State v. Walton , 2019 UT App 187 ( 2019 )


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    2019 UT App 187
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee,
    v.
    ROBERT BRIAN WALTON,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20170977-CA
    Filed November 21, 2019
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Paul B. Parker
    No. 121903179
    The Honorable Mark S. Kouris
    No. 161907013
    Deborah L. Bulkeley, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN M. HARRIS
    concurred.
    APPLEBY, Judge:
    ¶1    In 2014, Robert Brian Walton entered an Alford plea 1 to
    one count of retaliation against a witness, KB, a woman he had
    previously dated. As part of his sentence, Walton agreed to the
    1. “An Alford plea is a type of guilty plea in which a defendant
    does not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his
    right to a trial and authorizes the court for purposes of the case
    to treat him as if he were guilty.” State v. Archuleta, 
    2019 UT App 136
    , ¶ 5 n.2, 
    449 P.3d 223
     (quotation simplified).
    State v. Walton
    entry of a permanent criminal stalking injunction (Injunction),
    which prohibited him from contacting KB and her family. In
    2017, after violating the Injunction, Walton asked the district
    court to vacate the Injunction as an “illegal sentence.” The court
    denied the motion and we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2      Walton and KB started dating in 2010 but the relationship
    began to sour the following year. In 2011, KB tried to end the
    relationship but Walton continued to contact her. Walton went
    to KB’s workplace after repeatedly calling her, to convince her to
    go to his house. He yelled, “Know your place. Submit, woman.”
    KB called the police and made a report. After KB filed the police
    report, Walton began contacting her saying she needed to “fix”
    the report and “get rid of it” because it was going to hurt his
    career.
    ¶3      KB made several other police reports that same year. On
    one occasion, Walton went to KB’s birthday party and got into
    an altercation with one of the guests. He showed up at her
    apartment the following day and demanded information about
    the police report she filed. He refused to leave her apartment
    and demanded she “sleep with him” and “tried to take [her]
    clothes off.” KB sent a text message to one of her coworkers to
    call the police.
    ¶4     Over the next several months, Walton continued to
    contact and send text messages to KB, telling her, “You’re
    fucked. You’re in so much trouble. You need to take care of
    this.” Walton also told KB “he was gonna take [her] out like
    game.” When asked at the preliminary hearing what she thought
    that statement meant, KB responded, “I took it as a threat. I said,
    ‘Are you threatening me?’”—at which point Walton hung up the
    phone.
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    State v. Walton
    ¶5      In early 2012, KB received a text message from Walton
    telling her she “should go home,” she was in “so much trouble,”
    and “ignoring this [was] going to cost [her] dearly.” These
    statements scared KB and she called the police who offered to
    escort her to her apartment after work. About one month later,
    Walton showed up at KB’s apartment and tried to get money
    from her. He followed her from her apartment to her car. After
    another car pulled into the parking lot, Walton walked away
    saying, “[Y]ou deserve everything you’re gonna get.”
    ¶6      KB attempted to cut off all communication with Walton
    but he continued to call her and send her text messages. KB even
    tried moving her household in an effort to get him to leave her
    alone. She moved her belongings at night and during times she
    thought he would not be around. But within a couple of days,
    Walton left her a note on her door and a voicemail telling her he
    wanted money and to meet him at a cafe across the street from
    her new apartment. KB stated she was not sure how Walton was
    able to find her new address and thought he may have followed
    her from work. After this, KB began staying at her parents’
    house. She was frightened and tried to have Walton served with
    a civil stalking injunction.
    ¶7      One day, KB stopped at her new apartment after work to
    collect some belongings to take to her parents’ house. She parked
    on the street and noticed a car pull up nearby. Once KB realized
    it was Walton, she turned around and ran back to her car. Before
    KB was able to lock herself in her car, Walton ran toward her
    and opened the car door. Walton grabbed KB by her hair and
    began hitting her head against the steering wheel. She started
    honking the horn. He demanded she give him her cell phone;
    she told him it was in the back and she could not get to it. As the
    struggle continued, KB began screaming and hitting the panic
    button on her car keys. KB dropped her keys and Walton
    grabbed them. She begged Walton to give back her keys and let
    her go. Walton responded he would not unless she paid him
    money and signed paperwork stating he was not a threat to her.
