State v. Williams , 427 P.3d 434 ( 2018 )


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    2018 UT App 96
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee,
    v.
    BRIAN K. WILLIAMS,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20160625-CA
    Filed May 24, 2018
    First District Court, Logan Department
    The Honorable Kevin K. Allen
    No. 141100362
    Elizabeth Hunt, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Aaron G. Murphy, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES KATE A. TOOMEY and DIANA HAGEN concurred.
    MORTENSEN, Judge:
    ¶1     Although he testified that the events underlying this case
    never happened, a jury convicted Defendant Brian K. Williams
    of sexually abusing his three daughters. After Defendant was
    convicted, the district court sentenced him to multiple prison
    terms, several of which are potentially for the remainder of his
    life. Because we conclude that irregularities occurred in the
    State’s juror examination, 1 we reverse his convictions and
    remand for a new trial.
    1. Juror examination is often referred to as “voir dire.” Because
    both terms describe the same “tool for counsel and the court to
    (continued…)
    State v. Williams
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     Defendant’s three daughters, Oldest, Middle, and
    Youngest, accused Defendant of sexually abusing them
    repeatedly over a five-year period. During this time, the alleged
    abuse included, but was not limited to, touching his daughters’
    breasts and pubic areas; showering with them; and on one
    occasion, forcing his daughters to undress and smear body paint
    on each other as Defendant watched.
    ¶3     The State charged Defendant with six counts of
    aggravated sexual abuse of a child and six counts of forcible
    sexual abuse. During juror examination, the trial court asked
    potential jurors about their personal and professional lives
    before allowing counsel for the State and Defendant to conduct
    additional juror examination. 2
    ¶4   During trial, the jury heard testimony from Defendant’s
    daughters, who detailed the abuse. 3 The jury also heard
    (…continued)
    carefully and skillfully determine, by inquiry, whether biases
    and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will interfere
    with a fair trial if a particular juror serves in it,” see State v. Ball,
    
    685 P.2d 1055
    , 1058 (Utah 1984), we use the terms
    interchangeably.
    2. The specific content of the State’s juror examination is set forth
    in more detail below. Infra ¶¶ 15–23.
    3. As we explain, infra ¶¶ 5–8, some of the daughters’ trial
    testimony conflicted with their testimony at the preliminary
    hearing. Other pieces of information were contradicted at trial.
    “In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence . . . in a light
    most favorable to the verdict.” State v. Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 36,
    
    299 P.3d 892
     (cleaned up). However, we also present conflicting
    (continued…)
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    testimony regarding the daughters’ difficulties in school, their
    depression, Oldest’s habit of cutting herself, and Oldest and
    Middle’s joint overdose on antidepressants and subsequent
    hospitalizations. The State’s expert testified that these behaviors
    were consistent with symptoms exhibited by sexual abuse
    victims.
    ¶5      Oldest’s trial testimony conflicted with her testimony at
    Defendant’s preliminary hearing in some respects. She initially
    testified that Defendant showered with her once or twice a
    month before the family moved, but at trial she said it happened
    only once, total, in the family’s first house. At the preliminary
    hearing, she testified that she could not recall Defendant
    touching her in the shower, but at trial she said he “cupped” her
    breasts and buttocks and washed her body. Oldest testified at
    the preliminary hearing that Defendant touched her breasts and
    vaginal area five to ten times at the first house; but at trial she
    could not recall him touching any of her body parts at the first
    house. Shortly after her assertion at trial that Defendant had not
    touched her in the first house, she testified regarding an incident
    in the first house during which Defendant had touched her
    inappropriately while wrestling.
    ¶6     Middle originally testified at length at the preliminary
    hearing about Defendant’s abuse of her sisters, but later
    admitted at trial that she had never seen him inappropriately
    touching Oldest or Youngest. When Middle initially reported
    Defendant’s abuse, she denied that he had ever inserted his
    finger into her vagina. But at trial, she testified that he did so on
    multiple occasions, explaining that she originally denied this
    behavior because she wanted to minimize the trouble Defendant
    would be in.
    (…continued)
    evidence where it is necessary to understand the issues raised on
    appeal. See State v. Holgate, 
    2000 UT 74
    , ¶ 2, 
    10 P.3d 346
    .
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    ¶7      Youngest’s testimony that Defendant left “white gooey
    stuff” on her legs after a back rub was a detail reported for the
    first time at trial. Youngest explained that she only recalled that
    fact as she was testifying. At trial, on cross-examination,
    Youngest frequently answered that she could not recall the
    information she was asked to provide.
