State v. Dever , 2022 UT App 35 ( 2022 )


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    2022 UT App 35
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellee,
    v.
    JOSHUA VANCE DEVER,
    Appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20200143-CA
    Filed March 17, 2022
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Paul B. Parker
    No. 171901823
    Nathalie S. Skibine and Michael D. Misner, Attorneys
    for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and John J. Nielsen, Attorneys
    for Appellee
    JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
    in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JILL M. POHLMAN
    concurred.
    CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
    ¶1     Following a jury trial, Joshua Vance Dever was convicted
    of sodomy upon a child for sexually abusing his ex-girlfriend’s
    daughter, Faith. 1 Dever now appeals, arguing, among other
    things, that the district court erred in denying his motion for a
    directed verdict and in instructing the jury. While we conclude
    the court did not err in denying Dever’s motion for a directed
    verdict, we agree with Dever that the court’s jury instruction
    1. A pseudonym.
    State v. Dever
    was erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new
    trial.
    BACKGROUND 2
    ¶2     Dever began dating Faith’s mother (Mother) when Faith
    was around eighteen months old. The couple dated for
    approximately four years and had a child together (Sister).
    During their relationship, the couple lived together along with
    Faith, Sister, and Dever’s older daughter from a previous
    relationship (Stepsister). Before the couple separated, Faith and
    Dever had a “really good” relationship; Faith called Dever “dad”
    and “[s]he loved him.”
    ¶3      The couple separated in the fall of 2014. However, Dever
    continued to care for both Faith and Sister, and he “continued to
    be a father figure” to Faith. Although there was no set visitation
    schedule, it was typical for the girls to visit Dever “once or twice
    a week, if not more,” and they would frequently stay with him
    overnight on the weekends while Mother worked. At that time,
    Dever lived in his mother’s two-bedroom apartment, which he
    shared with her, his younger sister, and Stepsister. Dever did not
    have his own bedroom and would sleep on the couch in the
    living room. When Faith and Sister stayed overnight, they would
    sleep together along with Stepsister on a mattress on the floor of
    the living room next to the couch where Dever slept.
    ¶4    On May 29, 2015, when Faith was six years old, Dever
    picked up Faith and Sister for a weekend visit. Dever returned
    2. “On appeal from a jury verdict, we review the record facts in a
    light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts
    accordingly, presenting conflicting evidence only as necessary to
    understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Rogers, 
    2020 UT App 78
    , n.2, 
    467 P.3d 880
     (quotation simplified).
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    State v. Dever
    the girls to Mother’s house on May 31. Upon their arrival home,
    Mother unpacked a suitcase containing the clothes Faith and
    Sister had worn over the weekend at Dever’s house and placed
    them in the washing machine, but she did not start it. Mother
    then got the girls ready for bed. As Mother “tucked the girls into
    bed,” Faith informed her that she had left her “special blanket”
    at Dever’s house and that she did not “ever want to go to Dad’s
    house again” because “Dad . . . woke [her] up, . . . took down
    [her] underwear, and licked [her] butt.” At trial, Mother testified
    that, at that time, Faith used the word “butt” to mean vagina. 3
    ¶5     Mother promptly contacted the police to report that Faith
    had made allegations of sexual abuse. An officer responded and
    directed Mother to remove the girls’ clothing from the washing
    machine and put it in a paper bag, which she did.
    ¶6     On June 3, 2015, Faith went to the Children’s Justice
    Center (CJC) for an interview. During the interview Faith told
    the detective that while she was asleep, “Dad just picked me up,
    and he told me just take my underwear off, and he licked my
    butt.” Faith also told the detective that she and Sister talked
    about “when dad licked our butt.” The detective then asked if
    that happened to Sister as well, and Faith responded, “No.”
    ¶7     When asked about visiting her “dad’s house,” Faith stated
    she did not “want to go to [her] dad’s house” anymore; she
    explained that while she was at her dad’s house he had removed
    her underwear. But when asked if she could remember where it
    happened, Faith responded, “I went to mom’s house.” And
    3. Mother testified Faith was born prematurely, which had
    caused her learning difficulties and required that she repeat a
    grade in school. In particular, Faith struggles “connecting words
    in sentences,” and she “jump[s] the words” around when telling
    a story. In addition, Faith creates “her own words” for things
    when she does not know the actual words.
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    State v. Dever
    when asked in what room in Dever’s house it had occurred, she
    responded, “[W]e’re going to a new place.”
    ¶8     Next, the detective asked Faith if Dever had “ever done
    anything like that to [her] before.” Faith responded in the
    affirmative, initially indicating that it “happened two times,”
    before immediately changing her answer to “[o]ne time.”
    ¶9     At the close of the interview, Faith again repeated the
    allegation against Dever and stated that it happened at “his
    mom’s house.”
    ¶10 Shortly after the interview, Dever went to the local police
    station to speak with the detective. The detective informed
    Dever about Faith’s allegations and inquired about Dever’s
    activities during the relevant timeframe. Dever denied the
    allegations and told the detective he had worked that weekend
    and had spent one night out of the house. He also noted that in
    addition to Faith and Sister, his mother, his sister, and Stepsister
    had all stayed at his house that weekend. A few days later, the
    detective asked Dever to provide a DNA sample, which he did.
