Triple J Parking Inc. v. SCSB LLC ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                         
    2018 UT App 162
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    TRIPLE J PARKING INC.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    SCSB LLC,
    Appellee.
    Opinion
    No. 20170048-CA
    Filed August 23, 2018
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy
    No. 160906725
    Donald L. Dalton, Attorney for Appellant
    Matthew N. Evans and Matthew M. Cannon,
    Attorneys for Appellee
    JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JILL M. POHLMAN
    concurred.
    MORTENSEN, Judge:
    ¶1    In this case, Triple J Parking Inc. paved the property and
    put up a parking lot—and now it wants to recoup the
    improvement costs. 1 For nearly nine years, Triple J leased
    ground property from SCSB LLC, pursuant to a lease agreement,
    1. Joni Mitchell, Bob Dylan, and the Counting Crows can all
    attest: “you don’t know what you’ve got ‘til it’s gone.” Joni
    Mitchell, Big Yellow Taxi, on Ladies of the Canyon (Reprise
    Records 1970); Bob Dylan, Big Yellow Taxi, on Dylan (Columbia
    Records 1973); Counting Crows, Big Yellow Taxi, on Hard Candy
    (Geffen Records 2002).
    Triple J Parking v. SCSB
    in order to run its park-and-ride business. During that time,
    Triple J made millions of dollars’ worth of improvements to the
    property—but did not negotiate an agreement with SCSB
    regarding repayment or compensation for those improvements.
    In September 2016, the parties could not come to an agreement
    regarding renewal of the lease, and SCSB terminated the
    agreement, with the effective end date in October 2016. While
    the lease agreement with Triple J was still operative, SCSB
    negotiated a separate, future lease on the property with a new
    tenant, whose lease agreement would commence after Triple J’s
    agreement had expired and after Triple J had vacated the
    premises. Upon questioning whether the negotiations with the
    new tenant violated the non-competition clause in its own lease,
    Triple J brought suit against SCSB, alleging that SCSB breached
    (1) the non-competition provision of the ground lease agreement
    and (2) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. SCSB
    moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted
    its motion. Triple J now appeals the district court’s ruling. We
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     In November 2007, Triple J entered into a ground lease
    agreement (the Lease Agreement) with SCSB. The leased lot (the
    Property) was located near the airport and provided
    approximately six acres to Triple J for use as a parking lot, with
    an optional 2.87 acres also to be used as a parking facility.
    ¶3     The initial term of the Lease Agreement was three and a
    half years, but the Lease Agreement further specified that upon
    expiration, it would continue and renew on a month-to-month
    basis. Additionally, the Lease Agreement contained a
    non-competition provision. The Lease Agreement was silent,
    however, on the issue of any improvements made to the
    Property.
    ¶4    After the Lease Agreement became effective, Triple J
    spent millions of dollars improving the Property and
    20170048-CA                     2               
    2018 UT App 162
    Triple J Parking v. SCSB
    subsequently began operating a parking facility. Pursuant to the
    Lease Agreement, after the original term had expired in April
    2011, the Lease Agreement continued on a month-to-month basis
    until September 2016. At that time, SCSB proposed the
    elimination of the non-competition provision in the lease,
    sparking negotiations between the two parties. During these
    discussions, SCSB acknowledged that it was in dialogue with a
    third party with respect to the sale of the Property.
    ¶5     Triple J and SCSB could not reach a satisfactory resolution
    regarding the non-competition provision or a further renewal.
    Accordingly, in September 2016, SCSB served Triple J with a
    Notice of Termination of Ground Lease, and Triple J vacated the
    Property by the end of October 2016. Triple J asserts that in
    September 2016, SCSB sold, or agreed to sell, the Property to a
    competing parking business, but it was later discussed that the
    new agreement may have been a three-year lease with an option
    to purchase.
    ¶6      Upon discovering that SCSB had leased the Property to a
    competitor, Triple J filed suit, asserting two claims for relief—
    breach of the Lease Agreement and breach of the implied
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing—and seeking damages
    in the amount it had spent on improving the Property over
    many years. SCSB moved to dismiss the complaint, and the
    district court granted its motion. Triple J now appeals.
    ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶7      Triple J asserts that the district court incorrectly
    concluded that Triple J failed to allege facts demonstrating that
    SCSB breached the non-competition provision of the Lease
    Agreement by negotiating a future lease on the Property with a
    competing parking entity, to commence after Triple J’s Lease
    Agreement had expired. Similarly, Triple J asserts that the
    district court erred in concluding that Triple J failed to allege
    facts upon which a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
    good faith and fair dealing could be maintained.
    20170048-CA                     3               
    2018 UT App 162
    Triple J Parking v. SCSB
    ¶8       The grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6)
    of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure presents a question of law
    that this court reviews for correctness. See Lilley v. JP Morgan
    Chase, 
    2013 UT App 285
    , ¶ 4, 
    317 P.3d 470
    ; see also Utah R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6). When reviewing a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6), “we
    accept the plaintiff’s description of facts alleged in the complaint
    to be true . . . . The district court’s ruling should be affirmed only
    if it clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
    support of [the] claim.” America West Bank Members, L.C. v. State,
    
    2014 UT 49
    , ¶ 7, 
    342 P.3d 224
     (cleaned up).
