Staker v. Town of Springdale ( 2020 )


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    2020 UT App 174
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    ALLAN R. STAKER,
    Appellant,
    v.
    TOWN OF SPRINGDALE,
    Appellee.
    Opinion
    No. 20190641-CA
    Filed December 31, 2020
    Fifth District Court, St. George Department
    The Honorable Matthew L. Bell
    No. 170500349
    Bruce C. Jenkins and Kimball A. Forbes, Attorneys
    for Appellant
    J. Gregory Hardman and Devin Snow, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGE DIANA HAGEN concurred. JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN
    concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
    APPLEBY, Judge:
    ¶1      Allan R. Staker applied for a conditional use permit to
    operate a public parking lot (Proposed Lot) on a parcel of
    property (Property) he owns in Springdale, Utah. The
    Springdale Town Council (Town Council) denied his
    application, which denial the town’s Appeal Authority (Appeal
    Authority) affirmed. Staker petitioned for review with the
    district court, which ultimately upheld the Appeal Authority’s
    decision and dismissed Staker’s petition. On appeal, Staker
    contends the district court erred because the Appeal Authority’s
    decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was
    illegal. We affirm.
    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     Staker owns the Property, a three-acre parcel of land with
    a house in Springdale, Utah. The Property is on the southeast
    side of Zion Park Boulevard, a road connecting to the southeast
    entrance of Zion National Park.
    ¶3    In January 2017, Staker applied for a conditional use
    permit to operate the Property as a parking lot. Staker submitted
    a concept plan with his application, which originally proposed a
    parking area with 83 spaces, 1 removal of the house on the
    Property, and planting screening vegetation next to the
    neighboring property lines.
    ¶4      The Property is zoned as “Valley Residential,” a zone
    “established to provide areas . . . where residential uses may be
    harmoniously integrated with incidental agricultural pursuits”
    and “intended to retain land in parcels large enough to provide
    efficient and attractive residential development which preserves
    the historic open agricultural and farm type impression of the
    area.” Springdale, Utah, Code § 10-9B-1 (2020). 2 The Property is
    immediately adjacent to residences. But the zoning of the
    surrounding properties includes a mix of residential and
    commercial uses. The area south and southwest of the Property
    is zoned Village Commercial, allowing the potential for
    “low impact commercial and service uses” that may be
    “harmoniously integrated with low and medium density
    1. During the application process, the number of parking spaces
    was “narrowed down to between 50–60 spaces.”
    2. Although Staker submitted his application in 2017, the parties
    have not provided us the relevant 2017 code provisions to assist
    in our review. But with two notable exceptions, see infra ¶ 5, the
    relevant code provisions appear to be the same, and we therefore
    cite the current version for convenience.
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    residential uses,” 
    id.
     § 10-11B-1, while the properties to the west,
    north, and northeast are zoned residential.
    ¶5      When Staker applied for the conditional use permit,
    parking lots were allowed as conditional uses in the Valley
    Residential zone. 3 Recognizing that conditional uses “may only
    be suitable in specific locations,” id. § 10-3A-1, the Springdale
    Town Code (Code) required the Planning Commission and the
    Town Council to decide whether certain standards had been or
    could be met “through the imposition of the proposed
    conditions on the use,” including that the proposed use not
    “unreasonably interfere with the lawful use of surrounding
    properties” (Standard B) or “create a need for essential
    Municipal services which cannot be reasonably met within three
    (3) months and the party seeking the conditional use is willing
    and able to contribute to the cost of said services” (Standard C),
    id. § 10-3A-4. The parties also agree the Code at the time required
    denial of the conditional use permit if the “reasonably
    anticipated detrimental effects of a proposed conditional use”
    could not be “substantially mitigated by the proposal or the
    imposition of reasonable conditions to achieve compliance with
    applicable standards.”
    ¶6     Before the Planning Commission considered and voted on
    whether to recommend approval of Staker’s application,
    Springdale’s Director of Community Development (DCD)
    prepared a memorandum (DCD Memorandum) setting forth the
    standards related to parking lot approvals and analysis of each
    standard in light of the specific circumstances surrounding the
    Property. As relevant here, the DCD Memorandum indicated
    that the Proposed Lot “is adjacent to residential uses” and that it
    “will impact these surrounding properties with increases in
    3. Staker acknowledges that, after he filed his application,
    Springdale amended its ordinances to “prohibit all public
    parking areas in Valley Residential zones.”
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    traffic, noise, and general activity on the [Property].” The DCD
    Memorandum stated that if the Planning Commission
    recommended approval, it “should consider conditions that
    could help mitigate the impacts,” such as “requir[ing] screening,
    additional landscape buffers, and other similar measures.” The
    DCD Memorandum also indicated the Proposed Lot “has the
    potential to generate the same amount of noise, or noxious odors
    as any other parking lot might,” and that the Planning
    Commission “may wish to impose a condition of approval that
    requires this facility to avoid making loud noises between the
    hours of 11:00 PM and 7:00 AM.”
    ¶7     The      Planning    Commission      considered     Staker’s
    application and, following a public hearing, recommended
    denying it. The Planning Commission found, among other
    things, that the Proposed Lot “cannot be screened adequately
    from surrounding properties,” including the “nearby two-story
    homes.” And observing the Code provides that “allowable land
    uses are established to avoid incompatible uses in close
    proximity . . . and to preserve the peace, quiet and privacy in the
    residential zones,” the Planning Commission determined,
    among other things, that the Proposed Lot would be
    incompatible with Springdale’s “General Plan” because it would
    commercialize and “change the appearance and character of” the
    Property’s Village Residential designation.
    ¶8     The matter then went before the Town Council. After a
    public hearing, the Town Council denied Staker’s application. In
    addition to relying on the Planning Commission’s
    recommendation, the Town Council made several findings,
    including that the “proposed use is in the middle of an existing
    residential neighborhood,” “is less than 20 feet from a
    residence,” and “[t]he front yard of a residence to the northeast
    would look onto” the Proposed Lot; the “proposed use will
    unreasonably interfere with the lawful use of surrounding
    properties because it will substantially increase traffic, activity,
    and noise in an existing residential neighborhood” and “bring
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    congestion from other areas”; the “proposed use will emit
    excessive noise from parking patrons and their vehicles”;
    and “the proposed use will create a need for essential
    municipal services that cannot be met within three months
    because it will bring concentrated ridership on shuttles”
    into Zion National Park and “will require public restrooms
    in concern for public health” purposes. In making its
    findings, the Town Council relied on the applicable
    conditional use standards, the application materials, the
    Planning Commission’s recommendation and associated
    minutes, the DCD Memorandum, and community input.
