Zemlicka v. West Jordan City , 438 P.3d 1036 ( 2019 )


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    2019 UT App 22
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    NORMA ZEMLICKA,
    Appellant,
    v.
    WEST JORDAN CITY,
    Appellee.
    Opinion
    No. 20170136-CA
    Filed February 7, 2019
    Third District Court, West Jordan Department
    The Honorable James D. Gardner
    No. 160901181
    Rodger M. Burge, Matthew J. Ball, and
    Terry E. Welch, Attorneys for Appellant
    Matthew David Church and Terry M. Plant,
    Attorneys for Appellee
    JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER concurred. JUDGE JILL
    M. POHLMAN dissented.
    ORME, Judge:
    ¶1    Norma Zemlicka appeals the district court’s dismissal of
    her complaint against West Jordan City for failure to file a timely
    undertaking under a prior version of section 601 of the Utah
    Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA). We reverse.
    INTRODUCTION
    ¶2      At the time Zemlicka filed her complaint against West
    Jordan City, section 601, since amended so as to avoid the
    problem presented by this case, required that “[a]t the time the
    action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed
    Zemlicka v. West Jordan City
    by the court that is . . . not less than $300.” Utah Code Ann.
    § 63G-7-601(2) (LexisNexis 2016) (emphasis added). But this
    requirement is logistically impossible because the district court is
    tasked with fixing the amount of an undertaking in an action
    prior to the filing of the complaint that commences the action,
    which is the only way an undertaking in an amount fixed by the
    court could be filed at the same time that the complaint is filed.
    Yet experience suggests that district courts will not enter orders
    in connection with cases that have not yet been filed because the
    filing of the complaint is the mechanism by which an action is
    commenced and a judge is assigned. In effect, the
    now­superseded version of section 601 put the cart before the
    horse, requiring the court to fix the amount of an undertaking in
    an action before that action had even been filed.
    ¶3     Utah’s federal courts apparently recognized this problem
    and set about to work around it through the adoption of a local
    rule that obviated the need for individualized judicial action in
    each case by fixing a standard amount for such undertakings
    and requiring plaintiffs, at the time the complaint is filed, to file
    a $300 bond with the clerk of the court. See DUCivR 67-1(c). And
    in 2017, the Utah Legislature apparently perceived the problem
    created by the prior version of the statute and amended section
    601 along the lines of the local federal rule. Section 601 now
    provides: “At the time the action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an
    undertaking . . . in the amount of $300, unless otherwise ordered
    by the court.” 1 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601(2) (LexisNexis Supp.
    1. Although the Legislature recently amended the language of
    the statute at issue, the new statutory language does not guide
    our interpretation of the prior version of section 601. The
    statutory language at issue in the case before us is unambiguous,
    and “we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant
    policy considerations only if the statutory language is
    ambiguous or unclear.” Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 
    2010 UT 12
    ,
    ¶ 15, 
    227 P.3d 256
     (quotation simplified). Nonetheless, the
    amendment reflects the Legislature’s realization that the prior
    (continued…)
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    Zemlicka v. West Jordan City
    2017). The 2017 amendment resolves the logistical impossibility
    created by the prior statute, more fully discussed below, and
    obviates the problem presented by this case in future actions
    brought against government entities.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶4      On March 10, 2014, Zemlicka was driving in West Jordan
    City when the poorly lit street on which she was driving
    abruptly ended with a dirt ramp. 2 As a result, her car was
    thrown into the air, and she was seriously injured. On February
    18, 2016, having previously complied with the pre-suit notice
    requirements of UGIA, Zemlicka filed a complaint against West
    Jordan City for negligence. On March 14, 2016, the district court
    notified Zemlicka that a $300 undertaking was required. She
    filed a $300 bond that same day.