    ¶11 Following Faith’s interview, the detective went to
    Mother’s house and collected the paper bag that held Faith’s and
    Sister’s clothing. The bag’s contents were taken to the local lab
    and sorted; six pairs of underwear were removed and packaged
    individually. Based on Faith’s allegations in the interview, those
    packages were then sent to the state crime lab to test for saliva.
    ¶12 The crime lab analyst tested each pair of underwear
    separately for human alpha-amylase, which is found in saliva
    and, although not as concentrated, can also be found in tears and
    fecal material. Four of the six pairs of underwear had stains that
    tested positive for human alpha-amylase. A small piece of each
    positive stain was clipped from the underwear; three cuttings
    were sent to an outside lab for further DNA testing.
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    State v. Dever
    ¶13 DNA testing revealed that two of the samples were
    “inconclusive for male DNA.” The third sample contained 0.08%
    male DNA. 4 This sample, in turn, was compared against the
    reference sample provided by Dever. Based on a comparison of
    the two samples, the analyst concluded that Dever could not be
    excluded from the DNA found on the underwear.
    ¶14 In February 2017, nearly two years after Faith’s initial
    allegations, Dever was charged with one count of sodomy upon
    a child. Shortly thereafter, Faith disclosed to Mother additional
    details about Dever’s actions, explaining that during her last
    visit to Dever’s house he “took off [her] underwear, licked [her]
    butt, and poked [her] with his belly button.” Mother testified
    that Faith used “belly button” to mean penis. Mother
    immediately contacted the detective, and on April 6, 2017, Faith
    went to the CJC for a second interview.
    ¶15 During the second interview Faith told the detective
    Dever “did something to [her]”; he pushed “his belly button . . .
    in [her] butt . . . and he licked it.” The detective asked when it
    happened, and Faith responded, “Like maybe on a Wednesday,
    Thursday, Friday. I don’t know.” She stated that it “made [her]
    cry” and she “hated it.” She also indicated to the detective that it
    happened “more than one time.”
    ¶16 Faith told the detective Dever touched her with his “belly
    button” while she was at his house, but she did not identify a
    4. This sample was from a pair of underwear in size 2T-3T. At
    trial, Mother testified that Faith had always “been thin,” whereas
    Sister is “short and stockier,” and that the girls “fit in the same
    clothes basically all the time.” Although the girls “did not share
    clothing” at her house, she testified that sometimes the girls
    would return from Dever’s house wearing each other’s clothing
    or underwear. Nevertheless, Mother guessed the size 2T-3T
    underwear belonged to Sister.
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    State v. Dever
    specific room. She initially explained that it happened “[a]t
    night” while she was “watching a movie” but later stated that it
    happened “[i]n the morning.”
    ¶17 After Faith’s second interview, the State added a second
    count against Dever for rape of a child. However, concerned
    about potential delay, the State dismissed the rape charge and
    proceeded to trial on the sodomy charge alone.
    ¶18 A trial on the sodomy charge was held in August 2018.
    Although Dever was present in the courtroom, Faith was not
    able to identify him. Faith testified the last time she was at
    Dever’s house he “picked [her] up,” “pulled” off her clothes,
    “licked near [her] vagina,” and “pushed [her] from his . . . big
    belly button or something.” She further testified that she “didn’t
    like it” and she “was crying.” Faith stated this happened in
    Dever’s living room while she was trying to fall asleep. She was
    sleeping on the floor in the middle of Sister and Stepsister.
    Thereafter, Faith stated that only Dever and Sister were in the
    room when it happened. And later, on cross-examination, she
    explained that when Dever picked her up she was sleeping next
    to Sister because Stepsister “was in her room and their doors
    were shut.”
    ¶19 On cross-examination, Faith testified that the abuse
    happened during the “[m]orning and nighttime” and
    “[n]ighttime and day.” It happened when the sun was up and it
    was “[b]right” outside and also “when it turned dark.”
    ¶20 Faith also told defense counsel that she was not sick
    during her last visit to Dever’s house. And she stated that after
    the abuse, Dever took her and Sister back to Mother’s house
    where the girls had breakfast.
    ¶21 Mother testified that prior to the alleged abuse, Faith was
    a “very happy,” “very social,” and “sweet little girl.” Faith
    enjoyed spending time at Dever’s house and “always seemed to
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    State v. Dever
    have fun” during her visits. However, on the weekend of the
    alleged abuse, Faith “hid” behind a recliner at Mother’s house
    when Dever came to pick her up for the weekend visit. And after
    the alleged abuse, Faith told Mother she did not “ever want to go
    to [Dever’s] house again” and she no longer referred to Dever as
    her father. Furthermore, Faith “couldn’t sleep” and would
    “wake up crying,” claiming there were “big monsters over her
    bed harming her”; she also became “more fearful of things,”
    more “distant,” and no longer wanted anyone to touch her. In
    addition, Mother stated that on the weekend of the alleged
    abuse, Dever dropped the girls off at her house on Sunday
    around 7:30 p.m.
