Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch , 428 P.3d 51 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                         
    2018 UT App 118
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEAL DEUTSCH,
    Appellee.
    Opinion
    No. 20140568-CA
    Filed June 21, 2018
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Keith A. Kelly
    No. 139918085
    Barnard N. Madsen, Aaron P. Dodd, and Peter
    Reichman, Attorneys for Appellant
    Lester A. Perry, Attorney for Appellee
    JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in
    which JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and DIANA HAGEN concurred.
    CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
    ¶1      This is a case about preservation. Federated Capital
    Corporation (Federated), an out-of-state corporation, and Neal
    Deutsch, an out-of-state individual, entered into a contract that
    specified an out-of-state place of performance but provided that
    the contract would be governed by Utah law in Utah courts.
    Federated filed suit against Deutsch for breach of contract. The
    district court ruled that Utah’s borrowing statute applied
    because the other state’s statute of limitations had run, and the
    court therefore granted summary judgment for Deutsch.
    Federated appeals, arguing that Utah’s borrowing statute is
    inapplicable to the suit because the suit arose in Utah. Because
    Federated did not raise this issue in the district court, it is
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    unpreserved. We therefore affirm and remand for the limited
    purpose of calculating Deutsch’s attorney fees incurred on
    appeal.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2      Federated, a Michigan corporation, brought suit against
    Deutsch, a Florida resident, alleging that he had breached a
    credit card contract that required him to make payments in
    Pennsylvania. Specifically, Federated alleged that Deutsch had
    failed to make credit card payments to Federated’s predecessor-
    in-interest totaling $8,881.85 and that he consequently owed
    Federated that amount plus five years of interest at 29.99%. A
    provision of the contract specified that Utah law applied, that
    Utah courts were the proper forum, and that the parties
    consented to Utah courts’ jurisdiction (the Controlling Law
    & Jurisdiction Clause). Deutsch moved for summary judgment,
    arguing that because the place of performance was Pennsylvania
    and that state’s four-year statute of limitations had already run,
    Utah’s borrowing statute barred the suit. See generally 
    42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5525
    (a)(8) (2002); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-103
    (LexisNexis 2012). 1 The district court agreed and granted
    Deutsch’s motion. Federated appeals.
    1. Utah’s borrowing statute provides,
    A cause of action which arises in another
    jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in the
    other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time,
    may not be pursued in this state, unless the cause
    of action is held by a citizen of this state who has
    held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
    Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-103 (LexisNexis 2012).
    20140568-CA                     2                
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶3      On appeal, Federated contends that the district court
    erred by applying Utah’s borrowing statute so as to import
    Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations. In Federated’s view, the
    district court should have instead applied Utah’s six-year statute
    of limitations for actions founded on contracts. See generally Utah
    Code Ann. § 78B-2-309 (LexisNexis 2012). When evaluating a
    district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
    judgment, we consider the facts in favor of the nonmoving party,
    and review the court’s legal conclusions and ultimate decision
    for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson, 
    2008 UT 2
    , ¶ 6, 
    177 P.3d 600
    .
    However, we cannot review a legal conclusion or decision never
    actually made by the district court; the preservation doctrine of
    appellate review requires that, to reach the merits of an issue on
    appeal, the issue must have been brought to the district court’s
    attention such that it had the opportunity to rule on it. State v.
    Johnson, 
    2017 UT 76
    , ¶ 15, 
    416 P.3d 443
    . “To provide the court
    with this opportunity, the issue must be specifically raised by the
    party asserting error, in a timely manner, and must be supported
    by evidence and relevant legal authority.” 
    Id.
     (quotation
    simplified).
    ANALYSIS
    ¶4     This case is one of several that follow in the wake of the
    Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby,
    
