Second Big Springs v. Granite Peak ( 2023 )

2023 UT App 22THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND BIG SPRINGS IRRIGATION CO., BAKER RANCHES INC.,
OKELBERRY RANCH LLC, RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN OKELBERRY, AND
JAKE OKELBERRY,
Appellants,
v.
GRANITE PEAK PROPERTIES LC, GRANITE PEAK RANCH LC,
KENNETH C. KNUDSON, AND MILLARD COUNTY,
Appellees.
Opinion
No. 20210207-CA
Filed March 2, 2023
Fourth District Court, Fillmore Department
The Honorable Anthony L. Howell
No. 170700020
John H. Mabey Jr., David C. Wright, and Brooke A.
White, Attorneys for Appellants
J. Craig Smith, Nathan S. Bracken, and Jennie B.
Garner, Attorneys for Appellees Granite Peak
Properties LC, Granite Peak Ranch LC,
and Kenneth C. Knudson
Barton H. Kunz II, Attorney for Appellee
Millard County
Sean D. Reyes, Norman K. Johnson, Julie I. Valdes,
Sarah M. Shechter, and Gordon H. Rowe, Attorneys
for Amicus Curiae Utah State Engineer 1
1. The Utah State Engineer moved to file an amicus curiae brief
supporting Appellants. The parties did not oppose the motion,
and we granted it.
Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
SENIOR JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN
FORSTER concurred. 2
APPLEBY, Senior Judge:
¶1 This case began as an action in which Second Big Springs
Irrigation Co., Baker Ranches Inc., Okelberry Ranch LLC, Ray
Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, and Jake Okelberry (collectively,
Second Big Springs) alleged that Granite Peak Properties LC,
Granite Peak Ranch LC, and Kenneth C. Knudson (collectively,
Granite Peak) interfered with Second Big Springs’ already
established water rights. But more than two years later and after
Granite Peak’s joinder of twenty-five additional defendants, the
district court classified the action as a general adjudication of
water rights. Approximately sixteen months after that, the court
dismissed the case on the basis that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. This appeal ensued, and we reverse: general
adjudications determine only the validity, characteristic, and
ownership of water rights, and do not decide interference claims,
which involve torts against property rights.
BACKGROUND
¶2 To put this case in context, we begin with a more detailed
than usual description of its district court procedural history. This
is because the case has evolved to include more parties, and some
of those parties, as well as Granite Peak and the court itself, have
at various times altered their positions, changing the course of the
litigation over approximately four years and making the case at
2. Senior Judge Kate Appleby sat by special assignment as
authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(7).
20210207-CA 2 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
this stage appear more complex than it is. 3 Despite its convoluted
history, the matter on appeal is straightforward: Is this a tort case
or is this a case more appropriately addressed in a general
adjudication pursuant to the adjudication provisions of Utah’s
Water and Irrigation Code? See generally Utah Code §§ 73-4-1
to -24. And if this is a matter for general adjudication, should it be
part of an already pending general adjudication in another
district?
¶3 Second Big Springs and Granite Peak own water rights in
the Snake Valley Hydrographic Basin, a groundwater basin
straddling the Utah–Nevada border. Second Big Springs’ rights
are allegedly older than, or senior to, those of Granite Peak. This
is significant because in Utah, “[a]ppropriators shall have priority
among themselves according to the dates of their respective
appropriations, so that each appropriator is entitled to receive the
appropriator’s whole supply before any subsequent appropriator
has any right.” Id. § 73-3-21.1. 4
¶4 Second Big Springs’ April 2017 complaint alleged that
Granite Peak’s groundwater pumping was interfering with
Second Big Springs’ senior water rights by depleting the aquifer,
thereby “obstructing or hindering [Second Big Springs’] ability to
3. The district court docket has 402 entries, but no disposition has
been made other than dismissal.
4. The previous version of this statute contained the same
language, but it was only one subsection of the statute. Utah Code
§ 73-3-21.1(2)(a) (2021). The 2022 amendment deleted all other
provisions of the section, leaving this language as the entirety of
the section. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-21.1 Amendment Notes
(LexisNexis Supp. 2022). This language is the codification of what
is known in the western United States as the prior appropriation
doctrine. See 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters § 355 (2013); Fredric J.