    ¶9     The Lease Agreement was referenced several times in the
    Complaint and, therefore, the language of the Lease Agreement
    was properly considered by the district court on SCSB’s motion
    to dismiss. See Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 
    2004 UT 101
    , ¶ 13, 
    104 P.3d 1226
     (“If a plaintiff does not incorporate by
    reference or attach a document to its complaint, but the
    document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the
    plaintiff’s claim, a defendant may submit an indisputably
    authentic copy to the court to be considered on a motion to
    dismiss. The classic example is a contract where the complaint
    alleges a breach of contract.” (cleaned up)). Here, we need not
    look beyond the complaint and the language of the lease to
    determine whether a breach was sufficiently alleged.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶10 SCSB maintains, and Triple J does not dispute, that absent
    an agreement otherwise, a tenant is not entitled to compensation
    for improvements made to a leasehold. Commercial Fixtures
    & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 
    564 P.2d 773
    , 774 (Utah 1977) (“The
    right of plaintiff to recover for the goods incorporated into
    defendant’s real property must be based upon an agreement,
    either express or implied, and the stipulated facts are clear that
    none existed.”). Triple J acknowledges that the Lease Agreement
    is silent on the issue of compensation for improvements.
    Therefore, Triple J is not entitled to compensation by way of
    express agreement regarding those improvements. Instead,
    20170048-CA                      4                
    2018 UT App 162
    Triple J Parking v. SCSB
    Triple J claims that it is entitled to those sums as damages
    because SCSB negotiated with a competitor to lease the Property
    for a future period beginning after the termination of the Lease
    Agreement, thereby allegedly breaching the non-competition
    provision and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing. For the reasons that follow, we reject these contentions. 2
    I. Non-Competition Provision
    ¶11 Triple J first contends that the district court incorrectly
    concluded that Triple J failed to allege facts demonstrating that
    SCSB breached the Lease Agreement between the parties by
    agreeing to lease the Property to a competing parking entity
    after the Lease Agreement had expired. Simply stated, Triple J
    alleges that SCSB violated the non-competition provision by
    virtue of negotiating and entering into a lease with a future
    tenant while Triple J’s Lease Agreement was still operative. This
    argument fails.
    ¶12 SCSB’s actions are not prohibited under the plain
    language of the Lease Agreement. The Lease Agreement
    contains the following non-competition provision:
    Non-competition. To secure the interests of Lessee
    hereunder, and as a material inducement to Lessee
    to enter into this Lease, Lessor, its manager,
    members and affiliates will not, directly or
    indirectly compete with Lessee, its successors or
    assigns within a two (2) mile radius from the
    Leased Land. For the purposes of this paragraph,
    the term “compete” means owning, managing,
    operating, controlling, or participating in the
    2. We note that the request for damages in the amount of the
    Property’s improvements has no tether whatsoever that we can
    perceive to Triple J’s alleged injury for breach of contract. But
    this was not the basis of the district court’s conclusion.
    20170048-CA                     5                
    2018 UT App 162
    Triple J Parking v. SCSB
    ownership, management, operation or control of,
    any business, whether in corporate, proprietorship,
    or partnership form or otherwise, where such
    business involves the operation of a parking
    facility and related amenities; and the term
    “affiliate” means any legal entity or individual
    who directly or indirectly through one or more
    intermediaries controls, is controlled by, or is
    under common control with, Lessor or Lessee, as
    applicable.
    ¶13 On appeal, SCSB contends that the purpose of this
    provision was to prevent SCSB from “leas[ing] any surrounding
    property to a competing parking concern during the term of the
    Lease Agreement.” In contrast, Triple J maintains that a plain
    reading of the provision includes the Property itself. This
    difference of interpretation is immaterial. Even if Triple J is
    correct, the actual terms of the Lease Agreement do not provide
    a basis for claiming breach here. “Competing,” as specified in
    the provision, requires SCSB to be involved in the “operation of
    a parking facility and related amenities.” Here, Triple J has failed
    to assert that SCSB was involved in the operation of any parking
    facility or related amenities during the lease term. No
    “ownership, management, operation or control of” a
    competitor’s business occurred during Triple J’s lease period—
    not even for one minute—and therefore, no breach was
    sufficiently alleged. Accordingly, Triple J has failed to state a
    claim that SCSB breached the non-competition provision.
