State v. Akers , 438 P.3d 70 ( 2018 )


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    2018 UT App 235
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee,
    v.
    JASON REED AKERS,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20170713-CA
    Filed December 20, 2018
    Fourth District Court, Provo Department
    The Honorable Thomas Low
    No. 171401387
    Leah Jordana Aston and Dallas B. Young,
    Attorneys for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Jonathan S. Bauer,
    Attorneys for Appellee
    JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES KATE APPLEBY 1 and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
    ORME, Judge:
    ¶1      Defendant Jason Reed Akers appeals his sentences,
    arguing that the district court abused its discretion by relying on
    allegedly irrelevant and unreliable information contained in his
    presentence investigation report (the PSIR) when it imposed
    sentence. Alternately, Akers contends that his defense counsel
    rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
    challenged information in the PSIR prior to sentencing. We
    affirm.
    1. Judge Kate A. Toomey has resumed the use of her birth name
    and is now known as Judge Kate Appleby.
    State v. Akers
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     In April 2017, 38-year-old California resident Jason Reed
    Akers used a social media platform to “message” a teenager. The
    profile he reached out to indicated that it belonged to a
    13­year­old girl who resided in Utah, but in reality it belonged to
    an undercover Special Agent with Homeland Security
    Investigations. 2 Akers told the girl that he would be in Utah in
    two days and wanted to meet her. She quickly asked whether he
    was “cool” with her only being 13 years old. He answered,
    “Leave age out of this. Nobody should know, right?,” and
    shortly thereafter he asked if she was a virgin. After she
    confirmed that she was, he told her that he wished to “take” her
    virginity and named the sexual acts he wanted the two of them
    to perform. Akers twice unsuccessfully requested that the girl
    send him pictures of her genitals, but her refusal did not prevent
    him from sending her a pornographic video and two
    photographs depicting a penis.
    ¶3     Akers and the girl arranged to meet at a park in Utah
    County. At the girl’s request, Akers agreed to bring condoms,
    lubricant, an energy drink, and cookies. Akers also asked the girl
    whether she drank or smoked, to which she replied that she
    never had but would “be curious.” Akers then told her that he
    would bring “special gummy worms, . . . THC special.” 3
    2. To better facilitate recounting the facts of this case, we refer to
    the Special Agent by her undercover persona, “the girl,” in this
    opinion.
    3. “THC” is an acronym for “tetrahydrocannabinol,” which is a
    “crystalline compound that is the main active ingredient of
    cannabis.” Tetrahydrocannabinol, New Oxford American
    Dictionary 1794 (3d ed. 2010). In Utah, THC is categorized as a
    (continued…)
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    State v. Akers
    ¶4      Authorities arrested Akers as he waited for the girl at the
    arranged meeting place. Officers found a pipe containing
    methamphetamine in his vehicle, in plain view, and Akers
    subsequently admitted to smoking the drug during his drive
    from California to Utah. A more thorough search of the vehicle
    also produced lubricant, THC gummy worms, and a handgun.
    During interrogation, Akers admitted sending the messages and
    pornographic images to the girl and possessing the pipe and
    illegal substances found in his vehicle.
    ¶5     The State charged Akers with six felony and three
    misdemeanor counts. Akers and the State entered into a plea
    agreement in which Akers agreed to plead guilty to three of the
    nine charges. He pled guilty to one count of enticing a minor, a
    second degree felony; one count of dealing in materials harmful
    to a minor, a third degree felony; and one count of possession of
    a firearm by a restricted person, a third degree felony. In
    exchange, the State agreed to drop the remaining six charges,
    including a charge for possession of the THC gummy worms.
    ¶6     Prior to sentencing, Adult Probation and Parole prepared
    the PSIR. It recited the circumstances surrounding Akers’s arrest,
    including a single mention that officers located a gun, a pipe
    containing methamphetamine, and “marijuana gummy
    [worms]” in Akers’s vehicle. The PSIR recommended a sentence
    of only 105 days, with credit for time served, followed by 36
    months of supervised probation.
    ¶7     At the sentencing hearing, the district court began by
    inquiring whether the PSIR contained any errors. Akers’s
    defense counsel replied that it did not, stating, “[W]e don’t have
    (…continued)
    Schedule I controlled substance. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 58
    ­37­4(2)(a)(iii)(AA) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018).