    ¶8     All three daughters’ stories regarding the body-painting
    incident differed from one another. Oldest testified that she and
    Middle had been painting a picture when the sisters started
    painting each other. Defendant then instructed them to remove
    their clothing, and he stripped down to his underwear, before
    they all painted one another. When she was asked about this
    incident at the preliminary hearing, she denied that it occurred;
    only at trial did she allege that it took place. Middle testified that
    Defendant had told them he ordered the paints online. When he
    produced them, they all removed their clothes and started
    painting each other. Youngest also testified that Defendant
    bought the paints online and explained that he made them
    remove their clothing. Middle and Youngest testified that after
    they painted each other, all four showered together. Oldest
    made no such claim.
    ¶9     Defendant testified in his own defense and denied
    sexually abusing any of his daughters. The jury convicted
    Defendant as charged. He now appeals.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶10 Defendant argues that we should reverse his convictions
    for any one of five reasons. First, he asserts that the jury
    instructions given at trial were inadequate. Second, he asserts
    that during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor engaged
    in misconduct by (1) impermissibly bringing to the jury’s
    attention facts not in evidence, (2) arguing that Defendant lied,
    (3) disparaging the integrity of defense counsel, and (4)
    appealing to the jury’s fears by seeking a verdict to protect
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    State v. Williams
    society. Third, he asserts that the State violated rule 608 of the
    Utah Rules of Evidence by improperly bolstering the credibility
    of its witnesses. Fourth, he asserts that the State offered
    inadmissible evidence of his invocation of his right to counsel.
    And fifth, he asserts that during his testimony, he was
    improperly asked to opine on the veracity of other witnesses.
    ¶11 Defendant did not raise any of these arguments before the
    trial court. Instead, he brings his claims under the doctrines of
    ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error. To demonstrate
    ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must:
    (i) identify specific acts or omissions by counsel
    that fall below the standard of reasonable
    professional assistance when considered at the
    time of the act or omission and under all the
    attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that
    counsel’s error prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that
    but for the error, there is a reasonable probability
    that the verdict would have been more favorable to
    the defendant.
    State v. Dunn, 
    850 P.2d 1201
    , 1225 (Utah 1993). To demonstrate
    plain error, Defendant
    must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the
    error should have been obvious to the trial court;
    and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error,
    there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
    outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently,
    our confidence in the verdict is undermined.
    
    Id.
     at 1208–09.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶12 Although Defendant raises many potential grounds for
    reversing his convictions, we are persuaded by his arguments
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    regarding the irregularities and impropriety that occurred
    during juror examination. 4 Because we reverse on that ground
    and remand for a new trial, we need not consider the other
    issues raised. See State v. Holm, 
    2017 UT App 148
    , ¶ 8 n.2, 
    402 P.3d 193
    .
    ¶13 While the issue of determining when a juror examination
    has crossed the line into impermissible indoctrination is one of
    first impression, the true purpose of juror examination is well
    settled in our jurisprudence: to “determine, by inquiry, whether
    biases and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will
    interfere with a fair trial if a particular juror serves in it.” Salt
    Lake City v. Tuero, 
    745 P.2d 1281
    , 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
    (cleaned up). But the privacy interests of prospective jurors
    “must be balanced against the historic values . . . and the need
    for openness of the process.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
    of California, 
    464 U.S. 501
    , 512 (1984).
    To preserve fairness and at the same time protect
    legitimate privacy, a trial judge must at all times
    maintain control of the process of jury selection
    and should inform the array of prospective jurors,
    once the general nature of sensitive questions is
    made known to them, that those individuals
    believing public questioning will prove damaging
    because of embarrassment, may properly request
    an opportunity to present the problem to the
    judge in camera but with counsel present and on the
    record.
    4. Defendant argues that the State used the voir dire process to
    improperly bolster the credibility of his daughters’ testimony.
    Utah jurisprudence has long held that witnesses may not be
    bolstered by improper means. See State v. Adams, 
    955 P.2d 781
    ,
    786 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
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    Id.
     5 In determining whether the trial court properly balanced the
    privacy interests of the jurors with Defendant’s constitutional
    right to present the case before an impartial jury, we review the
    court’s decision for plain error. 6
    5. Other jurisdictions have held similarly. See People v. Knight,
    
    2013 IL App (4th) 111127-U
    , ¶ 45 (holding that at a minimum,
    the court’s responsibility includes “not permitting (1) courtroom
    proceedings to embarrass them and (2) trial court participants to
    engage in offensive conduct”); State v. Roby, 
    2017 ME 207
    , ¶ 12,
    
    171 A.3d 1157
     (“In order to select a qualified and impartial jury,
    the trial court has considerable discretion over the conduct and
    scope of juror voir dire, because it is the trial court that has the
    responsibility of balancing the competing considerations of
    fairness to the defendant, judicial economy, and avoidance
    of embarrassment to potential jurors.” (cleaned up)); People v.