    ¶9     Staker appealed the denial of the conditional use
    permit to the Appeal Authority. He argued, among other
    things, that the Town Council did not properly apply
    Springdale’s conditional use permit standards when considering
    his application and that its decision was arbitrary and
    capricious.
    ¶10 After a hearing, the Appeal Authority affirmed the Town
    Council’s decision. Noting there was no showing that the
    Planning Commission’s or the Town Council’s findings were
    clearly erroneous, the Appeal Authority deferred to those
    findings and made additional findings in support of affirmance.
    The Appeal Authority found, among other things, that the
    Planning Commission and the Town Council “thoroughly”
    discussed “site conditions, surrounding property uses, potential
    adverse impacts on surrounding properties, and whether those
    impacts could be mitigated.” And, like the Town Council, the
    Appeal Authority found that “[t]he surrounding properties are
    used primarily for residential purposes” and the Proposed Lot
    “would be constructed near residential uses”; the “proposed use
    would unreasonably interfere with the lawful use of
    surrounding properties”; the use would “create a need for
    essential municipal services that cannot be met within three
    months”; and the use would “emit excessive noise from parking
    patrons” that would impact neighboring residences.
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    ¶11 The Appeal Authority concluded the Town Council’s
    decision was not arbitrary or capricious. It emphasized that even
    though a parking lot was an “allowable use” in the Valley
    Residential zone, it was only conditionally so, subject to whether
    “reasonable conditions” could be imposed to mitigate the
    “reasonably anticipated detrimental effects” of the Proposed Lot
    “in accordance with” the applicable standards. (Quotation
    simplified.) In this respect, the Appeal Authority concluded
    there was substantial evidence the Proposed Lot would not meet
    Standard B—that is, the use would “unreasonably interfere with
    the lawful use of surrounding properties and that proposed
    conditions could not be imposed that would substantially
    mitigate the reasonably anticipated detrimental effects on the
    surrounding properties.” The Appeal Authority interpreted the
    term “lawful use” to include “the right to quietly and peaceably
    enjoy [one’s] property.” And it applied that interpretation to
    determine that, based on the record, “a reasonable mind could
    conclude . . . that operating a commercial parking lot in the
    middle of an existing residential neighborhood would increase
    both vehicular and foot traffic and bring with it the inevitable
    noise created when cars and people enter and exit the
    location”—all of which would “unreasonably interfere” with the
    surrounding properties’ lawful use. 4
    ¶12 Staker petitioned for review of the Appeal
    Authority’s decision in the district court. Among other things,
    he claimed the decision was arbitrary and capricious because
    4. The Appeal Authority additionally determined the proposed
    use would not meet Standard C, and it rejected Staker’s
    contention that the denial of his permit was arbitrary and
    capricious because other conditional use permits for parking lots
    in the Village Residential zone were approved. But as further
    noted below, infra nn. 8–9, we do not substantively address
    either issue.
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    it was “not supported by substantial evidence in the record”
    and it was “illegal because it [was] based on incorrect
    interpretations of . . . land use regulations and contrary to
    law.” He also claimed the court “should not give the
    Appeal Authority’s Decision the presumption of validity,”
    because there was no record “as to reasonable conditions that
    would mitigate” the anticipated detrimental effects of the
    Proposed Lot.
    ¶13 The district court dismissed Staker’s petition with
    prejudice. First, it determined the Appeal Authority’s decision
    was not illegal, explaining there was “no evidence . . . that the
    decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of a land use
    regulation or was otherwise contrary to law.”
    ¶14 Next, the court found the Appeal Authority’s decision
    was one a “reasonable mind could reach” and was “based on
    substantial evidence in the record.” Specifically, the court
    rejected Staker’s assertion that Springdale made “consent of
    neighboring landowners a criterion” for approving or
    denying Staker’s application. The court also concluded
    substantial evidence supported the Appeal Authority’s
    determination that the Proposed Lot did not meet Standard B,
    because the use would unreasonably interfere with the
    neighboring residential uses, stating that the Appeal Authority’s
    decision “acknowledges what were the natural consequences of
    operating a commercial parking lot situated close to other
    residents.”
    ¶15 Finally, on the issue of mitigation, the court noted that the
    record is “less than ideal with respect to details” but that the
    “potential for mitigation was considered” and ultimately
    rejected, particularly given that the Proposed Lot was “situated
    so close to other residences.”
    ¶16   Staker appeals.
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶17 Staker challenges the denial of his conditional use permit
    application. He contends the district court erred in dismissing
    his petition for review because the Appeal Authority’s decision
    was illegal and not supported by substantial evidence. In an
    appeal of an administrative order, “[w]e afford no deference” to
    the district court’s decision, reviewing it for whether the court
    “correctly determined whether the administrative decision was
    arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” McElhaney v. City of Moab, 
    2017 UT 65
    , ¶ 26, 
    423 P.3d 1284
    ; see 
    Utah Code Ann. § 10
    -9a-801(3)
    (LexisNexis 2015). “We will not disturb the decision of a land use
    authority or an appeal authority unless the decision is arbitrary
    and capricious or illegal.” LJ Mascaro Inc. v. Herriman City, 
    2018 UT App 127
    , ¶ 16, 
    428 P.3d 4
    .
    ANALYSIS
    ¶18 Staker raises two main arguments on appeal. First, he
    contends the district court incorrectly concluded that substantial
    evidence supported the Appeal Authority’s decision to deny his
    conditional use permit application. Second, he contends the
    court incorrectly concluded that the Appeal Authority’s decision
    was not illegal.
    ¶19 “Utah’s Municipal Land Use Development and
    Management Act (MLUDMA) empowers municipalities to zone
    the territory within their boundaries and to regulate land uses,”
    McElhaney v. City of Moab, 
    2017 UT 65
    , ¶ 27, 
    423 P.3d 1284
    ; see
    also 
    Utah Code Ann. § 10
    -9a-501 (LexisNexis 2015), 5 and to
    specifically approve or deny conditional uses, see 
    Utah Code Ann. § 10
    -9a-507. A conditional use is “a land use that, because
    5. We cite the version of the Utah Code in effect at the time of
    Staker’s 2017 application for a conditional use permit.
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    of its unique characteristics or potential impact on the
    municipality, surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may
    not be compatible in some areas or may be compatible only if
    certain conditions are required that mitigate or eliminate the
    detrimental impacts.” 