    2016 UT 41
    , 
    384 P.3d 221
    . In Libby, our supreme court addressed
    a similar case involving Federated based on an identical contract.
    The court there held that, because the contract’s forum-selection
    provision selected Utah law as applied by Utah courts, the case
    was governed by both the substantive and procedural law of
    Utah. See id. ¶¶ 13, 17. Consequently, Utah’s borrowing statute
    was applicable. Id. ¶ 17.
    20140568-CA                     3                
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    ¶5      The supreme court then considered the application of
    Utah’s borrowing statute to the facts of the case. The court
    explained that the borrowing statute creates a two-part test; first,
    the statute asks whether the cause of action arose in another
    jurisdiction and, second, it asks whether the cause of action is
    not actionable in the other jurisdiction due to the lapse of time.
    Id. ¶ 18. “If both of these elements are satisfied, a Utah court will
    adopt that foreign jurisdiction’s time limitations[.]” 2 Id. The
    supreme court noted in Libby that Federated had not challenged
    the district court’s determination that the cause of action arose in
    Pennsylvania and therefore proceeded to the second part of the
    test. Id. ¶ 19. The supreme court concluded that the second part
    of the test was satisfied because Pennsylvania’s four-year statute
    of limitations had expired by the time Federated filed suit in
    Utah. Id. ¶ 27. Because both elements set forth by the borrowing
    statute were satisfied, the supreme court concluded that
    Federated’s suit against Libby was time-barred. Id. ¶ 29.
    ¶6     In a concurring opinion, two members of the court
    emphasized that Federated’s concession—that the cause of
    action had arisen in Pennsylvania—meant that the court was
    unable to address the meaning of the term “arises in” found in
    the borrowing statute. See id. ¶ 36 (Lee, J., concurring) (“When
    the argument is squarely raised, our courts should decide
    whether the borrowing statute’s ‘arises in’ formulation is a
    2. The supreme court noted that the borrowing statute contains
    an exception: the statute does not operate when the cause of
    action is held by a citizen of Utah who has held it since it
    accrued. Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby, 
    2016 UT 41
    , ¶ 18, 
    384 P.3d 221
    . Because Federated is not a citizen of Utah and because
    Federated did not hold the causes of action at the time they
    accrued, the exception did not apply in Libby and does not apply
    here.
    20140568-CA                      4               
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    reference to applicable choice-of-law rules or is dictated simply
    by the longstanding ‘place of performance’ test.”).
    ¶7     Federated distinguishes the present case from Libby on a
    single ground. In contrast to its position in Libby, Federated does
    not concede that its causes of action flowing from this contract
    arose in Pennsylvania. 3 Instead, Federated contends that, based
    on the language of the contract, the causes of action pleaded in
    the complaint arose in Utah. Federated relies on the Controlling
    Law & Jurisdiction Clause in the contract, which contained
    choice-of-law,   forum-selection,      and     personal-jurisdiction
    provisions:
    CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION. This
    Agreement shall be governed solely by and
    interpreted entirely in accordance with the laws of
    the State of Utah, . . . regardless of where you
    reside . . . . YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL
    JURISDICTION IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL
    COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE THAT ANY
    LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT
    MUST BE BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS
    IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF WHO FILES THE
    SUIT, AND MAY BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN
    THOSE COURTS UNLESS AND UNTIL ANY
    PARTY ELECTS ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO
    THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN THIS
    AGREEMENT.
    (Capitalization in original.) Federated reasons that, because the
    contract specified that it would be governed by Utah law, any
    3. We note that this case, and the related cases we also decide
    today, had already been dismissed by the time the supreme
    court issued its decision in Libby.
    20140568-CA                     5                
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    breach of the contract should be deemed to have occurred in
    Utah. On this basis, Federated contends on appeal that its causes
    of action arose in Utah and that the district court was wrong to
    grant summary judgment in favor of Deutsch.
    I. Preservation
    ¶8      We will generally only address issues on appeal that have
    been properly preserved. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 
    2004 UT 72
    , ¶ 51, 
    99 P.3d 801
     (“Issues that are not raised at trial are
    usually deemed waived.”); see also Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 
    2014 UT App 154
    , ¶¶ 3–4, 
    330 P.3d 762
    . Here, Federated’s specific legal
    theory was not preserved for appeal, because Federated never
    presented this theory or the underlying line of reasoning to the
    district court. See Prime Ins. Co. v. Graves, 
    2016 UT App 23
    , ¶ 9,
    
