Wasatch Electric v. Labor Commission , 2020 UT App 20 ( 2020 )


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    2020 UT App 20
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    WASATCH ELECTRIC DYNALECTRIC COMPANY AND
    AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING, PA,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    LABOR COMMISSION AND WENDELL BENWARD,
    Respondents.
    Opinion
    No. 20190398-CA
    Filed February 13, 2020
    Original Proceeding in this Court
    Brad J. Miller and Trent D. Holgate, Attorneys
    for Petitioners
    Gary E. Atkin and K. Dawn Atkin, Attorneys for
    Respondent Wendell Benward
    JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and DIANA HAGEN concurred.
    HARRIS, Judge:
    ¶1      Wendell Benward was electrocuted while maintaining
    electrical power lines. He survived, but his injuries were so
    severe that doctors found it necessary to amputate both of his
    feet. Because of his injuries, Benward qualified for and received
    workers’ compensation benefits. Despite his injuries, however,
    Benward eventually was able to go back to work, albeit in a
    different capacity. His former employer, Wasatch Electric
    Dynalectric Company (Wasatch), does not think it should have
    to pay Benward permanent total disability benefits for time
    periods in which Benward was able to work. Under applicable
    Utah law, Wasatch’s argument would be a winner with regard to
    most injured workers, who ordinarily lose eligibility for
    permanent total disability benefits if they are able to return to
    Wasatch Electric v. Labor Commission
    work. But Utah law carves out an exception for workers who
    have lost limbs or eyes in a workplace accident, and considers
    such workers permanently disabled and entitled to permanent
    total disability benefits even if they are later able to return to
    work. We therefore reject Wasatch’s arguments, and decline to
    disturb the decision of the Labor Commission (the Commission),
    which ordered Wasatch to continue to pay benefits to Benward
    and refused to allow Wasatch to offset the wages it paid
    Benward post-accident.
    BACKGROUND 1
    ¶2     On July 23, 2012, Benward was working as part of a team
    tasked with maintaining a set of electrical power lines.
    According to Benward, the team was transporting a large pole
    when Benward observed that the grounded pole was too close to
    a live power line. Benward rushed over to help, but tripped and
    twisted his ankle just before reaching them. As he regained his
    footing, electricity suddenly arced between the pole and the
    nearby power line. Somehow, the electricity jumped to
    Benward’s left arm, and the current passed through his body
    and exited through both of his feet, causing significant injury.
    ¶3     Benward was evacuated from the scene by helicopter and
    taken to a hospital, where doctors determined that his injuries
    required the amputation of both feet. The amputation was
    performed that same day. In addition to the loss of his feet,
    Benward also suffered second- and third-degree burns over
    much of his upper body, as well as hearing loss, sleep apnea,
    1. “We state the facts and all legitimate inferences drawn
    therefrom in the light most favorable to the agency’s findings.”
    ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
    2009 UT 36
    , ¶ 2 n.1, 
    211 P.3d 382
     (quotation simplified).
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    tinnitus, meniscus tears in both knees, and memory loss, among
    other ailments.
    ¶4     After nearly a year, Benward recovered sufficiently to
    return to work on a part-time basis, although not in the same
    capacity. With some retraining, Benward was able to work as a
    safety manager, and he performed those duties for Wasatch on a
    part-time basis for a few months. Then, in January 2014,
    Benward was able to increase his hours to full time, and
    continued to work as a full-time safety manager until Wasatch
    laid him off, for unrelated reasons, in January 2017. After being
    laid off, Benward was eventually able to find similar
    employment as a safety professional at an electrical engineering
    company specializing in high-voltage power installation.
    Although the work is inconsistent and the wages and benefits
    are project-dependent, Benward now earns a weekly wage that
    is even higher than the wage he earned at Wasatch.
    ¶5     In addition to the part-time and full-time salary Benward
    has earned since the date of the accident, Wasatch (or its
    insurance company) also paid Benward workers’ compensation
    benefits. Beginning on the day following the accident, Wasatch
    paid Benward temporary total disability benefits until Benward
    was able to resume part-time work. While Benward was
    working part-time, Wasatch paid Benward—in addition to his
    part-time wages—temporary partial disability benefits. After
    Benward resumed full-time employment, Wasatch paid
    Benward permanent partial disability benefits, based on a forty-
    nine percent whole person impairment rating, until it laid
    Benward off in 2017. In total, Wasatch paid Benward $130,818.68
    in various types of workers’ compensation benefits between the
    date of his accident and the date he was laid off.
