such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend the
    traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’‛ 
    Id.
    (omission in original) (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
    Washington, 
    326 U.S. 310
    , 316 (1945)).
    ¶18 ‚The authority of the state to hale a nonresident into a
    state court hinges on the ability to establish personal
    jurisdiction.‛ Pohl, Inc. of Am. v. Webelhuth, 
    2008 UT 89
    , ¶ 9, 
    201 P.3d 944
    . ‚There are two categories of personal jurisdiction:
    specific and general jurisdiction.‛ 
    Id.
     In Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v.
    Piper Aircraft Corp., the Utah Supreme Court clarified the
    distinction between specific jurisdiction and general personal
    jurisdiction. 
    578 P.2d 850
    , 853 n.6 (Utah 1978). It explained that
    the most significant difference between general personal
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    Mower v. Nibley
    jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction is the degree of the
    defendant’s relationship with the forum state. See 
    id.
     The court
    noted that specific personal jurisdiction ‚is the concept
    applicable to a long-arm statute, which requires only minimum
    local contacts.‛ 
    Id.
     ‚Where the defendant has only minimum
    contacts with the forum, personal jurisdiction may be asserted
    only on claims arising out of the defendant’s forum-state
    activity.‛ 
    Id.
     By contrast, general personal jurisdiction requires
    something much more than minimum contacts; it requires
    ‚substantial and continuous local activity.‛ 
    Id.
     ‚Once that is
    shown, defendant is subject to litigation related or unrelated to
    that business, as he is a ‘pseudo resident.’‛ Roskelley & Co. v.
    Lerco, Inc., 
    610 P.2d 1307
    , 1311 (Utah 1980). Thus, whether the
    forum state can assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant
    ‚will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s
    activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by
    which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
    conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
    benefits and protections of its laws.‛ Abbott, 578 P.2d at 853 n.10
    (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 
    357 U.S. 235
    , 253 (1958)).
    ¶19 Because Mower conceded that Utah cannot exercise
    specific personal jurisdiction over Nibley, this case focuses on
    the court’s ability to exercise general personal jurisdiction. The
    United States Supreme Court has explained that, for purposes of
    determining general personal jurisdiction, ‚[a] person may
    submit to a State’s authority in a number of ways.‛ J. McIntyre
    Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 
    564 U.S. 873
    , 880–81 (2011). For example, a
    person’s ‚explicit consent‛ or physical ‚[p]resence within a State
    at the time suit commences through service of process‛ can
    support the exercise of general personal jurisdiction. 
    Id. at 880
    .
    Additionally, ‚[c]itizenship or domicile—or, by analogy,
    incorporation or principal place of business for corporations—
    also indicates general submission to a State’s powers.‛ 
    Id. at 881
    .
    In Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
    134 S. Ct. 746
     (2014) and Goodyear
    Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
    564 U.S. 915
     (2011), the
    Court reiterated this proposition; ‚‘For an individual, the
    paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
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    Mower v. Nibley
    individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place,
    one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.’‛
    Daimler, 
    134 S. Ct. at 760
     (quoting Goodyear, 
    564 U.S. at 924
    ). ‚By
    treating general jurisdiction over corporations based on
    continuous and systematic contacts as analogous to jurisdiction
    at an individual’s domicile, the Court may be signaling that such
    contacts will not separately establish a basis for general
    jurisdiction over an individual outside the individual’s domicile
    or residence.‛ Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal
    Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
    Brown, 
    60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 549
    , 601 (2012).4
    4. We note the United States Supreme Court has decided few
    cases, and Utah appellate courts even fewer, that have discussed
    the sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts with the state to
    establish general personal jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v. Bauman,
    
    134 S. Ct. 746
    , 755–56 (2014) (explaining that there are few ‚post-
    International Shoe opinions on general jurisdiction‛); Goodyear
    Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
    564 U.S. 915
    , 925 (2011)
    (explaining that only a handful of decisions have considered
    ‚whether an out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state contacts
    were sufficiently ‘continuous and systematic’ to justify the
    exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those
    contacts‛).
