Degao Xu v. Hongguang Zhao , 437 P.3d 411 ( 2018 )


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    2018 UT App 189
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    DEGAO XU,
    Appellant and Cross-appellee,
    v.
    HONGGUANG ZHAO,
    Appellee and Cross-appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20160453-CA
    Filed October 4, 2018
    Fourth District Court, Provo Department
    The Honorable Derek P. Pullan
    No. 124402420
    Steve S. Christensen and Clinton R. Brimhall,
    Attorneys for Appellant and Cross-appellee
    Brandon C. Bowen, Attorney for Appellee and
    Cross-appellant
    JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DIANA HAGEN concurred.
    HARRIS, Judge:
    ¶1    Degao Xu and Hongguang Zhao divorced in 2015, after
    twenty-three years of marriage. After a bench trial and post-trial
    motions, the trial court ultimately ordered Xu to pay $534 per
    month in alimony. Both parties are dissatisfied with that ruling,
    and both appeal. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2    The parties were married in China in 1992, but later
    moved to Utah. During their marriage, Xu obtained a Ph.D. in
    physics and worked for various employers using that degree.
    During the last few years before the parties’ separation, Zhao
    Xu v. Zhao
    was working as a translator and as a Chinese-language customer
    service representative, and for a few months worked a second
    job as a hotel manager. Prior to their separation, the parties
    resided in a home with a monthly mortgage payment of over
    $1,800. In 2009, the parties began living separately, and in 2012
    Xu filed for divorce.
    ¶3     After the petition for divorce was filed, Xu submitted
    financial declarations and supporting documentation, informing
    Zhao and the court that he earned $6,080 per month, and that he
    had monthly expenses of $5,987.31, including the $1,800 monthly
    mortgage payment. For her part, Zhao also completed a financial
    declaration, but claimed she had no income whatsoever and that
    her family members helped cover her monthly expenses, which
    she estimated amounted to $3,383.57, including a $650 housing
    expense. Zhao provided some documentation for a few of her
    expenses, but failed to provide any documentation for her claim
    that she had no income.
    ¶4     After reviewing Zhao’s financial declaration, Xu made
    discovery requests asking Zhao to produce bank statements and
    tax returns. Zhao refused to comply with these requests, and Xu
    asked the trial court to order Zhao to produce the documents,
    which request the trial court granted. When Zhao failed to
    comply with the court’s order, the court imposed a “discovery
    sanction” to the effect that Zhao would “not [be] permitted to
    introduce evidence in opposition to [Xu’s] evidence of her
    income.” In accordance with this sanction, the court ultimately
    barred Zhao from introducing evidence of her income at trial.
    ¶5     The case eventually proceeded to a bench trial, which was
    held in 2015. At trial, Xu revealed for the first time that he had
    recently been fired from his job, and attempted to introduce a
    new financial declaration indicating that he had no income other
    than unemployment benefits. However, during closing
    argument, when the court asked Xu’s attorney how it should
    “deal with [Xu’s] income,” Xu’s attorney responded by stating
    that the court should impute income to Xu based on his
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    Xu v. Zhao
    employment history, asserting that $60,000 to $79,000 would be a
    reasonable range, and asking the court to “place [Xu’s] income at
    $60,000 per year.” Xu also presented evidence of Zhao’s income,
    which, per the discovery sanction, Zhao was not permitted to
    rebut. Xu presented evidence that, prior to their separation, Zhao
    had earned $2,150 per month at her primary job and $1,500 per
    month at a part-time, secondary job. At the conclusion of the
    trial, the court took the matter under advisement.
    ¶6     A few weeks later, the court issued findings of fact and
    conclusions of law. Although Xu had maintained he was
    unemployed, the court found that Xu had an “extended history
    of working at jobs ranging in annual pay from $60,000 to
    $89,000,” and “[b]ased on such history” the court imputed
    income to Xu in the amount of $76,000 per year, or $6,333 per
    month. The court further determined that Xu’s claimed expenses
    were overstated, in part because the court refused to grant Xu
    the $1,800 housing allowance on the ground that the parties
    could not afford to live at the premarital standard of living and
    because the court ordered that the marital home should be sold.