    Mulroy, 
    439 N.Y.S.2d 61
    , 65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (“[In
    conducting voir dire] . . . this court conceives that it has the
    highest obligation, first, to the prospective juror that, if sworn, he
    may serve with a free mind, unfettered by personal discomfiture,
    embarrassment or subconscious restraint and, second, to all who
    stand before the bar of justice, to assure that such juror will be
    ultimately able to make his determination fairly and impartially,
    without fear, favor or sympathy.”).
    6. We would reach the same result if we instead reviewed
    Defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
    to object to the juror examination process. This is because the
    same error that should have been plain to the trial court should
    have alerted trial counsel to act. There was no strategic reason
    not to object, and in choosing not to, trial counsel’s performance
    fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Likewise,
    where we conclude that Defendant was harmed by the trial
    court’s failure to intervene, we would conclude that trial
    counsel’s performance prejudiced Defendant. Cf. State v. Bruun,
    
    2017 UT App 182
    , ¶ 79, 
    405 P.3d 905
     (explaining that “the
    (continued…)
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    ¶14 Defendant argues that “the prosecution began its
    campaign to bolster the alleged victims at the outset of the jury
    selection.” After reviewing the transcript of juror examination,
    we agree. We conclude that an error occurred and that the error
    should have been obvious to the trial court. Because Defendant’s
    challenge is best understood by experiencing the flow of the
    State’s juror examination in its odd entirety, we quote at length
    from it. Any emphasis is our own.
    ¶15 The prosecutor began by sharing, “My experience has
    been that jurors want to do a good job. They want to do a good
    job. They just want to make sure they understand all the
    evidence, and they want to do a good job.” She then assured the
    prospective jurors, “So as I talk to you right now, just
    understand there are not right or wrong answers. I’m just trying
    to find out how you view life, how you view your job as a juror,
    things of that nature, and maybe what your thoughts are on child sex
    abuse . . . . So please feel free to raise your hand.”
    ¶16 After encouraging members of the venire to “just be
    honest,” she initiated a discussion about child sex abuse:
    [Prosecutor]: How do you know children are
    sometimes sexually abused?
    ....
    [Prospective Juror]: Well, I can think of three
    friends that have either had someone in their
    family sexually abused or themselves.
    [Prosecutor]: Were these close friends?
    [Prospective Juror]: Well, they’re friends. I—
    (…continued)
    prejudice standard under ineffective assistance of counsel and
    plain error is the same”).
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    [Prosecutor]: Friends, okay. That you’re aware—
    [Prospective Juror]: They’re not my closest friends.
    [Prosecutor]: Yeah, but you—they shared with you
    the fact that they’ve had children in their family abused
    and so on and so forth. So how is it that society sort
    of proves or becomes aware of child sex abuse?
    Prospective jurors provided answers, such as, “Well, the person
    that has done that to the child has said that they did,” and “Or it
    is medically proven.”
    ¶17 Apparently not hearing the answer she wanted, the
    prosecutor continued, “So let’s say someone decides to be really
    brave and say, ‘Okay, okay, okay, I’ve been touching a kid.’ That
    may happen. I’ve never seen it, but—I’m only kidding. But how
    else?” An inaudible response was given, and then the prosecutor
    stated, without getting an answer from any member of the jury
    pool, “So a child may be acting weird or they may say
    something, and then an adult gets wind of that and then they
    report that. Is that generally what happens? In the end, what is it
    that causes it? Isn’t it that the child says . . . something is
    bothering me.” 7
    ¶18 Next, the prosecutor asked, “So you as jurors in a case like
    this, are you going to require anything more in terms of physical
    evidence or other corroboration necessarily?” After receiving an
    inaudible response, she began talking about “CSI or Law and
    Order or Boston Legal” regarding “physical evidence” and
    asserted, “I’m just going to tell you that I think you know this,
    but it’s actually an important concept to realize that we are not
    7. The official transcript ends this sentence with a period, rather
    than a question mark. Given the declaratory tone of most of this
    portion of the juror examination, we do not think that is a
    mistake.
    20160625-CA                      9                 
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    required to do CSI investigations or work. We just have to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” She asked, “Would any of you
    require that type of evidence in order to convict someone of this
    type of crime?” When she saw “some brow furrowing” she
    followed up with one of the prospective jurors:
    [Prosecutor]: What are you thinking up there, Ms.
    [K.]?
    [Ms. K.]: I’m thinking maybe so.
    [Prosecutor]: Okay, maybe so. Okay, tell me about
    that. That’s fine.
    [Ms. K.]: I mean I don’t know that it would need to
    be D—I don’t know. I’m not sure what evidence[.]
    Eventually the prosecutor elicited from Ms. K. that she would
    likely expect to see more evidence than solely “a child’s report in
    and of itself.”
    ¶19 With this understanding, the prosecutor switched course
    and began discussing “general rule[s]” about child sexual abuse.