    20170977-CA                     3               
    2019 UT App 187
    State v. Walton
    During this time, Walton pulled KB out of the car and again
    grabbed her hair and began hitting her head on the back
    window. He threatened to “snap [her] neck” if she did not sign
    the documents. A woman drove by and asked KB if she was
    okay. Walton told the woman, “Don’t worry about it, she’s just
    crazy.” The woman asked if she should call the police. KB told
    Walton that if he gave the woman KB’s car keys then KB would
    sign the papers. KB signed the documents and Walton threw her
    keys to the woman and told KB, “I know you’ve called the
    police.” As he was leaving he said to KB, “If you call the police I
    will hunt you down for as long as it takes and kill you.” KB got
    into the woman’s car with her and called the police.
    ¶8     The State charged Walton with (1) retaliation against a
    witness, victim, or informant, a third-degree felony; (2) stalking,
    a class A misdemeanor; (3) assault, a class B misdemeanor; (4)
    unlawful detention, a class B misdemeanor; and (5) threat of
    violence, a class B misdemeanor. In this opinion, we refer to this
    criminal case, filed in 2012, as the Retaliation Case. Walton and
    the State entered into a plea agreement that was preapproved by
    the district court under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
    Procedure. Walton entered an Alford plea to retaliation against a
    witness, and the remaining charges, in addition to other criminal
    charges on a separate matter relating to KB, were dismissed. As
    part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to prosecute
    Walton for any other potential criminal charges arising from his
    relationship with KB before the date of the plea agreement.
    Walton also agreed to the entry of the Injunction, which
    prohibited him from contacting KB and her family. Also
    consistent with the plea agreement, the court sentenced Walton
    to 330 days in jail with credit for time served and closed the case.
    ¶9     After the district court sentenced Walton and closed the
    case, the State presented Walton with the Injunction. The court
    asked whether Walton agreed to have the Injunction entered
    against him and he responded that he had “absolutely no
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    State v. Walton
    problem not contacting [KB]” and agreed to have it imposed.
    The court signed, sealed, and served it on Walton that day.
    ¶10 About eighteen months later, Walton contacted KB in
    violation of the Injunction. KB stated that, one day, while she
    was using her laptop on her front porch, Walton approached her
    with his “hands up” and proceeded to talk to her. Walton asked
    KB what she was going to do to “help his situation.” KB asked
    whether he was looking for money but he told her he wanted
    her help to “save his good name.” Walton repeatedly asked KB
    whether she was going to call the police. After about an hour of
    conversation, Walton walked away. KB called the police to
    notify them that Walton violated the Injunction.
    ¶11 The next day, KB went to work and Walton pulled into
    the parking lot and again engaged in conversation with her. He
    asked her if she was going to call the police. She told Walton she
    could not talk to him and walked into the office building. Later
    that day, while KB was driving, Walton pulled up next to her
    and it looked as though he was trying to talk to her. KB did not
    roll down her window and Walton drove off. KB called the
    police and sent an email to the prosecutor, letting him know
    about the Injunction violations.
    ¶12 The State charged Walton with three counts of stalking in
    violation of the Injunction. In this opinion, we refer to this
    second case, filed in 2016, as the Stalking Case. Walton
    responded to the Stalking Case in part by filing a motion in the
    Retaliation Case, invoking rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of
    Criminal Procedure and asking the court to correct the sentence
    that had been imposed upon him in the Retaliation Case.
    Specifically, Walton contended that the imposition of the
    Injunction in the Retaliation Case was improper and illegal, and
    asserted that, without the Injunction, the charges in the Stalking
    Case were groundless. The court denied the motion.
    ¶13 Several months later, Walton and the State entered into a
    plea agreement resolving the Stalking Case. Pursuant to that
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    State v. Walton
    agreement, Walton entered an Alford plea to one count of
    stalking, and the State dismissed the other two counts with
    prejudice. The court sentenced Walton to a suspended,
    indeterminate prison term of zero to five years and placed
    Walton on probation for thirty-six months. The court also issued
    another permanent criminal stalking injunction that prohibited
    Walton from contacting KB, her family, and the employees of the
    district attorney’s office. Walton filed a motion to reconsider the
    court’s order on his rule 22(e) motion. In the motion, he asked
    the court to terminate his probation and “mind [its] own
    business” because he had been punished enough and would
    now be labeled “a stalker for time and memoriam.” The court
    denied the motions.
    ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶14 Walton argues that, in the Retaliation case, the district
    court erred in denying his motion to vacate the Injunction under
    rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 We review
    the denial of a rule 22(e) motion for correctness. State v. Wynn,
    
    2017 UT App 211
    , ¶ 11, 
    407 P.3d 1113
    .