    Ultimately, the court determined that Xu’s monthly expenses
    were $3,865.89, and that Xu’s imputed income exceeds his
    expenses by over $2,400 each month.
    ¶7     The court imputed Zhao’s income for her primary job at
    $2,150 per month, but declined to consider her income from her
    secondary job, reasoning that her “need should not be based on
    working a second job any more than [Xu’s] ability to pay should
    be.” In assessing Zhao’s expenses, the court determined that
    Zhao’s $650 housing expense was acceptable because “there is
    not enough money for both parties to continue to live at [the
    marital] standard of living.” Ultimately, the court determined
    that Zhao’s monthly expenses were $3,033.57, and that Zhao
    therefore had a monthly unmet need of $883.57 per month. In
    the end, the court ordered Xu to pay monthly alimony to Zhao,
    and the court set that amount at $1,600 per month for four years,
    and then $1,200 per month for another thirteen years.
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    Xu v. Zhao
    ¶8     After the trial court issued these findings, Xu filed a
    motion asking the court to amend its findings of fact and the
    resulting alimony calculation. In his motion, Xu first pointed
    out—citing Bingham v. Bingham, 
    872 P.2d 1065
    , 1068 (Utah Ct.
    App. 1994) (stating that a “spouse’s demonstrated need must . . .
    constitute the maximum permissible alimony award”)—that the
    ceiling for any alimony award was Zhao’s unmet need, which
    the court had already determined was $883.57, and that any
    alimony award higher than that was improper. Xu also
    challenged some of the court’s specific determinations regarding
    the parties’ income and expenses. Specifically, Xu argued that
    Zhao had not done enough to prove her $650 monthly housing
    expense, which Xu asserted should be “removed” from her list
    of expenses. Next, Xu argued that the court should have
    considered Zhao’s second job when determining her income.
    Finally, Xu argued that the court should not have imputed him
    income based on his work history, because the court had not
    made a finding that Xu was voluntarily underemployed and had
    not made any findings that the job market would allow Xu to
    actually make $76,000 per year.
    ¶9     In response, Zhao argued that the trial court’s alimony
    determination was adequately supported by its factual findings,
    and posited that the court would have been within its discretion
    to determine that her expenses were in fact much higher than it
    had previously found. For example, Zhao noted that her current
    standard of living was well below the standard of living she
    enjoyed during the marriage, and that the court had nonetheless
    determined that her monthly housing expenses were $650 (the
    amount she claimed to be paying at the time of the trial) and not
    $1,800 (the amount the parties had paid on their mortgage on the
    marital home). Zhao also suggested that the parties’ respective
    standard of living could be “equalized” simply “by allocating
    them the exact same amount in current expenses,” and argued
    that her monthly expenses should be raised from $3,033.57 to
    $3,865.80 to match Xu’s. Xu filed a reply memorandum
    responding to these arguments.
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    Xu v. Zhao
    ¶10 At oral argument on the motion, the court addressed its
    decision to impute income to Xu at $76,000, and noted that it had
    made that imputation after it reviewed Xu’s work history and
    found that, while Xu did “have periods where he [was
    unemployed],” Xu was “always, in the past, able to get back” to
    full employment relatively quickly. The court also considered
    whether it should impute income to Zhao on the basis of her
    secondary job. Here, Xu argued that Zhao should be imputed
    income based on both of the jobs she held prior to separation
    because her lack of disclosure crippled the court’s ability to
    “really know how much she was receiving, how much she was
    spending, [and] what the source of those funds were.” Xu
    acknowledged that while “it’s hard to look back [several] years
    and say that it’s relevant today,” the evidence of Zhao’s income
    at the time of the separation was “all the [c]ourt had” due to her
    discovery noncompliance. The court apparently agreed with that
    argument, noting that it had decided that, “as a sanction,” Zhao
    would not be allowed to contradict evidence Xu produced
    regarding her income and that this sanction may well justify a
    decision to impute Zhao income from her second job. Finally, the
    court allowed both parties to present argument related to
    whether it correctly imputed their expenses in its initial findings.