    ¶22 Dever testified in his own defense. He denied the
    allegations and called them “sick.” He also explained that about
    one month before Faith made the allegations, Mother started
    dating someone new and Faith stopped referring to Dever as her
    father.
    ¶23 Dever testified about his schedule on the weekend of the
    alleged abuse. On Friday night, he picked Faith and Sister up
    from Mother’s house and took them to his apartment. That night
    he cooked them dinner and they “[h]ung out for a little while”
    before he bathed them, changed their clothes, and put them to
    bed. On Saturday, Dever worked a ten-hour day shift. When he
    returned home, he cooked the girls dinner, got them ready for
    bed, and then left them at the apartment with his mother while
    he went to a bar with his brother. After the bar, he slept at his
    brother’s house until about 6:00 a.m. on Sunday, at which point
    he returned home and slept until his next ten-hour work shift
    that started at 9:00 a.m. On Sunday night after work, he fed the
    girls before returning them to Mother’s house.
    ¶24 Dever’s mother and sister also testified for the defense.
    Dever’s mother said that on the weekend of the alleged abuse
    Faith, Sister, Stepsister, Dever’s sister, Dever, and she were all in
    the apartment. Dever’s mother testified that she always slept
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    State v. Dever
    with her bedroom door open and when she dressed the girls she
    always made sure they were wearing the correct clothing. She
    testified that on Saturday night Faith had “stomach issues.” The
    issues caused Faith to be “fussy”; they lasted “off and on
    throughout the night” and into Sunday morning. She explained
    that both Dever’s sister and Stepsister helped her take care of
    Faith that night. Lastly, Dever’s mother testified that on Sunday
    morning, Faith had breakfast at her apartment, not at Mother’s
    house.
    ¶25 Dever’s sister testified that on the weekend of the alleged
    abuse she was at home. On Saturday night she helped Dever’s
    mother take care of Faith, who “had been up most of the night
    with an upset stomach.”
    ¶26 After the close of the State’s evidence, Dever moved for a
    directed verdict, arguing (1) the DNA evidence was not enough
    to establish identity, (2) Faith was unable to identify Dever as the
    perpetrator of the alleged crimes while she was on the stand,
    and (3) the State did not meet its burden of proof. The court
    denied the motion, ruling that Faith “testified about specific
    information including that a person she identified as dad licked
    her” and that Dever himself had acknowledged that Faith had
    spent time with him during a sleepover and had called him
    “dad” at the time of the alleged events. Based on this, the court
    determined the State had presented evidence sufficient to “meet
    the elements of the . . . crime alleged” and therefore denied the
    motion.
    ¶27 Following closing arguments, the district court instructed
    the jury. Included in the instructions was one proposed by the
    State titled “Testimony of One Witness” (Instruction 19), which
    stated, “The testimony of a witness to a crime standing alone, if
    believed beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict if the
    testimony establishes all of the elements of the offense.” Dever
    objected to the instruction as “unnecessary,” arguing that it
    “overemphasize[d]” the testimony of one person. The court
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    State v. Dever
    disagreed, finding it “reasonable” in light of another instruction
    (Instruction 18) addressing witness credibility. Instruction 18
    stated, “In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, you may
    . . . consider anything . . . you think is important. . . . [Y]ou may
    believe all, part, or none of the witness’ testimony. You may
    believe many witnesses against one or one witness against
    many.”
    ¶28 The jury convicted Dever of sodomy upon a child.
    Defense counsel timely moved to arrest judgment or in the
    alternative for a new trial. The district court denied the motion.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶29 Dever now appeals, raising several issues for our review.
    We focus on two of Dever’s claims of error. First, Dever argues
    the district court erred by denying his motion for a directed
    verdict, claiming the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
    to support a conviction because Faith’s testimony was inherently
    improbable. “We review the district court’s denial of a motion
    for directed verdict for correctness.” State v. Washington, 
    2021 UT App 114
    , ¶ 8, 
    501 P.3d 1160
     (quotation simplified). However,
    “where a defendant challenges the denial of a motion for a
    directed verdict based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the
    applicable standard of review is highly deferential.” 
    Id.
    (quotation simplified). “We will uphold the district court’s
    denial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
    some evidence exists from which the elements of the crime could
    be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
     (quotation
    simplified).
    ¶30 Second, Dever argues the district court erred when it
    provided an instruction to the jury “that emphasized that a
    single witness’s account could support a conviction.” “Claims of
    erroneous jury instructions present questions of law that we
    review for correctness.” State v. Jeffs, 
    2010 UT 49
    , ¶ 16, 
    243 P.3d 20200143
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    State v. Dever
    1250. “If a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if
    the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected
    the outcome of [the] case.” State v. O'Bannon, 
    2012 UT App 71
    ,
    ¶ 15, 
    274 P.3d 992
     (quotation simplified). 5
    ANALYSIS
    I. Inherent Improbability
    ¶31 Dever first challenges the district court’s denial of his
    motion for a directed verdict, arguing the evidence was
    insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In
    particular, he asserts that Faith’s testimony was “inherently
    improbable” and was therefore insufficient to support his
    conviction. 6   He     argues    her     testimony  contained
    5. Dever also argues we should reverse and remand for a new
    trial because (1) the district court erred when it dismissed a juror
    and replaced the juror with an alternate over defense counsel’s
    objection and (2) defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective
    in two ways. Because we reverse the jury’s verdict and remand
    for a new trial on the ground that the court’s jury instruction was
    erroneous, we need not address these additional arguments
    because any error in either regard will be remedied by a new
    trial.