    367 P.3d 1029
     (explaining that “the appellant must present the
    legal basis for a claim, not merely the underlying facts or a
    tangentially related claim,” to preserve it for appeal (quotation
    simplified)); see also State v. Johnson, 
    2017 UT 76
    , ¶ 14 n.2, 
    416 P.3d 443
     (noting that when an appellant raises an “entirely
    distinct legal theory” on appeal, the appellant has raised a “new
    claim or issue” rather than merely an argument in support of an
    existing issue). To reach this conclusion, we first examine the
    filings and arguments made by the parties below. We then
    consider whether the policies underlying the preservation rule
    are implicated.
    ¶9    Federated sued Deutsch in November 2013, alleging that
    he had breached the credit card contract in March 2008. The
    complaint’s statement of jurisdiction alleged that jurisdiction
    flowed from the contract’s Controlling Law & Jurisdiction
    Clause:
    2. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
    [contract], [Deutsch] consented to personal
    jurisdiction in the State of Utah and the [contract] is
    20140568-CA                     6                
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    governed solely by and interpreted entirely in
    accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
    3. Accordingly, jurisdiction is obtained and venue
    is properly set in the Third Judicial District, Salt
    Lake County in the State of Utah.
    We note that Federated’s complaint did not allege that the Utah
    district court had jurisdiction because the causes of action arose
    in Utah as a result of the parties’ consent to Utah courts’
    jurisdiction.
    ¶10 We next consider whether Federated presented such a
    legal theory to the district court during the summary judgment
    proceedings. Deutsch moved for summary judgment, conceding
    the applicability of the Controlling Law & Jurisdiction Clause
    but arguing that the proper application of Utah’s borrowing
    statute mandated dismissal because the causes of action were
    time-barred in Pennsylvania. In its memorandum in opposition
    to summary judgment, Federated did not explicitly assert that
    the borrowing statute was inapplicable because the causes of
    action actually arose in Utah. Instead, Federated argued that
    “Utah’s borrowing statute should not be construed to rewrite the
    forum-selection clause of the agreement.” In Federated’s view,
    because Deutsch “ha[d] not challenged the enforceability of the
    forum-selection clause[, t]here is no question that Utah’s
    procedural rules govern Federated Capital’s claim.” In other
    words, Federated argued that the forum-selection provision of
    the Controlling Law & Jurisdiction Clause meant that Utah’s
    procedural rules, including Utah’s statutes of limitations,
    governed any lawsuit arising from the contract. But this
    argument did not set forth a theory that the Controlling Law
    & Jurisdiction Clause actually changed the place of breach, i.e.,
    where the causes of action arose. The memorandum in opposition
    thus did not “specifically raise[]” this issue, let alone provide
    20140568-CA                     7                
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    “support[] by evidence and relevant legal authority.” 4 See
    Johnson, 
    2017 UT 76
    , ¶ 15 (quotation simplified). Consequently,
    the memorandum did not preserve the issue for appeal.
    ¶11 Federated also claims that Deutsch’s reply to the
    memorandum in opposition “acknowledged Federated raised
    the same issue it is arguing on appeal,” i.e., whether the cause of
    action arose in Utah as a result of the Controlling Law
    & Jurisdiction Clause. Specifically, Federated highlights the
    sentence, “Federated then claims that the account agreement
    ‘states otherwise’ implying that since the agreement contains a
    forum selection clause for Utah, the cause of action for non-
    payment must have arose in Utah.” It is true that this sentence
    appears to concern the issue presented on appeal. But we do not
    believe that a brief mention in the defendant’s reply
    memorandum can satisfy the plaintiff’s preservation-burden of
    arguing the issue and providing supporting legal authority. See
    Johnson, 
    2017 UT 76
    , ¶ 15 (“To provide the court with this
    opportunity, the issue must be specifically raised by the party
    asserting error, in a timely manner and must be supported by
    evidence and relevant legal authority.” (emphases added)
    (quotation simplified)).
    ¶12 We next consider whether Federated raised the legal