    ¶11 After the hearing, the court issued amended findings of
    fact and conclusions of law. In these amended findings, the court
    refused to alter its previous decision to impute to Xu an annual
    income of $76,000, but did explain its decision in more detail.
    The court noted that Xu’s unemployment was a “temporary”
    condition and that Xu’s “work history demonstrated him to be
    resourceful and able to acquire new employment in his field.”
    Because of this, and because of Xu’s work history “working at
    jobs ranging in annual pay from $60,000 to $89,000,” the court
    again set Xu’s income at $76,000 per year, or $6,333 per month.
    However, the court did alter its previous conclusion regarding
    Zhao’s secondary job, and this time determined to assign to
    Zhao income received from a secondary job at a rate of $1,500
    per month, which when added to her other income of $2,150
    meant that Zhao’s imputed monthly income, for the purposes of
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    Xu v. Zhao
    the alimony calculation, was $3,650. Finally, the court elected to
    raise both Xu’s and Zhao’s housing expenses to $1,800 per
    month to allow both of them “to enjoy the same standard of
    living [they] had during the marriage.” The court declined to
    raise any of Zhao’s other expenses (such as medical expenses,
    utility bills, and insurance expenses) to match Xu’s expenses.
    Using these numbers, the court determined that Zhao’s monthly
    expenses were $4,183, leaving her with an unmet monthly need
    of $533.37. The court determined that Xu could meet that need,
    and therefore ordered Xu to pay Zhao $534 in monthly alimony.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶12 Both parties appeal from the court’s                  alimony
    determination, each raising two issues for our review.
    ¶13 First, Xu contends that the trial court erred when it
    determined, in its amended findings, that Zhao’s monthly
    housing expense was $1,800. “The trial court in a divorce action
    is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial
    and property interests of the parties, and its actions are entitled
    to a presumption of validity.” Goggin v. Goggin, 
    2013 UT 16
    , ¶ 26,
    
    299 P.3d 1079
     (quotation simplified). Thus, we will not disturb a
    trial court’s determinations unless they are “clearly unjust or a
    clear abuse of discretion.” 
    Id.
     (quotation simplified).
    ¶14 Second, Xu contends that the trial court erred when it set
    his income at $76,000 per year. “Trial courts have considerable
    discretion in determining a spouse’s income, and determinations
    of income will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of
    discretion.” Leppert v. Leppert, 
    2009 UT App 10
    , ¶ 7, 
    200 P.3d 223
    .
    ¶15 For her part, Zhao contends that the trial court erred
    when, relying on the discovery sanction, it included income
    from a second job in her income calculation. Again, we review a
    trial court’s determination of a spouse’s income for abuse of
    discretion. 
    Id.
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    Xu v. Zhao
    ¶16 Next, Zhao contends that the trial court erred when it did
    not equalize all of her imputed expenses with Xu’s. Trial courts
    have “considerable discretion” in determining the financial and
    property interests of parties and we will disturb such
    determinations only if they are “clearly unjust or a clear abuse of
    discretion.” Goggin, 
    2013 UT 16
    , ¶ 26 (quotation simplified).
    ANALYSIS
    A
    ¶17 Xu first contends that the trial court erred when it
    determined that, in order to help raise her to the same standard
    of living the parties enjoyed during the marriage, Zhao’s
    monthly housing expense should be considered to be $1,800. Xu
    challenges the trial court’s determination on both procedural
    and substantive grounds.
    ¶18 Xu’s procedural complaint is premised on the assumption
    that the trial court originally assessed Zhao’s housing expenses
    as $650, and then sua sponte raised those expenses to $1,800
    without giving Xu a chance to be heard on the matter. Xu asserts
    that no party “ask[ed] the [trial] court to find the housing
    expense to be that high,” and therefore concludes that the trial
    court acted on its own motion, and contrary to due process, by
    raising Zhao’s housing expenses. Xu notes that while he asked
    the court to amend its findings of fact, “Zhao did not file a
    motion or counter motion for additional findings of fact or a new
    trial in which she requested the Court to raise her housing
    expense, and Xu did not have an opportunity to oppose any
    such motion.”
