In re J.S. , 2017 UT App 197 ( 2017 )


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    2017 UT App 197
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF J.S.,
    A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
    N.P.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee.
    Per Curiam Opinion
    No. 20170622-CA
    Filed October 26, 2017
    Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Charles D. Behrens
    No. 1138567
    Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
    Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
    Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
    Virginia L. Sudbury and Alison Satterlee, Attorneys
    for Father P.S.
    Before JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN, JILL M. POHLMAN, and
    DIANA HAGEN.
    PER CURIAM:
    ¶1     N.P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s July 10,
    2017 order granting permanent custody and guardianship of her
    child to the child’s Father and terminating the jurisdiction of the
    court. Mother argues that she was denied effective assistance of
    counsel and that she was denied a reasonable accommodation
    under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA).
    In re J.S.
    ¶2     Mother first asserts that she was denied effective
    assistance of counsel. By statute, an indigent parent is entitled to
    appointment of counsel in a child welfare action. See Utah Code
    Ann. § 78A-6-1111(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). In this case,
    Mother was appointed counsel, later requested and obtained
    appointment of substitute counsel, and ultimately chose to
    represent herself with the assistance of appointed standby
    counsel. Mother does not identify any conduct by any one of her
    three appointed attorneys that supports a traditional ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim. Mother also fails to demonstrate that
    there is a reasonable probability that but for any deficiency in
    her attorneys’ actions the case would have been resolved
    differently. Accordingly, Mother has failed to demonstrate that
    she was denied effective assistance of counsel. 1
    ¶3     Mother next argues that she was denied reasonable
    accommodations under the ADA. However, Mother has failed to
    demonstrate that she preserved such a claim by requesting an
    accommodation. “[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal, the
    issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the
    1. To the extent Mother is challenging the juvenile court’s
    decision to allow counsel to withdraw and Mother to proceed
    pro se, Mother has failed to provide the court with an adequate
    record to review such claims. Mother has not provided a
    transcript of any hearing in which her right to counsel was
    discussed or in which the juvenile court resolved any of the
    motions to withdraw as counsel. Nor has Mother provided a
    transcript of the hearing in which Mother requested to proceed
    pro se. Without such transcripts, the court cannot evaluate
    Mother’s claims. See Bevan v. J.H. Construction Co., 
    669 P.2d 442
    ,
    443 (Utah 1983) (stating that “[i]n the absence of a transcript, we
    assume that the proceedings at trial were regular and proper and
    that the judgment was supported by competent and sufficient
    evidence”).
    20170622-CA                     2                
    2017 UT App 197
    In re J.S.
    trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” 438 Main St.
    v. Easy Heat, Inc., 
    2004 UT 72
    , ¶ 51, 
    99 P.3d 801
     (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re K.C., 
    2015 UT 92
    ,
    ¶ 29, 
    362 P.2d 1248
     (indicating that the juvenile court had no
    obligation to examine whether reasonable accommodations were
    made under the ADA until the parent actually “invoked” the
    Act). Mother fails to demonstrate that she ever indicated to the
    court that she believed that the services offered to her did not
    adequately take into account her alleged disability. In fact, the
    record demonstrates that the juvenile court actually did take
    Mother’s disability into account in determining the services
    Mother would be offered. Specifically, when the juvenile court
    entered its disposition order in March of 2017, it found that the
    “[s]ervices are a reasonable accommodation for the parent’s
    disability.” There is no indication that Mother objected to the
    finding or otherwise requested services that were not offered.
    Accordingly, because Mother did not preserve the issue, and has
    not otherwise argued that an exception to the preservation rule
    applies in this case, we do not address the issue on appeal.
    ¶4    Affirmed.
    20170622-CA                     3               
    2017 UT App 197
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20170622-CA

Citation Numbers: 2017 UT App 197

Filed Date: 10/26/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2021