    6. The State argues this claim of error was not preserved. At trial,
    Dever moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that (1) the
    DNA evidence was not enough to establish identity, (2) Faith
    was unable to identify Dever in court, and (3) the State had not
    generally met its burden of proof. Citing State v. Doyle, 
    2018 UT App 239
    , ¶¶ 12–19, 
    437 P.3d 1266
    , the State argues that
    “[i]nsufficient evidence due to inherent improbability in the
    crime victim’s testimony is an issue that is discrete enough from
    those Dever raised that the [district] court had no notice that it
    (continued…)
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    State v. Dever
    “inconsistencies” and “patently false statements” and that it
    lacked any corroboration.
    ¶32 Appellate courts “are not normally in the business of
    reassessing or reweighing evidence,” and conflicts in the
    evidence are typically resolved “in favor of the jury verdict.”
    State v. Prater, 
    2017 UT 13
    , ¶ 32, 
    392 P.3d 398
     (quotation
    simplified); see also State v. Robbins, 
    2009 UT 23
    , ¶ 16, 
    210 P.3d 288
    . However, because “a conviction not based on substantial
    reliable evidence cannot stand,” Robbins, 
    2009 UT 23
    , ¶ 14
    (quotation simplified), our supreme court has carved out a
    narrow exception to this general rule, under which a court may
    disregard witness testimony as “inherently improbable” when
    “determining if sufficient evidence exists to sustain a
    conviction,” id. ¶ 13.
    ¶33 In determining whether a witness’s testimony may be
    disregarded as “inherently improbable,” our supreme court has
    identified three factors that merit consideration: “material
    inconsistencies, patent falsehoods, and lack of corroborating
    evidence.” State v. Jok, 
    2021 UT 35
    , ¶ 32, 
    493 P.3d 665
    ; see also
    Prater, 
    2017 UT 13
    , ¶ 38; Robbins, 
    2009 UT 23
    , ¶ 19. However,
    “inflexible reliance on these factors” is improper. Jok, 
    2021 UT 35
    ,
    ¶ 32. “The proper test is, and always has been, whether
    reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
    the defendant committed the crime.” 
    Id.
     (quotation simplified).
    (…continued)
    needed to address it.” Although the State’s preservation
    argument may be well taken, we elect to resolve the claim on the
    merits because we can easily do so in the State’s favor. See State
    v. Kitches, 
    2021 UT App 24
    , ¶ 28, 
    484 P.3d 415
     (“If the merits of a
    claim can easily be resolved in favor of the party asserting that
    the claim was not preserved, we readily may opt to do so
    without addressing preservation.” (quotation simplified)).
    20200143-CA                     11                
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    State v. Dever
    ¶34 Thus, where a defendant raises an inherent improbability
    claim in the context of a directed verdict motion for
    insufficiency, the court must first evaluate the complained of
    witness testimony and determine if it is inherently improbable.
    This determination cannot be based on “a strictly factored test.”
    
    Id.
     “Rather, when weighing the testimony in light of the other
    evidence, the testimony of the witness must run so counter to
    human experience that it renders the testimony inappropriate for
    consideration in sustaining a finding of guilt.” Id. ¶ 36 (quotation
    simplified). If, after engaging in this analysis, the court
    determines the complained of testimony was indeed inherently
    improbable, it must disregard that testimony before conducting
    its sufficiency-of-the-evidence review.
    ¶35 Dever first claims Faith’s testimony was inherently
    improbable because it “contained internal inconsistencies.”
    Specifically, he contends Faith’s testimony was inconsistent
    regarding the number of times Dever touched her sexually and
    what time of day the touching occurred. Dever notes that during
    both CJC interviews, Faith indicated to the detective that Dever
    touched her both “one time” and “more than one time.” And
    during the second CJC interview, Faith initially claimed the
    touching occurred at night but later said it happened in the
    morning.
    ¶36 Although Faith’s accounts were sometimes inconsistent in
    these regards, we cannot conclude the inconsistencies render her
    testimony inherently improbable. See State v. Ruiz, 
    2012 UT App 42
    , ¶ 3, 
    272 P.3d 185
     (“We stress that the court may choose to
    exercise its discretion to disregard inconsistent witness
    testimony only when the court is convinced that the credibility
    of the witness is so weak that no reasonable jury could find the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation
    simplified)). As an initial matter, Utah courts have recognized “it
    is not unusual that a child’s testimony be somewhat inconsistent,
    especially in sexual abuse cases.” State v. Virgin, 
    2006 UT 29
    ,
    ¶ 38, 
    137 P.3d 787
    . And mere “inconsistency alone does not
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    State v. Dever
    necessarily make a child’s testimony inherently improbable.”