    ¶19 The record, however, does not support Xu’s argument. As
    an initial matter, it was Xu who—in his motion to alter the trial
    court’s findings—directly challenged the $650 housing expense
    the trial court originally assigned to Zhao, and even implied that
    the court should “remove” that expense from its calculation
    entirely. Then, in her response, Zhao raised the argument that
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    Xu v. Zhao
    $1,800 might be a better reflection of her monthly housing
    expenses because it was in keeping with the parties’ standard of
    living prior to separation, and Xu had the opportunity to
    respond to that argument—and did in fact respond to it—in his
    reply memorandum. Thus, Xu put the issue of Zhao’s housing
    expense before the court in the first instance, elicited a
    responsive counter-argument from Zhao that reflected the
    reasoning which eventually swayed the court, and had the
    opportunity to respond to that counter-argument in a reply brief.
    On this record, Xu has failed to persuade us that the trial court
    raised the issue sua sponte, or that Xu had anything less than a
    full and fair opportunity to address the issue. 1
    ¶20 Substantively, Xu asserts that the trial court abused its
    discretion in setting Zhao’s monthly housing expense at $1,800
    for three reasons. First, Xu argues that the trial court acted
    improperly by setting the parties’ housing expense based on
    what they were paying at the time of their separation, but setting
    many of their other expenses based on their estimates of their
    post-separation financial needs. Xu argues that, because the
    court initially calculated his and Zhao’s expenses as of the time
    of separation, the court “opt[ed] to adopt the standard of living
    existing at the time of trial” as its time frame for assessing the
    1. To the extent that Xu is asserting that a trial court, when asked
    to reconsider one of its findings, is bound to either (a) leave the
    finding undisturbed or (b) change the finding to exactly what the
    movant requests, we find that argument unconvincing. Once a
    movant asks a trial court to reconsider a finding or conclusion,
    the trial court retains discretion to reassess that finding or
    conclusion in its entirety. Cf. County Board of Equalization of Salt
    Lake County v. Tax Comm’n ex rel. Schneiter Enters., 
    899 P.2d 1228
    ,
    1230 (Utah 1995) (stating that once a party raises an issue before
    a reviewing body, the reviewing body is “entitled to rule on
    precisely the issue [the movant] presented,” even if that places
    the movant in a worse position than he was prior to his motion).
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    Xu v. Zhao
    parties’ expenses and was therefore foreclosed from including a
    pre-separation housing expense in its calculation.
    ¶21 We disagree, because a trial court may, in its discretion,
    assess some of the parties’ expenses as of the time of separation,
    but nevertheless assess other expenses as of the time of trial. See
    
    Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
    (8)(e) (LexisNexis 2013) (stating that
    “[a]s a general rule, the court should look to the standard of
    living, existing at the time of separation, in determining
    alimony,” but noting that “the court shall consider all relevant
    facts and equitable principles and may, in the court’s discretion,
    base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of
    trial”); see also Kidd v. Kidd, 
    2014 UT App 26
    , ¶ 24, 
    321 P.3d 200
    (noting that trial courts should “avoid focusing on actual
    expenses alone when assessing need because the expense level
    during separation may be necessarily lower than needed to
    maintain an appropriate standard of living for various reasons,”
    and encouraging courts to consider “the standard of living
    during the marriage” as well as the expenses during separation
    (emphasis added) (quotation simplified)).
    ¶22 Second, Xu asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
    in setting Zhao’s monthly housing expenses at $1,800, because
    the “the evidence and testimony” on the record “cannot . . .
    support[]” that figure. Xu argues that Zhao “presented a
    financial declaration . . . reflecting that the rent on her residence
    . . . was $650 per month,” and that no evidence supported
    assigning a higher expense to her. Xu acknowledges that $1,800
    was the approximate amount of the mortgage payment on the
    marital home prior to separation. Nonetheless, Xu argues that, to
    justify assigning that amount as Zhao’s monthly housing
    expense, the court would need to make additional findings “that
    Zhao needed to spend $1,800 per month . . . to live comfortably
    or to live at any particular level,” and asserts that the court made
    no such findings.