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    State v. Akers
    any corrections with the pre-sentence report,” and he urged the
    court to follow the PSIR’s sentencing recommendation. The State
    asked the court to deviate from the recommendation, arguing
    that Akers’s case was not a “typical enticement of a minor case.”
    In support of this assertion, the State recounted how, among
    other things, authorities had apprehended Akers with the THC
    gummy worms, methamphetamine, and a handgun in his
    possession. Akers’s counsel responded that the district court
    should not consider such “ancillary incidences” because they
    were unsubstantiated and Akers had not pled guilty to them.
    Counsel emphasized that this was Akers’s first offense and once
    more urged the district court to follow the PSIR’s sentencing
    recommendation.
    ¶8      Following these arguments, the district court asked Akers
    why he was in possession of the gun and THC gummy worms
    while waiting to meet his intended victim. Akers replied that he
    had forgotten the gun was in the vehicle and that he was
    “certified in California for medicinal marijuana.” The district
    court then noted that it appeared that the THC gummy worms
    were intended for the girl.
    ¶9      The district court deviated from the PSIR’s
    recommendation and imposed concurrent sentences of 1 to 15
    years imprisonment on the enticement of a minor count and 0 to
    5 years each on the remaining two counts. It explained that of
    the many enticement-of-a-minor cases to which it had previously
    been assigned, this case stood out because “this is the first one [it
    had] ever seen with a gun and with THC gummy [worms],” as
    well as methamphetamine. As such, it appeared to the court that
    Akers was “going to kidnap a child, maybe kill it.” The district
    court explained, “Had any of those circumstances been different,
    even the two states away is disconcerting but not enough to send
    [Akers] to prison for. It’s the gun and the gummy [worms] that
    really concerns the Court so much.”
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    State v. Akers
    ¶10 After the district court explained its sentencing decision,
    Akers’s counsel requested that the district court reconsider its
    decision without relying on “activity that [Akers] did not plead
    guilty to, such as the methamphetamine or the THC.” Counsel
    argued that the district court’s consideration of that information
    put Akers “in a position where he cannot defend himself, where
    he cannot assert his innocence to those issues.” The district court
    responded that it was ordinary practice for courts to consider the
    facts contained in presentence investigation reports, which often
    include “uncharged criminal activity.” It further explained that
    for that reason presentence investigation reports are either
    stipulated to, or evidentiary hearings are held to “get the final
    set of facts [to which] everybody agrees.” The district court
    declined to reconsider the sentence. Akers appeals.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶11 Akers asserts that the district court erred by largely
    basing its sentencing decision on the fact that he was in
    possession of THC gummy worms at the time of his arrest. 4 “The
    4. Akers additionally contends that the district court had a
    statutory duty to make findings on the record regarding the
    accuracy and relevance of the information when his defense
    counsel objected to its reliance on the THC gummy worms in
    imposing sentence. Because the district court allegedly failed to
    meet its obligation, Akers argues that his case “should be
    remanded with instructions that the [district] court resolve
    [Akers’s] objections to the inclusion of the irrelevant information
    in [the PSIR].” Although Utah Code section 77-18-1(6)(a)
    requires the district court to “make a determination of relevance
    and accuracy on the record” when parties object to the inclusion
    of unresolved information in presentence investigation reports,
    section 77­18­1(6)(b) requires the party to make the challenge “at
    (continued…)
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    State v. Akers
    sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for abuse of
    discretion.” State v. Valdovinos, 
    2003 UT App 432
    , ¶ 14, 
    82 P.3d 1167
    . Although “we traditionally afford the district court wide
    latitude and discretion” in sentencing, a district court abuses its
    discretion when it relies on irrelevant or unreliable information
    when imposing sentence. State v. Moa, 
    2012 UT 28
    , ¶¶ 34, 36, 
    282 P.3d 985
     (quotation simplified).
    ¶12 Alternatively, Akers argues that he received ineffective
    assistance when his defense counsel failed to object to the
    inclusion of the gummy worm information in the PSIR but
    instead affirmatively told the court that there were no errors in
    the PSIR. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
    raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling
    to review and we must decide whether the defendant was
    deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of
    (…continued)
    the time of sentencing.” See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 77
    ­18­1(6)(a)–(b)
    (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). Otherwise, “that matter shall be
    considered to be waived.” 
    Id.