    Id.
     § 10-9a-103(5). “A conditional use shall
    be approved if reasonable conditions are proposed, or can be
    imposed, to mitigate the reasonably anticipated detrimental
    effects of the proposed use in accordance with applicable
    standards.” Id. § 10-9a-507(2)(a). But “[i]f the reasonably
    anticipated detrimental effects of a proposed conditional use
    cannot be substantially mitigated by the proposal or the
    imposition of reasonable conditions to achieve compliance with
    applicable standards, the conditional use may be denied.” Id.
    § 10-9a-507(2)(b).
    ¶20 Here, Springdale has established standards for evaluating
    conditional uses. To begin with, the Property is zoned as Valley
    Residential, which the Code designates as a zone “established to
    provide areas . . . where residential uses may be harmoniously
    integrated with incidental agricultural pursuits” and “intended
    to retain land in parcels large enough to provide efficient and
    attractive residential development which preserves the historic
    open agricultural and farm type impression of the area.”
    Springdale, Utah, Code § 10-9B-1 (2020). At the time of Staker’s
    application, parking lots were designated as an allowable
    conditional use in the Valley Residential zone. In that respect,
    the Code established “[a]llowable land uses,” including
    conditional uses, “to avoid incompatible uses in close proximity,
    preserve the Town’s unique village character, promote tourism
    based economy in the commercial zones, and to preserve the
    peace, quiet, and privacy in residential zones.” Id. § 10-7A-1.
    ¶21 The Code provides more specific standards for evaluating
    conditional uses. “If the reasonably anticipated detrimental
    effects of a proposed conditional use cannot be substantially
    mitigated by the proposal or the imposition of reasonable
    conditions to achieve compliance with applicable standards,” the
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    parties agree the Code at the time required the use be denied. As
    relevant here, “[i]n considering what conditions may
    substantially mitigate the detrimental effects of the use, the
    Planning Commission and Town Council shall each find that the
    following general standards have been met or can be met
    through the imposition of the proposed conditions on the use,”
    including Standard B—“[t]he proposed use shall not
    unreasonably interfere with the lawful use of surrounding
    properties”—and Standard C—“[t]he proposed use shall not
    create a need for essential Municipal services which cannot be
    reasonably met within three (3) months.” 
    Id.
     § 10-3A-4.
    ¶22 Applying these principles, we address Staker’s challenges
    to the district court’s order.
    I. Substantial Evidence
    ¶23 Staker argues the Appeal Authority’s decision was
    arbitrary and capricious because its decision that the proposed
    use would unreasonably interfere with the lawful uses of
    surrounding properties, and in a way that could not be
    substantially mitigated, was not supported by substantial
    evidence.
    ¶24 As discussed above, we will uphold a land use authority’s
    decision unless it is arbitrary and capricious. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 10
    -9a-801(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2015). “[A] decision is arbitrary and
    capricious when it is not supported by substantial evidence in
    the record.” LJ Mascaro Inc. v. Herriman City, 
    2018 UT App 127
    ,
    ¶ 20, 
    428 P.3d 4
    . “Substantial evidence is that quantum and
    quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to persuade a
    reasonable mind,” and on review “we will consider all the
    evidence in the record, both favorable and contrary,” with the
    aim of determining “whether a reasonable mind could reach the
    same conclusion as the land use authority.” Checketts v.
    Providence City, 
    2018 UT App 48
    , ¶ 18, 
    420 P.3d 71
     (quotation
    simplified); see also Kilgore Cos. v. Utah County Board of
    20190641-CA                    10                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    Adjustment, 
    2019 UT App 20
    , ¶ 24, 
    438 P.3d 1025
    . In doing so, we
    “do not weigh the evidence anew or substitute our judgment for
    that of the municipality.” LJ Mascaro Inc., 
    2018 UT App 127
    , ¶ 20
    (quotation simplified); see also J.P. Furlong Co. v. Board of Oil, Gas
    & Mining, 
    2018 UT 22
    , ¶ 25, 
    424 P.3d 858
    .
    ¶25 The district court concluded the Appeal Authority’s
    decision was “based on substantial evidence in the record” and
    was a decision “a reasonable mind could reach.” Specifically, the
    court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Appeal
    Authority’s decision that the proposed use did not meet the
    requirements of Standard B. It determined the Appeal
    Authority’s decision that the “proposed use would interfere with
    lawful uses of surrounding properties” in light of the close
    proximity to surrounding residences “acknowledge[d] what
    were the natural consequences of operating a commercial
    parking lot situated close to other residents.” And while the
    record was “less than ideal with respect to details on the
    mitigation issue,” the court concluded “the potential for
    mitigation was considered and, in light of the concerns noted”—
    particularly “the finding[] that [the Proposed Lot] is situated so
    close to other residences”—“rejected.” In doing so, the court
    acknowledged “Springdale solicited information from members
    of the public” in rendering its decision, but determined the
    feedback it received was “permissible” and the town “did not
    make consent of neighboring landowners a criterion for the
    issuance or denial of the [conditional use permit].”
    A.     Standard B
    ¶26 Staker first argues the district court erred in dismissing
    his petition because, in his view, there is no substantial evidence
    supporting the Appeal Authority’s decision regarding Standard
    B—that the proposed use would “unreasonably interfere with
    the lawful use of surrounding properties.” See Springdale, Utah,
    Code § 10-3A-4(B) (2020).
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ¶27 We are not persuaded. A central concern vis-à-vis
    Standard B, as expressed by the Town Council and adopted by
    the Appeal Authority, was the close proximity of the Proposed
    Lot to adjacent residential uses. Indeed, as Staker acknowledges,
    one of the surrounding residential uses is a house “20 feet away
    from the [Proposed Lot].” In light of that proximity, the Town
    Council and the Appeal Authority considered the potential
    effects of the Proposed Lot, including increases in traffic, noise,
    and other activities. For example, the Town Council found the
    “proposed use is less than 20 feet from a residence” and “[t]he
    front yard of a residence to the northeast would look onto” the
    Proposed Lot. In addition to adopting the Town Council’s
    findings, the Appeal Authority found the Proposed Lot “would
    be constructed near residential uses” and the “surrounding
    properties are used primarily for residential purposes.” And,
    indeed, the district court’s dismissal recognized the concern
    about the effects in light of the specific location, noting that the
    Proposed Lot was “so close to other residences” and that the
    findings regarding noise, congestion, and other similar effects
    were “natural consequences of operating a commercial parking
    lot situated close to other residents.”