    ¶23 We see the matter differently. We first note that the trial
    court did in fact find that its assigned housing expense reflected
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    Xu v. Zhao
    that Zhao “would be required to spend at least two times as
    much as she now pays in rent” in order “to enjoy the same
    standard of living she had during the marriage.” We construe
    that statement to be a finding by the trial court that Zhao
    required the higher housing expense in order to live at a
    particular level—the level she enjoyed during her marriage.
    Second, we note that Xu cites to no case law—and we are aware
    of none—supporting his contention that a court, in determining
    alimony, must first make a finding that the parties need a
    specific expense item in order to “live comfortably” or “at any
    particular level” before determining to assign individual
    expenses as of the date of separation rather than as of the date of
    trial. Indeed, while the alimony statute encourages courts to
    consider the standard of living that “[existed] at the time of
    separation” in determining alimony, it does not require the court
    to make specific findings explaining how each imputed expense
    contributes or fails to contribute to that standard of living. 
    Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
    (8)(e). We conclude that all of the evidence in
    the record—including, among other things, that the parties’
    spent $1,800 per month for housing during the marriage—is
    sufficient to support the trial court’s amended finding regarding
    Zhao’s housing expense.
    ¶24 Finally, Xu asserts that setting Zhao’s housing expense at
    $1,800 was unwarranted because that amount was being spent,
    prior to separation, to house the entire family, and not just Zhao.
    We are unpersuaded, for two reasons. First, we note that Xu
    specifically asked the trial court to set his housing expense at
    $1,800, even though he was also living alone, because he was
    living in the same house in which the parties had lived during
    the marriage. Where one spouse asks the court to set his housing
    expense to reflect his perceived needs and the court has no
    evidence that the other spouse has significantly different needs,
    it is not improper for the court to set the housing expense for
    both spouses at the amount requested. Cf. Sauer v. Sauer, 
    2017 UT App 114
    , ¶ 10, 
    400 P.3d 1204
     (noting that, when a husband asked
    for a higher housing allowance than his wife, and where there
    was no “claim or evidence that [the husband's] and [the wife's]
    20160453-CA                    10               
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    Xu v. Zhao
    reasonable housing needs differed or were wildly different than
    the housing they enjoyed during their marriage,” this court saw
    “no impropriety in the trial court's decision to impute housing
    needs to [the wife] in the same amount as [the husband] had
    claimed was reasonable for him”). Second, we note that it is not
    an abuse of discretion for a trial court to calculate divorcing
    spouses’ housing expenses by trying to determine what each
    spouse would need to live in a home of the same size and value
    as the marital home. See Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 
    2012 UT App 282
    , ¶¶ 14–15, 
    288 P.3d 298
     (holding that when a wife was
    “accustomed to living in a single-family home on property
    suitable for keeping horses,” setting her housing expense at the
    amount that would be required to place her in a different home
    of that variety was “the appropriate measure of her housing
    needs”). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
    setting Zhao’s housing expense at the amount Xu had requested
    be allotted for his own housing, nor did it abuse its discretion by
    setting Zhao’s housing expense at the amount she would
    theoretically need to continue to live in the type of home she
    enjoyed during her marriage: a single-family home similar to the
    marital home in which Xu continued to reside.
    ¶25 Part of the purpose of alimony is to “get the parties as
    close as possible to the same standard of living that existed
    during the marriage,” and “to equalize the standards of living of
    each party.” See Richardson v. Richardson, 
    2008 UT 57
    , ¶ 7, 
    201 P.3d 942
    . The trial court’s decision to amend its findings to raise
    Zhao’s housing expense from $650 to $1,800 was supported by
    competent evidence, and furthered these purposes of alimony.
    Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
    determination.
