State v. Blais , 2020 UT App 4 ( 2020 )


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    2020 UT App 4
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee,
    v.
    RONALD ALAN BLAIS,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20180509-CA
    Filed January 3, 2020
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Linda M. Jones
    No. 171906926
    Wendy Brown, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Lindsey L. Wheeler, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
    APPLEBY, Judge:
    ¶1     Ronald Alan Blais was convicted of distributing a
    controlled substance and possessing a controlled substance with
    intent to distribute, both of which were enhanced to first-degree
    felonies due to a prior conviction. He also was convicted of
    giving false personal information to a peace officer, a class C
    misdemeanor. Blais challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
    convict him of the felonies, alleges the district court abused its
    discretion in denying his motion to reduce the degrees of his
    felony convictions, and claims he was given an illegal sentence
    for the misdemeanor. We affirm his convictions, but we reverse
    the sentence for the misdemeanor count and remand for
    correction of that sentence.
    State v. Blais
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     Blais was arrested after a police officer (Officer One)
    observed him and two other individuals, a man (Man) and
    Blais’s daughter (Daughter), selling drugs on a street. Officer
    One, who was four stories above Blais and his cohorts in a
    building across the street from them, used a spotting scope to
    survey the suspicious activity. The spotting scope gave Officer
    One “a clear view of what was going on below,” including
    “details of faces.” He observed buyers giving Daughter or Man
    money. Daughter “would then put [the money] in a backpack
    and then direct [the buyers] to” Blais, who “would give them
    some sort of object from his backpack or mouth.” Occasionally,
    Daughter “would pull a pill bottle out of her backpack and
    dump what appeared to be small objects, [that Officer One]
    believed to be twists,[1] into [Blais’s] hand, and he would either
    place them into his mouth or into his backpack.” Two officers
    later testified that the pill bottle had a strong vinegar odor,
    which in their training and experience indicated “it was used to
    store heroin.” There were two backpacks at the scene. One was
    on the ground between Blais and Daughter, and the other, which
    was “black and gray [and] had a [sporting goods] symbol,” was
    on Blais’s lap.
    ¶3     Officer One observed “about a dozen” transactions in
    which he could see twists. After Officer One saw Blais hand a
    buyer (Buyer) a black twist from his backpack, Officer One
    called in another officer (Officer Two) to arrest Buyer. After
    Officer Two informed Officer One that Buyer was in custody and
    1. According to Officer One, “a twist is a piece of plastic, almost
    like a garbage-bag type of plastic, that drug dealers will place
    heroin or crack cocaine in, and then they wrap it and they twist
    it very tightly.” See also State v. Bowdrey, 
    2019 UT App 3
    , ¶ 3 n.2,
    
    438 P.3d 946
     (defining a twist).
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    State v. Blais
    that Officer Two found a black twist in Buyer’s possession,
    Officer One gave other nearby officers descriptions of Blais,
    Man, and Daughter, and of the suspects’ locations. Using his
    spotting scope, Officer One “had eyes on [them] the whole time”
    and confirmed the officers detained the correct people. He also
    testified that none of the suspects left the area and no one else
    “looking like them” entered the area during his surveillance. The
    arresting officers later testified that the descriptions Officer One
    provided of the suspects were “spot on.” Upon arrest, Blais did
    not produce identification and told the arresting officer multiple
    times that his name was spelled “Ronald Blaze.”
    ¶4      After Officer One dismantled his surveillance equipment,
    he went to the scene where all three suspects were handcuffed
    and the other officers were in the process of searching the
    backpacks. Officer Two searched the backpack that was on the
    ground between Blais and Daughter and found a pill bottle with
    Daughter’s name on it and “a large amount of cash” that, in his
    training and experience, was “indicative of . . . sales of drugs.”
    Officer One searched the black and gray backpack that was on
    Blais’s lap and found “two [white] twists of what appeared to be
    crack cocaine” inside. Blais was arrested and charged with
    distribution of a controlled substance (heroin), possession of a
    controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, each
    second-degree felonies, and providing false personal
    information to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor. 2
    ¶5     The officers seized and booked into evidence the cash, the
    white twists, and the black twist. Officer Two testified that
    booking evidence consists of packaging each piece of evidence,
    printing a receipt that is affixed to the package, taping the
    package closed, and signing the tape “so it can show that it
    2. Blais also was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia,
    but that charge was dismissed before the jury received the case.