     § 77-18-1(6)(b). Because Akers’s
    defense counsel stated that the PSIR did not contain errors
    immediately before sentencing and challenged the inclusion of
    the information about THC gummy worms only after the district
    court imposed sentence, Akers waived any objections to the
    inclusion of the information in the PSIR. See State v. Franz, 2007
    UT App 297U, para. 6 (“[W]hen trial counsel stated that he had
    reviewed the PSI with Defendant and ‘there were no errors’ in
    the PSI, he statutorily waived any objections to the document.”).
    The district court therefore had no duty to hold an evidentiary
    hearing to address the objections belatedly made by Akers’s
    defense counsel. On the record before us, it appears that the
    objections would have been unavailing in any event. The
    presence of the THC gummy worms in his vehicle was solidly
    documented.
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    law.” State v. Craft, 
    2017 UT App 87
    , ¶ 15, 
    397 P.3d 889
    (quotation simplified).
    ANALYSIS
    I. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing
    ¶13 District courts are permitted to “consider a wide range of
    evidence” when fashioning an appropriate sentence. State v.
    Howell, 
    707 P.2d 115
    , 118 (Utah 1985). But the latitude afforded to
    district courts is not without limit. The due process clause of the
    Utah Constitution requires district courts to base sentencing
    decisions “on reasonably reliable and relevant information.” 
    Id.
    See Utah Const. art. I, § 7. And “when there is evidence in the
    record showing a sentencing judge’s reliance on specific
    information, we will not consider it improper for a judge to rely
    on such information if the evidence in question had indicia of
    reliability and was relevant in sentencing.” State v. Moa, 
    2012 UT 28
    , ¶ 36, 
    282 P.3d 985
     (quotation simplified). Thus, to show an
    abuse of discretion, a defendant bears the burden of establishing
    that the information the district court said it relied on in reaching
    its sentencing decision was unreliable or irrelevant. 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 35–36.
    ¶14 In the present case, there is ample evidence in the
    record supporting the district court’s reliance, when
    imposing sentence, on the information about Akers’s
    possession of THC gummy worms. In explaining its decision to
    deviate from the PSIR’s recommendation, the district court
    first noted that the combination of the gun, the THC
    gummy worms, and the methamphetamine made it appear
    that Akers intended to “kidnap a child, maybe kill it.” The
    court further stated that it would not have sentenced Akers to
    prison “[h]ad any of those circumstances been different.” But
    it was “the gun and the gummy [worms] that really concern[ed]
    the Court so much.” This affirmative representation by the
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    State v. Akers
    court satisfies the first requirement for a possible showing
    that the district court abused its discretion. See id. ¶ 35
    (requiring a defendant to show “evidence of reliance, such as an
    affirmative representation in the record that the judge
    actually relied on the specific information in reaching her
    decision”). Nonetheless, Akers’s challenge to the district court’s
    sentencing decision fails because he has not shown that the
    information about the gummy worms was unreliable or
    irrelevant.
    A.    Reliability
    ¶15 District courts must base sentencing decisions on
    “reasonably reliable” information. State v. Howell, 
    707 P.2d 115
    ,
    118 (Utah 1985). Information is reasonably reliable if it has
    sufficient “indicia of reliability.” 
    Id.
    ¶16 Here, Akers has failed to identify any substantive
    evidence that challenges the reliability of the information
    regarding his possession of the THC gummy worms. See State v.
    Lingmann, 
    2014 UT App 45
    , ¶ 41, 
    320 P.3d 1063
    . On the contrary,
    evidence in the record strongly supports the reliability of the
    challenged information. Not only did Akers’s defense counsel
    explicitly state that the PSIR did not contain any errors, but
    Akers himself did not deny being in possession of the THC
    gummy worms when the district court asked why he had
    brought them to the expected encounter with the girl. Instead,
    Akers essentially acknowledged their presence in his vehicle by
    responding that he was “certified in California for medicinal
    marijuana.” And in anticipation of his encounter with the girl, he
    had promised to bring “special gummy worms, . . . THC
    special.” These exchanges and the lack of evidence challenging
    the information’s accuracy satisfy the “reasonably reliable”
    standard of the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. See
    Howell, 707 P.2d at 118.
    20170713-CA                     8              
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    State v. Akers
    B.    Relevance
    ¶17 Akers pled guilty to one count of enticing a minor, one
    count of dealing in harmful materials to a minor, and one count
    of possession of a firearm by a restricted person. In exchange, the
    State dismissed the other six charges, including two counts of
    possession of a controlled substance. Akers argues that the
    district court inappropriately considered the THC gummy
    worms because that information was relevant only to one of the
    dismissed possession charges and was irrelevant to the charges
    to which he pled guilty. Like the district court, we disagree.