    B
    ¶26 Xu next contends that the court erred when it set his
    income at $76,000 per year, despite his testimony during trial
    that he was unemployed. While Xu initially argued in his brief
    that the trial court was unjustified in imputing him income
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    Xu v. Zhao
    based on his prior work history, he acknowledged at oral
    argument that he waived any challenge to the court adopting an
    imputation methodology when his counsel advocated for it at
    trial. 2 Indeed, at trial, Xu’s counsel appropriately invited the
    court to assign income to Xu based on his employment history,
    indicated that $60,000 to $79,000 would be a reasonable range of
    income to consider, and asked the court to set Xu’s income at
    $60,000. In light of this concession, Xu has narrowed his
    argument to assert that the court was not justified in assigning
    Xu an income figure of $76,000 (as opposed to $60,000).
    ¶27 “When determining the appropriate amount of alimony, a
    trial court must make findings as to the ability of the payor
    spouse to provide support.” Rayner v. Rayner, 
    2013 UT App 269
    ,
    ¶ 7, 
    316 P.3d 455
     (quotation simplified). When doing so, the
    court shall base its income determination “upon employment
    potential and probable earnings as derived from” a long list of
    factors, including “work history.” Fish v. Fish, 
    2010 UT App 292
    ,
    ¶ 14, 
    242 P.3d 787
    ; see also Olson v. Olson, 
    704 P.2d 564
    , 566 (Utah
    1985) (noting that where a spouse “has experienced a temporary
    decrease in income, his historical earnings must be taken into
    account in determining the amount of alimony to be paid”). In
    this case, Xu’s counsel invited the trial court to impute Xu’s
    income based on his work history. The court did so and, after
    determining that Xu had an “extended history of working at jobs
    ranging in annual pay from $60,000 to $89,000,” and reasoning
    that Xu’s “work history demonstrated him to be resourceful and
    able to acquire new employment in his field,” assigned Xu an
    income figure of $76,000, a figure that was well within both the
    2. We note that even if Xu had not agreed to the use of his work
    history to impute his income, the trial court would have been
    within its discretion to forbid Xu from introducing any evidence
    that he was unemployed, because Xu opted not to disclose that
    fact until the day of trial. Because Zhao had no reason to believe
    that Xu was unemployed prior to trial, Zhao had no opportunity
    to prepare for imputation-of-income arguments prior to trial.
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    Xu v. Zhao
    range of income demonstrated by Xu’s work history and the
    somewhat lower range suggested by Xu’s counsel at trial.
    ¶28 On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    by imputing Xu annual income of $76,000.
    C
    ¶29 On her cross-appeal, Zhao first contends that the trial
    court abused its discretion when it altered its initial calculation
    of her income to also reflect income from a secondary job. Zhao
    alleges that this was an abuse of discretion because the only
    “evidence before [the] court was that Zhao could not even find
    one job let alone a second,” and that there was no evidence that
    she had worked in any job since 2009. Further, Zhao argues that
    the only evidence regarding any second job was in reference to
    an eight-month period in which she worked as a hotel manager,
    and Zhao asserts that drawing long-term conclusions from an
    eight-month work history is improper. Accordingly, Zhao
    argues that she should not have been imputed any income, and
    especially should not have been imputed income from both a
    primary and secondary job.
    ¶30 While under ordinary circumstances a court’s inclusion of
    income from a second job under the conditions Zhao describes
    would give us pause, here Zhao fails to take into account the
    impact of the discovery sanction the court applied to her with
    regard to her income information. During discovery, Zhao
    refused to provide any documentation (bank statements, tax
    returns) to substantiate her claim that she was not receiving any
    income, despite being ordered to do so by the court. As a result,
    the court eventually imposed a discovery sanction, noting that
    Zhao would not be able to contradict any evidence of her income
    that Xu was able to introduce. In this case, Xu introduced
    evidence that, prior to the separation, Zhao had held both a
    primary and secondary job, and that Zhao was working both of
    those jobs at the time the parties separated. Based on this
    evidence, the trial court inferred that Zhao continued to work
    those (or similar) jobs after the parties’ separation, and due to
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    Xu v. Zhao
    her discovery violations Zhao was prohibited from contradicting
    this evidence at trial.