Donaldson, Farmer Beware: Water Rights Enforcement in Utah, 27 J.
Land, Res., & Env’t L. 367, 370 (2007).
20210207-CA 3 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
divert water.” The complaint identified Second Big Springs’ and
Granite Peak’s Utah water rights in detail, including water right
numbers, priority dates, beneficial uses, allowances, and points of
diversion. Second Big Springs sought, among other things,
damages and injunctive relief as well as a declaratory judgment
(1) confirming its seniority; (2) declaring that “Big Springs Creek,
Lake Creek and their spring sources . . . are fully appropriated”;
and (3) declaring that Granite Peak has no rights in those waters.
¶5 Granite Peak moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. It argued that because
Second Big Springs’ action was “squarely aimed at reducing or
eliminating” Granite Peak’s water rights, it was not an
interference claim but, rather, a claim that required an
adjudication of rights under Utah’s water law statutes. Granite
Peak also argued that its Nevada water rights were implicated in
the dispute and that Utah courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate
Nevada water rights. The district court rejected the argument that
Second Big Springs was claiming something other than
interference with its water rights, and because the complaint
alleged a tort committed in Utah, the court found jurisdiction
proper here.
¶6 The action proceeded, but in August 2018, Granite Peak
filed a Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint, Join
Parties, or Make a General Determination of Water Rights.
Among other things, it argued that adjudicating the alleged
interference claim would require the joinder of “all water users”
in the area “whose water rights are junior to [Second Big Springs’]
water rights” and that those other users “must be added as third-
party defendants or joined” because “[i]t is impossible both
factually and legally to make the necessary determinations or
grant the relief requested in a vacuum that does not consider the
diversion of water by other intermingled water users.” The
district court granted the motion to file a third-party complaint
but denied the “request for a general determination.”
20210207-CA 4 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
¶7 Nearly two years after the action began, Granite Peak filed
a Third-Party Complaint naming twenty-five additional parties.
These included businesses and corporations, individuals, and
government entities including the Bureau of Land Management
(the BLM), 5 Millard County, and the Millard County School
District (the school district). It alleged that to the extent each
defendant with a junior water right caused harm to Second Big
Springs, fault should be allocated proportionately. The Third-
Party Complaint also identified details such as water right
numbers, holders, priority dates, allowances, points of diversion,
and limitations of the use of the water rights. Granite Peak sought
(1) monetary damages, (2) injunctive relief, (3) curtailment, 6 (4) an
award of fees and costs, and (5) a declaratory judgment “declaring
Third-Party Defendants responsible for their proportionate share
of damages.”
¶8 Millard County and the school district responded to the
Third-Party Complaint with motions to dismiss. The school
district’s motion stated that there was no allegation that it would
be liable to Granite Peak. Millard County’s motion contended the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because no notice of claim
had been served on the county, and it also noted that the “claim
for injunctive relief . . . [is] a de facto equitable general
determination claim, which is both statutorily precluded and
subject to another court’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Further, to issue
injunctive relief, the court would have to “determine the level of
curtailment” for each claimant, and because that involved “ten or
5. The BLM filed a Special Appearance contesting the district
court’s jurisdiction over the BLM because there was “no
applicable waiver of sovereign immunity.”
6. A curtailment order is one reducing or restricting a party’s
water usage. See generally Curtail, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail [https://pe
rma.cc/5288-CRT5] (defining “curtail” as “to make less by or as if
by cutting off or away some part”).
20210207-CA 5 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
more claimants,” it would have to proceed under the general
adjudication statute. It noted that a general adjudication was
pending in the Third District Court (the Tooele County general
adjudication) and alleged that the Fourth District Court lacked
jurisdiction.
¶9 In late October 2019, the district court orally announced a
ruling on the motions to dismiss, which it granted with regard to
the damages claim but not as to curtailment. It agreed to classify
the action as a general adjudication because Granite Peak’s
joinder of so many additional potential claimants “ha[d] by
statutory definition transformed [the] case.” It did not agree that
dismissal was appropriate but noted that the “[p]arties are well
aware there is a pending general adjudication addressing the
[a]ffected area already filed in Tooele County, Case No. 650306049
currently assigned to Judge Bates.” It made suggestions,
including consolidation pursuant to rule 42 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the parties agreed to “permit the court to
discuss the issue with Judge Bates for determination on how to
proceed further.”
