State v. Young , 2023 UT App 26 ( 2023 )

2023 UT App 26THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
CODY ALEXANDER YOUNG,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20210540-CA
Filed March 23, 2023
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Robert C. Lunnen
No. 191401048
Emily Adams and Freyja Johnson,
Attorneys for Appellant
David O. Leavitt and Tye Lane Christensen,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JOHN D. LUTHY
concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 After pleading guilty to a misdemeanor drug charge, Cody
Alexander Young sought to withdraw his plea, asserting that it
was not knowingly made. The district court denied Young’s
motion, and Young appeals, asserting that, when he entered his
plea, he did not fully understand that he had a possibly
meritorious suppression defense. We affirm the district court’s
denial of Young’s motion because Young has failed to carry his
burden of demonstrating that, under the circumstances, his plea
was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.
State v. Young
BACKGROUND
¶2 In November 2018, Young was convicted—in an unrelated
case in Juab County (the Juab County Case)—of misdemeanor
drug and weapons charges and was placed on probation. Among
other conditions of probation, Young was required to inform
Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) of his “current address at all
times,” and was required to make himself “available to [AP&P]
and the court when requested to do so” but in any case at least
monthly. Young was also “ordered to comply with GPS/ankle
monitoring.” In addition, the court ordered Young to “enter into
an agreement with” AP&P but, for reasons unclear from the
record, AP&P never created a probation agreement for Young to
sign, and therefore Young never signed one. The agreement
AP&P typically has probationers sign includes a provision in
which they consent to allow AP&P to search their residences upon
request. But because Young was never asked to sign any such
agreement, the parties agree that Young provided no such blanket
consent to AP&P for searches of his residence.
¶3 In December 2018 and January 2019, Young reported as
required to his probation agent (Agent), but he missed his
appointments the following two months—February and March
2019—and was therefore “considered to have absconded.” Agent
also learned, during this same time period, that the battery in
Young’s ankle monitor was dead. In an effort to locate Young,
Agent visited Young’s last known address, but Young was not
there. In early April, Young notified Agent by electronic message
that he was staying in a camp trailer on or near national forest
land, but he failed to send Agent specific information about where
the trailer was located.
¶4 The next day, Agent—with the assistance of a local deputy
sheriff—went looking for Young and located a trailer he believed
to be the one to which Young had been referring. Agent decided
to conduct a “knock and talk”; Young’s girlfriend (Girlfriend)
20210540-CA 2 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
answered the door, stepped outside, and confirmed that Young
was in the trailer. Agent then entered the trailer with his gun
drawn and at the “low ready” position, and located Young in the
bedroom, where Agent also saw—in “plain view”—a glass pipe
that he believed was drug paraphernalia. After Agent
administered a Miranda1 warning, Young initially indicated that
he did not want to speak with Agent. Agent then informed Young
that he would be required, in light of his status as a probationer,
to submit to a drug test; Young then said that he wanted to talk to
Agent, and he proceeded to admit to using both marijuana and
methamphetamine within the last ten days.
¶5 A search of the trailer turned up “a large white crystal
substance” that field-tested positive for methamphetamine, as
well as various items of drug paraphernalia (in addition to the
glass pipe). And Young’s eventual urine test was positive for both
marijuana and methamphetamine. Agent arrested Young at the
trailer and took him into custody. A few days later, the State
charged Young with possession or use of methamphetamine (a
class A misdemeanor) and possession of drug paraphernalia (a
class B misdemeanor).
¶6 At his first appearance before the court, Young was
appointed counsel. A week later, at his first hearing accompanied
by counsel, Young agreed to plead guilty to the drug possession
charge, in exchange for the State dismissing the paraphernalia
charge and agreeing to his release from custody in this case. At
that hearing, Young signed a statement in support of his guilty
plea; in that document, Young stated that he “did knowingly
possess a schedule II controlled substance, meth,” and that he was
“entering these pleas voluntarily.” He also acknowledged that, by
pleading guilty, he was giving up various constitutional rights,
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20210540-CA 3 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
and that he and his attorney had “fully discussed this statement,
[his] rights, and the consequences of” the plea.