    ¶31 This case is similar to Breinholt v. Breinholt, 
    905 P.2d 877
    (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In that case, a trial court granted a divorce
    to a husband and wife, and issued findings of fact and
    conclusions of law concerning alimony. 
    Id.
     at 878–79. The
    husband was working two jobs at the time of the alimony
    calculation, but the court declined to consider his income from
    the second job, reasoning that it should “consider only the
    income from the equivalent of one . . . full-time job” when
    calculating its support award. 
    Id. at 880
     (quotation simplified).
    On appeal, this court disagreed, holding that “when determining
    an alimony award, it is appropriate and necessary for a trial
    court to consider all sources of income that were used by the
    parties during their marriage to meet their self-defined needs,”
    including income from a second job. 
    Id.
     (quotation simplified).
    Accordingly, we held that it was an abuse of discretion for the
    court to decline to consider the husband’s income from his
    second job. 
    Id.
    ¶32 Here, Xu presented evidence that Zhao worked two jobs
    at the time of separation, and asked the court to infer that Zhao
    continued to be so employed between the separation and the
    trial. Because of her discovery misdeeds, Zhao was not
    permitted to contradict this evidence. While the trial court
    initially seemed to support Zhao’s position, it later reasoned
    that, “because of the discovery sanction,” it was justified in
    imputing Zhao’s income at the last documented level she had
    received, including both of her jobs. In this unique situation, the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion when, pursuant to the
    discovery sanction, it elected to impute Zhao income from both
    the primary and secondary jobs she held during the last time her
    income was documented.
    D
    ¶33 Finally, Zhao contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion when it elected to equalize her housing expense with
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    Xu v. Zhao
    Xu’s but declined to equalize their other expenses, including
    utility expenses, medical expenses, and insurance expenses.
    Zhao argues that these expenses must be equalized to allow her
    to enjoy “the same standard of living” as Xu.
    ¶34 We disagree. While Zhao is correct that the “primary aims
    of alimony” include bringing “the parties as close as possible to
    the same standard of living that existed during the marriage, or
    otherwise equalizing the parties’ standards of living,” Jensen v.
    Jensen, 
    2008 UT App 392
    , ¶ 13, 
    197 P.3d 117
     (quotation
    simplified), we have consistently discouraged trial courts from
    “simply attempting to equalize the parties’ income, rather than
    going through the traditional needs analysis,” when determining
    alimony, 
    id.
     (quotation simplified). “This is so because,
    regardless of the payor spouse’s ability to pay,” alimony should
    be limited by the recipient spouse’s “demonstrated need.” 
    Id.
    (quotation simplified). Because different people may pay
    different amounts to enjoy the same standard of living, simply
    electing to equalize all of the parties’ expenses is inappropriate
    for an alimony calculation. Id.; see also Willey v. Willey, 
    951 P.2d 226
    , 231–32 (Utah 1997) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to
    impute medical expenses at a value not justified by a payee
    spouse’s demonstrated need, and reversing a court of appeals
    holding to the contrary).
    ¶35 In this case, as the trial court observed, Xu’s and Zhao’s
    basic expenses differed. As indicated by their financial
    declarations, they spent different amounts on their medical care,
    utility bills, insurance, and several other recurring expenses.
    However, the mere fact that Zhao spent less than Xu on, for
    example, medical care does not in and of itself prove that Zhao
    needed to spend more in order to enjoy the same standard of
    living as Xu did. While large expenses like mortgage payments
    tend to be borne equally by marital partners, other expenses (like
    those required for medical care) often vary greatly from person
    to person. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
    to impute Zhao expenses that matched Xu’s expenses dollar-for-
    dollar on every line-item.
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    Xu v. Zhao
    CONCLUSION
    ¶36 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining
    that Zhao’s monthly housing expenses were $1,800, imputing
    income to Xu at $76,000 per year, imputing additional income to
    Zhao based on her second job, or by declining to impute equal
    expenses to both Xu and Zhao in every category. We therefore
    affirm the trial court’s alimony calculation.
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