    ¶5     On October 6, 2016, nearly seven months later and while
    the parties were engaged in discovery—and after the applicable
    statute of limitations had run—West Jordan City moved to
    dismiss Zemlicka’s suit for her failure to file an undertaking at
    the time her complaint was filed rather than a few weeks later
    when the court instructed her to file a $300 undertaking. See
    Utah Code Ann. § 63G­7­601(2) (LexisNexis 2016). The district
    court granted West Jordan City’s motion and dismissed
    (…continued)
    version of the statute was problematic, and future cases will be
    governed by the more sensible amended version of section 601
    rather than the prior version that applies in this case.
    2. “On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the facts only
    as they are alleged in the complaint. We accept the factual
    allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those
    facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” State v. Apotex
    Corp., 
    2012 UT 36
    , ¶ 3, 
    282 P.3d 66
     (quotation simplified).
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    Zemlicka v. West Jordan City
    Zemlicka’s suit, determining that Zemlicka “failed to strictly
    comply” with section 601 “because, ‘at the time the action [was]
    filed,’ the Plaintiff did not ‘file an undertaking in the sum fixed
    by the court that is not less than $300.00.’” Zemlicka appeals.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶6     Zemlicka contends that the district court erred in its
    interpretation of the prior version of section 601. 3 “Statutory
    interpretation is a matter of law that we review for correctness,”
    affording no deference to the district court’s interpretation.
    Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 
    2007 UT 26
    , ¶ 10, 
    160 P.3d 1041
    .
    ¶7      Zemlicka argues that “[t]he plain and unambiguous
    language of the statute requires a court to first fix the amount of
    the undertaking, and then for the plaintiff to file an undertaking
    in said amount,” asserting that the grammatical structure of the
    statute requires the court to set an undertaking amount for each
    suit “[a]t the time the action is filed.”
    ¶8     West Jordan City, in contrast, argues that the statute,
    despite its terms, does not actually require the court to fix an
    undertaking amount in each case but instead “includes a default
    minimum undertaking amount of $300” that a plaintiff should
    know to file with the complaint. This contention seems to rely on
    what West Jordan City sees as “the well-settled rule” in Utah
    that a plaintiff should file a $300 undertaking when the complaint
    3. Zemlicka also contends that the district court erred in
    dismissing her complaint because West Jordan City waived any
    issue about the timing of her filing of the undertaking by
    proceeding with discovery and waiting seven months before
    raising an objection to when the undertaking was filed. Because
    we reverse on the basis of statutory interpretation, we do not
    reach the question of whether West Jordan City waived any
    defense premised on the timeliness of the undertaking’s filing.
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    Zemlicka v. West Jordan City
    is filed to satisfy the statutory undertaking requirement. 4 While
    this view effectively ignores the “in a sum fixed by the court”
    requirement, we recognize that the Utah Supreme Court has, in
    passing, stated that section 601 requires a plaintiff to “include an
    undertaking at the time of filing,” Marziale v. Spanish Fork City,
    
    2017 UT 51
    , ¶ 21, 
    423 P.3d 1145
    , but the definitive interpretation
    of the applicable version of section 601 is an issue of first
    impression, see also Craig v. Provo City, 
    2016 UT 40
    , ¶¶ 6, 40, 
    389 P.3d 423
     (noting that the complaint was filed “without the $300
    bond required by” section 601).
    ¶9     When interpreting a statute, “we first examine the
    statute’s plain language and resort to other methods of statutory
    interpretation only if the language is ambiguous.” State v.
    4. Utah’s federal courts complied with the prior version of
    section 601 by requiring a plaintiff to file a $300 undertaking at
    the time of filing a complaint. See Rippstein v. Provo City, 
    929 F.2d 576
    , 578 (10th Cir. 1991); Mglej v. Garfield County, No.