¶10 In December 2019, the district court entered an order
classifying the action as a general adjudication. It noted that
“[a]lthough a general adjudication is pending for this water
source, the specific issues the parties have raised in this case have
not been addressed in the [Tooele County] general adjudication.
It therefore seems to the Court that the best course of action would
be to seek to consolidate this matter with the general adjudication
pending in Tooele County.” It added, “Although no party has
specifically requested consolidation with the general adjudication
pending in Tooele County, the Court believes that is the
appropriate course because it would save the parties from the
expense of re-filing complaints, joining parties, and re-
adjudicating issues that have already been addressed in this
action.” Having decided that the case “has become a statutory
general determination,” the court gave the parties the option of
either briefing what procedures to follow or allowing the court to
20210207-CA 6 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
ask Judge Bates to consolidate this action with the action already
pending before him. Ultimately, the order stated that “[t]he Court
shall sua sponte move Judge Bates to consolidate this matter with
the general determination pending before him in the Utah Third
District Court in Tooele County.”
¶11 The same day, the district court stated that it had “agreed
with some parties that this case had, by statute, become a general
adjudication of water rights.” And because “the watershed at
issue in this matter” was part of the Tooele County general
adjudication, the court directed the parties to move for
consolidation with that case.
¶12 None of the parties did this until several months later,
when Millard County filed a motion to consolidate this action
with the Tooele County general adjudication; Granite Peak filed a
joinder, but Millard County withdrew its motion and Granite
Peak filed no independent motion. Then there were motions to
reconsider, which the district court denied.
¶13 The next series of events brought the matter to this court.
Granite Peak filed another motion to dismiss, which the district
court granted, without prejudice, in late March 2021. Granite Peak
pointed to the court’s earlier determination that it lacked
jurisdiction to proceed and argued that although the court
directed the parties to seek consolidation, that solution “only
works if the parties comply,” which Second Big Springs had not
done.
¶14 The district court granted this motion to dismiss, stating
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, further, that “[t]he
respective claims of the parties to the use of water in the Aquifer
may be determined in the General Adjudication, which has
subject matter jurisdiction to determine the parties’ respective
claims to the right to the use of water under Title 73 Chapter 4 of
the Utah Code.” Given the existence of the Tooele County general
adjudication and the parties’ failure to seek consolidation with
20210207-CA 7 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
that case, the court found it “appropriate” to dismiss the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. That order is the subject of this
appeal.
General Adjudication
¶15 With respect to water law cases, a general determination,
alternatively referred to as a general adjudication, is a statutory
proceeding that “determine[s] and settle[s] water rights which
have not been adjudicated or which may be uncertain or in
dispute.” Green River Adjudication v. United States, 404 P.2d 251,
252 (Utah 1965); see also Utah Code §§ 73-4-12(1)(a), -15. General
adjudications “prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water
rights” by gathering into a single action all the claimants to water
rights. See EnerVest, Ltd. v. Utah State Eng’r, 2019 UT 2, ¶ 5, 435
P.3d 209 (quotation simplified).
¶16 General adjudication actions proceed under Title 73,
Chapter 4 of the Utah Code “and not otherwise.” See Utah Code
§ 73-4-3(10). Thus, “in this state[,] there is an exclusive statutory
method provided for the determination of relative rights in a river
system.” Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346, 349 (Utah 1944)
(quotation simplified). The statute includes extensive procedure,
and because the cases are technical, the state engineer’s
experience and training play a significant role in their resolution.
See United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.,
2003 UT 49, ¶ 14, 79 P.3d 945. The process begins when a general
adjudication is initiated. The authority to initiate this suit “is
vested—and wisely so—in [a] disinterested public official,” that
is, the state engineer or the district court. See Spanish Fork West
Field Irrigation Co. v. District Court, 110 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1941). 7
7. Although this cited case refers to a prior version of the general
adjudication statute in its holding that only the state engineer or
the court is empowered to initiate a general adjudication, the
current version of the statute has not changed in this respect.