    ¶28 Substantial evidence supported the concern regarding the
    reasonableness of the Proposed Lot’s interference with the
    closely situated surrounding residential uses and, by extension,
    the decision that the proposed use did not meet Standard B. See
    Checketts, 
    2018 UT App 48
    , ¶ 18 (defining substantial evidence as
    “that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate
    to persuade a reasonable mind” (quotation simplified)). First,
    Staker’s application included a design of the Proposed Lot
    overlaid on a bird’s-eye view photograph of the Property, which
    plainly displayed the close proximity of the Proposed Lot to the
    surrounding residential properties. Likewise, the materials
    Staker presented to the Appeal Authority included several
    additional diagrams and overhead photographs of the Proposed
    Lot and surrounding properties that again portrayed the close
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    proximity of the Proposed Lot to the surrounding properties and
    residential uses.
    ¶29 Next, before the Planning Commission’s meeting on
    Staker’s application, the DCD Memorandum addressed the
    conditional use permit standards, including Standard B, and its
    recommendations, based on a specific evaluation of the
    Proposed Lot, under each. For Standard B, the DCD
    Memorandum indicated the Proposed Lot was “adjacent to
    residential uses” and it would “impact these surrounding
    properties with increases in traffic, noise, and general activity on
    the [Property].” It also generally noted the “property to the
    south of the proposed parking contains a residence that will be
    located very near the proposed parking area.” After the
    Planning Commission meeting, the DCD updated the
    Memorandum for the Town Council’s use, and the updated
    Memorandum additionally indicated that the “proximity of
    adjacent residentially used properties,” including “one residence
    . . . located approximately 20 feet from the parking area,”
    justified careful consideration of the impacts the Proposed Lot
    would have on surrounding properties. It also noted the public’s
    perception of the anticipated impacts, which included “noise,
    garbage accumulation, loss of privacy, loitering, [and] headlights
    directed into adjacent properties.”
    ¶30 And in this respect, during the Planning Commission and
    Town Council meetings, the public provided input about the
    Proposed Lot’s impact on surrounding properties, especially
    given the surrounding properties’ uses. In particular, members
    of the public highlighted the anticipated and inherent impacts
    the Proposed Lot would impose, given the anticipated use of the
    Proposed Lot, its size, and its location. See generally Thurston v.
    Cache County, 
    626 P.2d 440
    , 445 (Utah 1981) (“While it is true that
    the consent of neighboring landowners may not be made a
    criterion for the issuance or denial of a conditional use permit,
    there is no impropriety in the solicitation of, or reliance upon,
    information which may be furnished by other landowners in the
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    vicinity of the subject property at a public hearing.”). In the
    Planning Commission meeting, the public expressed concerns
    about noise, odors, and the overall increase in activity in the
    immediate area, and in close proximity to neighboring
    residences. For example, members of the public expressed their
    beliefs that screening would not be adequate, and one
    commenter stated her belief that the Staker application had
    “tremendously more impact on residences” than other active
    applications for similar conditional parking uses that did not
    involve properties surrounded by residential uses, explaining
    that the Staker application was therefore different in kind in
    terms of the effects it would have on neighboring properties. The
    public also expressed concerns about “headlights,” “managing
    people from wandering onto private property,” “noise and air
    pollution,” and “safety and the lack of lighting.” And one
    member of the public in particular raised the issue that Staker’s
    property line was “about twenty” feet from a neighboring
    residence.
    ¶31 Likewise, during the Town Council meeting, the public
    expressed several concerns with the Proposed Lot, including the
    effect on the six neighboring properties “of vehicles coming in
    and out of” the Proposed Lot on a consistent basis, “excessive
    noise, odors[,] and screening” concerns, and the traffic impacts
    to the neighborhood. Several neighbors also submitted letters in
    anticipation of the town’s decision on Staker’s application, many
    of which detailed similar concerns with respect to potential
    negative impacts on surrounding properties. 6
    6. In evaluating Staker’s application, several of the Planning
    Commission and Town Council members expressed similar
    views that the use could not meet Standard B in light of the
    anticipated and inherent impacts of the Proposed Lot,
    highlighting the increased noise, odors, activity, and overall
    (continued…)
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ¶32 Taken together, this constituted substantial evidence from
    which a reasonable mind could conclude that the Proposed Lot
    would unreasonably interfere with the lawful use of the
    surrounding properties. See Checketts, 
    2018 UT App 48
    , ¶ 18. It
    provided a sufficient basis to conclude that the reasonably
    anticipated and inherent effects of the Proposed Lot, such as
    increased noise and activity, were particularly problematic given
    the location of the Proposed Lot and, specifically, its close
    proximity to surrounding residential uses.
    ¶33 Nevertheless, Staker claims the district court’s dismissal
    of his petition was improper because the Appeal Authority
    relied “solely on public clamor” in rendering its decision. But
    although Staker is correct that “‘public clamor’ . . . [is] not a
    legally sufficient basis for denying [a conditional use] permit,”
    see Davis County v. Clearfield City, 
    756 P.2d 704
    , 711–13 & n.9
    (Utah Ct. App. 1988), we agree with the court that, while the
    Town Council “solicited information” from the public, “it did
    not make consent of neighboring landowners a criterion” for
    either approving or denying the conditional use permit. It is not
    improper to “solicit” and rely on “information which may be
    furnished by other landowners in the vicinity of the subject
    property at a public hearing,” see Thurston, 626 P.2d at 445, so
    long as the decision is not solely based on the public’s concerns
    or consent, see Davis County, 
    756 P.2d at
    711–13 & n.9. And, as
    discussed above, it is apparent the public’s expressed concerns
    did not constitute the only evidence on which the Appeal
    Authority’s decision was based. Moreover, there is no indication
    in the record that the Town Council conditioned approval on the
    public’s support or otherwise permitted the public’s response to
    dictate the denial. Cf. Stucker v. Summit County, 
    870 P.2d 283
    ,
    (…continued)
    interference with the surrounding residences’ “peace, quiet, and
    privacy.”