    theory at the summary judgment hearing. The hearing
    addressed the motions for summary judgment in this case and
    two others, all of which had nearly identical filings. The
    4. On appeal, Federated identifies three cases that, in its view,
    support the proposition that a cause of action “arises” in the
    jurisdiction whose law applies to the case. Federated’s
    memorandum in opposition to summary judgment did not
    present this proposition or cite any of the three cases. The
    omission strongly suggests that Federated did not present this
    argument to the district court.
    20140568-CA                     8                
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    defendants had made payments electronically and those
    payments had been routed through Utah. Federated argued that
    the routing of the payments had changed the place of
    performance to Utah and thus that the causes of action in those
    cases had arisen in Utah:
    I don’t believe [the] cause of action arose in another
    jurisdiction for the two cases where electronic
    payments were made to Utah. And even if they
    were, I believe all of them, all these three cases[,]
    the borrowing statute shouldn’t apply based on
    that second prong where a cause of action was not
    brought in Pennsylvania because of lapse of time.
    That simply wasn’t the case. . . . A cause of action
    or a case could not have been brought in
    Pennsylvania. It had to be brought in Utah based
    on the agreement of the parties. And based on that
    we think [Utah’s] six-year statute should apply,
    your Honor.
    On appeal, Federated characterizes this as an argument “that the
    borrowing statute did not apply because, by contract, the case
    arose in Utah.”
    ¶13 We do not agree. We read this portion of the transcript to
    make two arguments based on the premise that the causes of
    action arose where the contract was to be performed, i.e., in
    Pennsylvania. Neither argument presented to the district court
    the legal theory now before us: whether the Controlling Law
    & Jurisdiction Clause changed the legal place of breach such that
    the causes of action arose in Utah.
    ¶14 First, Federated argued that the place of performance
    changed to Utah as a result of electronic payments being routed
    through Utah; thus, the causes of action arose in Utah because
    Utah was the place of performance in those cases. This position
    20140568-CA                     9                
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    accepted the premise that the place of performance determined
    where the causes of action arose. In contrast, Federated now
    contends that the place of performance was irrelevant to
    determining where the causes of action arose. The argument that
    routing payments through Utah changed the place of
    performance to Utah did not preserve a claim that the
    Controlling Law & Jurisdiction Clause meant that any breach-of-
    contract cause of action arose in Utah, because it did not bring
    the latter legal theory to the district court’s attention such that
    the court had the opportunity to rule on it. See Johnson, 
    2017 UT 76
    , ¶ 15.
    ¶15 Second, Federated made essentially the same argument to
    the district court as it presented in Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby.
    Specifically, Federated asserted “that the borrowing statute
    applies only where a cause of action that arises in another
    jurisdiction is ‘not actionable by reason of the lapse of time,’ and
    is thus inapplicable here since it was the forum selection clause
    that rendered Federated’s claims not actionable in
    Pennsylvania.” See Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby, 
    2016 UT 41
    ,
    ¶ 8, 
    384 P.3d 221
    . In other words, Federated claimed that,
    because it could file suit only in Utah, the claims were not barred
    by any Pennsylvania statute of limitations. 5 This second
    argument does not specifically suggest that the causes of action
    arose in Utah by operation of the choice-of-law provision; rather,
    it posited only that the causes of action were actionable solely in
    Utah by operation of the forum-selection clause.
    5. The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that the
    borrowing statute “unambiguously applies whenever a cause of
    action is ‘not actionable by reason of the lapse of time,’
    regardless of whether some independent reason also renders a
    cause of action ‘not actionable.’” Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby,
    
