Murphy v. Sean Whalen & Flip Ave. LLC , 437 P.3d 619 ( 2018 )


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    2018 UT App 215
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    ROZALIND MURPHY AND NICOLE RADFORD,
    Appellants,
    v.
    SEAN WHALEN AND FLIP AVENUE LLC,
    Appellees.
    Opinion
    No. 20170730-CA
    Filed November 16, 2018
    Fourth District Court, Provo Department
    The Honorable Darold J. McDade
    No. 160400282
    Trevor Brett Fugate and Michael R. Anderson,
    Attorneys for Appellants
    Richard J. Armstrong, Attorney for Appellees
    JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
    TOOMEY, Judge:
    ¶1      Rozalind Murphy and her daughter Nicole Radford
    (collectively, Buyers) appeal the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment in favor of Sean Whalen and Flip Avenue,
    LLC (collectively, Sellers), contending the court erred in
    determining as a matter of law that Buyers failed to present
    sufficient evidence of damages. We agree with Buyers that they
    were able to produce evidence of damages. We therefore reverse
    the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of
    Sellers and remand for further proceedings.
    ¶2     Buyers “became interested in purchasing and ‘flipping’
    real property” and purchased from Sellers three properties (the
    Properties) in Detroit, Michigan. According to the Real Estate
    Murphy v. Whalen
    Purchase Contract (the Contract), Buyers paid $103,000 for the
    Properties. After purchasing the Properties, Buyers hired “a real
    estate agent to inspect [the Properties] who said they were all in
    very poor condition, one had been flooded, and one was
    occupied by a squatter.” Buyers filed a complaint against
    Sellers, 1 alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, constructive
    trust, and unjust enrichment.
    ¶3     According to Buyers, Sellers represented that the
    Properties were “‘turn-key’ rental properties,” that they would
    supply “instant cash flow,” and that they were valued higher
    than the price Sellers were asking. They claimed that they
    learned, after inspection, “one of the houses was worthless, and
    the other two (2) were worth about $2,500 each.” To mitigate
    their damages, Buyers sold the Properties for a total of $22,000.
    Their complaint claimed that they reasonably relied on Sellers’
    representations about the Properties and that they sustained
    damages exceeding $100,000.
    ¶4     Following discovery, Sellers filed a motion for summary
    judgment. Among other things, Sellers argued that all of Buyers’
    claims for relief were “barred” because they “failed to prove
    damages.” The district court granted summary judgment in
    favor of Sellers, basing its decision solely on its conclusion that
    Buyers “produced no evidence of their damages.”
    ¶5     Buyers appeal and contend the district court erred when
    it granted summary judgment in favor of Sellers because there
    1. The Contract included a choice of law provision and a forum
    selection clause, providing that Utah law would govern the
    Contract and designating Utah as the proper forum for any
    dispute arising out of the Contract. See Coombs v. Juice Works Dev.
    Inc., 
    2003 UT App 388
    , ¶¶ 9–10, 
    81 P.3d 769
    ; see also Utah Code
    Ann. § 78B-3-307(1) (LexisNexis 2012).
    20170730-CA                     2                
    2018 UT App 215
    Murphy v. Whalen
    were genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether they
    sustained damages. 2
    ¶6      Summary judgment is appropriately granted “if the
    moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
    material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). When the district court
    grants summary judgment, “we review de novo whether the
    record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
    fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law,” Dillon v. Southern Mgmt. Corp. Ret. Trust, 
    2014 UT 14
    ,
    ¶ 21, 
    326 P.3d 656
     (quotation simplified), and recite “all facts and
    fair inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable
    to the nonmoving party,” Poteet v. White, 
    2006 UT 63
    , ¶ 7, 
    147 P.3d 439
    .
    ¶7    To recover damages, the party must prove both the “fact
    of damages” and the “amount of damages.” Atkin Wright & Miles
    v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
    709 P.2d 330
    , 336 (Utah 1985).
    To prove the “fact of damages,” the party must “do more than
    merely give rise to speculation that damages in fact occurred”
    and instead must provide evidence that “give[s] rise to a
    reasonable probability that the [party] suffered damage[s].” 
    Id.
    “[T]he standard for determining the amount of damages is not
    2. Buyers raise other arguments on appeal with respect to
    whether (1) Sellers made false statements, (2) Buyers’ reliance on
    Sellers’ statements was reasonable, (3) Buyers requested proof of
    existing lease agreements, and (4) the Properties’ defects were
    discoverable “pre-purchase.” We decline to address those
    arguments because, although Sellers’ moved for summary
    judgment on these grounds, the district court did not rule on
    them. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of
    Sellers on the ground upon which the district court relied. See
    infra ¶¶ 8–9.
    20170730-CA                     3                
    2018 UT App 215
    Murphy v. Whalen
    so exacting as the standard for proving the fact of damages,” but
    “there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and
    provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise,
    estimate of damages.” 
    Id.
    ¶8     Here, the district court granted summary judgment in
    favor of Sellers based solely on its conclusion that Buyers
    “produced no evidence of their damages.” The court referred to
    Murphy’s deposition testimony in which she stated she did not
    “have any evidence of how much or whether the purchase price
    that [they] paid for [the Properties] was fraudulently inflated.”
    Although Buyers’ damages evidence may have flaws that may
    be explored on remand, Buyers have nevertheless demonstrated
    they suffered a loss between the amount for which they
    purchased the Properties and the amount they received upon
    selling them. Buyers asserted in their complaint that the
    Properties’ values were significantly lower than what Sellers
    represented they were and lower even than the price Buyers
    paid for them. Buyers purchased the Properties for $103,000 3
    and, about six months later, resold them for $22,000. They
    presented to the district court the sales contract for the resale of
    the Properties for $22,000, supporting their claim of damages.
    This was sufficient evidence to overcome a grant of summary
    judgment to Sellers based solely on the court’s determination
    there was an absence of evidence of damages.
    ¶9      We conclude that Buyers presented evidence of both the
    fact and the amount of damages. We therefore reverse the
    district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sellers
    and remand for trial or other such proceedings as may now be
    appropriate.
    3. Buyers assert that both Buyers and Sellers agree that the total
    purchase price was $110,000, even though the Contract stated
    that the purchase price was $103,000.
    20170730-CA                     4                
    2018 UT App 215
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20170730-CA

Citation Numbers: 2018 UT App 215, 437 P.3d 619

Judges: Toomey

Filed Date: 11/16/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024