    ¶14 While Triple J alleges that the mere act of selling or
    leasing land to a tenant for a future term is the same as
    “ownership, management, operation or control of” 3 a competing
    3. See, e.g., Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 
    58 F.3d 1063
    , 1066
    (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the plain and ordinary meaning of
    operate is “to control or direct the functioning of,” or “to
    conduct the affairs of; manage” (cleaned up)); see also Nathanson
    (continued…)
    20170048-CA                     6                
    2018 UT App 162
    Triple J Parking v. SCSB
    parking concern, we are not persuaded. 4 The plain language
    of the Lease Agreement does not restrict SCSB from
    negotiating with any third party while the Lease Agreement was
    in effect. In fact, Triple J concedes, “Certainly, the parties did
    not use the word ‘lease’ in the definition of prohibited acts of
    competition.” Simply put, Triple J has failed to allege facts
    that would trigger the application of the non-competition
    provision and, therefore, Triple J fails to state a claim as a matter
    of law.
    II. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
    ¶15 Triple J also argues that the district court
    incorrectly concluded that Triple J failed to allege facts
    demonstrating that SCSB breached the implied covenant of
    good faith and fair dealing associated with the Lease
    Agreement when SCSB signed a new lease with a
    different tenant during the term of the Lease Agreement. Triple
    J seeks to recover the cost of the improvements made to
    the property—millions of dollars—based on this alleged breach.
    (…continued)
    v. Spring Lake Park Panther Youth Football Ass’n, 
    129 F. Supp. 3d 743
    , 749 (D. Minn. 2015) (“Operates has been accorded its plain
    and ordinary meaning of put or keep in operation, to control or
    direct the function of, or to conduct the affairs of; manage.”
    (cleaned up)).
    4. When interpreting a contract, we look “first to the plain
    language within the four corners of the document. . . . If we find
    the language unambiguous, we interpret the contract as a matter
    of law. We find ambiguity only where the language of the
    contract is reasonably capable of being understood in more than
    one sense.” Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 
    2009 UT 54
    , ¶ 13, 
    217 P.3d 716
     (cleaned up). Here, the language of the
    contract is unambiguous, and we interpret the non-competition
    provision as a matter of law.
    20170048-CA                      7               
    2018 UT App 162
    Triple J Parking v. SCSB
    ¶16 Under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing, each party to a contract “impliedly promises that he will
    not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or
    injure the other party’s right to receive the fruits of the contract.”
    St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 
    811 P.2d 194
    , 199
    (Utah 1991). However, the “reach of the implied covenant of
    good faith and fair dealing extends no further than the purposes
    and express terms of the contract.” Smith v. Grand Canyon
    Expeditions Co., 
    2003 UT 57
    , ¶ 22, 
    84 P.3d 1154
    .
    ¶17 To allow Triple J to recover under the facts alleged here
    would run afoul of established law. This court has previously
    rejected the notion that the implied covenant of good faith and
    fair dealing can be used to rewrite a contract, holding,
    It is fundamental that every contract imposes a
    duty on the parties to exercise their contractual
    rights and perform their contractual obligations
    reasonably and in good faith. Nonetheless, a court
    may not make a better contract for the parties than
    they have made for themselves; furthermore, a
    court may not enforce asserted rights not
    supported by the contract itself. It cannot be
    adopted as a general precept of contract law that,
    whenever one party to a contract can show injury
    flowing from the exercise of a contract right by the
    other, a basis for relief will be somehow devised by
    the courts.
    Ted R. Brown & Assocs., Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 
    753 P.2d 964
    , 970–71
    (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (cleaned up).
    ¶18 Here, Triple J received the benefits—the fruits—it was
    contractually entitled to, namely: the use of the Property and
    subsequent improvements, along with a non-competition
    agreement preventing SCSB from operating any rival business,
    for the entirety of the nearly nine-year Lease Agreement. Despite
    receiving the fruits of the contract, Triple J asks us to interpret
    20170048-CA                      8                
    2018 UT App 162
    Triple J Parking v. SCSB
    the Lease Agreement to mean that it was entitled to receive
    compensation for the improvements even though the Lease
    Agreement was silent on this point. Silence in the lease on the
    issue of improvements has consequences as a matter of law. See
    supra ¶ 10. In this case, silence means that Triple J was not
    entitled to recover costs relating to improvements that it made to
    the Property.
    ¶19 Triple J could have insisted on addressing this issue in the
    Lease Agreement, but apparently did not. It is not the place of
    this court to “make a better contract” for Triple J than it made for
    itself. See Ted R. Brown & Assocs., 
    753 P.2d at 970
    . Because
    effectively adding a term about the improvements remains
    outside the scope of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing, and because nothing in Triple J’s complaint alleges that
    SCSB interfered in any way with Triple J receiving the complete
    fruits of its contract, the district court properly dismissed the
    claim under rule 12(b)(6).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶20 The district court correctly held that Triple J failed to state
    a claim when it alleged that SCSB breached the Lease Agreement
    by negotiating a separate lease with a future tenant—effective
    after Triple J had vacated the property. Additionally, the district
    court correctly dismissed Triple J’s claim for breach of the
    implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
    ¶21    Affirmed.
    20170048-CA                     9                
    2018 UT App 162