A.T. v. State (In Re C.T.) ( 2018 )


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    2018 UT App 233
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF C.T.,
    A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
    A.T.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee.
    Opinion
    No. 20180435-CA
    Filed December 20, 2018
    Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Julie V. Lund
    No. 1137406
    Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
    Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
    Jeannine Timothy, Guardian ad Litem
    JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
    HAGEN, Judge:
    ¶1     A.T. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental
    rights as to C.T. (Child), arguing that termination was not in
    Child’s best interest. Mother relies on this court’s recent decision
    in In re B.T.B., 
    2018 UT App 157
    , contending that termination
    was not strictly necessary because the juvenile court could have
    allowed Mother’s parents (Grandparents) to have guardianship
    of Child. In B.T.B, we concluded that a court may not find that
    termination of parental rights is strictly necessary until it has
    In re C.T.
    considered or explored “less-permanent arrangements,” such as
    custody or guardianship with a family member. Id. ¶ 55. Because
    the juvenile court correctly applied our holding in B.T.B. by
    exploring guardianship and custody with Grandparents before
    terminating Mother’s parental rights, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     Mother is a minor who lives with Grandparents and her
    five younger siblings. Mother has been a caretaker of her
    younger siblings since she was eleven. When Mother was
    thirteen, she was allegedly sex-trafficked by her older sister, and
    became pregnant and contracted HIV as a result of rape by an
    unknown man. At that time, the Division of Child and Family
    Services (DCFS) took custody of Mother.
    ¶3     Mother gave birth to Child at the age of fourteen and was
    returned to Grandparents’ custody. Shortly after the birth, DCFS
    received a report that Mother had threatened to kill herself and
    Child. DCFS found Mother and Child living in a park and placed
    both in DCFS custody. 1 Mother denied that she intended to harm
    Child but threatened to harm herself if forced to return to
    Grandparents’ home at that time. DCFS filed abuse, neglect, and
    dependency petitions as to Mother and Child. At a shelter
    hearing in Child’s case, the juvenile court made findings that
    Mother had been adjudicated incompetent to stand trial in a
    1. Mother and Child remained in DCFS custody for a period of
    weeks. Grandparents later received reunification services and
    Mother was ultimately returned to their custody. Although
    Mother’s and Child’s child protection cases were adjudicated
    simultaneously, Grandparents’ fitness as parents to Mother is
    not at issue in this appeal.
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    In re C.T.
    previous delinquency matter and that she and Child should
    remain in DCFS custody.
    ¶4     Mother and Child were placed by DCFS into a girls’
    group home. While there, Mother engaged in multiple outbursts
    in which she made ostensibly aggressive and threatening
    comments toward Child. Mother also threatened to take her own
    life again but later testified that she was just angry and that she
    did not mean what she said. At one point during their stay at the
    group home, Child was removed from Mother and taken to the
    hospital because Child was dehydrated. The staff at the group
    home indicated that Mother needed ongoing supervision
    “regarding the most basic caregiving skills” for Child. The
    psychologist who later evaluated Mother drew a similar
    conclusion, testifying that Mother “does not have a bond with
    [Child]” and “does not have the cognitive capacity to make
    decisions for [Child] and keep her safe.”
    ¶5     Mother eventually returned to Grandparents’ home, but
    Child was placed with foster parents, who were friends of
    Mother and Grandparents. The juvenile court ordered
    reunification with Mother as the primary permanency goal for
    Child and adoption as the secondary goal. The court also
    ordered reunification services for Mother that required her to
    participate in “therapy to address her past trauma,” take
    medication and monitor the progression of her HIV, attend
    school, “work with her peer parent to gain parenting skills,” and
    have supervised visitation with Child. DCFS also recommended
    that Grandparents attend family therapy with Mother.
    ¶6     Although Mother attended individual therapy, she was
    never given a psychological evaluation, and Mother and
    Grandparents did not participate in family therapy. In addition,
    Mother did not participate in peer parenting and failed to take
    the medication as prescribed to address her HIV and emotional
    issues. DCFS explained at Mother’s termination trial that it had
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    In re C.T.
    failed to secure peer parenting resources because peer parenting
    had been unsuccessful during Mother’s previous case.
    ¶7      After Mother failed to complete reunification services, the
    court changed the primary permanency goal for Child to
    permanent custody and guardianship with Grandparents. 2
    Guardianship with Grandparents remained the primary
    permanency goal for only one month. At the end of the
    one-month period, DCFS requested that the primary goal be
    changed to adoption, citing a number of ongoing concerns.