¶7 During the plea hearing, the district court conducted a
robust colloquy with Young. Young acknowledged that he
had read and understood the plea statement document; that he
understood the charge to which he was pleading guilty and the
potential sentence that could be imposed; that he understood
that he was “waiving certain constitutional rights” by pleading
guilty; and that the conviction resulting from the plea would
function as both an enhancement to any future drug charges as
well as an admission of a violation of his probation in the Juab
County Case. Young also acknowledged that he was thinking
clearly and was entering into the plea agreement voluntarily, and
that he was satisfied with the representation provided to him by
his attorney. Young also accepted the factual basis provided by
the State for the charge, and acknowledged that he was pleading
guilty because he was guilty, and not for any other reason. After
accepting Young’s plea, the court ordered that the paraphernalia
count be dismissed and that Young be released from custody in
this case.
¶8 At a scheduled sentencing hearing several weeks later,
Young indicated that he wanted to file a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, and requested that his sentencing be postponed and
that he be appointed conflict counsel. The court granted both of
these requests. For reasons not entirely clear from the record, it
took Young some eighteen months to file a written motion to
withdraw his plea. When finally filed, the motion asserted that the
search of the trailer had been “illegal” and that Young’s plea was
not knowingly entered “because he had not signed [any]
[p]robation [a]greement” in the Juab County Case and “was never
advised of the terms of his [p]robation in that case.” The motion
was relatively brief—containing only three paragraphs of legal
argument—and came unaccompanied by any affidavits,
declarations, or other attachments.
20210540-CA 4 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
¶9 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. At
the hearing, the State called Agent as a witness, and Young’s
attorney briefly cross-examined Agent, eliciting an admission
that Young had never signed a probation agreement. But
Agent was the only witness to testify at the hearing; Young did
not take the stand and he called no other witnesses, nor did he
offer any documentary evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing,
Young’s new attorney argued that, because Young had not
signed a probation agreement, the search of the trailer was illegal,
and that Young had not fully comprehended the potential
illegality of the search at the time he entered his plea; on that
basis, counsel asserted that Young’s plea had not been knowing.
The court then set a briefing schedule on the motion, ordering
Young to file any post-hearing brief within ten days, and
the State to respond thereafter. A few weeks later, the State
filed a brief in opposition to Young’s motion, but Young filed
neither a post-trial brief of his own nor any reply to the State’s
opposition.
¶10 After considering the briefing and the evidence presented,
the district court denied Young’s motion in an oral ruling.
Focusing first on the plea hearing itself, the court noted that
Young was not asserting that there had been any infirmities in the
plea colloquy or the plea hearing. The court found unpersuasive
Young’s argument that he was “not technically on probation,”
noting that Young “was on an ankle monitor” and knew that “he
was required to report to AP&P.” And as for Young’s argument
that the search of the trailer had been illegal, the court indicated
that it would have denied any motion to suppress on that issue
because Young “was on the ankle monitor” and AP&P “could
have arrested him or searched him at any time.” After denying
the motion to withdraw, the court later sentenced Young to a
suspended jail sentence and twenty-four months of probation on
the misdemeanor count to which he had pled guilty.
20210540-CA 5 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 Young now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. We “reverse a district court’s ruling
on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only when we are
convinced that the court has abused its discretion,” State v.
Ciccolelli, 2019 UT App 102, ¶ 9, 445 P.3d 528 (quotation
simplified), “incorporating the clearly erroneous standard for the
trial court’s findings of fact made in conjunction with that
decision,” State v. Harvey, 2015 UT App 92, ¶ 8, 348 P.3d 1199(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 362 P.3d 1255 (Utah 2015).
ANALYSIS
¶12 Under Utah law, any attempt to withdraw a guilty plea “is
governed by statute.” State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 19, 279 P.3d
371. The relevant statute provides that a guilty plea “may be
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that [the
plea] was not knowingly and voluntarily made.” Utah Code § 77-
13-6(2)(a). In this context, the defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
made. See State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶ 37, 282 P.3d 998 (holding
that “on a presentence motion to withdraw, the burden of proof
is on the defendant, who must show that his or her plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily made”). For the reasons that follow,
we conclude that Young has not carried his burden in this case
because he failed to supply the district court with evidence
regarding his state of mind when he entered his plea.