    Indeed, since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
    326 U.S. 310
     (1945), the United States Supreme Court’s ‚decisions have
    elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise
    of specific jurisdiction,‛ Goodyear, 
    564 U.S. at 924
    , and the
    Supreme Court’s decisions have largely involved corporate
    defendants, rather than individual defendants. See 4 Charles
    Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1069.5 (3d ed.
    1998) (‚By and large the preponderance of cases in the federal
    courts raising jurisdictional questions during the past several
    decades have involved corporations.‛); Mary Twitchell, The
    Myth of General Jurisdiction, 
    101 Harv. L. Rev. 610
    , 633 (1988)
    (‚Courts routinely exercise jurisdiction over individual
    (continued<)
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    Mower v. Nibley
    ¶20 If an individual defendant has neither consented to a
    state’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction nor has been
    personally served in the state, for purposes of determining
    whether a state may exercise general personal jurisdiction over
    him, we must therefore look to the individual’s domicile. See
    Daimler, 
    134 S. Ct. at
    760–61; Goodyear, 
    564 U.S. at 924
    . Under
    federal jurisprudence, ‚an individual has only one domicile,‛
    Martinez v. Bynum, 
    461 U.S. 321
    , 340 (1983), which ‚usually
    requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place
    one’s home,‛ Lilly v. Lilly, 
    2011 UT App 53
    , ¶ 13, 
    250 P.3d 994
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also
    Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 11 (Am. Law Inst.
    2016) (‚Every person has a domicil[e] at all times and, at least for
    the same purpose, no person has more than one domicil[e] at a
    time.‛); Domicile, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining
    ‚domicile‛ as ‚*t+he place at which a person has been physically
    present and that the person regards as home; a person’s true,
    fixed, principal, and permanent home‛).
    (564 U.S.
    915
     (holding that North Carolina’s courts could not exercise
    general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant);
    Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 
    466 U.S. 408
    (1984) (determining that Texas courts could not exercise general
    personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant);
    Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 
    342 U.S. 437
     (1952) (holding
    that Ohio courts could exercise general personal jurisdiction
    over a foreign corporation without offending due process); Ho v.
    Jim’s Enters., Inc., 
    2001 UT 63
    , 
    29 P.3d 633
     (considering whether
    Utah could exercise general personal jurisdiction over a
    corporate defendant).
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    Mower v. Nibley
    ¶21 Here, it cannot be disputed that Nibley’s domicile is in
    Japan—his home is in Japan and he has made clear that he
    intends to stay there. Nibley has lived in Japan for thirty years,
    his wife is in Japan, he no longer owns property in Utah, and he
    has only visited Utah twice in the last ten years. Thus, under the
    recent string of cases from the United States Supreme Court,
    Utah may not exercise general personal jurisdiction over Nibley
    because he is not domiciled here. We therefore conclude the
    district court did not err in granting Nibley’s motion to dismiss
    for lack of personal jurisdiction.
    ¶22 Even if we accept Mower’s argument and assume that the
    analysis applicable to whether a state may exercise general
    personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant applies to
    individual defendants, we cannot conclude that Utah has the
    authority to bind Nibley to judgment in its courts.
    ¶23 In the context of corporate defendants, the Utah Supreme
    Court recently explained that for a state to exercise general
    personal jurisdiction, a corporation’s affiliations with the state
    must be more than just continuous and systematic. Rather, the
    defendant’s contacts must be ‚‘so ‚continuous and systematic‛
    as to render [them] essentially at home in the forum State.’‛
    ClearOne, Inc. v. Revolabs, Inc., 
    2016 UT 16
    , ¶ 37, 
    369 P.3d 1269
    (quoting Daimler, 
    134 S. Ct. at 761
    ). The court emphasized ‚that a
    defendant’s contacts with the state must be so extensive as to be
    ‘comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.’‛ 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Daimler, 
    134 S. Ct. at
    758 n.11).