    DCFS expressed concern about Child remaining in
    Grandparents’ home because Grandparents had failed to make
    sure that Mother attended medical appointments relating to her
    HIV infection, had failed to ensure that Mother’s medication was
    “filled and taken on a consistent basis,” had failed to participate
    in peer parenting, and had allowed Mother’s older sister, who
    allegedly sex-trafficked and assaulted Mother, back into the
    home. DCFS was also concerned about Grandparents’ financial
    ability to care for Child and the fact that the home was not kept
    clean and only had one bathroom. Furthermore, although
    Grandparents had placed Mother’s younger siblings in daycare,
    there were still hours during the day where Mother was the
    primary caregiver for her siblings. Thus, if Child was returned to
    Grandparents’ home, Mother would also be caring for Child
    without supervision during those times. Based on these
    concerns, the juvenile court changed the primary permanency
    goal for Child to adoption.
    ¶8    Following this final change to Child’s permanency goal,
    Child remained in the care of her foster parents. Child bonded
    2. Both parties acknowledge that the juvenile court was unable
    to set the goal as adoption by Grandparents because
    Grandparents are present in the United States under refugee
    status and are therefore unable to legally adopt.
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    In re C.T.
    with her foster parents and they expressed a desire to adopt.
    Child’s foster parents also expressed a desire that Child continue
    to have a relationship with her biological family and remain
    connected to her heritage, “as long as it doesn’t cause her
    anxiety, or angst, or confusion in any way that is harmful to her
    growth and development.”
    ¶9      A few months after Child’s primary permanency goal was
    changed to adoption, the juvenile court held a trial on the
    termination of Mother’s parental rights. Upon hearing testimony
    from a psychologist, Mother, DCFS, Child’s grandmother, and
    Child’s foster mother, the court entered findings of fact and
    conclusions of law and an order terminating Mother’s parental
    rights. As grounds for termination, the court found that Mother
    had neglected Child and was an unfit or incompetent parent.
    The court also found that guardianship with Grandparents was
    “untenable” because Mother, “as a child herself, was the child in
    her home providing the [care-giving] to her younger siblings in
    the home, and would therefore also, of necessity, be providing
    the primary care to [Child],” despite Mother’s continuing
    “emotional instability.” Because of Mother’s unfitness, and after
    finding that termination of her parental rights was strictly
    necessary, the court concluded that adoption was in Child’s best
    interest.
    ¶10   Mother appeals.
    ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶11 Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights as
    to Child, contending that the juvenile court erred in concluding
    that termination was in Child’s best interest. “The ultimate
    decision about whether to terminate a parent’s rights presents a
    mixed question of law and fact.” In re B.T.B, 
    2018 UT App 157
    ,
    ¶ 8 (quotation simplified). “We afford great deference to the
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    In re C.T.
    juvenile court’s findings of fact and overturn the result only if
    the facts are against the clear weight of the evidence,” but we
    review the court’s “interpretation of the Termination of the
    Parental Rights Act for correctness.” In re A.C.M., 
    2009 UT 30
    ,
    ¶ 8, 
    221 P.3d 185
    .
    ANALYSIS
    ¶12 Mother argues that “the juvenile court erred in
    terminating [her] parental rights without fully exploring
    whether [Child’s] best interests would be better served by
    awarding permanent custody and guardianship of [Child] to
    [Grandparents].” “To terminate parental rights, [a] juvenile court
    must make two separate findings.” In re T.E., 
    2011 UT 51
    , ¶ 17,
    
    266 P.3d 739
     (quotation simplified). First, a “court must find by
    clear and convincing evidence that there is at least one statutory
    ground for termination.” Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507
    (LexisNexis 2012) (setting forth grounds for termination).
    Second, a court must “find that termination of the parent’s rights
    is in the best interests of the child.” In re A.C.M., 
    2009 UT 30
    ,
    ¶ 23, 
    221 P.3d 185
    . Because “the relationship between parent and
    child is constitutionally protected,” In re J.P., 
    648 P.2d 1364
    , 1372
    (Utah 1982) (quotation simplified), a court may only terminate
    parental rights upon a finding that termination is “strictly
    necessary” to the best interests of the child, Utah Code Ann.
    § 78A-6-507(1).
    ¶13 On appeal, Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s
    finding that there are statutory grounds for termination. Instead,
    she challenges the court’s finding that termination was in Child’s
    best interest and, specifically, that “it was strictly necessary to
    terminate [her] parental rights given the existence of family
    members who could have raised [Child].” To support this
    argument, Mother relies on In re B.T.B, 
    2018 UT App 157
    . In that
    case, this court addressed “whether [a] juvenile court correctly
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    In re C.T.
    applied the ‘strictly necessary’ language to the historical test for
    termination of parental rights.” Id. ¶ 7. In framing our
    interpretation of the “strictly necessary” language, this court
    discussed Utah’s legal standards for terminating parental rights
    and our supreme court’s interpretation of those standards,
    noting that “every indication from our legislature and our
    supreme court demonstrates that our law has had, and continues
    to have, a rigorous test” that must be met in order to terminate
    parental rights. Id. ¶ 18. The court observed that the second step
    of that rigorous test—the best interest analysis—“is broad, and is
    intended as a holistic examination of all of the relevant
    circumstances that might affect a child’s situation.” Id. ¶ 47.