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    289–90 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that a planning
    commission’s denial of a “request for a permit due to the
    incompatibility of the project with surrounding land uses” was
    not the product of a delegation of “veto power to the
    [applicant’s] neighbors” where the planning commission “use[d]
    information gathered from neighbors in making [the] decision”
    to deny the permit); Davis County, 
    756 P.2d at
    711–13 & n.9
    (concluding the city council impermissibly based its denial of a
    conditional use permit on “public clamor,” as evidenced by the
    “curious action taken at the Planning Commission hearing,
    where citizens in attendance were asked to vote on the
    application”). 7
    7. Staker also briefly suggests the Appeal Authority’s decision
    was not supported by substantial evidence because it did not
    explain how the anticipated effects of the Proposed Lot
    unreasonably interfered with neighboring properties. As our
    supreme court explained in McElhaney v. City of Moab, 
    2017 UT 65
    , 
    423 P.3d 1284
    , the term “substantial evidence” includes
    a requirement that the “findings of fact and conclusions of law
    . . . are adequately detailed to permit meaningful appellate
    review” and “resolve issues which are relevant to the legal
    standards that will govern the agency’s decision.” Id. ¶ 35
    (quotation simplified). Here, we conclude the Appeal
    Authority’s decision was sufficiently detailed with respect to the
    reasonableness issue. In addition to finding that the Planning
    Commission and Town Council engaged in a “thorough”
    discussion of the “adverse impacts on surrounding properties,”
    the Appeal Authority adopted the Town Council’s findings,
    which emphasized the close proximity of the Proposed Lot to the
    surrounding residential uses, and also found that the
    “surrounding properties are used primarily for residential
    purposes” and the Proposed Lot “would be constructed near
    residential uses.” Additionally, the Appeal Authority explained
    (continued…)
    20190641-CA                    16                 
    2020 UT App 174
    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ¶34 Staker also argues the Appeal Authority denied the
    permit based on the general and inherent impacts of operating a
    parking lot, “without any particularized evidence that the
    [Proposed Lot] would adversely affect surrounding properties
    any more than any other parking lot would.” But, as discussed
    above, the main issue regarding Standard B was the impact of
    the Proposed Lot in light of its specific location and close
    proximity to neighboring properties and residential uses. By
    focusing on the anticipated effects in light of the particular
    location of the Proposed Lot, the Appeal Authority and the
    district court necessarily relied on particularized evidence about
    the Proposed Lot and its location in denying the application and
    dismissing the petition.
    ¶35 Finally, Staker claims the Appeal Authority’s findings are
    not themselves substantial evidence, and particularly challenges
    its findings that the Proposed Lot would be “in the middle of a
    residential neighborhood,” would be “adjacent to existing
    residential homes,” and would “require the removal of an
    existing residence.” But his challenges to these findings do not
    persuade us that the district court erred. First, Staker’s challenge
    to the finding about the Proposed Lot being in the “middle of a
    residential neighborhood” essentially recites the evidence about
    the zoning, use, and location of surrounding properties and asks
    us to reweigh it in his favor, which we will not do on review. See
    LJ Mascaro Inc., 
    2018 UT App 127
    , ¶ 20. Next, he suggests the
    (…continued)
    that “operating a commercial parking lot in the middle of an
    existing residential neighborhood,” given the increases of
    activity and noise generated by such an operation, “would
    unreasonably interfere” with the surrounding properties. In our
    view, these findings and the associated explanation adequately
    explained why the Appeal Authority determined the use’s
    interference was unreasonable.
    20190641-CA                     17                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    adjacency finding “runs afoul of [Springdale’s conditional use]
    Standards” because it suggests a decision “based on criteria
    outside the applicable standards.” But, as discussed above, the
    decision to deny the permit was not based solely on the
    adjacency of the Proposed Lot to residential homes but rather on
    the convergence of the anticipated and inherent impacts of the
    Proposed Lot with the close proximity of the surrounding uses.
    And, as Staker acknowledges, the location of the Proposed Lot
    vis-à-vis surrounding uses is relevant to the overall Standard B
    inquiry. Finally, Staker asserts the removal of the house is not
    substantial evidence, because it is irrelevant to the Standard B
    inquiry. But we agree with Springdale that the removal of the
    residence on the Proposed Lot is relevant to the Standard B
    inquiry as it bears on the proximity issue as well as the manner
    in which the proposed use would affect the surrounding
    neighborhood. 8
    ¶36 In sum, we are not persuaded by Staker’s arguments
    challenging the existence of substantial evidence supporting the
    Appeal Authority’s Standard B decision. Rather, in our view, the
    district court correctly concluded that substantial evidence
    supported the Appeal Authority’s decision that the Proposed
    Lot unreasonably interfered with the lawful use of the
    surrounding properties.
    8. Staker also suggests the “Appeal Authority’s refusal to
    consider approvals of other parking lots in the Valley Residential
    zone was arbitrary and capricious.” But we review the district
    court’s decision, not the Appeal Authority’s. See McElhaney, 
    2017 UT 65
    , ¶ 26 (“[I]n the appeal of an administrative order, we
    review the intermediate court’s decision.”). The district court’s
    decision did not address this issue, and apart from noting this,
    Staker makes no argument that the court erred by not
    considering it. Accordingly, we do not address it.
    20190641-CA                    18                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    B.     Mitigation
    ¶37 Staker also challenges the district court’s decision
    regarding mitigation of the Proposed Lot’s anticipated
    detrimental effects. He contends there is no substantial evidence
    that the proposed conditions “could not substantially mitigate
    the [Proposed Lot’s] anticipated detrimental effects.”
    Specifically, he argues the Appeal Authority’s findings are not
    sufficiently detailed and do “not inform the reader why the [it]
    ruled the way it did on mitigation.” And, acknowledging the
    district court’s conclusion that there was substantial evidence on
    the record on the mitigation issue where the Proposed Lot was
    “situated so close to other residences,” Staker argues that
    “closeness to residences is not evidence adequate to convince a
    reasonable mind that the detrimental effects of the [Proposed
    Lot] could not be substantially mitigated.” We disagree.
    ¶38 The district court stated that, although the record was
    “less than ideal” on the mitigation issue, “the potential for
    mitigation was considered and, in light of the concerns noted,
    rejected.” It noted Staker’s proposal “included visual and sound
    barriers,” and there was “consideration of reducing the
    number of parking spaces or moving them back.” But the court
    was persuaded that “those mitigation efforts were unconvincing
    . . . , given the findings that [the proposed] lot is situated so close
    to other residences.”
    ¶39 During the application process, various mitigation
    conditions were proposed and considered. The DCD
    Memorandum recommended that the Planning Commission,
    and later the Town Council, consider mitigation conditions,
    such as “screening, additional landscape buffers,” and
    “increased setback from existing residentially used structures.”