    State v. Wells, 
    2014 UT App 13
    , ¶ 10, 
    318 P.3d 1251
    ; see also 
    id.
    (concluding the child witness’s testimony was not materially
    inconsistent where she “describ[ed] fewer incidents [of abuse]
    when first examined and then describe[ed] slightly more
    incidents on cross-examination”); State v. Kamrowski, 
    2015 UT App 75
    , ¶ 18, 
    347 P.3d 861
     (concluding the victim’s pre-trial
    statements and trial testimony were consistent where “she
    initially told her stepmother about a single instance of abuse but
    was more forthcoming to investigators or prosecutors” after her
    initial disclosure); Robbins, 
    2009 UT 23
    , ¶ 22 (concluding the
    child witness’s “inconsistent accounts regarding the extent of the
    physical abuse she suffered, her age when the abuse occurred,
    and what she was wearing at the time of the abuse may alone be
    insufficient to invoke the inherent improbability exception”).
    Indeed, inconsistencies in a child’s testimony could be
    “explained by her age and lack of sophistication,” Prater, 
    2017 UT 13
    , ¶ 38, and, in some cases, by the child’s “language
    limitations and cognitive impairment,” Ruiz, 
    2012 UT App 42
    ,
    ¶ 4.
    ¶37 Dever also claims Faith’s accounts were “inconsistent
    with each other” because the rape allegation was not made
    during the initial CJC interview and because Faith’s emotional
    reaction to the alleged abuse did not occur until two years after
    the initial report.
    ¶38 We disagree with Dever’s characterizations on both
    points. Although Faith disclosed an additional allegation of
    abuse in the second CJC interview as compared to her initial CJC
    interview, it does not appear the separate disclosures were
    actually inconsistent. “Delayed discovery and reporting are
    common in child sexual abuse cases.” State v. Bair, 
    2012 UT App 106
    , ¶ 47, 
    275 P.3d 1050
     (quotation simplified). The “simple fact”
    that a child sexual abuse victim “allege[s] additional abuse” after
    an initial report “does not make [the child’s] testimony
    inherently improbable.” Wells, 
    2014 UT App 13
    , ¶ 9; see also 
    id.
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    State v. Dever
    (concluding that despite the differences between the child
    witness’s trial testimony and her original reports regarding the
    number of times she was allegedly abused, the “multiple
    disclosures were not inconsistent, but merely cumulative, and
    simply added more details in the later statements”); State v.
    Klenz, 
    2018 UT App 201
    , ¶¶ 14, 78, 
    437 P.3d 504
     (concluding the
    child witness’s testimony was not materially inconsistent even
    though she did not initially disclose all the details of abuse but
    did so gradually over time).
    ¶39 So too with Faith’s emotional reaction. That Faith’s
    reaction to the abuse was delayed does not render it inconsistent.
    As this court has recognized, sexual assault victims “display a
    diverse range of reactions to the harm they suffered.” See State v.
    Jok, 
    2019 UT App 138
    , ¶ 24, 
    449 P.3d 610
    . And in cases where the
    victim is a child, the “possible psychological effects of sexual
    abuse” “can occur down the road from the abuse.” State v. Boyer,
    
    2020 UT App 23
    , ¶ 46, 
    460 P.3d 569
     (quotation simplified).
    Moreover, in this case, Faith’s emotional reaction began at
    approximately the same time she made the second disclosure,
    which included the rape allegation. Thus, her reaction was
    entirely consistent with the second disclosure.
    ¶40 Second, Dever claims Faith’s testimony was inherently
    improbable because it contained several “patent falsehoods,”
    including that Sister was also abused by Dever, that Faith “had
    never been sick” during her last visit to Dever’s house, that
    Stepsister “was in her room and their doors were shut” when the
    abuse occurred, and that Faith went back to Mother’s house
    before breakfast after the alleged abuse. We are not persuaded
    these statements are patently false.
    ¶41 Testimony is “patently false” “only when it is physically
    impossible or self-evidently false.” State v. Lyden, 
    2020 UT App 66
    , ¶ 19, 
    464 P.3d 1155
    . But the alleged falsehoods Dever
    identifies do not rise to this level. Rather, “[t]he question of
    which version of [the witnesses’] stories [is] more credible is the
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    State v. Dever
    type of question we routinely require juries to answer.” Prater,
    
    2017 UT 13
    , ¶ 39.
    ¶42 Last, Dever claims Faith’s testimony was inherently
    improbable because her “allegations were uncorroborated.” In
    particular, he argues the forensic evidence did not corroborate
    Faith’s allegations.
    ¶43 But Dever’s argument misses the point. “Corroborating
    evidence sufficient to defeat a Robbins claim does not have to
    corroborate the witness’s account across the board, in every
    particular. It only has to provide a second source of evidence for
    at least some of the details of the witness’s story.” State v.