    ¶6     In March 2017, after being laid off, Benward filed a claim
    for permanent total disability benefits stemming from the loss of
    both of his feet. In this claim, Benward asserted that he was
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    entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits from
    the date of his accident, and continuing for the rest of his
    life, regardless of the fact that he was able to return to work
    after the accident as a safety manager. In response, Wasatch
    acknowledged that Benward met the criteria for permanent total
    disability under Utah’s workers’ compensation statute, given the
    amputation of both of his feet, and that he should receive
    benefits for the time periods in which he was fully or partially
    unable to work. However, Wasatch asserted that Benward was
    not entitled to permanent total disability benefits once it was
    demonstrated that he was again capable of gainful employment.
    ¶7     An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of
    Wasatch, determining that Benward’s injury created only a
    “presumptive finding” that he was permanently and totally
    disabled, and that this presumption was rebutted by the fact that
    Benward had returned to work. The ALJ concluded that Wasatch
    was not obligated to pay Benward permanent total disability
    benefits during periods in which he was gainfully employed.
    ¶8     Benward appealed the decision to the Commission, which
    reversed the ALJ’s legal determination, concluding that Benward
    was entitled to permanent total disability benefits even after
    returning to work, and stating as follows:
    The Commission recognizes that awarding
    permanent total disability compensation to Mr.
    Benward for a period during which he was
    working may seem counterintuitive; however,
    neither gainful employment nor the ability to work
    are part of the criteria under § 413(9) as they are
    under § 413(1). The unique criteria found in
    § 413(9) provide for a final award of permanent
    total disability compensation without regard for or
    consideration of the claimant’s interim work
    following the loss described in that subsection.
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    However, the Commission noted that Benward would not be
    entitled to permanent total disability benefits during the time he
    worked for Wasatch, if his wages had not really been earned but
    had merely been “intended to be paid in lieu of disability
    compensation.” The Commission remanded the case back to the
    ALJ for a factual determination about whether the money paid to
    Benward while he was employed by Wasatch post-accident was
    “intended as a substitute for disability compensation or as
    regular compensation for the work performed.”
    ¶9     On remand, the ALJ found that Benward “was paid
    during the relevant time period for actual work for which [he]
    earned the wages he was paid,” that his job “was not a make-
    work job” and “was legitimate and not just to avoid permanent
    total disability benefits,” and that Benward “gave a dollar’s
    worth of labor for every dollar he was paid.” The Commission
    affirmed the ALJ’s factual findings, and concluded that Wasatch
    acquired an ongoing obligation to pay Benward permanent total
    disability benefits starting on the date of his accident and
    continuing for the remainder of Benward’s life, and that—
    although Wasatch was entitled to an offset for the $130,818.68
    that it had already paid Benward for other types of workers’
    compensation benefits—Wasatch was not entitled to an offset for
    what it had paid him in wages after the accident.
    ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶10 Wasatch now seeks judicial review of certain aspects of
    the Commission’s order. Wasatch does not seek judicial review
    of any factual findings made by the ALJ or the Commission, and
    does not dispute the fact that it has a workers’ compensation
    obligation to Benward for at least the time periods in which
    Benward was unable to work due to his injuries. However, it
    asserts that it has no obligation to pay permanent total disability
    benefits to Benward during periods of time in which Benward
    was or is gainfully employed, and that it should be entitled to
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    offset the wages it paid to Benward post-accident against its
    workers’ compensation obligation to Benward. Thus, the issues
    Wasatch raises in this case are legal in nature, and involve the
    meaning and interpretation of Utah’s workers’ compensation
    statutes. In this context, we review the Commission’s legal
    determinations for correctness. See Esquivel v. Labor Comm’n, 
    2000 UT 66
    , ¶ 13, 
    7 P.3d 777
     (stating that “[m]atters of statutory
    construction are questions of law that are reviewed for
    correctness” (quotation simplified)); see also Intermountain Slurry
    Seal v. Labor Comm’n, 
    2002 UT App 164
    , ¶ 4, 
    48 P.3d 252
     (stating
    that, when reviewing the Commission’s resolution of a question
    of law, we give “no deference” to the “agency’s determination,
    because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what
    the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the
    jurisdiction” (quotation simplified)).
    ANALYSIS
    ¶11 For most injured workers—those who have not lost limbs
    or eyes—permanent total disability benefits under Utah’s
    workers’ compensation statutes are available only if the worker
    proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of six
    elements: (1) that he “sustained a significant impairment” as a
    result of a work-related injury; (2) that he “is not gainfully
    employed”; (3) that he has an impairment that limits his “ability
    to do basic work activities” and (4) prevents him from
    “performing the essential functions of the work” for which he
    was qualified prior to his accident; (5) that he “cannot perform
    other work reasonably available”; and (6) that “the industrial
    accident or occupational disease is the direct cause of the
    employee’s permanent total disability.” See Oliver v. Labor
    Comm’n, 
    2017 UT 39
    , ¶ 15, 
    424 P.3d 22
     (quoting Utah Code Ann.