    She asked, “[I]s a child abused in secret or somewhere where it is
    not secret?” Without pausing for an answer, she stated,
    So that’s kind of a no brainer, right? Everybody
    understand[s] . . . who is usually there? The
    perpetrator and the child, right? Okay.
    So who are the only two people in the world who
    really know what really happened? Just those two. If
    a child is touched, and it isn’t reported
    immediately, is that something that we’re
    necessarily going to have physical evidence of?
    Does that mean it didn’t happen? No. Okay.
    ¶20 Next came a conversation about delayed reporting and
    why that might occur. Some prospective jurors provided
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    answers—fear, guilt, and grooming. 8 When the answer
    “grooming” was given, the prosecutor replied, “Grooming,
    okay. Okay. Very good. Very good.”
    ¶21 Changing tack, the prosecutor engaged in the following
    exchange:
    [Prosecutor]: Now I sometimes do this, and it’s
    really awful, but . . . I sometimes say—who do I
    want to pick on? I wonder if you would turn to Ms.
    [M.] there and—is it [M.]?
    [Ms. M.]: Uh-huh.
    [Prosecutor]: Okay. If you would just tell her about
    the very last sexual experience you had, and if you
    could be very detailed, okay? Please make sure you
    don’t (inaudible) the body parts and where
    everybody put everything and all of that. Would
    you mind just turning and just sharing that with
    her?
    Meaning to use this as a demonstration of how the court system
    often asks victims in child sexual abuse cases to testify as to
    “some pretty embarrassing things,” she ended the inquiry
    without actually requiring the venire to engage in such an
    8. The definition of grooming ranges from “testing the waters”
    and “breaking down boundaries so as to not get caught,” see
    Benedict v. State, No. 05-15-00958-CR, 
    2016 WL 3742127
    , at *3
    (Tex. App. July 7, 2016), to “less intrusive and less highly
    sexualized forms of sexual touching, done for the purpose of
    desensitizing the victim to future sexual contact,” see People v.
    Steele, 
    769 N.W.2d 256
    , 269–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). Given
    varying definitions of what grooming might mean, it can
    certainly be considered a loaded term and it is unclear from the
    record what the prospective juror was referring to.
    20160625-CA                   11                
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    State v. Williams
    intimate conversation. She said, “I’m not going to ask you do
    that. Why do I ask that? Why do I ask that?” And when someone
    gave the answer she was looking for, she replied, “There we go.
    There we go.”
    ¶22 The discussion shifted to the topic of changed stories and
    why someone might give different accounts of the same story.
    The prosecutor frequently replied to prospective jurors’ answers
    by saying things like, “Yeah, exactly,” or, “That’s exactly right.”
    Then she discussed with the venire whether we can “tell who
    touches children by looking at them.” Receiving no answers
    from individual members of the jury pool, the prosecutor
    presented a string of questions, the answers to which were
    implied:
    Can we tell by how much money they make? Can
    we tell by how old they are? Can we tell by how
    they look?
    What about their personality? What about if
    they’re very charming? Does that tell us? Do
    charming people touch children? Do you think?[ 9]
    ¶23 Finally, the prosecutor ended with what we consider
    standard juror examination questions regarding prospective
    jurors’ willingness to “sit in judgment of another person,”
    whether they would feel “uneasy about having to hear about
    sexual abuse,” whether anyone “just doesn’t want to be here,”
    and whether there was “anything that [they could] think of that
    makes [them] feel like” they should not sit on the jury.
    9. This portion of the juror examination is important in light of
    the State’s closing argument, when the prosecutor mirrored
    these words: “[Defendant] is very charming. He’s likeable.” This
    passage particularly informs our consideration of whether the
    juror examination process prejudiced Defendant. See infra ¶ 38–
    40.
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    ¶24 Defendant now argues that the prosecutor’s juror
    examination was “more of a Socratic lecture on why the jurors
    should believe the [victims], despite and even because of the
    inconsistencies in their claims.” He complains that “rather than
    asking questions designed to skillfully cull [honest] attitudes
    from the jurors, the prosecutor asked the panel of prospective
    jurors a number of rhetorical questions designed to indoctrinate
    the jurors on the State’s theor[ies]” of the case.
    ¶25 The State responds that the juror examination simply
    involved “friendly responses to juror answers,” and suggests
    that because “none of these questions or comments related to
    any particular witness or testimony,” juror examination was
    “merely designed to ferret out biases among the jurors that
    might predispose them to disbelieve children.” For several
    reasons, we cannot agree that the prosecutor’s juror examination
    was as innocuous as the State asserts.