    Skinner, 
    2020 UT App 3
    , ¶ 34, 
    457 P.3d 421
    ; see also In re J.R.H.,
    
    2020 UT App 155
    , ¶ 13, 
    478 P.3d 56
     (concluding that although
    “the most contested piece of evidence at trial” was
    uncorroborated, Robbins did not apply because “at least
    portions” of the victim’s account were corroborated). Here, there
    was some evidence to support Faith’s allegations. Faith told the
    detective during the first CJC interview that Dever had “licked
    [her] butt.” Based on this statement, Faith’s underwear was
    analyzed for DNA evidence and it tested positive for male DNA
    that did not exclude Dever. Although the testing did not
    conclusively prove that Dever was the source of the male DNA,
    it was sufficient to corroborate at least some of Faith’s account.
    ¶44 Moreover, Mother’s testimony regarding Faith’s changed
    demeanor after the alleged abuse is sufficient to corroborate
    Faith’s account. “Corroboration in a [sexual assault] case may
    consist of circumstantial rather than direct evidence.” State v.
    Stettina, 
    635 P.2d 75
    , 77 (Utah 1981). “Changes in a victim’s
    behavior, emotional health, and lifestyle can be circumstantial
    evidence that the alleged act occurred.” State v. Anderson, 
    2020 UT App 135
    , ¶ 26, 
    475 P.3d 967
    ; see also State v. Escobar-Florez,
    
    2019 UT App 135
    , ¶ 65, 
    450 P.3d 98
     (concluding “significant”
    changes in the victim’s behavior constituted sufficient evidence
    to “prove that [the defendant] had sexual intercourse with [the
    20200143-CA                    15               
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    State v. Dever
    victim]”); State v. Cosey, 
    873 P.2d 1177
    , 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
    (same). Prior to the alleged abuse, Faith and Dever had a good
    relationship; Faith called Dever “dad,” and she frequently spent
    time at his house, which she enjoyed. However, after the alleged
    abuse Faith no longer referred to Dever as her father and she
    told Mother she did not “ever want to go to [Dever’s] house
    again.” In addition, Mother testified that after the alleged abuse,
    Faith “couldn’t sleep” and would “wake up crying” because
    there were “big monsters over her bed harming her.” Faith also
    became “more fearful of things,” more “distant,” and no longer
    wanted anyone to touch her. These changes in Faith’s behavior
    are sufficient to corroborate her account.
    ¶45 In sum, Faith’s testimony was not inherently improbable
    and was therefore sufficient to support a conviction. Although
    not perfect in every regard, when weighed “in light of the other
    evidence,” the testimony does not “run so counter to human
    experience” as to render it “inappropriate for consideration in
    sustaining a finding of guilt.” See Jok, 
    2021 UT 35
    , ¶ 36 (quotation
    simplified). Thus, Dever cannot show that “reasonable minds
    must have entertained a reasonable doubt that [he] committed
    the crime” for which he was convicted. See id. ¶ 32 (quotation
    simplified). And, the district court did not err when it denied
    Dever’s motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, we now
    address whether the court erred in instructing the jury.
    II. Jury Instruction
    ¶46 Dever next argues the district court prejudicially erred
    when it overruled an objection to Instruction 19, which stated,
    “The testimony of a witness to a crime standing alone, if
    believed beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict if the
    testimony establishes all of the elements of the offense.” Dever
    contends this instruction was improper because it “unfairly
    singled out [Faith’s] testimony and commented on the evidence”
    by suggesting the jury could (1) discount inconsistencies in
    Faith’s accounts and focus on her trial testimony, “standing
    20200143-CA                     16                
    2022 UT App 35
    State v. Dever
    alone,” and (2) disregard other evidence—including Dever’s
    own testimony—if, “standing alone,” Faith’s testimony was
    credible.
    ¶47 “It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to
    determine the facts in all criminal cases.” State v. Salgado, 
    2018 UT App 139
    , ¶ 38, 
    427 P.3d 1228
     (quotation simplified). Thus, a
    district court “may not comment on the evidence or the
    credibility of a witness’s testimony.” State v. Taylor, 
    2005 UT 40
    ,
    ¶ 22, 
    116 P.3d 360
    ; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 19(f). “Language
    used in jury instructions should not overemphasize an aspect of
    the evidence or amount to a comment on the evidence.” Salgado,
    
    2018 UT App 139
    , ¶ 38 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, a
    “jury instruction may amount to an improper comment on the
    evidence where the court singles out or gives undue emphasis to
    particular evidence while disregarding other evidence.” 
    Id.
    ¶48 Utah appellate courts have yet to address whether a “no
    corroboration” instruction like Instruction 19 violates the basic
    rule that jury instructions may not amount to a comment on the
    evidence. However, courts in other jurisdictions have denounced
    such instructions, and we find those decisions persuasive.
    ¶49 For example, in Gutierrez v. State, 
    177 So. 3d 226
     (Fla.
    2015), the Florida Supreme Court held that the use of a “no
    corroboration” instruction in a prosecution for sexual battery
    was improper. In that case, the defendant was charged with
    sexual battery after the victim reported to police that the
    defendant had vaginally raped her in the front seat of her car. 