    ANALYSIS
    ¶15 Walton argues the district court erred in failing to correct
    his sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
    Procedure. He contends a permanent criminal stalking
    injunction can be imposed only upon a conviction for stalking,
    2. Walton also argues if we find the Injunction was entered as an
    illegal sentence, then we also should vacate his subsequent
    stalking conviction for violating the Injunction. But Walton
    failed to timely appeal his conviction in the Stalking Case and
    therefore we decline to reach the merits of his argument on this
    issue.
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    State v. Walton
    not retaliation against a witness, and the Injunction exceeded the
    statutorily authorized maximum sentence. 3
    ¶16 Under rule 22(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
    Procedure, a district court can correct a sentence at any time if it
    (1) “exceeds the statutorily authorized maximums,” (2) “is less
    than statutorily required minimums,” (3) “violates Double
    Jeopardy,” (4) “is ambiguous as to the time and manner in which
    it is to be served,” (5) “is internally contradictory,” or (6) “omits
    a condition required by statute or includes a condition
    prohibited by statute.” In this case, Walton invokes the first and
    the last of these categories, arguing the Injunction “exceeds the
    statutorily authorized maximums” and “includes a condition
    prohibited by statute.” Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(1)(A), (F).
    ¶17 Walton argues the Injunction “exceeds the statutorily
    authorized maximums,” 
    id.
     R. 22(e)(1)(A), because the Injunction
    is a life-long restriction that extends his sentence well beyond the
    five-year maximum for a third-degree felony conviction of
    retaliation against a witness, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508.3(2)
    (LexisNexis 2017) (providing that retaliation against a witness
    convictions are third-degree felonies); id. § 76-3-203(3)
    (articulating that prison sentences for third-degree felonies are
    not to exceed five years). Walton is mistaken. The term
    “maximums” used in rule 22(e) refers to the maximum periods
    for incarceration described in Utah Code section 76-3-203. This
    3. The State argues we can affirm Walton’s conviction on the
    basis that the Injunction was entered as part of his plea
    agreement, not his sentence, and therefore rule 22(e) is
    inapplicable. We disagree. In State v. Kropf, this court applied
    rule 22(e) in the context of evaluating whether a permanent
    criminal stalking injunction was an illegal sentence. 
    2015 UT App 223
    , ¶ 24, 
    360 P.3d 1
    . Accordingly, we conclude the
    Injunction was part of Walton’s sentence that, if illegal, could be
    remedied under rule 22(e).
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    State v. Walton
    provision does not limit the court’s ability to impose other
    sanctions, such as stalking injunctions, that may exceed a term of
    five years.
    ¶18 And nothing in the retaliation statute—or in any other
    statute of which we are aware—prohibits district courts from
    imposing permanent criminal stalking injunctions as part of a
    sentence. 
    Id.
     § 76-8-508.3. Walton contends because the stalking
    statute authorizes district courts to enter permanent criminal
    stalking injunctions upon a conviction for stalking, such
    injunctions are appropriately imposed only in this context and
    not for convictions of retaliation against a witness. Id. § 76-5-
    106.5(9)(b) (Supp. 2019). But this misses the point. Under rule
    22(e), a sentence may be deemed illegal if it includes a condition
    prohibited by statute. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(1)(F). Walton has not
    identified any statute prohibiting district courts from entering
    stalking injunctions as part of a sentence for a conviction of
    retaliation against a witness.
    ¶19 Furthermore, absent circumstances not present here (for
    instance, a “mistake as to the law in effect at the time the parties
    entered into the plea agreement,” State v. Patience, 
    944 P.2d 381
    ,
    388 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)), Walton cannot accept the benefits of a
    plea bargain and then argue that the sentence imposed as part of
    that bargain was invalid after it does not work in his favor. The
    State offered Walton a favorable plea deal in exchange for the
    entry of the Injunction. It agreed to dismiss the remaining
    charges in the information, to dismiss other outstanding charges
    relating to KB, to forgo prosecution of any other crimes relating
    to KB that occurred prior to the plea date, and that Walton
    should be sentenced to 330 days in jail with credit for time
    served. Importantly, when asked whether he agreed to having
    the Injunction entered against him, Walton responded he had
    “absolutely no problem not contacting [KB].” We conclude that,
    under these circumstances, Walton cannot agree to a particular
    sentence, enjoy its benefits, and then attempt to withdraw it after
    the court imposes the stipulation.
    20170977-CA                     8                
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    State v. Walton
    CONCLUSION
    ¶20 The district court did not err in denying Walton’s motion
    to correct his sentence because imposing the Injunction was not
    an illegal sentence under rule 22(e). Affirmed.
    20170977-CA                   9              
    2019 UT App 187
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20170977-CA

Citation Numbers: 2019 UT App 187

Filed Date: 11/21/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2021