    ¶26 First, the prosecutor posed “hypothetical questions
    closely approximating the facts of the case . . . and delivered a
    lecture.” See State v. Martin, 
    877 N.W.2d 859
    , 860 (Iowa 2016)
    (reviewing this and more concerning behavior in a prosecutor’s
    juror examination but refusing to grant a new trial “[i]n part
    because [the defendant] did not object in the district court to all
    the statements he challenge[d] on appeal”). Such questions, and
    the relevant fact scenarios, included:
    •   “If a child is touched, and it isn’t reported
    immediately, is that something that we’re
    necessarily going to have physical evidence of?
    Does that mean it didn’t happen? No. Okay.”
    Defendant’s daughters delayed reporting, and
    there was no physical evidence of their abuse.
    •   “Do charming people touch children?” The
    prosecutor later described Defendant as
    “charming.”
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    State v. Williams
    •   “So let’s say someone decides to be really brave
    and say, ‘Okay, okay, okay, I’ve been touching
    a kid.’ That may happen. I’ve never seen it,
    but—I’m only kidding.” Defendant never
    wavered on his position that he had never
    touched his daughters inappropriately, and by
    presenting denial as an inference of guilt during
    juror examination, the prosecutor improperly
    indoctrinated the jury to react favorably to the
    same argument at trial.
    ¶27 Additionally, the prosecutor devoted much of her juror
    examination to making statements and posing rhetorical
    questions rather than inquiring into the prospective jurors’
    thoughts and attitudes, including:
    •   Making proclamations about the general
    pattern of sexual abuse, such as, “[I]s a child
    abused in secret or somewhere where it is not
    secret? So that’s kind of a no brainer, right?”
    •   Telling the venire its options for whom to
    believe at trial. “So who are the only two people
    in the world who really know what really
    happened? Just those two.”
    •   Indicating when prospective jurors gave
    answers she liked and praising them, showing
    (despite her opening remarks to the contrary)
    that there were indeed right and wrong
    answers. “Okay. Very good. Very good.”
    “There we go. There we go.” “Yeah, exactly.”
    “That’s exactly right.”
    ¶28 Finally, in many instances, the prosecutor posed
    questions without awaiting a response. “Isn’t it that the child
    says . . . something    is    bothering     me.”     “Everybody
    understand[s] . . . who is usually there? The perpetrator and the
    child, right? Okay.” On this point, we consider persuasive a
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    Virginia case discussing juror examination questions posed by a
    trial judge.
    Proof of a prospective juror’s impartiality should
    come from him and not be based on his mere
    assent to persuasive suggestions. When asked by
    the court, a suggestive question produces an even
    more unreliable response. A juror’s desire to say
    the right thing or to please the authoritative figure
    of the judge, if encouraged, creates doubt about the
    candor of the juror’s responses.
    Bradbury v. Commonwealth, 
    578 S.E.2d 93
    , 95 (Va. Ct. App. 2003)
    (cleaned up). And like the judge’s questions in Bradbury, the
    prosecutor’s questions in the present case
    were leading, long, and complex. They suggested
    the answer that the [prosecutor] preferred to hear,
    compressed several issues into one phrase, and
    generally incorporated several legal concepts.
    These questions constituted persuasive suggestions
    more than an impartial inquiry and, as such, were
    an ineffective means [of conducting voir dire].
    See 
    id. at 96
     (citation omitted). 10 While jurors ordinarily might
    place more weight on a judge’s comments than those of the
    10. This is to say nothing of the concept of “commitment” or
    “stake out” questions. See Haarhuis v. Cheek, 
    805 S.E.2d 720
    , 725
    (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (“A stake out question asks a juror to
    pledge himself or herself to a future course of action by asking
    what verdict the prospective juror would render, or how they
    would be inclined to vote, under a given state of facts.” (cleaned
    up)); Standefer v. State, 
    59 S.W.3d 177
    , 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
    (“Commitment questions are those that commit a prospective
    juror to resolve, or to refrain from resolving, an issue a certain
    way after learning a particular fact.”). Some states have
    (continued…)
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    State, the State’s representative commands similar respect, and
    with that respect the same inherent danger exists that, when
    improperly prompted, a juror will attempt to say the “right”
    thing or otherwise please the prosecutor with certain responses.
    This danger is heightened in a group setting where jurors may
    be inclined to make socially acceptable responses.
    ¶29 The process employed by the prosecutor in this case was
    not designed to find out what jurors’ thoughts or attitudes were,
    but instead served as an attempt to influence the jury panel—in
    effect intentionally tainting it with a bias favorable to the State’s
    case. And while the prosecutor never couched her questions or
    comments by reference to a specific victim, it is clear, given the
    context, that the prosecutor was essentially arguing the State’s
    case and inappropriately bolstering the anticipated testimony of
    the alleged victims.