(continued…)
20210207-CA 8 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
Prompted by either a petition from water users or by “[t]he
executive director of the Department of Environmental Quality,
with the concurrence of the governor,” the state engineer is
authorized to “file an action in the district court for a general
adjudication.” See Utah Code § 73-4-1(1)–(2). Alternatively, the
district court is empowered to convert an action into a statutory
adjudication suit when the action “involves a determination of the
rights to the major part of the water of the source of supply or the
rights of 10 or more of the claimants of the source of supply.” See
id. § 73-4-3(1).
¶17 Once an action is commenced, the state engineer publishes
notice, identifies possible claimants, and serves a summons to
each. Id. §§ 73-4-3(2)–(4), -4. The state engineer must “give notice
of further proceedings” to all claimants and to any attorney who
appears on a claimant’s behalf. See id. § 73-4-3(5)(a). The state
engineer holds an informational public meeting and provides
claimants instruction on how to claim a water right in the action.
See id. § 73-4-3(7). Each person claiming a right to use water has
ninety days to file a statement of claim. See id. §§ 73-4-3(8)(b)(i)(A),
-5(1). In that statement, each claimant must provide the state
engineer or the district court with “facts that clearly define the
extent, limits, and nature of the claim.” See id. § 73-4-5(1)(j). Failure
to file a statement of claim is “considered evidence of an intent to
abandon” one’s right, and in most circumstances, the claimant
will be “forever barred and estopped from subsequently asserting
the unclaimed right.” See id. § 73-4-9(1)–(2).
¶18 The state engineer compiles the statements of claim and
files them with the district court, along with a list of unclaimed
water rights of record. See id. §§ 73-4-3(8)(d), -9.5(1). From there,
the state engineer serves notice of the list of unclaimed rights to
all summoned claimants and holds a public meeting to explain
Compare Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. v. District Court, 110
P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1941) (citing Revised Statutes of Utah §§ 100-
4-1, -18 (1933)), with Utah Code §§ 73-4-1(1)–(2), -3(1).
20210207-CA 9 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
that list. See id. § 73-4-9.5(1)(b)–(c). A claimant has a finite period
in which to object. See id. § 73-4-9.5(2). Thereafter, the state
engineer must “exhaust[] the search” for any other claimants that
have not yet been identified. See id. § 73-4-22(2), (3). After this, the
state engineer must “prepare a proposed determination of all
rights to the use of the water” and hold a public meeting “to
explain the proposed determination to the claimants.” See id. § 73-
4-11(1). Again, claimants have a period in which to object. See id.
§ 73-4-11(2). If no objections are filed, the court must “render a
judgment in accordance with” the state engineer’s proposed
determination. See id. § 73-4-12(1). If objections are filed, the court
holds a hearing on these before rendering a judgment. See id.
§§ 73-4-13 to -15.
¶19 The general adjudication process culminates in a judicial
decree establishing water rights in a water source. This decree
includes, for each right, “the name of the person entitled to the
use of the water,” “the quantity of water,” “the time during which
the water is to be used each year,” “the name of the stream or
other source from which the water is diverted,” “the point on the
stream or other source where the water is diverted,” “the priority
date of the right,” and “any other matters as will fully and
completely define the [water] right[].” See id. § 73-4-12(1)(b).
Interference Claims
¶20 An interference action is a way to enforce one’s water
rights against obstruction and hinderance. See Bingham v. Roosevelt
City Corp., 2010 UT 37, ¶ 48, 235 P.3d 730; see also Wayment v.
Howard, 2006 UT 56, ¶ 13, 144 P.3d 1147. “Generally, a cause of
action for interference lies where a junior appropriator’s use of
water diminishes the quantity or quality of the senior
appropriator’s existing water right.” Arave v. Pineview West Water
Co., 2020 UT 67, ¶ 30, 477 P.3d 1239. When this principle of
priority is violated, a senior water right holder may seek relief,
commonly in the form of an injunction and damages. See Stauffer
v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 39 P.2d 725, 732 (Utah 1935) (instructing
20210207-CA 10 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
as to when “plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction or judgment for
damages” in an interference action); see also In re Water Rights of
Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 348 P.2d 679, 683 (Utah 1960) (“If
the supply is not sufficient the use must be curtailed or cut off in
inverse order of priority.”). But “[b]efore plaintiffs are entitled to”
a remedy, “they must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that they are not receiving the water to which they are
entitled, and that the defendant by the acts complained of has
wrongfully deprived them of such water.” See Stauffer, 39 P.2d at
732. Water right interference actions are thus distinct from general
adjudications. Where the latter must proceed pursuant to statute,
with its prescribed procedures, interference actions do not. Cf.
Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. v. District Court, 110 P.2d 344,
346 (Utah 1941) (“The statutory general adjudication is not
intended as a remedy for the wrong to an individual, or to protect
the individual against adverse interests.”).
¶21 Indeed, our supreme court “clarif[ied] the boundaries of
the cause of action for interference” and found it could “be
invoked only by a party with an enforceable water right.” Bingham,
2010 UT 37, ¶ 53 (emphasis added). Further still, an interference
action and a general adjudication have different ends. As noted,
general adjudications determine and settle unknown, uncertain,
or disputed claims. See Green River Adjudication v. United States,
404 P.2d 251, 252 (Utah 1965). From a claimant’s perspective, the
goal of the process is to avoid abandonment of one’s water right.
See Utah Code § 73-4-9(1). That differs from a plaintiff’s objectives
in filing an interference action, which are to enforce a water right,
stop the prevailing harm, and be reimbursed for it. See Bingham,
2010 UT 37, ¶ 6. Likewise, a litigant’s role in each action is not the
same. In a general adjudication, a water user must prove “the
extent, limits, and nature” of a water claim. See Utah Code § 73-4-
5(1)(j). But in an interference action, a plaintiff must prove
obstruction or hinderance to an existing water right. See Bingham,
2010 UT 37, ¶ 48.
20210207-CA 11 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶22 Second Big Springs contends the district court erred when
it dismissed its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
“Because the propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of law,
we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of
the trial court.” Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ¶ 2, 20 P.3d 895.
“When determining whether a trial court properly granted a
motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.” Id.ANALYSIS
¶23 Did the district court correctly determine that the action
before it was one requiring general adjudication and that the
Tooele County general adjudication divested the court of subject
matter jurisdiction to hear Second Big Springs’ interference
action? “Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s power to
hear a case.” Iota LLC v. Davco Mgmt. Co. LC, 2016 UT App 231,
¶ 44, 391 P.3d 239 (quotation simplified). State district courts have
original jurisdiction in all civil matters “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by the Utah Constitution or by statute.” See Utah Code
§ 78A-5-102(1). As an initial matter then, regardless of whether
Second Big Springs’ cause of action is one of interference or
requires a general adjudication, it is within the district court’s
original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d
346, 350 (Utah 1944) (“Controversies may arise in which the
District Court could exercise its discretion and determine
whether to proceed as a private suit or under a statutory
adjudication . . . .”). Indeed, our legislature contemplated judicial
review of each. See Utah Code § 73-3-32 (contemplating a plaintiff
filing “a judicial action for interference, damages, declaratory,
injunctive, or other relief, based on the use of water under an
existing water right”); id. §§ 73-4-1, -3 (contemplating judicial
20210207-CA 12 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
review of general adjudication actions). And our caselaw
demonstrates as much. See, e.g., Arave v. Pineview West Water Co.,
2020 UT 67, ¶ 1, 477 P.3d 1239 (addressing the district court’s
exercise of its original jurisdiction over a water right interference
claim).
¶24 But even where a district court has jurisdiction, it may not
be able to exercise it. See Christensen v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2020
UT 45, ¶ 33, 469 P.3d 962 (distinguishing “a lack of jurisdiction
from an inability to exercise that jurisdiction”). The exercise of
jurisdiction is “subject to overrides or exceptions set forth in our
case law,” in rules of procedure, and through legislative
restraints. Id. ¶¶ 33–34 (quotation simplified). Appellate
deadlines and incomplete administrative exhaustion, for instance,
can restrict the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. Likewise, and more
relevantly, the legislature may divest a court of jurisdiction by
conferring on another court exclusive jurisdiction. See Torgerson v.