    ¶18 District courts have the latitude to consider a wide range
    of evidence in reaching a sentencing decision. State v. Howell, 
    707 P.2d 115
    , 118 (Utah 1985). See also State v. Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    ,
    ¶ 290, 
    299 P.3d 892
     (“[A] sentencing body may consider evidence
    beyond a defendant’s conviction when determining an
    appropriate sentence.”). Akers does not cite any authority to
    support his contention that information automatically becomes
    irrelevant to a defendant’s sentencing on other charges if it
    relates most directly to dismissed charges. On the contrary,
    appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that it is
    an abuse of discretion for a district court to consider dismissed
    charges when imposing sentence. See Howell, 707 P.2d at 118
    (holding that dismissed charges of sexual abuse were “[c]learly
    . . . relevant in sentencing” defendants who pled guilty to
    physical abuse of their children); State v. Valdez, 
    2017 UT App 185
    , ¶ 13, 
    405 P.3d 952
     (“[W]e disagree with [the defendant’s]
    specific contention that dismissed or reduced charges are
    irrelevant or unreliable information regarding the gravity and
    circumstances of [the defendant’s] crime or background.”); State
    v. Perkins, 
    2014 UT App 176
    , ¶ 6, 
    332 P.3d 403
     (per curiam)
    (noting that the defendant had not cited any authority
    supporting his argument that a district court is precluded from
    considering dismissed charges for sentencing purposes). Indeed,
    we have treated a district court’s comments regarding a
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    State v. Akers
    defendant’s dismissed charges during sentencing as evidence
    that it considered all of the legally relevant factors in reaching its
    decision. See State v. Williams, 
    2006 UT App 420
    , ¶ 30, 
    147 P.3d 497
    . The information regarding the THC gummy worms
    therefore cannot be deemed irrelevant solely on the basis of its
    having been the subject of a dismissed charge.
    ¶19 Although the charge for possession of the THC
    gummy worms was dismissed as part of a plea negotiation,
    it still bore relevance to the remaining charges for enticement of
    a minor and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
    person. During the course of convincing the girl to meet him in
    Utah to have sex, Akers told her that he would bring “special
    gummy worms, . . . THC special.” While the district court was
    not necessarily aware of this promise at the time of sentencing, it
    was entitled to consider the totality of the circumstances
    surrounding the charged conduct and make reasonable
    inferences concerning the charges to which Akers pled guilty. 5
    And even absent awareness of the promise to bring the THC
    gummy worms, it was not unreasonable for the district court to
    infer that the THC gummy worms were “there for the child.” 6
    5. Moreover, even if Akers’s defense counsel had timely objected
    to the information about the THC gummy worms in the PSIR,
    the State undoubtedly would have entered into evidence the
    messages in which Akers promised to bring the THC gummy
    worms for the girl.
    6. Marijuana products that are designed to resemble
    commercially available gummy products, such as bears or
    worms, and other brightly colored candies are by their nature
    more appealing to children than marijuana in its traditional
    form. See Sean O’Connor & Sam Méndez, Concerning
    Cannabis­Infused Edibles: Factors That Attract Children to Foods 4–8
    (continued…)
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    State v. Akers
    ¶20 The THC gummy worms were also relevant to the
    possession­of-a-dangerous-weapon-by-a-restricted-person
    charge. Akers achieved restricted status due to his unlawful
    possession of a Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substance.
    See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 76
    ­10­503(1)(b)(iv) (LexisNexis 2017) (“A
    Category II restricted person is a person who . . . is in possession
    of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and intentionally in
    unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance.”).
    And THC is a Schedule I controlled substance. See 
    id.
    § 58­37­4(2)(a)(iii)(AA) (Supp. 2018). Even without the presence
    of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, his
    possession of the THC gummy worms alone was sufficient to
    qualify him as a Category II restricted person, making the THC
    gummy worms relevant to the gun possession charge and
    therefore properly before the court. 7
    (…continued)
    (Univ. Wash. Sch. Law, Cannabis Law Policy Project, June 28,
    2016), https://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/Concerning­MJ
    ­Infused-Edibles-Factors-That-Attract-Children.pdf [https://perm
    a.cc/2JJP-VTSM] (noting that children are attracted to foods that
    are “red, green, orange, and yellow” in color, shaped like
    “common candies [and] cookies” and with “sweet, fruity, and
    candy-like odors”).