    ¶30 This is not the purpose of juror examination. See supra
    ¶ 13. A party is not permitted to argue a case under the auspices
    of jury selection. A majority of the cases we discovered that have
    ruled on this issue do not allow questions or statements that
    serve to “pre-educate and indoctrinate jurors as to the [party’s]
    theory of the case.” People v. Boston, 
    893 N.E.2d 677
    , 681 (Ill. App.
    Ct. 2008); see also, e.g., People v. Landry, 
    385 P.3d 327
    , 354 (Cal.
    (…continued)
    prohibited these sorts of questions during juror examination
    altogether. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 
    923 A.2d 44
    , 54 (Md. 2007);
    State v. Parks, 
    378 S.E.2d 785
    , 787 (N.C. 1989); Hyundai Motor Co.
    v. Vasquez, 
    189 S.W.3d 743
    , 756 (Tex. 2006); Standefer, 
    59 S.W.3d at 183
    . And while we have encountered no Utah case addressing
    these sorts of questions, we note that the prosecutor’s juror
    examination included questions that may offend the standards
    of those other states. See supra ¶ 18 (“[A]re you going to require
    anything more in terms of physical evidence or other
    corroboration necessarily?”; “Would any of you require that type
    of evidence in order to convict someone of this type of crime?”).
    20160625-CA                     16                 
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    State v. Williams
    2016) (holding that it is not the purpose of juror examination to
    educate, compel, prejudice, indoctrinate, or instruct the jury);
    Preston v. State, 
    306 A.2d 712
    , 715 (Del. 1973) (“Too often we see
    the [v]oir dire process being misused to argue the case, to
    indoctrinate the jury, and to seek other undue advantage.”);
    People v. Bell, 
    505 N.E.2d 365
    , 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (reversing
    where a juror examination “went beyond a probe for bias and
    sought to educate the jury and convert the panel to [the
    prosecutor’s] beliefs” and other grounds); Coy v. State, 
    720 N.E.2d 370
    , 372 (Ind. 1999) (holding a party’s “attempt to
    indoctrinate the jury during [juror examination] may require
    reversal if his or her questions amount to misconduct”); State v.
    Iromuanya, 
    806 N.W.2d 404
    , 425 (Neb. 2011) (holding that
    “parties may not use [juror examination] to impanel a jury with
    a predetermined disposition or to indoctrinate jurors to react
    favorably to a party’s position”); Khoury v. Seastrand, 
    377 P.3d 81
    ,
    86 (Nev. 2016) (noting that “while counsel may inquire to
    determine prejudice, he cannot indoctrinate or persuade the
    jurors” (cleaned up)); State v. Broyhill, 
    803 S.E.2d 832
    , 841 (N.C.
    Ct. App. 2017) (holding that counsel may not attempt to cause
    jurors to “pledge themselves to a particular position in advance
    of the actual presentation of the evidence”(cleaned up)); State v.
    Frederiksen, 
    700 P.2d 369
    , 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that
    juror examination questions must be reasonably calculated to
    “discover an actual and likely source of prejudice” (cleaned up)).
    ¶31 Furthermore, a majority of the cases that we have
    discovered relevant to this issue have held that questions or
    statements about specific defenses, scenarios, or evidence—even
    presented as hypotheticals—should be excluded from juror
    examination. 11 See, e.g., Boston, 
    893 N.E.2d at 681
    ; see also Steelman
    v. State, 
    602 N.E.2d 152
    , 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
    11. While there are exceptions for “matters of intense
    controversy,” those exceptions do not apply in the present case
    against Defendant. See People v. Boston, 
    893 N.E.2d 677
    , 681 (Ill.
    App. Ct. 2008).
    20160625-CA                      17                 
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    State v. Williams
    juror examination “should not be used to begin trying the case
    before evidence has been presented”); State v. Holmes, 
    5 So. 3d 42
    , 56 (La. 2008) (holding that “Louisiana law clearly establishes
    that a party interviewing a prospective juror may not ask a
    question or pose a hypothetical scenario which would demand a
    commitment or pre-judgment from the juror”); Iromuanya, 806
    N.W.2d at 425 (holding that “counsel may not use [juror
    examination] to preview prospective jurors’ opinions of the
    evidence that will be presented”); State v. Johnson, 
    706 S.E.2d 790
    ,
    793 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “a defendant is not entitled
    to put on a mini-trial of his evidence during [juror examination]
    by using hypothetical questions [or] situations to determine
    whether a juror would cast a vote for his theory”); Broyhill, 803
    S.E.2d at 841 (holding that “stakeout” questions were improper
    where counsel posed “hypothetical evidence or scenarios to
    attempt to ‘stake-out’ prospective jurors” (cleaned up)); State v.
    Janis, 
    2016 SD 43
    , ¶ 23, 
    880 N.W.2d 76
     (holding that “questions
    regarding what the jurors considered to be signs of intoxication”
    were impermissible). Simply stated, these types of “stakeout”
    questions are improper.