    § 34A-2-413(1)). In this case, given that he is now able to work
    full-time, and has been since at least 2014, Benward cannot meet
    this test, and does not argue that he can.
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    ¶12 Instead, Benward points to subsection (9) of that same
    statutory provision, and asserts that there exists a second and
    alternative path to proving permanent total disability, one that
    exists only for workers who sustained a catastrophic injury
    involving the loss of limbs or eyes, and one that does not
    consider whether the worker can return to work. That provision
    reads, in its entirety, as follows:
    (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the
    use of the following constitutes total and
    permanent disability that is compensated
    according to this section:
    (i)     both hands;
    (ii)    both arms;
    (iii)   both feet;
    (iv)    both legs;
    (v)     both eyes; or
    (vi)    any combination of two body members
    described in this Subsection 9(a).
    (b) A finding of permanent total              disability
    pursuant to Subsection 9(a) is final.
    Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(9) (LexisNexis 2019). 2
    ¶13 We have interpreted this statutory subsection once before,
    in Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Commission, 
    2002 UT App 164
    , 
    48 P.3d 252
    . In that case, we noted that Utah’s workers’
    compensation statute sets forth “two avenues” that are
    “available for an employee to demonstrate the existence of a
    permanent, totally disabling condition.” Id. ¶ 7. Under the first
    avenue, set forth in section 34A-2-413(1) of the Utah Code, the
    2. Because the relevant sections of the statute have not changed
    since the date of the administrative proceeding in question, we
    cite the current version of the Utah Code for convenience.
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    injured worker must meet the six-part test discussed above. 
    Id.
    The second avenue, set forth in subsection (9) of that same
    statute, is available only to workers who have lost two limbs or
    eyes, and under that avenue the worker does not have to make
    the six-part showing detailed in subsection (1). Instead, “if an
    employee suffers one of the combination of injuries articulated in
    subsection [(9)],[ 3] there is a conclusive presumption that the
    employee is permanently and totally disabled.” Id. ¶ 9. Indeed,
    we stated that “[o]ur reading of the plain language of subsection
    [(9)] evidences a clear intent to separate the injuries enumerated
    under subsection [(9)] from other injuries that may also result in
    an award of permanent total disability benefits.” See id. ¶ 11; see
    also id. ¶ 14 (stating that “the legislature carefully [chose] to
    immunize subsection [(9)] claims from the rigorous requirements
    applied to all other [workers’ compensation] claims”). We noted
    that workers attempting to use the subsection (9) avenue in
    proving that they suffered a permanent total disability “need
    show nothing more than the existence of an injury listed within
    subsection [(9)] and that the injury was the result of an industrial
    accident,” and that such an employee “is not required to
    establish that he is totally disabled as all other claimants are
    required to do pursuant to” subsection (1). Id. ¶ 11.
    ¶14 Moreover, we emphasized that a subsection (9) claimant’s
    entitlement to permanent total disability benefits is final, and not
    3. In Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Commission, 
    2002 UT App 164
    , 
    48 P.3d 252
    , we refer to “subsection (10)” as the relevant
    subsection. Since our opinion in Intermountain Slurry Seal, the
    legislature removed one of the earlier-listed statutory
    subsections, rendering the former subsection (10) now
    subsection (9), and when quoting Intermountain Slurry Seal, we
    use the current subsection number. The relevant statutory
    language, although now numbered differently, remains
    substantively unchanged.