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    State v. Blais
    hasn’t been tampered with.” Officer Two personally booked the
    evidence in this case and testified that he followed standard
    procedure in doing so.
    ¶6     At trial, Officer One positively identified a “white twist
    containing crack cocaine” that he found in the black and gray
    backpack. Officer Two then identified the black twist found on
    Buyer, and testified it was the only narcotic in Buyer’s
    possession. A senior forensic scientist testified that he performed
    a “screening test and a confirmation test” on each twist and
    positively identified the substance in the white twists as cocaine
    and the substance in the black twist as heroin. He also testified
    that another person in the lab reviewed his results and
    confirmed his conclusions.
    ¶7     The forensic scientist testified about the crime lab’s
    process of receiving and testing drugs and said applicable
    protocol had been followed in this case. Therefore, he was
    “confident that those results [we]re the correct results.” The State
    also introduced into evidence the lab report from “this case,”
    which included the case number, the lab’s case number, and the
    forensic scientist’s signature. The report also identified the
    substances as heroin and cocaine. On cross-examination, Blais
    asked the forensic scientist whether any DNA or fingerprinting
    tests were performed on the evidence and the scientist
    responded in the negative. Blais did not object to any alleged
    deficiency in the chain of custody.
    ¶8      Blais testified in his own defense. He claimed Daughter
    “might have asked” him to hold the black and gray backpack,
    that he was there only to “convince” her to leave her
    drug-addicted lifestyle, and that he did not sell heroin or possess
    crack cocaine. Blais emphasized that no drugs were found on
    him when he was arrested. The jury convicted Blais on all three
    counts. After the guilty verdict, the district court found that
    Blais’s prior conviction of attempted possession with the intent
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    State v. Blais
    to distribute enhanced his convictions from second- to
    first-degree felonies.
    ¶9      Before sentencing, Blais moved for a reduction of his
    first-degree felony convictions to second-degree convictions,
    arguing that his history of mental illness warranted deviation
    and that, rather than a prison sentence, he should be given the
    opportunity to seek mental health treatment. The court denied
    the motion, reasoning that “the Utah legislature has indicated
    how those crimes should be handled appropriately” and noting
    that the drugs involved—heroin and cocaine—are “very
    dangerous substances.” The court also said Blais was dealing
    drugs to “a vulnerable population . . . with his daughter” when
    he “could have been a role model to her, and instead [he] was
    just the opposite.” The court observed that Blais “was caught in
    the act and he has continued to deny and minimize his conduct
    and his own history” and he already had unsuccessful “efforts in
    probation.” The court then sentenced Blais to concurrent terms
    of five years to life in prison for each of the felonies and one year
    in prison for the class C misdemeanor.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶10 Blais raises three issues on appeal. First, he claims there
    was insufficient evidence to convict him of both distribution of a
    controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance
    with intent to distribute. Because this issue was not preserved at
    trial, Blais asks us to review these claims under the plain error
    exception to the preservation rule. See State v. Graves, 
    2019 UT App 72
    , ¶ 18, 
    442 P.3d 1228
    . “In considering an insufficiency of
    the evidence claim, we review the evidence and all inferences
    which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
    favorable to the verdict of the jury,” and “we will reverse a jury
    verdict only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
    inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
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    State v. Blais
    must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
    committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.” State v.
    Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 302, 
    299 P.3d 892
     (quotation simplified).
    When, as is the case here, this issue is unpreserved, the appellant
    must also show “the insufficiency was so obvious and
    fundamental that the [district] court erred in submitting the case
    to the jury.” State v. Holgate, 
    2000 UT 74
    , ¶ 17, 
    10 P.3d 346
    .
    ¶11 Second, Blais asserts the district court erred in denying his
    motion to reduce his convictions from first- to second-degree
    felonies. “We review a [district] court’s denial of a motion to
    reduce the degree of a conviction for abuse of discretion.” State v.
    Salt, 
    2015 UT App 72
    , ¶ 9, 
    347 P.3d 414
    .
    ¶12 Finally, Blais contends he received an illegal sentence
    when the district court sentenced him to one year in prison for a
    class C misdemeanor. Whether a sentence is illegal is reviewed
    for correctness. State v. Thorkelson, 
    2004 UT App 9
    , ¶ 9, 
    84 P.3d 854
    .