    Id.
    at 227–28. Following the report, a sexual assault nurse conducted
    a physical exam of the victim that revealed bruises and scratches
    on her body, including in her vaginal area. Id. at 228. At trial,
    evidence of the exam was admitted along with the testimony of
    the sexual assault nurse, who opined that the victim’s injuries
    could have occurred during both consensual and nonconsensual
    sex. Id. at 228, 232. Both parties also stipulated that DNA
    collected from the victim during the exam matched the
    20200143-CA                    17                
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    State v. Dever
    defendant’s DNA profile. Id. at 228. At the close of trial, the
    prosecutor requested a special instruction “advising the jury that
    the testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a
    prosecution for sexual battery.” Id. The defendant objected to the
    instruction, arguing it “singled out the testimony of the victim
    and could mislead the jury into believing it did not need to
    weigh or evaluate the credibility of the victim’s testimony.” Id.
    The district court provided the instruction, and the jury found
    the defendant guilty. Id.
    ¶50 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the
    conviction, finding the giving of the “no corroboration”
    instruction was reversible error. Id. at 234. The court reasoned
    that although the instruction was a correct statement of law, it
    was nevertheless improper because it “constitute[d] a comment
    on the testimony presented by the alleged victim and present[ed]
    an impermissible risk that the jury [would] conclude it need not
    subject the victim’s testimony to the same tests for credibility
    and weight applicable to other witnesses.” Id. at 229–30. As such,
    the instruction violated the long-standing prohibition that “a
    judge may not sum up the evidence or comment to the jury upon
    the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, or the
    guilt of the accused.” Id. at 231 (quotation simplified). By
    providing the “no corroboration” instruction, the judge
    suggested that “one witness’s testimony need not be subjected to
    the same tests for weight or credibility as the testimony of
    others,” which effectively “bolster[ed] that witness’s testimony
    by according it special status.” Id. at 231–32. And because the
    evidence was not a “slam dunk” for either side, a reasonable
    possibility existed that the erroneous instruction contributed to
    the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 233–34 (quotation simplified).
    ¶51 In addition to improperly commenting on the evidence,
    the Florida court noted the “no corroboration” instruction was
    improper because the standard instruction on weighing the
    evidence was not erroneous and it adequately informed the jury
    how to evaluate the weight and credibility of each witness’s
    20200143-CA                     18                
    2022 UT App 35
    State v. Dever
    testimony. Id. at 230. Further, the “no corroboration” instruction
    was likely to confuse and mislead the jury regarding its duty to
    consider the weight of the testimony and credibility of the
    victim. Id.
    ¶52 Other jurisdictions have also disapproved of giving no
    corroboration instructions for similar reasons, namely because
    such instructions amount to a comment on the evidence and
    emphasize the victim’s testimony over other evidence. See Burke
    v. State, 
    624 P.2d 1240
    , 1257 (Alaska 1980) (concluding
    instruction was improper because it “unduly emphasize[d]” that
    the victim’s testimony need not be corroborated “without
    similarly indicating that other witnesses’ testimony need not be
    corroborated” and recognizing that in cases “where the
    defendant has given a statement or taken the stand,” such an
    instruction would be particularly prejudicial “without similarly
    indicating that the defendant’s testimony need not be
    corroborated”); Ludy v. State, 
    784 N.E.2d 459
    , 461 (Ind. 2003)
    (“An instruction directed to the testimony of one witness
    erroneously invades the province of the jury when the
    instruction intimates an opinion on the credibility of a witness or
    the weight to be given to his testimony.” (quotation simplified));
    State v. Kraai, No. 19-1878, 
    2022 WL 258199
    , at *2–4 (Iowa Jan. 28,
    2022) (finding that a no corroboration instruction was improper
    because it highlighted the victim’s testimony over other
    testimony, including the defendant’s); In re D.D.R., 
    713 N.W.2d 891
    , 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (finding prejudicial error where
    the district court instructed the jury that the testimony of the
    victim “need not be corroborated”); State v. Stukes, 
    787 S.E.2d 480
    , 483 (S.C. 2016) (rejecting a no corroboration instruction and
    reasoning that such instructions “invite[] the jury to believe the
    victim, explaining that to confirm the authenticity of her
    statement, the jury need only hear her speak”); Veteto v. State, 
    8 S.W.3d 805
    , 816 (Tex. App. 2000) (finding the “effect of an
    instruction that a conviction could be had only on [the victim’s]
    testimony” singled out her testimony and amounted to “an
    improper comment on the weight of the evidence”), abrogated on
    20200143-CA                    19                
    2022 UT App 35
    State v. Dever
    other grounds by State v. Crook, 
    248 S.W.3d 172
     (Tex. Crim. App.
    2008); Garza v. State, 
    2010 WY 64
    , ¶ 21, 
    231 P.3d 884
     (holding that
    a no corroboration instruction was improper because of its
    “potential to mislead the jury”).