Talbot, 2017 UT App 231, ¶ 11, 414 P.3d 504 (describing the
legislature’s ability to “confer exclusive jurisdiction on another
court” and “deprive [a] court of jurisdiction” where it would
“normally have” it (quotation simplified)). It is this limit that
concerns us here, because general adjudication proceedings can,
in some instances, bar courts from exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. See Smith v. District Court, 256 P. 539, 542 (Utah 1927),
modified on other grounds by Anderson, 148 P.2d 346.
¶25 Indeed, in Smith, our supreme court declared that a
pending general adjudication could “entire[ly] exclu[de]” another
court from exercising its jurisdiction. See id. (quotation
simplified). But it “confined” this exclusive jurisdiction “to
instances where both suits are substantially the same.” See id.(quotation simplified). That is, only where both suits are “nearly
identical”—as to “parties” and “interests represented,” “relief”
and “purposes sought,” and “rights asserted”—is a court barred
from exercising concurrent jurisdiction. See id. (quotation
simplified).
20210207-CA 13 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
¶26 Relying on this exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, the district
court dismissed Second Big Springs’ claims. It found the Tooele
County general adjudication divested it of jurisdiction. 8 To
determine whether the district court was correct in that respect,
we conduct a two-step analysis. First, we decide the nature of the
action before the district court and whether it is an interference
action or a general adjudication. Only in the latter case can the
Tooele County general adjudication affect the Fourth District
Court’s jurisdiction. But even then, the Tooele County general
adjudication bars the Fourth District Court’s involvement only if
that suit and the one before us are “substantially the same.” See id.(quotation simplified). Evaluation of this substantial sameness is
the second step, and only where it exists can we uphold the
district court’s decision to dismiss Second Big Springs’ claim on
subject matter jurisdiction grounds.
8. To the extent the record relies on the “principle of priority” set
forth in Hillyard v. Logan City Court, 578 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1978), to
support a bar against concurrent jurisdiction, we disagree. See
generally id. at 1273 (Ellett, J., dissenting) (providing that, to avoid
conflict between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, “the first court
to exercise jurisdiction acquires exclusive jurisdiction to further
proceed in the case”). The record reflects a series of motions filed
with the district court asserting that concurrent jurisdiction
cannot exist under Hillyard. If the court adopted Hillyard’s
principle of priority, it never said so, but because in support of its
decision to dismiss the case, the court pointed only to the pending
Tooele County general adjudication, we are left to assume as
much. Although the jurisdictional limitation expressed in Hillyard
is not unlike the one in Smith, there are some differences. But
because the relevant language is found in the dissenting opinion
to a criminal case, far afield of water law, it is unclear to what
extent Hillyard is controlling here. Rather than decide that
question, we rely instead on Smith with its straightforward
application to water law.
20210207-CA 14 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
I. Nature of the Action
¶27 District courts have authority and discretion to initiate a
general adjudication by converting a non-statutory water law case
into a statutory proceeding. See Utah Code § 73-4-3(1) (“Upon the
filing of any action by . . . any person claiming the right to use
the waters of any river system, lake, underground water basin,
or other natural source of supply that involves a determination of
. . . the rights of 10 or more of the claimants of the source of supply,
the clerk of the district court shall notify the state engineer that a
suit has been filed.”); Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. v.
District Court, 110 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1941) (providing that “the
lower court may, if it finds [it] advisable, conduct” a private suit “as
a statutory general adjudication” (emphasis added)); see also Salt
Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1944)
(“Controversies may arise in which the District Court could
exercise its discretion and determine whether to proceed as a
private suit or under a statutory adjudication . . . .”). With that
said, “all suits involving water rights [are] not necessarily general
adjudications.” Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land
& Livestock Co., 137 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1943). And it is not
necessary “to force” a private suit “through the statutory
procedure for a general adjudication.” See id. “In many instances,”
doing so “would complicate rather than simplify litigation.” See
Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co., 265 P.2d 1016, 1019
(Utah 1954). And in instances in which the action is “clearly” of
one nature, it is an abuse of discretion to proceed otherwise. See
Anderson, 148 P.2d at 349–50. The nature of a water law action is
determined by the pleadings and, specifically, by what the request
for relief seeks to accomplish. See id.; see also Smith v. District Court,
256 P. 539, 543 (Utah 1927), modified on other grounds by Anderson,
148 P.2d 346. Second Big Springs and Granite Peak ask the court
20210207-CA 15 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
for three things: monetary damages, injunctive relief, and
declaratory relief. We consider the nature of each. 9
A. Monetary Damages
¶28 Plaintiffs commonly seek monetary damages in water right
interference actions. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 39
P.2d 725, 732 (Utah 1935); Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake
Reservoir Co., 2020 UT 47, ¶ 29, 469 P.3d 1003. But damages are
9. The district court did not determine the nature of the action
according to the requests for relief. Instead, it concluded that
“Granite Peak’s joinder of [twenty-five] users of the same source
of supply as third-party defendants” had “by statutory
definition” “transformed” the nature of the case. As the court saw
it, a case with “more [than] ten parties” was “complicated enough
. . . to be characterized as a general determination.”