    2:13­CV­713, 
    2014 WL 2967605
    , at *2 (D. Utah July 1, 2014). But
    the federal courts did not view this as an automatic function of
    the statute. Rather, to resolve the logistical impossibility
    presented by the statute, the Utah federal district court created a
    local rule, essentially fixing the undertaking amount at $300 in
    all cases. See DUCivR 67-1(c). See also Markus B. Zimmer
    & Louise S. York, Negotiating the Amended Federal Court Local
    Rules of Practice, 10 Utah Bar Journal 37, 38 (Sept. 1997) (stating
    that this rule amended an earlier rule requiring “the filer to
    obtain a signed order from the assigned judge at the time of case
    opening to set the amount of bond and to authorize the clerk to
    accept the funds . . . often caus[ing] delay and inconvenience for
    counsel filing the actions and for the judge signing the order”).
    This rule complies with the prior version of section 601,
    applicable in this case but since amended, because the court has
    “fixed” the amount of the undertaking in each case, albeit by
    court rule applicable across the board instead of via judicial
    consideration in each individual case.
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    Zemlicka v. West Jordan City
    Masciantonio, 
    850 P.2d 492
    , 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In so doing,
    we “presume that the Legislature used each term advisedly, and
    we give effect to each term according to its ordinary and
    accepted meaning.” Versluis v. Guaranty Nat’l Cos., 
    842 P.2d 865
    ,
    867 (Utah 1992).
    ¶10 Section 601, as previously phrased, clearly and
    unambiguously required a plaintiff, at the time of filing the
    complaint, to file an undertaking in an amount already fixed by
    the court. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601(2) (LexisNexis 2016).
    Although an undertaking could not be less than $300, the
    Legislature purposely left the amount of an undertaking in each
    case to be determined by the district court prior to the filing of an
    action, using the past tense form of the verb “fix,” i.e., “fixed.” Id.
    See also Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 
    794 P.2d 838
    , 840 n.4 (Utah
    1990) (noting that, under the statute, the district court initially
    fixes the undertaking amount). Cf. Zamora v. Draper, 
    635 P.2d 78
    ,
    81 (Utah 1981) (stating that similar statutory language allows the
    court flexibility to fix the amount of the bond in accordance with
    the plaintiff’s circumstances).
    ¶11 Because the statute by its plain terms required a logistical
    impossibility, we cannot adopt the simplest plain reading of the
    statute. We therefore must embrace a reasonable interpretation
    of section 601, one that accepts the legislative intent to protect
    governmental entities from frivolous suits by requiring an
    undertaking, while mandating that courts, in the exercise of their
    sound discretion, fix the amount of the undertaking in each case.
    See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601(2); Hansen, 794 P.2d at 840. Our
    primary goal in statutory interpretation “is to evince the true
    intent and purpose of the Legislature,” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ
    Ranch P’ship, 
    2011 UT 50
    , ¶ 14, 
    267 P.3d 863
     (quotation
    simplified), “requir[ing] us to consider what the figurative
    ‘legislative mind’ would have intended had it adverted to the
    particular circumstances we are confronted with for
    adjudication.” ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 
    2010 UT 65
    , ¶ 17, 
    245 P.3d 184
     (quotation simplified). “In doing this,
    we take into account the purpose of the statute and what
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    Zemlicka v. West Jordan City
    interpretation and application will best serve that purpose in
    practical operation.” 
    Id.
     (quotation simplified).
    ¶12 Under the previous version of the statute applicable in
    this case, the phrase, “[a]t the time the action is filed, the plaintiff
    shall file an undertaking,” seemingly required plaintiffs to file an
    undertaking at the time they filed their complaint. But the
    undertaking must be in an amount “fixed by the court,” and as
    we have already pointed out, a district court will not fix the
    amount of the undertaking before a complaint has been filed,
    thereby actually commencing the action. Because “time” is “a
    period during which something (as an action, process, or
    condition) exists or continues,” Time, Webster’s Third New
    International Dictionary 2394 (1993), and because the prior
    version of section 601 imposed on the court the duty to fix the
    amount of the undertaking, an action, once filed in the technical
    sense, will not be considered filed and effective for purposes of
    section 601 until the court fixes the amount of the undertaking,
    whereupon the plaintiff is obliged to post an undertaking in that
    amount. Accordingly, once the complaint is filed, the court is
    obligated to fix an undertaking in an amount that is
    discretionary with the court but which may not be “less than
    $300.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-601(2). Once the amount is fixed
    by the court, the plaintiff must promptly 5 file an undertaking
    5. This does not mean that the plaintiff is expected to file the
    undertaking at the same moment the court fixes the amount.