    ¶53 Like the “no corroboration” instructions in these cases,
    Instruction 19 was improper, and the district court erred in
    giving it to the jury. Instruction 19 unduly favored the testimony
    of a single witness—in this case Faith—by suggesting that if
    believed to be credible, the jury need not consider other
    evidence. As a result, the jury could have understood the
    instruction as an indication that Faith’s testimony carried more
    weight than the testimony of other witnesses or evidence or that
    it should not be held to the same level of scrutiny as other
    witnesses or evidence. Furthermore, by mentioning only the
    “testimony of a witness to a crime,” the jurors could have
    believed that the testimony of other witnesses, particularly
    Dever, did require corroborating evidence to be believed.
    ¶54 Having concluded Instruction 19 was erroneous, we must
    consider whether it prejudiced Dever. 7 “To reverse a trial
    verdict, we must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable
    likelihood that the error affected the result.” State v. Jeffs, 
    2010 UT 49
    , ¶ 37, 
    243 P.3d 1250
     (quotation simplified). “When
    7. The parties disagree as to which side bears the burden of
    proving prejudice. Dever argues the State “should bear the
    burden to prove that a preserved error was not prejudicial,”
    whereas the State argues Dever bears the burden. Our supreme
    court has instructed that “the defendant generally bears the
    burden to demonstrate that the error he complains of affected
    the outcome of his case.” State v. Reece, 
    2015 UT 45
    , ¶ 33, 
    349 P.3d 712
    ; see also State v. Leech, 
    2020 UT App 116
    , ¶ 43 n.7, 
    473 P.3d 218
     (“Except in cases of constitutional error, Utah law places the
    burden on the defendant to prove that a preserved error is
    harmful.”). Thus, Dever bears the burden here.
    20200143-CA                     20                
    2022 UT App 35
    State v. Dever
    reviewing jury instructions, we look at the jury instructions in
    their entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as a
    whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.”
    State v. Lambdin, 
    2017 UT 46
    , ¶ 41, 
    424 P.3d 117
     (quotation
    simplified).
    ¶55 Dever argues he was prejudiced by Instruction 19 because
    the evidence presented at trial “was not overwhelming” as to his
    guilt and the case “was ultimately a credibility contest—the kind
    of case where a ‘judge’s thumb on the scale to lend an extra
    element of weight to the victim’s testimony’ could make all the
    difference.” (Quoting Gutierrez, 177 So. 3d at 232.) We agree. The
    forensic evidence admitted by the State did not conclusively
    identify Dever as the source of the DNA on the underwear.
    Indeed, during closing argument, the State acknowledged that
    “this is not the type of DNA evidence that says ‘Oh, absolutely,
    it’s him. It’s the defendant.’” Furthermore, it is unknown
    whether the underwear stained with the DNA belonged to Faith
    or Sister; and in any event, underwear belonging to both girls
    was placed together in a suitcase, then a washing machine, and
    then a paper bag before being taken for testing. Likewise, Faith’s
    accounts were, at times, inconsistent, and some details cast
    doubt on her credibility.
    ¶56 Moreover, we are not persuaded by the State’s argument
    that other jury instructions “directed the jury to consider all the
    evidence” thereby rendering any defect in Instruction 19
    harmless. To the contrary, when read along with the other jury
    instructions about assessing witness credibility, Instruction 19
    may have actually confused or misled the jury. For example,
    Instruction 18—the court’s model jury instruction regarding
    witness credibility—correctly informed the jurors how to assess
    witness credibility and weigh witness testimony. See, e.g., State v.
    Schmidt, 
    757 N.W.2d 291
    , 297 (Neb. 2008) (concluding that a no
    corroboration instruction was “redundant and unnecessary”
    when considered together with the general witness credibility
    instructions). But by giving Instruction 19, the court confused
    20200143-CA                     21                
    2022 UT App 35
    State v. Dever
    matters by overemphasizing the testimony of “a witness to a
    crime.”
    ¶57 In sum, we agree with the district court that the State and
    Dever both raised “some good points,” “[i]t was a triable case on
    each side, and the verdict was not clear until the outcome of the
    trial.” There was not a “mountain of evidence” against Dever;
    rather, the case ultimately hinged on witness credibility. By
    giving Instruction 19, however, the court impermissibly
    highlighted Faith’s testimony and suggested that if believed to
    be credible, the jury need not consider other evidence. This was
    especially problematic here because Dever’s main trial strategy
    “was to focus on inconsistencies between [Faith’s] account at
    trial and her accounts in the CJC [interviews]” rather than to
    present evidence corroborating his account. Given the conflicting
    evidence before the jury, particularly Dever’s own testimony, we
    cannot say that absent Instruction 19 the jury would have
    accorded Faith’s testimony the same weight. Accordingly, we
    conclude that without Instruction 19 there is a reasonable
    likelihood a jury would have returned a verdict more favorable
    to Dever.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶58 The district court correctly denied Dever’s motion for a
    directed verdict because Faith’s testimony was not inherently
    improbable and was sufficient to support Dever’s conviction.
    However, the district court erred in instructing the jury, and
    because the evidence that Dever committed the crime for which
    he was charged was not overwhelming, our confidence in the
    jury’s verdict is undermined. Therefore, we reverse Dever’s
    conviction and remand for a new trial.
    20200143-CA                   22                
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