But section 73-4-3 does not grant the district court authority
to convert a water law action into a statutory adjudication
proceeding merely because “10 or more . . . claimants of the source
of supply” have been joined in the suit. See Utah Code § 73-4-3(1).
Indeed, our supreme court has concluded that a private
interference suit can, just as a statutory adjudication could, “cover
[thousands of] water users.” See Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation
Co. v. District Court, 110 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1941). Rather, a
statutory proceeding is triggered when a suit calls for “a
determination of the rights . . . of 10 or more of” such claimants. See
Utah Code § 73-4-3(1) (emphasis added). And to determine if
Granite Peak’s complaint called for that, the court must look to
Granite Peak’s request for relief. See Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148
P.2d 346, 349–350 (Utah 1944).
Second Big Springs contends that only its complaint, and
not that of Granite Peak, can shape the cause of action in this case.
We need not decide whether Second Big Springs is correct in that
respect, because we reach the same conclusion whether or not we
take into account the Third-Party Complaint filed by Granite
Peak.
20210207-CA 16 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
unavailable in a general adjudication proceeding. See Smith v.
District Court, 256 P. 539, 542 (Utah 1927) (describing plaintiff’s
and defendant’s requests for damages and stating that,
“[m]anifestly, such relief as this is not within the contemplation of
the statute providing for a general adjudication of water rights”),
modified on other grounds by Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346,
351 (Utah 1944).
¶29 Second Big Springs requested that the court award
monetary damages. Granite Peak asked the court to order
reimbursement according to each third-party defendant’s
“percentage of fault.” These remedies are unavailable in a general
adjudication.
B. Permanent Injunction
¶30 Injunctive relief is a common request in interference
actions. See, e.g., Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ¶ 7, 144 P.3d
1147; Stauffer v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 39 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1935);
Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan City, 269 P. 776,
778 (Utah 1928). But injunctive relief is not unique to interference
actions. Our supreme court has identified the district court’s
“power and jurisdiction” “under the general statutory
adjudication procedure” “to issue temporary injunction orders
prior to judgment” and, afterward, to enjoin water users “as a
necessary corollary” “to protect and enforce such rights.” See Salt
Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346, 351 (Utah 1944) (quotation
simplified).
¶31 Because injunctive relief is not limited to one form of
action, the request for injunctive relief is unhelpful to identifying
the underlying nature of the action. But a specific request for
injunctive relief, how it is worded and other requests that
surround it, is instructive. When an injunction is pleaded in a
general adjudication, the request usually accompanies a request
for the court to adjudicate water rights. For example, in a suit that
could be “maintained only as a statutory proceeding,” the
20210207-CA 17 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
plaintiffs first asked the court to determine the rights, title, and
priority “of each plaintiff” and of “approximately 2,430
defendants” “to the use of water from Utah Lake.” See id. at 347,
349. 10 Accompanying that request, the plaintiffs asked the court to
enter “all orders and injunctions necessary to a full exercise and
enjoyment . . . of every right herein decreed.” See id. at 347
(quotation simplified).
¶32 On the other hand, injunctive relief in an interference
action is tailored to the alleged interference, obstruction, or
hinderance. And the request is often accompanied by other
remedies to reimburse for past harm and to ensure against future
harm. For instance, in Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144 P.3d
1147, where a water user’s dike hindered and obstructed his
neighbor’s water right, a district court in a private proceeding
“permanently enjoined [the user] from further interference” and
ordered that the diversion point in question be physically
modified to stop the harm. See id. ¶¶ 7, 13. Similarly, Stauffer v.