    ¶24 There is no bright-line rule to determine which types of
    contacts are sufficient to render a defendant ‚essentially at
    home‛ in a forum state. A jurisdictional determination must
    therefore be based on a realistic evaluation of the quality of the
    relationship among the defendant, the controversy, and the
    forum. See Ho v. Jim’s Enters., Inc., 
    2001 UT 63
    , ¶ 8, 
    29 P.3d 633
    .
    ‚For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process,
    that relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant
    himself’ creates with the forum, and must be analyzed with
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    Mower v. Nibley
    regard to the defendant’s contacts with the forum itself, not with
    persons residing there.‛ Walden v. Fiore, 
    134 S. Ct. 1115
    , 1118
    (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
    471 U.S. 462
    , 475
    (1985)); see also 
    id.
     at 1122–23. Thus, ‚the plaintiff cannot be the
    only link between the defendant and the forum.‛ 
    Id.
     at 1122–23.
    ¶25 In his complaint, the only fact Mower asserted to
    demonstrate Nibley had sufficient contacts with Utah to exercise
    personal jurisdiction over him was that Nibley used to work for
    SISEL International, a Utah-based international company. In
    opposition to Nibley’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
    jurisdiction, Mower asserted that Nibley has had to appear and
    defend ‚in at least two other litigation matters in Utah.‛ He
    further argued that Utah could maintain general personal
    jurisdiction over Nibley because, at the time Nibley was served
    in this suit, Nibley ‚was the record owner of property located [in
    Utah].‛ Nibley ‚continues to collect rental payments for
    property in Utah and deposits the money collected into his bank
    account,‛ which Mower argued ‚constitut*es+ ‘substantial and
    continuous local activity.’‛ Finally, Mower argued that their
    business interactions regarding the book sales equated to Nibley
    transacting business within Utah because Mower is a resident of
    Utah.
    ¶26 When viewed in the light of the high standard for general
    personal jurisdiction set by the United States Supreme Court, we
    cannot conclude that Mower demonstrated that Nibley has
    sufficient contacts with Utah to render him ‚essentially at home‛
    here. First, Mower’s arguments rely on Nibley’s dealings with
    Mower and SISEL International, not the state. But Nibley’s
    contacts with Mower, especially those regarding this suit, cannot
    drive the jurisdictional analysis. See ClearOne, 
    2016 UT 16
    , ¶ 26
    (citing Walden, 
    134 S. Ct. at
    1122 to explain that due process
    requires that ‚the relationship [between the defendant, the
    litigation, and forum+‛ state must arise ‚out of contacts the
    defendant himself creates‛ (alteration in original) (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc.
    v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 
    578 P.2d 850
    , 853 n.10 (Utah 1978). At the
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    Mower v. Nibley
    evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed that all activities
    regarding the books occurred in Japan. Indeed, Mower even
    conceded that Utah could not exercise specific personal
    jurisdiction over Nibley. Nibley also demonstrated that he was
    not employed by SISEL International when Mower initiated this
    suit. Thus, Nibley’s relationship with SISEL International and
    Mower have little to no bearing on our jurisdictional analysis.
    ¶27 Second, Nibley’s ownership of property in Utah alone
    cannot support a sufficient relationship with the state to
    establish general personal jurisdiction. Moreover, a realistic
    evaluation of the quality of Nibley’s relationship with the forum
    shows that the majority of Nibley’s contacts with Utah are
    merely secondary to his property ownership.
    ¶28 Although Utah courts have not addressed this issue
    directly, the United States Supreme Court has explained that
    the presence of property in a State may bear on the
    existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts
    among the forum state, the defendant, and the
    litigation. For example, when claims to the
    property itself are the source of the underlying
    controversy between the plaintiff and the
    defendant, it would be unusual for the State where
    the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In
    such cases, the defendant’s claim to property
    located in the State would normally indicate that
    he expected to benefit from the State’s protection of
    his interest.