    ANALYSIS
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    A.     Distribution of a Controlled Substance
    ¶13 To convict a defendant of distribution of a controlled
    substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    the defendant “knowingly and intentionally . . . distribute[d] a
    controlled . . . substance.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
    (1)(a)(ii)
    (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). 3
    3. Because the material provisions of the statute have not
    changed since the incident in question, we cite the most recent
    (continued…)
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    State v. Blais
    ¶14 Blais argues there was insufficient evidence to convict
    him of distribution of heroin. Specifically, he claims “no
    evidence established that” the black twist found on Buyer “was
    the same [i]tem . . . that tested positive [for] heroin.” He claims
    “the State essentially showed the jury a black plastic twist, from
    which the jury returned a verdict that Blais had distributed
    heroin,” without evidence of “the physical characteristics of
    heroin.” Not only was there sufficient evidence for this
    conviction, Blais has not demonstrated any alleged
    “insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the [district]
    court erred in submitting the case to the jury.” State v. Holgate,
    
    2000 UT 74
    , ¶ 17, 
    10 P.3d 346
    .
    ¶15 First, Officer One, using a high-powered spotting scope,
    watched Blais, Daughter, and Man conduct “about a dozen”
    drug deals in which he could see twists. After Officer One saw
    Blais hand Buyer a black twist, Officer Two arrested Buyer and
    found only one drug on Buyer—a black twist of heroin. Second,
    Officer One observed Daughter “dump what appeared to be
    small objects” from a pill bottle into Blais’s hand, which he then
    placed “into his mouth or into his backpack.” When the pill
    bottle was recovered, it “had a strong vinegar-type odor,”
    indicating it “was used to store heroin.” Then, Officer Two
    positively identified the black twist as the drug he seized from
    Buyer upon arrest, immediately after Officer One watched the
    drug deal occur. Officer Two also testified to the evidentiary
    booking process by which he placed the twists into evidence,
    and the senior forensic scientist’s testimony reiterated that all
    protocol was followed in this case and that the substance in the
    black twist positively tested as heroin. Not only was he
    “confident that those results [we]re the correct results,” but the
    (…continued)
    version of the Utah Code. See State v. Lopez, 
    2019 UT App 11
    , ¶ 25
    n.3, 
    438 P.3d 950
    .
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    lab report from “this case” identified the black twist as
    containing heroin. Further, Blais did not raise an objection at trial
    regarding any alleged missing link in the evidentiary chain of
    custody; instead, he focused on the lack of DNA and absence of
    fingerprint analysis on the evidence. In fact, everyone at trial
    seemed to be working under the assumption that the twists
    recovered at the scene were the same twists the forensic scientist
    tested.
    ¶16 This constitutes sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury
    to find Blais “knowingly and intentionally . . . distributed”
    heroin,    a     controlled  substance.    
    Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
    (1)(a)(ii). Although the jury’s conclusion necessarily
    required it to infer certain facts (for instance, that the black
    twist Blais handed Buyer was the same black twist
    confiscated from Buyer, that the black twist was the same
    twist that tested positive for heroin, and that the items
    Daughter dumped from her pill bottle into Blais’s hand
    were twists), these are reasonable inferences drawn from
    the evidence presented at trial. See Salt Lake City v. Carrera,
    
    2015 UT 73
    , ¶ 12, 
    358 P.3d 1067
     (“A jury draws a reasonable
    inference if there is an evidentiary foundation to draw and
    support the conclusion.”). That the charge of distribution of a
    controlled substance went to the jury does not amount to plain
    error.
    B.     Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
    Distribute
    ¶17 To obtain a conviction for possession of a controlled
    substance with intent to distribute, the State must prove beyond
    a reasonable doubt that the defendant “knowingly and
    intentionally . . . possesse[d] a controlled . . . substance with
    intent to distribute.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
    (1)(a)(iii)
    (LexisNexis Supp. 2019).
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    State v. Blais
    ¶18 Blais claims there is insufficient evidence to convict him of
    possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He alleges that
    “no evidence established” that the white twists recovered from
    the backpack on Blais’s lap were the same items that tested
    positive for cocaine. He also asserts that no differentiation was
    made at trial between the two backpacks at the scene, “thus
    never allowing the jury to properly consider whether Blais was
    in possession of the same backpack that contained the white
    twists.” These arguments are unavailing.