    ¶32 The issue of determining when a juror examination has
    crossed the line into impermissible indoctrination is one of first
    impression. While Utah case law does address situations in
    which the juror examination is too restrictive, we have not found
    any Utah case discussing when juror examination is too
    permissive. See State v. Saunders, 
    1999 UT 59
    , ¶¶ 38, 43, 
    992 P.2d 951
     (reversing and remanding where defense counsel was
    prohibited from investigating possible bias regarding
    “specialized knowledge concerning child sexual abuse” during
    juror examination); State v. Holm, 
    2017 UT App 148
    , ¶ 18, 
    402 P.3d 193
     (reversing and remanding where the trial court did not
    permit questions regarding “jurors’ experiences and the
    experiences of persons close to them in serious car collisions”);
    Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps. & Clinics, 
    2008 UT App 222
    ,
    ¶ 1, 
    188 P.3d 490
     (reversing and remanding where the trial court
    refused to allow questions regarding jurors’ attitudes toward
    tort reform and medical malpractice).
    20160625-CA                     18                
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    State v. Williams
    ¶33 Nevertheless, as pointed out above, the proper purpose of
    juror examination is well established in Utah law. The
    prosecutor’s approach departed from this well-established
    purpose and the prosecutor’s departure should have been
    obvious to the judge. Looking to other jurisdictions supports the
    conclusion that error occurred here. People v. Knight, 
    2013 IL App (4th) 111127-U
    , is instructive in this case. There, the court
    reviewed a defendant’s convictions for sexual assault and
    aggravated sexual abuse. Id. ¶ 2. During juror examination, the
    prosecutor asked prospective jurors, “Would somebody
    volunteer to tell all of us about your last sexual experience?” Id.
    ¶ 6. Presumably because no one volunteered, the prosecutor
    followed up with, “How about last year, experience from last
    year? Doesn’t have to be the most recent.” Id. Again, the
    prosecutor had no takers. So he asked a specific prospective
    juror, “Why didn’t you raise your hand and tell everybody about
    that[?]” Id. This led to a discussion about “feelings of
    nervousness and embarrassment and that sort of thing involved
    and attached to that question,” as well as how difficult it would
    be for a fifteen-year-old girl to share details about sexual abuse
    by her stepfather. Id.
    ¶34 The Illinois Appellate Court reviewed for plain error the
    defendant’s claim that “the prosecutor improperly indoctrinated
    the jurors during [juror examination].” Id. ¶ 33. Noting that
    “[t]he threshold question, o[f] course, is whether any error
    occurred at all,” the court concluded, “Here, an error occurred.”
    Id. ¶¶ 35–36. It explained:
    [Juror examination] is not to be used as a means of
    indoctrinating a jury, or impaneling a jury with a
    particular predisposition. In this case, the
    prosecutor erroneously incorporated specific facts
    from his case into his [juror examination] inquiry,
    essentially attempting to bolster his star witness’s
    credibility before the trial began[.]
    20160625-CA                    19                
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    State v. Williams
    Id. ¶ 36 (cleaned up). Ultimately, though, the Illinois court
    concluded that the defendant had not been prejudiced by this
    error and affirmed his convictions. Id. ¶¶ 37, 50. 12
    ¶35 The similarity between portions of the State’s juror
    examination in the present case and that at issue in Knight allows
    us to easily and similarly conclude, “Here, an error occurred.”
    See id. ¶ 36. Both cases involved a father figure allegedly sexually
    abusing his daughters. Both prosecutors asked inappropriately
    intimate questions about the jurors’ sex lives. Both prosecutors
    used their examination questions to segue to a discussion
    regarding the difficulties of sharing intimate details in a public
    setting. And in doing so, both prosecutors improperly attempted
    to bolster the victim’s credibility. We accordingly conclude, like
    the Illinois Appellate Court, that the “prosecutor should never
    have asked these questions, and once they were asked, the trial
    court should have emphatically stopped this line of inquiry.” See
    id. ¶ 44. Because the trial court presiding over Defendant’s case
    did not intervene, it erred.
    ¶36 We note that in the present case, the improper juror
    examination went far beyond the error identified in Knight.
    Additional problematic questions posed by the prosecutor in this
    case make it a clear call. Here, the prosecutor impermissibly
    used juror examination to preview and argue her case,
    explaining how child sex abuse cases are reported, investigated,
    and proven at trial and coaching the potential jury members on
    how they should evaluate the evidence. In People v. Boston, 
    893 N.E.2d 677
     (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), the Appellate Court of Illinois
    12. However, a member of the panel dissented, arguing “the
    error rises to the level of plain error.” People v. Knight, 
    2013 IL App (4th) 111127-U
    , ¶ 53 (Turner, J., dissenting). Because the
    case “hinged on credibility,” and the prosecutor’s improper juror
    examination was “designed to bias the jurors in assessing
    credibility,” the dissent concluded that the error was prejudicial.