    Staker also proposed mitigation options, including signs
    requesting patrons to respect the neighbors’ privacy and keep
    noise to a minimum, setting the hours of operation from 7 a.m.
    to 11 p.m., developing vegetation screening, and providing
    20190641-CA                      19                
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    no lighting. And it is apparent from the record that the
    mitigation issue was considered both at the Planning
    Commission and the Town Council meetings. Indeed, the
    Appeal Authority found that, during deliberations, the Planning
    Commission and Town Council engaged in a “thorough
    discussion of site conditions, surrounding property uses,
    potential adverse impacts on surrounding properties, and
    whether those impacts could be mitigated,” and it concluded
    there was substantial evidence in the record from which a
    reasonable mind could conclude that “proposed conditions
    could not be imposed that would substantially mitigate the
    reasonably anticipated detrimental effects” of the Proposed Lot
    on the surrounding properties.
    ¶40 The Appeal Authority’s findings were adequate on
    the mitigation issue. In McElhaney v. City of Moab, 
    2017 UT 65
    ,
    
    423 P.3d 1284
    , our supreme court recognized the term
    “substantial evidence” in the administrative context includes
    a requirement that the “administrative agency . . . make
    findings of fact and conclusions of law that are adequately
    detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review,” which
    includes making “findings of fact that resolve issues which
    are relevant to the legal standards that will govern the agency’s
    decision.” 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 34–35 (quotation simplified). In this respect,
    an administrative agency’s decision need not be “perfect or
    even laudable.” See J.P. Furlong Co. v. Board of Oil, Gas
    & Mining, 
    2018 UT 22
    , ¶ 30 & n.8, 
    424 P.3d 858
    . Rather,
    findings are sufficiently detailed if they “inform[]” the parties
    “of the basis” of the administrative agency’s decision “such
    that [the parties] knew why the [agency] ruled the way it did,”
    afford the parties “notice of what [they] would need to challenge
    on appeal,” and “allow[] [an appellate court] to perform” a
    meaningful review. See 
    id.
     ¶ 30 n.8. (concluding the [agency’s]
    order was sufficient where it gave the petitioner “notice of the
    rationale behind the [agency’s] decision” and “outlined its
    findings with sufficient precision that [the appellate court]
    20190641-CA                    20                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    could have a meaningful discussion on appeal about what
    occurred below and whether record evidence supported the
    [agency’s] decision”).
    ¶41 Here, as the district court recognized, the Appeal
    Authority’s findings adequately informed the parties “of the
    basis” and rationale behind its decision. See 
    id.
     ¶ 30 & n.8. The
    Appeal Authority found that the Planning Commission and the
    Town Council “thorough[ly]” discussed “whether [the
    anticipated] impacts” on surrounding properties “could be
    mitigated,” and it deferred to the Planning Commission’s and
    the Town Council’s findings on those issues. The Planning
    Commission’s findings included, among other things, a
    determination that the “nearby two-story homes” “cannot be
    screened for . . . headlights or from view.” And the Town
    Council’s findings, as discussed above, emphasized the close
    proximity of the Proposed Lot to surrounding properties in
    denying the permit. The Appeal Authority also made similar
    findings about the Proposed Lot’s proximity to residential uses.
    And it explained that, where approving the application would
    “place a parking lot in the middle of a residential
    neighborhood . . . adjacent to existing residential homes,” a
    reasonable mind could conclude that “proposed conditions
    could not be imposed that would substantially mitigate the
    reasonably anticipated detrimental effects on the surrounding
    properties” from increases in “both vehicular and foot traffic”
    and the “inevitable noise created when cars and people enter
    and exit the location.” The Appeal Authority’s findings and
    discussion thereby informed Staker that the issue of mitigation
    was considered but that the Appeal Authority concluded from
    the record that the anticipated impacts on the surrounding
    residential uses were too great to be substantially mitigated. In
    this respect, Staker was informed what he needed to challenge
    about the Appeal Authority’s mitigation determination and, by
    extension, the Appeal Authority’s findings and discussion have
    allowed a meaningful appellate review. See 
    id.
    20190641-CA                    21                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ¶42 Likewise, Staker has not persuaded us that the close
    proximity of the Proposed Lot to the surrounding residential
    uses is inadequate evidence on which to base the mitigation
    determination. Although he contends that the Proposed Lot’s
    “closeness” to residential properties is not enough to convince a
    reasonable mind on the mitigation question, he does not explain
    why it is not. See Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 
    2017 UT 2
    , ¶ 12, 
    391 P.3d 196
     (“An appellant who fails to adequately brief an issue
    will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on
    appeal.” (quotation simplified)); Hess v. Canberra Dev. Co., 
    2011 UT 22
    , ¶ 25, 
    254 P.3d 161
     (stating “a party’s brief must contain
    meaningful legal analysis,” meaning that “a brief must go
    beyond providing conclusory statements and fully identify,
    analyze, and cite its legal arguments” (quotation simplified)).
    And, in our view, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that
    the various proposed mitigation conditions would not
    substantially mitigate the anticipated impacts in circumstances
    where the proposed use would be situated in uniquely close
    proximity to residential uses, and in circumstances where the
    use and view of the Proposed Lot could not be adequately
    screened from nearby residences. After all, a conditional use is
    rooted in the idea that some uses, due to “unique characteristics
    or potential impact[s]” on “surrounding neighbors[] or adjacent
    land uses, may not be compatible in some areas.” See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 10
    -9a-103(5) (LexisNexis 2015).
    ¶43 In sum, we conclude Staker has not shown the district
    court’s dismissal of his petition under Standard B and the
    inability to substantially mitigate the reasonably anticipated
    detrimental effects on surrounding properties is not supported
    by substantial evidence. 9
    9. The Appeal Authority additionally denied Staker’s permit by
    finding the proposed conditional use did not meet Standard C,
    and Staker appeals that aspect of the Appeal Authority’s
    (continued…)
    20190641-CA                    22                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    II. Illegality
    ¶44 Staker contends the Appeal Authority’s decision is illegal.
    Specifically, he argues it “incorrectly interpreted the meaning of
    ‘lawful use’ in Standard B.” And, characterizing the Appeal
    Authority’s decision that the Proposed Lot would not comply
    with Standard B as disregarding a legislative decision “that
    commercial parking lots were compatible with residential land
    uses in the Valley Residential zone,” Staker asserts the Appeal
    Authority illegally applied Standard B.