    ¶19 First, Officer One observed “about a dozen” transactions
    in which he could see twists. He also saw two backpacks, one on
    the ground between Blais and Daughter and one—black and
    gray with a sporting goods logo—on Blais’s lap. When Officer
    One responded to the scene, he searched the black and gray
    backpack. Inside that backpack, he “found two twists of what
    appeared to be crack cocaine,” which he “collected . . . and
    put . . . in evidence bags.” Officer Two testified that he booked
    the white twists into evidence, and the senior forensic scientist
    testified that all crime lab protocol was followed in this case. At
    trial, Officer One positively identified one of the white twists as
    the same he had recovered from the black and gray backpack
    that was “[o]n [Blais’s] lap when [Officer One] first observed
    him.” Further, the forensic scientist testified that he tested the
    substance and confirmed it was cocaine and that he was
    “confident that those results [we]re the correct results.” The lab
    report from “this case” was entered into evidence and identified
    the substance from the white twist as cocaine. As previously
    discussed, supra ¶ 15, Blais’s failure to raise an objection
    regarding any alleged missing link in the chain of custody does
    not indicate a lack of evidence but, rather, that all parties at the
    trial appeared to agree that the twists seized at the scene were
    the same that were tested and presented at trial.
    ¶20 This evidence sufficiently supports not only that the
    substance recovered from the black and gray backpack was
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    State v. Blais
    cocaine but that the black and gray backpack was in Blais’s
    possession, and we therefore discern no error in the court
    allowing the charge of possession of a controlled substance to be
    submitted to the jury, let alone an error that is “obvious and
    fundamental.” State v. Holgate, 
    2000 UT 74
    , ¶ 17, 
    10 P.3d 346
    .
    II. Motion to Reduce Convictions
    ¶21 Blais also argues that the district court erred when it
    denied his motion to reduce his first-degree felony convictions to
    second-degree convictions. A district “court may enter a
    judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and
    impose sentence accordingly” if it “concludes it would be
    unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree
    of offense” for which the defendant was convicted. 
    Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402
    (1) (LexisNexis 2017). In making this
    determination, the court must take into account “the nature and
    circumstances of the offense” and “the history and character of
    the defendant.” 
    Id.
    ¶22 Blais claims the district court abused its discretion in
    denying his motion to reduce his convictions because it “failed
    to consider all the legally relevant factors,” namely his history of
    mental illness and request to instead be treated at an inpatient
    mental health program. (Quoting State v. Sanchez, 
    2015 UT App 58
    , ¶ 5, 
    346 P.3d 701
     (quotation simplified).) We disagree. The
    court explained why it denied Blais’s motion, noting that heroin
    and cocaine are “very dangerous substances” and that Blais was
    dealing those drugs to “a vulnerable population . . . with his
    daughter” when he “could have been a role model to her, and
    instead [he] was just the opposite.” The court also noted Blais
    “was caught in the act,” yet had “continued to deny and
    minimize his conduct and his own history,” and that Blais
    already had unsuccessful “efforts in probation.” Although the
    court did not explicitly state the weight it gave to Blais’s mental
    illness and his desire to seek treatment, we “presume that the
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    State v. Blais
    district court made all the necessary considerations.” State v.
    Moa, 
    2012 UT 28
    , ¶ 35, 
    282 P.3d 985
    ; see also State v. Helms, 
    2002 UT 12
    , ¶ 11, 
    40 P.3d 626
     (noting the “general rule” that an
    appellate court, in reviewing a district court’s sentencing order,
    “upholds the [district] court even if it failed to make findings on
    the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the
    court actually made such findings” (quotation simplified)). The
    court therefore did not abuse its discretion.
    III. Illegal Sentence
    ¶23 Blais argues, and the State concedes, the district court
    erred when it sentenced Blais to one year in prison for providing
    false information to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor. A
    conviction of a class C misdemeanor may result in
    “imprisonment . . . for a term not exceeding 90 days.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204
     (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). Because the court
    sentenced Blais to more than ninety days in prison for this
    conviction, we reverse his sentence on this count and remand to
    the district court to correct it.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶24 Sufficient evidence supports Blais’s convictions of
    distribution of a controlled substance and possession of a
    controlled substance with intent to distribute, and the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to
    reduce his convictions from first-degree felonies to
    second-degree felonies. We thus affirm those convictions. But
    because the district court erred when it sentenced Blais to more
    than the statutory maximum for a class C misdemeanor under
    Utah law, we reverse that sentence and remand to the district
    court for correction.
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