¶13 “To show that a plea was not knowing and voluntary, a
defendant must show either that he did not in fact understand the
nature of the constitutional protections that he was waiving by
pleading guilty, or that he had such an incomplete understanding
of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission
of guilt.” Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 23 (quotation simplified). When
a court evaluates a defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea, it must
20210540-CA 6 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
consider the “totality of the circumstances,” and should not focus
exclusively on whether the plea colloquy complied with rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Magness, 2017
UT App 130, ¶ 20, 402 P.3d 105 (stating that “[t]he district court’s
analysis was too narrowly focused” because it “look[ed] primarily
at what was said at the plea hearing and whether the plea hearing
complied with rule 11”). And when a defendant claims that the
plea was not knowingly entered, the relevant inquiry—by
definition—requires a court to assess the defendant’s state of
mind at the time the plea was entered. See generally Alexander, 2012
UT 27, ¶ 62 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that “[a]lthough the motion mouthed the words
‘knowingly and voluntarily,’” the defendant “never raised the
factual question of his state of mind in entering the guilty plea”
but “simply rested on the legal theory that a rule 11 violation
alone was sufficient to render his plea unknowing or
involuntary”); see also People v. Kyler, 991 P.2d 810, 817 (Colo. 1999)
(“To ensure that a plea represents the accused’s free and reasoned
decision, the Rule 11 court must, to some degree, assess the
defendant’s state of mind when he enters a guilty plea.”); State v.
Callantine, 2022 MT 221N, ¶ 11 (explaining that when considering
the totality of the circumstances for a plea withdrawal, “[t]his
searching inquiry necessarily includes consideration, inter alia, of
the state of mind and subjective impressions of the accused at the
time of the plea”).
¶14 In this case, Young’s sole contention is that his plea was not
knowingly entered because, at the time he entered his plea, he was
not aware that he had a potentially meritorious suppression
motion that could have been filed. Whether unawareness of the
possibility of filing (or of the potential strength of) such a motion
constitutes a sufficient basis to declare a plea “unknowing”
presents an interesting question that courts in other jurisdictions
have answered in differing ways. Compare United States v.
Williams, 48 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2022) (rejecting a defendant’s
argument that “his plea was plainly not knowing because of his
20210540-CA 7 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
failure to understand that he could not file a motion to suppress
if he pled guilty”), with United States v. McTiernan, 546 F.3d 1160,
1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a defendant can succeed in a plea
withdrawal setting by showing “that proper advice [from
counsel] could have at least plausibly motivated a reasonable
person in [the defendant’s] position not to have pled guilty had
he known about the grounds for suppression now advanced prior
to pleading” (quotation simplified)). But we need not further
concern ourselves with this question in the context of this case
because even assuming—for purposes of the argument and
without deciding—that unawareness or misapprehension of the
strength of a potential suppression motion could render a plea
unknowing in appropriate cases, Young’s claim fails for a lack of
proof. See State v. Sharp, 2021 UT App 90, ¶¶ 30–32, 498 P.3d 9(declining to reach the merits of “an interesting question” in the
plea withdrawal context—in that case, “[w]hether post-plea, pre-
sentence evidence demonstrating a defendant’s innocence may
render a plea unknowing or involuntary under the current plea
withdrawal statute”—because the defendant “did not present to
the court” sufficient evidence supporting his motion), cert. denied,
502 P.3d 270 (Utah 2021).
¶15 In particular, Young provided the court with no evidence
regarding his state of mind at the time he entered his guilty plea.
Particularly glaring is the absence of any affidavit, declaration, or
testimony from Young himself indicating what he knew at the
time of his plea about a potential suppression motion, and
whether he would have pled guilty had he known more about
such a motion. The act of pleading guilty—indeed, of settling any
legal dispute—necessarily entails an assessment of risks and
benefits, including the risk that one’s opponent’s case might
worsen over time (through, for instance, evidentiary
developments or motion practice). See, e.g., In re Reise, 192 P.3d
949, 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that by pleading guilty, a
defendant “assumes the risk that the State’s potential trial
evidence will weaken: a State witness might not attend trial,
20210540-CA 8 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
might move away, might die; a new exculpatory witness might
come forward; or new laboratory tests might be less conclusive”;
noting that “[t]he passage of time always changes the quantity
and quality of potential State’s evidence”; and concluding that,
“by pleading guilty, the defendant gives up the right to force the
State to prove its case with the potential evidence” and therefore
“a guilty plea thus generally bars a later collateral attack based on
newly discovered evidence”). Indeed, it is not at all uncommon
for defendants to plead guilty despite an existing potential for
filing motions, including suppression motions, that might (if
successful) result in dismissal or reduction of the pending
charges. A defendant may rationally decide, even with full
knowledge of the relative strength of potential motions, to enter a
guilty plea anyway and forgo the opportunity to file motions; for
instance, a defendant may believe that the terms of a particular
offered plea agreement are especially favorable or, alternatively,
may want to obtain a release from custody sooner rather than
later. In short, the existence of a potential unfiled suppression
motion at the time of a guilty plea does not, by itself, indicate that
the plea was unknowing.