    ¶45 A land use authority’s decision is illegal if it “violates a
    law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was
    made or the ordinance or regulation adopted.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 10
    -9a-801(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2015); see also Outfront Media, LLC
    v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
    2017 UT 74
    , ¶ 12, 
    416 P.3d 389
    ; Baker v.
    Park City Mun. Corp., 
    2017 UT App 190
    , ¶ 28, 
    405 P.3d 962
    . Thus,
    whether a decision is illegal “depends on a proper interpretation
    and application of the law.” Patterson v. Utah County Board of
    Adjustment, 
    893 P.2d 602
    , 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). We interpret
    statutes and ordinances according to their plain meaning,
    assuming, “absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used
    each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually
    accepted meaning.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 
    2011 UT 50
    , ¶ 14, 
    267 P.3d 863
     (quotation simplified); Cahoon v.
    Hinckley Town Appeal Auth., 
    2012 UT App 94
    , ¶ 4, 
    276 P.3d 1141
    .
    (…continued)
    decision. However, as Staker recognizes, the district court did
    not address the Standard C issue, and Staker makes no argument
    that the court’s failure to address Standard C was in error. See
    generally McElhaney, 
    2017 UT 65
    , ¶ 26. And where we have
    affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the grounds of
    Standard B, we need not address this issue further.
    20190641-CA                     23                
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ¶46 The Appeal Authority rejected Staker’s proposed
    interpretation that “lawful use” means “that his proposed use
    must somehow result in a surrounding property falling into an
    illegal use.” Instead, the Appeal Authority interpreted “lawful
    use” as “necessarily includ[ing] the right to quietly and
    peaceably enjoy that property,” observing that reading the
    language as Staker suggested would render Standard B
    “inoperative as it is difficult to imagine a proposed use that
    would effectively convert the lawful use of a surrounding
    property into an unlawful use.” The district court concluded the
    Appeal Authority’s decision was not illegal, stating, “There is no
    evidence . . . that the decision was based on an incorrect
    interpretation of a land use regulation or was otherwise contrary
    to law.”
    ¶47 Staker has not persuaded us that the district court erred
    by concluding the Appeal Authority’s decision was not illegal.
    Relying on a Hawaii case, Waikiki Marketplace Inv. Co. v. Chair of
    Zoning Board of Appeals of City & County of Honolulu, 
    949 P.2d 183
    (Haw. Ct. App. 1997), Staker suggests the “most meaningful way
    to read” Standard B is to interpret “lawful use” to mean
    “compliance with previous zoning laws.” (Quotation simplified.)
    But Waikiki Marketplace’s interpretation of the phrase “lawful
    use” is not persuasive under the circumstances present here.
    That case involved consideration of whether a storage building
    was grandfathered 10 in as a nonconforming use under a zoning
    10. In general, a “grandfather clause” is a “provision that creates
    an exemption from the law’s effect for something that existed
    before the law’s effective date; specif., a statutory or regulatory
    clause that exempts a class of persons or transactions because of
    circumstances existing before the new rule or regulation takes
    effect.” Grandfather Clause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
    2019); see also Grandfather, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
    Thus, a nonconforming use that is grandfathered in is covered
    (continued…)
    20190641-CA                     24                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ordinance, which required a certain minimum setback. 
    Id.
     at
    192–93. At the time the storage building was built, there was no
    setback regulation, but a setback minimum was later enacted. 
    Id.
    And under the applicable zoning ordinance, a structure was
    grandfathered in as a nonconforming use if it was “previously
    lawful” but thereafter did not comply with enacted setback
    requirements. 
    Id. at 193
    . Thus, the “dispositive issue” was
    “whether the terms ‘lawful,’ as used in [the applicable zoning
    statute], and ‘previously lawful,’ as used in [the applicable
    zoning ordinance], refer to (a) lawfulness under the zoning laws
    or ordinances or (b) lawfulness under any and all laws,
    ordinances, or rules to which the addition may be subject.” 
    Id.
    The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals ultimately
    determined, in that specific context, that “whether a structure
    was grandfathered in as a ‘previously lawful’ nonconforming
    structure under the [applicable zoning ordinance] . . . should be
    measured by reference to the zoning code or ordinance in
    existence at the time the structure was built.” Id.; see also 
    id. at 196
     (“We conclude that the terms ‘lawful use’ and ‘previously
    lawful,’ as used in [the applicable zoning statute and ordinance],
    refer to compliance with previous zoning laws, not the building
    codes or other legal requirements that may be applicable to the
    construction or operation of a structure.”).
    ¶48 Here, in contrast, we are not dealing with the question of
    how to measure the term “lawful use” (and, by extension, where
    to look to determine what constituted a lawful use). Rather, we
    (…continued)
    by and exempted from later-enacted statutes or regulations. See
    id.; see generally Hatch v. Kane County Board of Adjustment, 
    2013 UT App 119
    , ¶¶ 11–13, 
    302 P.3d 146
     (discussing nonconforming
    uses and concluding the county properly determined the land
    use at issue could not be grandfathered in as a nonconforming
    use).
    20190641-CA                     25                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    are faced with the question of what constitutes a lawful use in the
    context of determining whether a proposed conditional use
    meets an already known legal standard (in this case, Standard
    B). Accordingly, Waikiki Marketplace does not answer the
    interpretive question presently before us. And beyond his
    reliance on Waikiki Marketplace, Staker does not further explain
    why his preferred interpretation accords with the plain language
    of Standard B or why the district court erred by rejecting it.
    ¶49 We likewise are unpersuaded by Staker’s argument that
    the Appeal Authority exceeded its authority in applying
    Standard B. For one thing, Staker’s argument relies on an
    incorrect underlying assumption—that the Appeal Authority
    determined the Proposed Lot did not comply with Standard B
    because it was a commercial use. As discussed above, the
    Appeal Authority, as recognized by the district court, denied the
    requested use not solely because it was a commercial use; it
    determined the use was not compatible with the surrounding
    uses due largely to the Proposed Lot’s close proximity to
    surrounding residential uses. And it is permissible to deny a
    conditional use in circumstances where, applying relevant legal
    standards, the use is determined to be incompatible with
    surrounding     uses.   See   
    Utah Code Ann. §§ 10
    -9a-
    103(5), -507(2)(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2015) (setting forth the
    circumstances under which the conditional use shall be
    approved and may be denied). 11
    11. Staker also contends the Appeal Authority incorrectly
    interpreted what constitutes an “essential municipal service”
    under Standard C. But, as noted above, the district court did not
    address the Appeal Authority’s determinations regarding
    Standard C, and because we affirm the district court’s dismissal
    of the petition as noncompliant of Standard B, we need not
    address this additional claim of illegality.
