State v. McClellan , 2014 Utah App. LEXIS 265 ( 2014 )


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    2014 UT App 271
    _________________________________________________________
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    THEOPHELUS CLAY MCCLELLAN JR.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Memorandum Decision
    No. 20130469-CA
    Filed November 14, 2014
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
    No. 121911815
    Joanna E. Landau, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Ryan D. Tenney, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Memorandum
    Decision, in which JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH and JOHN A. PEARCE
    concurred.
    VOROS, Judge:
    ¶1      Theophelus Clay McClellan Jr. appeals his sentences for
    retail theft and for violating a protective order. Because he has
    already served these sentences, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
    ¶2     On April 29, 2013, the district court sentenced McClellan
    to two concurrent 365-day jail sentences less time served. The
    court ordered the cases to be closed upon completion of the
    sentences. McClellan’s appeal does not challenge his convictions,
    only his sentences, which he has now completed.
    State v. McClellan
    ¶3     Courts are not in the business of deciding moot cases. See
    In re C.D., 
    2010 UT 66
    , ¶ 11, 
    245 P.3d 724
    . An appellate challenge
    becomes moot when ‚circumstances change so that the
    controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested
    impossible or of no legal effect.‛ Richards v. Baum, 
    914 P.2d 719
    ,
    720 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, ‚[w]here the issues that were
    before the trial court no longer exist, the appellate court will not
    review the case.‛ 
    Id.
    ¶4     Where a defendant completes his sentence and his case is
    closed, an appeal challenging that sentence is generally moot. See
    State v. Peterson, 
    2012 UT App 363
    , ¶ 5, 
    293 P.3d 1103
    ; State v.
    Martinez, 
    925 P.2d 176
    , 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Because
    McClellan has completed his sentences, ‚the relief he requests—
    resentencing—is ‘impossible or of no legal effect.’‛ See Peterson,
    
    2012 UT App 363
    , ¶ 5 (quoting In re Adoption of L.O., 
    2012 UT 23
    ,
    ¶ 8, 
    282 P.3d 977
    ). His appellate challenge is thus moot.
    ¶5      It is true that a criminal case is moot ‚’only if it is shown
    that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences
    will be imposed.’‛ Martinez, 
    925 P.2d at 177
     (quoting Sibron v.
    New York, 
    392 U.S. 40
    , 57 (1968)). And McClellan asserts that his
    sentences prevent him from ‚improv[ing] his living situation
    and support network in the community‛ and from ‚be[ing] a
    better father to his children.‛ But such consequences, even if
    they persist past McClellan’s incarceration, are not imposed by
    law and thus do not qualify as collateral consequences in this
    context. See Towner v. Ridgway, 
    2012 UT App 35
    , ¶ 9, 
    272 P.3d 765
    (noting that specific consequences of district court denying
    motion to vacate civil stalking injunction—‚such as harm to his
    reputation, family relationships, and employment prospects—
    are not ‘imposed by law’‛ and are therefore not collateral
    consequences of the alleged illegality); cf. Spencer v. Kemna, 
    523 U.S. 1
    , 16 n.8 (1998) (noting that an injury to reputation or stigma
    resulting from a criminal conviction is not adequate alone to
    overcome mootness).
    20130469-CA                      2                
    2014 UT App 271
    State v. McClellan
    ¶6      McClellan also claims that his appeal fits within an
    exception to the mootness doctrine. While we typically decline to
    adjudicate moot questions, we recognize an exception to this
    general rule where the ‚alleged wrong is ‘capable of repetition
    yet evading review.’‛ In re Giles, 
    657 P.2d 285
    , 286 (Utah 1982)
    (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
    Comm’n, 
    219 U.S. 498
    , 515 (1911)). This exception applies to an
    issue that ‚is of wide concern, affects the public interest, is likely
    to recur in a similar manner, and, because of the brief time any
    one person is affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial
    review.‛ Wickham v. Fisher, 
    629 P.2d 896
    , 899 (Utah 1981); see also
    State v. Moore, 
    2009 UT App 128
    , ¶ 11, 
    210 P.3d 967
     (referencing
    Wickham’s standard in dismissing as moot appellant’s claim that
    he was denied due process at disciplinary hearing). However,
    McClellan’s challenge to his concurrent sentences depends on
    the unique circumstances of this particular case and is not of
    wide concern. Hence the exception does not apply here.
    ¶7     Because McClellan is no longer incarcerated and no
    legally imposed collateral consequences flow from his sentences,
    the present appeal is moot. We accordingly dismiss it.
    ____________
    20130469-CA                       3                
    2014 UT App 271
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20130469-CA

Citation Numbers: 2014 UT App 271, 339 P.3d 942, 2014 Utah App. LEXIS 265, 2014 WL 6068420

Judges: Voros, Roth, Pearce

Filed Date: 11/14/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/13/2024