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    “subject to the same rehabilitation provisions as a disability
    finding under subsection (1).” Id. ¶ 10. “Once a subsection [(9)]
    claimant has established a qualifying injury, there is a conclusive
    presumption that the claimant/employee is permanently totally
    disabled and no further findings are required.” Id. ¶ 12. We
    concluded by stating that “the plain language of the statute
    clearly establishes that total permanent disability benefits
    awarded pursuant to subsection [(9)] are not subject to, nor
    controlled by, the claimant/employee’s limitations or
    employability.” Id. 4
    ¶15 Wasatch makes no effort to distinguish Intermountain
    Slurry Seal, or to argue that it is inapplicable, and does not ask us
    4. More than seventeen years have passed since our decision in
    Intermountain Slurry Seal, and in that time span, while the
    legislature has made certain changes to section 34A-2-413 of the
    Utah Code, it has not substantively changed the language of
    subsection (9), nor has it made any other changes that would
    indicate a legislative belief that our opinion in Intermountain
    Slurry Seal was inconsistent with legislative intent. Because we
    presume that the legislature is aware of judicial interpretations
    of statutes, we in turn may presume that the legislature’s choice,
    over the course of nearly two decades, not to amend the statute
    to supersede Intermountain Slurry Seal indicates an acceptance of
    our interpretation. See Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin. Co., 
    2019 UT 27
    , ¶ 62, 
    445 P.3d 474
     (noting the significance of the fact that,
    “in the years since Clover was decided, the legislature has not
    amended the [relevant statute] to overrule the holding of
    Clover”); United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co. v. Nielsen,
    
    430 P.2d 162
    , 167 (Utah 1967) (Ellett, J., dissenting) (noting that a
    previous holding was twenty-seven years old, and that “the
    Legislature by not changing this statute would have given its
    tacit approval to the interpretation placed thereon” by the
    previous holding).
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    to reexamine the holding we rendered in that case. 5 Instead,
    Wasatch makes generalized arguments that Benward’s
    interpretation of the statute leads to an “absurd result” that
    “exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality” and
    would result in a “windfall” to Benward. But we are bound by
    Intermountain Slurry Seal, and—absent a disavowal or overruling
    of that case, something Wasatch does not seek here—we must
    follow the holding and rationale of our prior cases. 6 See State v.
    Legg, 
    2018 UT 12
    , ¶ 9, 
    417 P.3d 592
     (stating that, “[u]nder the
    doctrine of horizontal stare decisis, the first decision by a court on
    a particular question of law governs later decisions by the same
    court,” that “one panel on the court of appeals owes great
    deference to the precedent established by a different panel on
    the court of appeals,” and clarifying that “[t]he doctrine of
    horizontal stare decisis applies as between different panels of the
    court of appeals” (quotation simplified)); see also In re adoption of
    B.N.A., 
    2018 UT App 224
    , ¶ 22, 
    438 P.3d 10
     (stating that “one
    panel of this court is bound to follow the previous decisions of
    5. Wasatch cited Intermountain Slurry Seal only once in its
    opening brief, in the context of making a passing reference to the
    ALJ’s and the Labor Commission’s rulings. And, after Benward
    relied heavily upon Intermountain Slurry Seal in his brief,
    Wasatch chose not to file a reply brief.
    6. We note, as an aside, that we find the statutory interpretation
    analysis in Intermountain Slurry Seal to be not only binding, but
    also persuasive. See 7 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s
    Workers’ Compensation Law § 83.08 (2014) (stating that “[s]pecial
    statutory provisions may supersede the general principles
    controlling the relation between medical and wage loss factors in
    determining total disability,” and that “[t]he commonest
    example of this type of statute is the familiar provision that
    certain combinations of losses of members shall be presumed to
    constitute total disability”).
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    Wasatch Electric v. Labor Commission
    another panel of this court, unless we make a specific decision to
    overrule or disavow the earlier precedent”).
    ¶16 In this case, there is no dispute that Benward meets the
    requirements of subsection (9) for demonstrating permanent
    total disability. The parties to this case have stipulated that
    Benward’s workplace accident arose out of the course and scope
    of his employment with Wasatch, and that, as a result of that
    accident, he sustained the loss of both of his feet. And under
    subsection (9), Benward need show nothing more. See Utah Code
    Ann. § 34A-2-413(9)(a); see also Intermountain Slurry Seal, 
    2002 UT App 164
    , ¶ 11 (stating that a subsection (9) claimant “need show
    nothing more than the existence of an injury listed within
    subsection [(9)] and that the injury was the result of an industrial
    accident”). He has proven that he was permanently and totally
    disabled, and under subsection (9), that status is “final” and does
    not change even if Benward is at some point able to return to the
    workforce. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(9)(b); see also
    Intermountain Slurry Seal, 
    2002 UT App 164
    , ¶ 12 (stating that
    “[o]nce a subsection [(9)] claimant has established a qualifying
    injury, there is a conclusive presumption” of permanent total
    disability that is not “controlled by” future “employability”).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17 The plain language of the relevant statutory subsection, as
    interpreted by this court in Intermountain Slurry Seal, compels the
    conclusion that Benward is entitled to permanent total disability
    benefits, even if he is now capable of working. To the extent
    Wasatch finds that conclusion absurd or unreasonable, Wasatch
    would be better served to direct its complaints to the Utah
    Legislature. Because we are obligated to apply both the statute
    as written as well as our own prior case law, we decline to
    disturb the decision of the Labor Commission.
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