¶16 In order to succeed on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
on the basis that the plea was unknowing due to the defendant’s
unawareness (or misunderstanding) of a potential motion,
defendants must point to evidence that they did not know about
(or misunderstood) the potential motion, that they had not
appropriately factored that motion into their calculus in deciding
to plead guilty, and that—had they known more about the
potential motion—they would not have entered into the plea
agreement. Such evidence is often a necessary (although not
necessarily a sufficient) condition for success on any such motion.
A court could, of course, find that a defendant’s evidentiary
proffer in this regard is unpersuasive or not credible. But in the
absence of such a proffer, a court may not have sufficient evidence
upon which it could base a finding that a defendant’s plea was not
knowing at the time it was entered.
20210540-CA 9 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
¶17 An example of how the process is supposed to work is
provided in State v. Magness, 2017 UT App 130, 402 P.3d 105. In
that case, the defendant sought withdrawal of his guilty plea on
the basis that, at the time he entered his plea, he had relied on
assurances from the prosecutor that the State would not
recommend a prison sentence unless the victim specifically asked
it to do so and that the victim “did not want the defendant to go
to prison.” Id. ¶¶ 3–7. In support of his plea withdrawal motion,
the defendant submitted three affidavits—one from defense
counsel, one from a private investigator, and one from the
defendant himself—all attesting that the State had made the
representations in question, that those representations had turned
out to be false, and that the defendant had materially relied on
those representations in making the decision to plead guilty. Id.¶¶ 3–8. On appeal, we noted that “a defendant is not entitled to
withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea
has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality
of the State’s case,” id. ¶ 24 (quotation simplified), and that if the
defendant had “simply miscalculated the likelihood that the
victim would make a sentencing request for prison, a basis for
withdrawing the guilty plea would likely not exist,” id. ¶ 29. But
because the defendant’s “calculus” was based on erroneous
representations made by the prosecutor, we held that the
defendant’s plea had not been “knowingly” entered. Id. ¶¶ 27–29.
¶18 In this case, by contrast, Young has provided no evidence
regarding what his internal mental calculus was in deciding to
plead guilty. He provided no affidavit, from himself or his
defense counsel, indicating that he was unaware of (or otherwise
misapprehended) the existence or strength of any potential
suppression motion. The only evidence submitted by either side
in connection with Young’s motion to withdraw his plea was the
testimony of Agent, who of course had nothing to say about
Young’s state of mind at the time he entered his plea. Agent did
confirm that Young had not signed a probation agreement. But
this fact sheds no light on what Young knew about suppression
20210540-CA 10 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
possibilities at the time of his plea or, more significantly, on
whether additional knowledge about such possibilities would
have materially affected his decision to plead guilty.
¶19 On appeal, Young acknowledges the absence of evidence
regarding his state of mind at the time he entered his plea. He
contends, however, that the district court could have drawn
favorable inferences about his state of mind from other
circumstances, including the fact that he asked for discovery in
the case and the fact that he pled guilty very early in the case,
before discovery had been provided. But we see no error—let
alone clear error—in the district court’s decision not to draw any
such inferences in Young’s favor.2 Certainly, other circumstances
amply supported the opposite conclusion: the State agreed, as
part of the plea agreement, to drop one of the two misdemeanor
charges and release Young from custody in this case immediately.
In addition, the district court noted that it did not think much of
the merits of Young’s unfiled suppression motion, stating that it
would have denied the motion had it been filed. Given that it was
Young’s burden to demonstrate that his plea was not knowingly
entered, in our view the district court made no error in
determining that Young had not met that burden, especially in
light of Young’s failure to offer any direct evidence about what
his plea calculus actually was. See State v. Knowlden, 2013 UT App
63, ¶ 5, 298 P.3d 691 (per curiam) (explaining that the defendant
“fail[ed] to demonstrate that he did not understand the
constitutional protections he was waiving or the factual basis for
the charges against him” and therefore “failed to demonstrate that
his pleas [were] not knowing”).
2. “The question of [a defendant’s] state of mind when entering
[a] guilty plea is a classic question of fact.” State v. Alexander, 2012
UT 27, ¶ 67, 279 P.3d 371 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). And as noted, in this context we review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error. See supra ¶ 11.
20210540-CA 11 2023 UT App 26State v. Young
CONCLUSION
¶20 By failing to provide any evidence regarding his own
subjective state of mind at the time he entered his guilty plea,
Young failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that his plea
was not knowingly entered. Accordingly, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motion to withdraw.
¶21 Affirmed.
20210540-CA 12 2023 UT App 26