    Ultimately, the court concluded that “trial courts should analyze
    whether termination of a child’s parent’s rights is ‘strictly
    necessary’” “as part of the ‘best interest’ analysis required by the
    second element of the two-part [termination] test.” Id. ¶ 50.
    ¶14 After concluding that the “strictly necessary” finding was
    part of the best interest analysis, the court went on to define the
    term as it operates in Utah Code section 78A-6-507. Id. ¶¶ 51–53.
    Looking to dictionary definitions of “strictly” and “necessary”
    and the legislature’s decision to place the two words together in
    the statute, the court concluded that the statutory requirement
    that courts find termination of parental rights “strictly
    necessary” means that “the legislature intended for courts to
    terminate parental rights only in situations when it is absolutely
    essential to do so.” Id. ¶¶ 52–54. In order to make this finding,
    courts must examine “all of the relevant facts and circumstances
    surrounding the child’s situation, not just the specific statutory
    grounds for termination.” Id. ¶ 55. As part of this examination,
    courts must “explore whether other feasible options exist that
    could address the specific problems or issues facing the family,
    short of imposing the ultimate remedy of terminating the
    parent’s rights” and “should consider whether other
    less-permanent arrangements (for instance, a guardianship with
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    In re C.T.
    a family member) might serve the child’s needs just as well in
    the short term, while preserving the possibility for rehabilitation
    of the parent-child relationship in the longer term.” 
    Id.
    ¶15 It is this principle—that courts must consider alternatives
    to termination and adoption such as guardianship with family
    members—on which Mother’s claim of error rests. Mother
    contends that the juvenile court failed to adequately explore
    Child’s placement with Grandparents as an alternative to
    termination and adoption. Although Mother acknowledges that
    the juvenile court set permanent custody and guardianship of
    Child with Grandparents as a permanency goal for a time,
    Mother contends that no services were given to Grandparents
    “to fully explore that goal.” Neither the State nor the Guardian
    ad Litem dispute this contention, and the DCFS caseworker
    admitted at the termination trial that neither Grandparents nor
    DCFS made any progress toward the guardianship goal. But
    nothing in B.T.B. suggests that certain services must be provided
    before a juvenile court may determine that such alternatives are
    not viable.
    ¶16 Instead, B.T.B. simply stands for the proposition that
    juvenile courts must consider or explore alternatives to
    termination of parental rights before they may find that
    termination is “strictly necessary” to the best interests of the
    child. See 
    id.
     After this consideration, if a juvenile court
    determines that no such alternatives are available or articulates
    supported reasons for rejecting alternatives that do exist, such
    findings are entitled to deference on appeal. Here, the juvenile
    court not only considered guardianship with Grandparents, but
    also made this arrangement a permanency goal in Child’s case. It
    quickly became clear, however, that this arrangement was not in
    Child’s best interest. During the time when custody and
    guardianship with Grandparents was the permanency goal, the
    juvenile court found that Mother was still in Grandparents’
    home and was providing unsupervised child care for the
    20180435-CA                     8               
    2018 UT App 233
    In re C.T.
    younger siblings despite the fact that Mother’s “emotional
    instability continued.” With these circumstances in mind, the
    court changed the permanency goal to termination and
    adoption. It determined that Child “could not and should not
    return to” Mother and Grandparents’ home because Mother was
    unfit to care for Child and Grandparents could not provide
    adequate supervision. Thus, not only did the juvenile court
    consider alternatives to termination, the court specifically
    explored permanent custody and guardianship with family
    members, but rejected those options for well-articulated reasons.
    ¶17 Contrary to Mother’s argument, nothing in this court’s
    decision in B.T.B requires courts to do anything more than
    “explore whether other feasible options exist” and “consider
    whether other less-permanent arrangements . . . might serve
    [Child’s] needs just as well” as termination of parental rights. 
    Id.
    Here, the juvenile court did more than consider and explore an
    alternative to termination; the court ordered custody and
    guardianship with Grandparents as a permanency goal. Only
    after exploring this placement and finding that this arrangement
    was not in Child’s best interest did the court order termination
    and adoption as Child’s permanency goal. Accordingly, because
    the court did consider and explore alternatives before finding
    that termination of Mother’s parental rights was necessary, we
    affirm.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶18 We reject Mother’s argument that DCFS was required to
    provide additional services to Grandparents as guardians of
    Child before the juvenile court could find that termination of
    Mother’s parental rights was strictly necessary, and we affirm
    the juvenile court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental
    rights was in Child’s best interest.
    20180435-CA                     9                
    2018 UT App 233
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20180435-CA

Judges: Hagen, Mortensen, Harris

Filed Date: 12/20/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024