    And given that electronic filing is the typical method for filing a
    complaint and issuing an order while, as we were advised at oral
    argument, bonds and other undertakings are memorialized in
    paper documents that must be physically presented to the court,
    the filing of the undertaking will necessarily follow the issuance
    of the order fixing the amount even as that order will necessarily
    follow the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the filing of an
    undertaking should promptly follow the court’s fixing of the
    amount of the undertaking. And in this case, Zemlicka filed her
    bond later that same day.
    20170136-CA                       7                  
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    Zemlicka v. West Jordan City
    upon entry of the court’s order fixing the amount which, of
    necessity, will be a time later than when the complaint was filed.
    Cf. Kiesel v. District Court, 
    84 P.2d 782
    , 783–84 (Utah 1938)
    (interpreting statutory language that required a plaintiff to
    “prepare and file with, and at the time of filing, the complaint in
    any such action, a written undertaking” to mean
    “contemporaneously[6] with the [filing of the] complaint”). An
    undertaking must therefore be filed as soon as the amount is
    fixed by the court, or the plaintiff risks having the suit
    dismissed. See Hansen, 794 P.2d at 840 (providing that “[f]ailure
    to pay the undertaking is an affirmative defense”).
    ¶13 Here, on March 14, 2016, the court notified Zemlicka that
    she needed to post a $300 undertaking. She did so immediately.
    But, in its decision granting West Jordan City’s motion to
    dismiss, the district court stated that it was merely advising
    Zemlicka of the undertaking requirement, not fixing the amount
    of the undertaking. We will not set aside a factual finding unless
    it is “without factual support in the record or if [we] on the
    entire evidence [are] left with the definite and firm conviction
    that a mistake has been made.” Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations,
    Inc., 
    927 P.2d 170
    , 174 (Utah 1996) (quotation simplified).
    Because section 601 required the court to fix the amount of the
    undertaking, and there was nothing in the record establishing
    that the court fixed the amount before March 14, 2016, the court
    erred in implicitly determining that the amount was set before
    this date. On the contrary, the court is deemed to have fixed the
    amount on March 14, 2016, less than a month after the action
    was filed, when its clerk notified Zemlicka that she must post a
    $300 undertaking. Zemlicka was required to file her undertaking
    contemporaneously with the court fixing the amount of the
    undertaking, which she did by filing it later that same day.
    6. “Contemporaneously” means “at or near the same time.”
    Contemporaneously, Webster’s Third New International
    Dictionary 491 (1993).
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    Zemlicka v. West Jordan City
    ¶14 Given the legislative intent behind section 601, West
    Jordan City’s objection to Zemlicka’s late undertaking “is at best
    but a technical one,” because “[t]he only legitimate advantage
    [West Jordan City] was entitled to was protection from loss of
    costs.” See Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmet D. Ford Contractors, Inc.,
    
    272 P.2d 191
    , 192 (Utah 1954). But Zemlicka “stands to lose
    forever the right to pursue what might well be a meritorious
    cause of action. It would have been one thing to dismiss the
    action without prejudice and require [Zemlicka] to incur the
    additional expense and inconvenience of filing anew, but it is
    quite another to dismiss with prejudice and completely,
    effectively and permanently bar [her] from remedy.” See 
    id.
     at
    192–93.
    ¶15 We conclude that Zemlicka complied with the
    requirements of the version of section 601 applicable to her case,
    as properly understood. And we again note that the problem
    presented in this case will be avoided in the future because in
    the amended version of section 601, the Legislature has fixed the
    amount of the initial undertaking to be filed in such cases.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16 We reverse the district court’s grant of West Jordan City’s
    motion to dismiss because Zemlicka complied with the prior
    version of section 601. We remand the case for resolution on its
    merits.
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