    2016 UT 41
    , ¶ 24, 
    384 P.3d 221
     (quotation simplified).
    20140568-CA                      10                
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    ¶16 We have examined the transcript carefully but do not see
    where Federated “specifically raised” a claim that the causes of
    action legally arose in Utah because the parties selected Utah law
    as controlling the place of breach. See Johnson, 
    2017 UT 76
    , ¶ 15;
    see also Thomas v. Mattena, 
    2017 UT App 81
    , ¶ 8, 
    397 P.3d 856
    (explaining that preservation requires that the legal basis of a
    claim be presented to the district court and not merely the
    underlying facts or a tangentially related claim); cf. Wohnoutka v.
    Kelley, 
    2014 UT App 154
    , ¶ 6, 
    330 P.3d 762
     (noting that it is not
    the duty of the appellate court to “scour the record to save an
    appeal”). Nor do we see where Federated supported such an
    argument below with “relevant legal authority.” See Johnson,
    
    2017 UT 76
    , ¶ 15. Indeed, Federated’s arguments below mirrored
    those made in Libby 6 and largely rested on the position that,
    regardless of where the causes of action arose, the claims were
    actionable only in Utah due to the forum-selection clause.
    ¶17 We recognize that “issues must be preserved, not
    arguments for or against a particular ruling on an issue raised
    below.” See Gressman v. State, 
    2013 UT 63
    , ¶ 45, 
    323 P.3d 998
    (quotation simplified). The words “issue” and “argument,”
    however, are not dispositive; in addressing preservation, “Utah
    courts have conflated the words issue, claim, argument, and
    matter.” Patterson v. Patterson, 
    2011 UT 68
    , ¶ 15, 
    266 P.3d 828
    (quotation simplified); see also id. ¶ 17 (“This court and the Utah
    Court of Appeals have on countless occasions exercised our
    discretion to refuse to consider new issues, arguments, claims, or
    matters on appeal.”). As a result, “semantics alone cannot be our
    guide in applying our preservation rule.” Id. ¶ 15. Instead, to
    properly apply the preservation rule, we must consider the role
    6. The notice of appeal in the current case was filed two years
    before the Utah Supreme Court issued Libby.
    20140568-CA                     11               
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    of the policies of judicial economy and fairness underlying the
    rule. 
    Id.
    ¶18 The policy of judicial economy seeks to avoid
    “unnecessary appeals and retrials” by giving “the trial court an
    opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate,
    correct it.” 
    Id.
     (quotation simplified). And the policy “requires
    that a party must present his entire case and his theory of
    recovery to the trial court.” 
    Id.
     (quotation simplified). As
    explained above, Federated did not assert to the district court the
    legal theory now before us—that a choice-of-law provision in a
    contract sets the place of breach such that the case actually arose
    in Utah. Instead, Federated argued to the district court that the
    second element of the borrowing statute was unsatisfied because
    the suit was rendered non-actionable in Pennsylvania by reason
    of the forum-selection provision rather than by the lapse of time.
    See supra ¶ 5 (describing the borrowing statute’s elements);
    ¶¶ 12, 15 (examining Federated’s argument below). Federated’s
    failure to raise the “place of breach” legal theory below thereby
    frustrated the policy of judicial economy.
    ¶19 The policy of fairness is also implicated. “It generally
    would be unfair to reverse a district court for a reason presented
    first on appeal.” Patterson, 
    2011 UT 68
    , ¶ 16. This is because, had
    the contention now before us been raised below, Deutsch “might
    have countered the argument, potentially avoiding the time and
    expense of appeal.” See 
    id.
     But because Federated only argued to
    the district court that Utah law applied and did not make a claim
    that the suit arose in Utah pursuant to the Controlling Law
    & Jurisdiction Clause, Deutsch had no opportunity to counter
    such a claim and thereby avoid the costs of an additional three
    years of appellate litigation.
    ¶20 We conclude that allowing Federated to contend on
    appeal that a choice-of-law provision also sets the place of any
    20140568-CA                     12               
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    breach would violate both of the policies on which the
    preservation rule rests. Consequently, regardless of whether it is
    properly characterized as an issue or an argument, we deem the
    contention unpreserved.
    ¶21 “When an issue has not been preserved in the trial court,
    but the parties argue that issue on appeal, the parties must argue
    an exception to preservation for the issue to be reached on its
    merits.” Johnson, 
    2017 UT 76
    , ¶ 47. Federated does not assert that
    an exception to the preservation rule applies here. We therefore
    decline to reach the merits on this issue.
    II. Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal
    ¶22 Deutsch contends that he should be awarded his
    reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. “Under
    Utah’s reciprocal attorney fee statute, courts may award attorney
    fees to the prevailing party of a contract dispute so long as the
    contract provided for the award of attorney fees to at least one of
    the parties[.]” 7 Federated Capital Corp. v. Haner, 
    2015 UT App 132
    ,
    ¶ 11, 
    351 P.3d 816
    ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826
    (LexisNexis 2012). Here, the contract provided for an award of
    attorney fees to Federated, and the district court awarded
    attorney fees to Deutsch based on the reciprocal attorney fee
    statute. “A party entitled by contract or statute to attorney fees
    7. Utah’s reciprocal attorney fee statute provides,
    A court may award costs and attorney fees to
    either party that prevails in a civil action based
    upon any promissory note, written contract, or
    other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when
    the provisions of the promissory note, written
    contract, or other writing allow at least one party to
    recover attorney fees.
    Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (LexisNexis 2012).
    20140568-CA                     13               
    2018 UT App 118
    Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch
    below and that prevails on appeal is entitled to fees reasonably
    incurred on appeal.” Haner, 
    2015 UT App 132
    , ¶ 19 (quotation
    simplified). Deutsch has prevailed on appeal, and we therefore
    award Deutsch his reasonable attorney fees incurred in
    connection with this appeal in an amount to be determined by
    the district court on remand.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶23 We conclude that Federated did not preserve the issue it
    presents on appeal—namely, that Utah’s borrowing statute was
    inapplicable because the causes of action actually arose in Utah
    pursuant to the Controlling Law & Jurisdiction Clause—because
    Federated did not squarely raise this legal theory in the district
    court proceedings such that the court had an opportunity to rule
    on it.
    ¶24   Affirmed.
    20140568-CA                     14               
    2018 UT App 118
                                

Document Info

Docket Number: 20140568-CA

Citation Numbers: 2018 UT App 118, 428 P.3d 51

Judges: Christiansen

Filed Date: 6/21/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024