    7. Akers argues that because he lawfully obtained the
    THC gummy worms for medicinal purposes in California, they
    could not form the basis for his restricted status in Utah.
    To support this contention, he cites Utah Code section 58­37­2,
    which states that a controlled substance does not include
    “any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure,
    mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in human or
    other animals.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2
    (1)(f)(ii)(B) (LexisNexis
    2016). But Akers fails to acknowledge that this provision is
    (continued…)
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    State v. Akers
    ¶21 For these reasons we hold that the information in the PSIR
    about the THC gummy worms was both reliable and relevant to
    Akers’s sentencing and that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in relying on the information when imposing
    sentence.
    II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    ¶22 “Implicit in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel
    is the right to effective assistance of counsel.” Lafferty v. State,
    
    2007 UT 73
    , ¶ 11, 
    175 P.3d 530
    . A criminal defendant receives
    ineffective assistance when (1) “counsel’s performance was
    deficient” and (2) that “deficient performance prejudiced the
    defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984).
    Defense counsel does not render deficient performance if
    counsel refrains from making futile objections. See Layton City v.
    Carr, 
    2014 UT App 227
    , ¶ 19, 
    336 P.3d 587
    .
    ¶23 Akers argues that his defense counsel performed
    deficiently when he did not object to the mention of the THC
    gummy worms in the PSIR. We disagree, because an objection to
    the inclusion of that information in the PSIR would have proven
    unsuccessful.
    ¶24    Utah Code section 77­18­1(6)(a) states:
    (…continued)
    limited to “ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine,
    or phenylpropanolamine,” that are obtained as an
    “over­the­counter medication without prescription.” 
    Id.
     The
    limited scope of this statute does not exonerate Akers from being
    illegally in possession of THC in Utah, in 2017, regardless of
    whether he lawfully obtained it for medical purposes in
    California. See 
    id.
     § 58­37­4(2)(a)(iii)(AA) (Supp. 2018)
    (categorizing THC as a Schedule I controlled substance).
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    State v. Akers
    Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
    investigation report . . . shall be brought to the
    attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge
    may grant an additional 10 working days to
    resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with
    the department. If after 10 working days the
    inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make
    a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
    
    Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1
    (6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018)
    (emphasis added). As such, had Akers’s defense counsel raised
    an objection to the inclusion of the challenged information in the
    PSIR, the district court would have been required to make a
    determination of relevance and accuracy of the information on
    the record. If the court determined the information to be both
    relevant and accurate, then the information would have
    remained in the PSIR and defense counsel’s objection would
    have been unsuccessful.
    ¶25 The information in the PSIR was accurate and relevant.
    When asked about the THC gummy worms, Akers essentially
    acknowledged that he was in possession of them at the time of
    his arrest. Rather than deny their existence, he sought to justify
    his possession of them by referring to his eligibility in California
    to use medical marijuana. This explanation and his counsel’s
    statement that the PSIR did not contain any errors strongly
    support a finding of reliability, which no doubt would have been
    supported by police testimony and the evidence log, had the
    State been put to its proof.
    ¶26 The district court also clearly considered the information
    to be relevant as it affirmatively represented that the THC
    gummy worms significantly factored into its sentencing
    decision—and we have determined that it did not abuse its
    discretion in doing so. See supra Part I.B. Akers’s defense counsel
    20170713-CA                      13               
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    State v. Akers
    therefore did not perform deficiently when he did not raise an
    objection that would have ultimately proven to be futile. 8
    CONCLUSION
    ¶27 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion by relying on information relating to the dismissed
    charges when it sentenced Akers. The information regarding his
    possession of THC gummy worms that he brought to his
    expected encounter with the girl was both reliable and relevant.
    Also, Akers did not receive ineffective assistance from his
    defense counsel because any objection to the inclusion of that
    information in the PSIR would have proven unsuccessful.
    ¶28    Affirmed.
    8. Because we conclude that the performance of Akers’s defense
    counsel was not deficient, we do not reach the prejudice prong
    of the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry. See State v. Reid,
    
    2018 UT App 146
    , ¶ 19, 
    427 P.3d 1261
     (“A defendant’s inability
    to establish either element defeats a claim for ineffective
    assistance of counsel.”).
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