    20190641-CA                    26                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ¶50 For these reasons, we conclude Staker has not shown the
    district court’s illegality decision was in error.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶51 We conclude the district court did not err by dismissing
    Staker’s petition for review of the denial of his conditional use
    application.
    ¶52   Affirmed.
    POHLMAN, Judge (concurring and dissenting):
    ¶53 Although I join Part II of the majority opinion, I disagree
    with Part I because I do not share my colleagues’ view, and the
    view of the district court, that substantial evidence supported
    the Appeal Authority’s denial of Staker’s conditional use permit.
    ¶54 The district court first considered whether there was
    substantial evidence to support the Appeal Authority’s
    determination that the Proposed Lot would “unreasonably
    interfere with the lawful use of surrounding properties.” See
    Springdale, Utah, Code § 10-3A-4(B) (2020). The court concluded
    that there was substantial evidence, stating that the Appeal
    Authority’s “decision acknowledges what were the natural
    consequences of operating a commercial parking lot situated
    close to other residents.”
    ¶55 Those natural consequences the district court referred to
    appear to be an “increase [in] vehicular and foot traffic” and “the
    inevitable noise created when cars and people enter and exit the
    location.” Although there was no attempt by the Planning
    Commission or the Town Council to measure or quantify those
    anticipated impacts, it is apparent that each held the view that
    20190641-CA                    27                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    because of the proximity of the Proposed Lot to residences,
    whatever noise or traffic the Proposed Lot would generate
    would unreasonably interfere with the residents’ right to quietly
    and peaceably enjoy their properties. 12
    ¶56 While I have no doubt that a parking lot will generate
    noise and traffic and therefore have some impact on neighboring
    properties, I hesitate to equate presumed impacts with
    substantial evidence. See Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. West
    Jordan City, 
    2000 UT App 49
    , ¶ 17, 
    999 P.2d 1240
     (“[T]he decision
    to deny an application for a conditional use permit may not be
    based solely on adverse public comment.”); see also Uintah
    Mountain RTC, LLC v. Duchesne County, 
    2005 UT App 565
    , ¶ 32,
    
    127 P.3d 1270
     (concluding that the denial of a conditional use
    permit was “impermissibly based solely on adverse public
    comment” where there was “no record evidence detailing actual
    safety issues” with the proposed use (quotation simplified)).
    Absent some attempt to measure those impacts, it is difficult to
    assess whether those impacts would not just interfere with the
    right to quietly and peaceably enjoy one’s property, but whether
    they would unreasonably interfere.
    ¶57 But even if the assumptions about generalized impacts
    inherent in a commercial lot equate to substantial evidence, I
    cannot agree with the district court’s conclusion that there was
    substantial evidence to support the Appeal Authority’s
    determination that reasonable conditions could not be imposed
    to mitigate those detrimental effects.
    12. The majority describes this as evidence, see supra ¶ 32, but it
    is apparent that what it really describes are merely “concerns”
    and “beliefs” about potential noise and traffic congestion, see
    supra ¶¶ 30–31 (describing “concerns” and “beliefs” about the
    parking lot’s potential to generate noise, odors, and other
    activities).
    20190641-CA                    28                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    ¶58 As the majority notes, the district court observed that the
    record is “less than ideal with respect to details on the mitigation
    issue.” Supra ¶ 25. And while the district court expressed
    concern over that lack of detail, it ultimately concluded that
    because the town “considered” and “rejected” Staker’s proposals
    for mitigation, there was substantial evidence to support the
    Appeal Authority’s decision. I disagree.
    ¶59 The Utah Code required that Staker’s conditional use
    permit application be approved “if reasonable conditions are
    proposed, or can be imposed, to mitigate the reasonably
    anticipated detrimental effects of the proposed use.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 10
    -9a-507(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2015). Staker proposed a
    number of ways to mitigate the anticipated impacts of the
    Proposed Lot, including limiting the number of parking spaces,
    installing visual and sound barriers, limiting the hours of
    operation, and moving the spaces farther away from the closest
    residence. And while I agree with both the district court and the
    majority that some of those mitigation proposals were discussed
    before the Planning Commission and the Town Council, I do not
    agree that there was substantial evidence to support the Appeal
    Authority’s decision that Staker’s proposals could not mitigate
    the anticipated detrimental effects. I find no discussion or
    supporting evidence in the record suggesting why Staker’s
    proposals were insufficient; I find only articulation of beliefs that
    they were.
    ¶60 This court has previously stated that even if the reasons
    given by a municipality for denying a conditional use permit
    would be legally sufficient, “the denial of a permit is arbitrary
    when the reasons are without sufficient factual basis.” See Davis
    County v. Clearfield City, 
    756 P.2d 704
    , 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
    Applying that principle here, I see no basis on which to affirm
    the district court’s decision. The concerns and beliefs expressed
    by the Town Council may have been legally sufficient to justify
    denying Staker’s conditional use permit had the record
    demonstrated a factual basis for them. But where the Appeal
    20190641-CA                     29                 
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    Staker v. Town of Springdale
    Authority simply concluded, without evidence, that anticipated
    but unquantified impacts from the Proposed Lot could not be
    mitigated, I cannot sustain that conclusion.
    ¶61 For this reason, I respectfully dissent. Instead of affirming
    the district court, I would remand the case to the court for it to
    address the Appeal Authority’s conclusion that Staker’s
    conditional use permit application was appropriately denied on
    the alternative basis that it created a need for essential municipal
    services that cannot reasonably be met within three months. See
    supra ¶¶ 5, 11 n.4, 21. As the majority notes, the district court did
    not address this aspect of the Appeal Authority’s decision. Supra
    ¶ 43 n.9. The court should address Staker’s appeal of that
    decision in the first instance. See generally McElhaney v. City of
    Moab, 
    2017 UT 65
    , ¶¶ 15–26, 
    423 P.3d 1284
     (explaining the
    benefits of an appellate court reviewing the district court’s
    decision compared to directly reviewing the administrative
    body’s decision); Siebach v. Brigham Young Univ., 
    2015 UT App 253
    , ¶ 36, 
    361 P.3d 130
     (stating that even when we could affirm
    on any legal ground apparent on the record, “we also possess
    the discretion to conclude that the district court should be
    afforded the opportunity to rule on the arguments in the first
    instance”).
    20190641-CA                     30                 
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