    Id. ¶ 54.
    20160625-CA                     20                
    2018 UT App 96
    State v. Williams
    reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision to allow
    counsel to ask similar questions, such as
    is there anyone that believes if a person or a
    woman gets an order of protection against
    someone and then invites that person over that she
    has the [order of protection] against, does anyone
    believe that the invitation itself equals consent to a
    later sexual act? . . . [I]s there anyone that believes a
    person consents to a sexual act if they [do not]
    scream or fight or kick or yell or scratch or hit?
    Anyone require a victim to do any of those things
    while [she is] being assaulted?
    Id. at 681. The court held that these questions impermissibly
    “highlighted factual details about the case and asked prospective
    jurors to prejudge those facts.” Id.
    ¶37 Again, we conclude that a similar error occurred in this
    case, which should have been obvious to the trial court.13 When
    the prosecutor veered from acceptable juror examination
    territory, the trial court allowed it. Furthermore, the trial court
    allowed the prosecutor to improperly bolster the anticipated
    testimony of the daughters and invited the jury to prejudge the
    case. This process was disconnected with the true purpose of
    juror examination, which is to “determine, by inquiry, whether
    biases and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will
    interfere with a fair trial if a particular juror serves in it.” Salt
    13. Illinois’s plain-error doctrine requires “a clear or obvious
    error,” id. ¶ 34 (majority opinion), similar to our requirement
    that an appellant arguing plain error demonstrate that “the error
    should have been obvious to the trial court,” State v. Dunn, 
    850 P.2d 1201
    , 1208–09 (Utah 1993). Thus, while the Knight court did
    not explicitly decide that the error was clear or obvious, its
    conclusion that there was an error implies that clear or obvious
    error occurred.
    20160625-CA                      21                 
    2018 UT App 96
    State v. Williams
    Lake City v. Tuero, 
    745 P.2d 1281
    , 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
    Using juror examination as a tool to indoctrinate the jury on a
    party’s argument or bolster anticipated witness testimony is
    improper.14
    ¶38 As stated, the multiplicity of the prosecutor’s divergence
    from the established purpose of juror examination was error and
    should have been obvious to the trial court. We are thus tasked
    with considering whether “absent the error, there is a reasonable
    likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or
    phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
    undermined.” State v. Dunn, 
    850 P.2d 1201
    , 1208–09 (Utah 1993).
    We conclude that had error not occurred, there is a reasonable
    likelihood that Defendant would have had a more favorable
    outcome. Our reasoning is two-fold.
    ¶39 First, the prosecutor’s attempts to bolster the victims’
    credibility were not isolated incidents, but permeated the State’s
    entire juror examination. When she did ask questions, they were
    almost always premised on facts—presented as hypotheticals—
    that mirrored the actual facts of this case. See supra ¶¶ 27–28.
    Instead of asking open-ended questions, her questions
    resembled those one would expect to hear on cross-examination.
    See supra ¶¶ 27–28. In short, where the juror examination process
    was replete with suggestive questions and improper allusions to
    the actual facts of this case, and lacking in questions meant to
    root out biases, Defendant’s trial was tainted before it began.
    14. In Utah’s trial courts, the days of perfunctory—and often
    insufficient—judge-only-conducted juror examination are gone.
    Indeed, our rules now expressly provide for attorney-conducted
    juror examination, see Utah R. Crim. P. 18(b), and many judges
    and attorneys wisely embrace the conscientious use of a well-
    drafted questionnaire. But a free-for-all attorney-conducted juror
    examination in the presence of the entire venire carries with it a
    substantial risk of irreparably tainting the entire panel and
    effectively guaranteeing the resulting mistrial.
    20160625-CA                    22               
    2018 UT App 96
    State v. Williams
    ¶40 Second, the case turned on the credibility of the victims,
    and the improper juror examination predisposed the jury to
    believe the victims’ testimony, despite evidence of inconsistency.
    We acknowledge that the State presented a large amount of
    evidence indicating Defendant’s guilt. But that evidence was not
    without its problems, and ultimately the case turned entirely on
    the victims’ testimony. The incongruities in the daughters’
    testimony, see supra ¶¶ 5–8, thus compound the concerns that
    began during juror examination and undermine our confidence
    in Defendant’s convictions. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. We
    therefore reverse.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶41 We reverse Defendant’s convictions. Given the trial
    court’s failure to intervene in the State’s improper juror
    examination, the court plainly erred. Coupled with the
    inconsistencies in the evidence, our confidence in the jury’s
    verdicts is undermined. We therefore remand for a new trial.
    20160625-CA                    23               
    2018 UT App 96