    Shaffer v. Heitner, 
    433 U.S. 186
    , 207–08 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
    The Shaffer Court further explained that the ‚presence of
    property may also favor jurisdiction in cases such as in suits for
    injury suffered on the land of an absentee owner, where the
    defendant’s ownership of the property is conceded but the cause
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    Mower v. Nibley
    of action is otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of
    that ownership.‛ 
    Id. at 208
    .
    ¶29 But the existence of property in the forum state does not
    automatically confer jurisdiction over the defendant. See 
    id.
     at
    211–12. The Shaffer Court emphasized that while ‚jurisdiction
    based solely on the presence of property satisfies the demands of
    due process, . . . it is not decisive.‛ 
    Id.
     Thus, a defendant’s
    ownership of property in the forum state is not dispositive—the
    ownership only increases the likelihood of a defendant having
    more significant contacts with the state. See 
    id.
     Therefore, a court
    must still consider the relationship among the defendant, the
    litigation, and the state to make a fair determination of whether
    jurisdiction exists.
    ¶30 Mower argues that the requisite level of contacts is
    reached because Nibley not only owned property in Utah, but
    also pays taxes in Utah and collects monthly rents. Any such
    contacts are merely incidental to his ownership of property
    within the forum state, however, and Mower has offered no
    evidence that Nibley actually pays taxes on the property. Indeed,
    from the record, the only continuous or systematic contact
    Nibley seems to have with Utah is a monthly deposit of rental
    income in his bank account. Mower has not provided any
    evidence demonstrating otherwise.
    ¶31 As the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified, ‚The
    limited number of Supreme Court cases on this point clearly
    require something more than just some revenue or contracts
    to qualify the *defendant+ as ‘at home’ in that state.‛
    ClearOne, Inc. v. Revolabs, Inc., 
    2016 UT 16
    , ¶ 40, 
    369 P.3d 1269
    .
    ‚Indeed, as a matter of common sense, there are likely
    many companies that have no official operations in Utah that
    still derive some revenue from Utah consumers. It would strain
    the Supreme Court’s standard of general jurisdiction beyond
    recognition‛ to conclude that an individual domiciled in Japan
    can fairly be said to be ‚essentially at home‛ in Utah merely
    because he once owned a rental property and continues to
    20150410-CA                     14               
    2016 UT App 174
    Mower v. Nibley
    perform the necessary secondary obligations associated with his
    wife’s ownership of the property, such as receiving rent and
    paying taxes. See id. ¶ 41.
    ¶32 Of course, the presence of property in a state may have an
    impact on the personal jurisdiction inquiry. Indeed, ‚when
    claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying
    controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be
    unusual for the State where the property is located not to have
    jurisdiction.‛ Shaffer, 
    433 U.S. at 207
    . Yet, when the property that
    serves as the basis for jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the
    plaintiff’s cause of action, jurisdiction is not reasonable. See 
    id.
     at
    207–08. The fact that renters deposit monthly rent for a single
    property that Nibley used to own in Utah is not contact ‚so
    extensive as to be ‘comparable to a domestic enterprise’‛ in
    Utah. See ClearOne, 
    2016 UT 16
    , ¶ 37 (quoting Daimler AG v.
    Bauman, 
    134 S. Ct. 746
    , 758 n.11 (2014)). We therefore conclude
    that the district court did not err in dismissing Mower’s
    complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶33 In sum, because Nibley’s pro se opposition was not a
    responsive pleading, we conclude the district court did not err
    when it found that Nibley had not waived his personal
    jurisdiction objection. Moreover, because Nibley—a resident of
    Japan—is not domiciled in Utah, we conclude that Utah courts
    cannot maintain general personal jurisdiction over him. And
    even if we assume that the analysis applicable to corporate
    defendants applied here, as Mower urges, Nibley’s few
    attenuated contacts with Utah, including his former relationship
    with Mower, SISEL International, and property ownership, are
    not ‚so continuous and systematic as to render him essentially at
    home‛ in the state. See ClearOne, 
    2016 UT 16
    , ¶ 37. Consequently,
    we conclude that the court did not err when it dismissed this
    case for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.
    20150410-CA                      15                
    2016 UT App 174