Utah Oil Refining Co., 39 P.2d 725 (Utah 1935), was an interference
action against an oil refinery in which the water users alleged that
the refinery’s pumping had deprived them of their entitlements
and asked the court “to enjoin [the refinery] from operating its
pumps” as well as “to recover money judgments.” See id. at 726.
¶33 Second Big Springs’ request is similar to the requests in
Wayment and Stauffer. Second Big Springs requested a permanent
injunction “to the extent necessary to stop the ongoing
interference with [Second Big Springs’] senior rights.” In that
sense, Second Big Springs’ request is tailored to alleged
10. The proceeding in Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346 (Utah
1944), was not initiated under the general adjudication statute. Id.
at 348. Rather, the plaintiffs brought a private suit in equity and
“consistently maintained” their position that the action was “in
no sense a suit under the [general adjudication] statute.” See id.
(quotation simplified). But the supreme court disagreed. See id. at
349–50.
20210207-CA 18 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
interference. Further still, its request for injunctive relief is, as in
Stauffer, accompanied by a request for a money judgment to
remedy past harms. Critically, though, Second Big Springs’
request for injunction is not accompanied by one for adjudication.
To be sure, Second Big Springs does not request that any water
rights be “determined,” “adjudged,” or “decreed.” See Anderson,
148 P.2d at 347 (quotation simplified). And indeed, Second Big
Springs does not ask for these things because its and Granite
Peak’s rights have already been established. Second Big Springs’
complaint alleges those very water rights, detailing the water
right number, holder, priority date, and permitted quantity for
both its own and Granite Peak’s water rights. See supra ¶ 4. Rather
than ask the court to identify new water rights, Second Big
Springs asked the court to enforce rights already obtained by
enjoining Granite Peak from interfering. And it is in this sense that
Second Big Springs’ request for an injunction is consistent with a
cause of action for interference and is wholly at odds with a
general adjudication.
¶34 Still, Granite Peak and Millard County construe Second Big
Springs’ request for injunctive relief as implicitly requiring an
adjudication of water rights. Granite Peak asserts that Second Big
Springs seeks to “permanently enjoin” Granite Peak “from ever
using its water rights again regardless of whether sufficient water
is available to supply both [Second Big Springs’] rights and
[Granite Peak’s] rights.” “Thus,” it argues, “rather than an
interference claim,” Second Big Springs has “effectively” sought a
water right determination that Granite Peak “has no right to
pump water.” Alternatively, Millard County asserts that Second
Big Springs “seeks to curtail” Granite Peak’s water rights “in an
amount to be determined,” thus implicating an adjudication of
water rights. Each argument is unavailing.
¶35 We acknowledge that, in some cases, a plaintiff expressly
asked only for an injunction, yet an adjudication is what was
required. See Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land
& Livestock Co., 137 P.2d 634, 636–37 (Utah 1943); see also Logan,
20210207-CA 19 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co., 269 P. at 778–79 (Utah 1928). In
Wellsville, for instance, plaintiff irrigation companies sought to
enforce their water rights, as established in the Kimball Decree, 11
by enjoining the defendants from “interfering with the flow of any
water from” the Little Bear River “beyond or in excess of the rights
specifically decreed to each [defendant].” See Wellsville, 137 P.2d
at 636. As it happened, some of the defendants were not subject to
the Decree, “because neither they nor their predecessors were
made parties to it.” See id. Accordingly, although the plaintiffs did
not expressly seek a determination of “the relative rights of” those
defendants not properly bound, their request for injunctive relief
required it. See id. at 637. But even there the court found that
because such a determination lacked “the comprehensiveness” of
a statutory adjudication, the court could proceed non-statutorily
with an interference suit. 12 See id.
¶36 Second Big Springs’ request does not implicitly ask the
court to adjudicate any water right, let alone rights of a
“comprehensive” sort. Granite Peak does not challenge the fact
that its rights are already established, but instead argues that
Second Big Springs requests to overrule that determination by
curtailment. “Put simply,” Granite Peak argues, “the Complaint
seeks a permanent determination that Granite Peak’s water rights
may never be used again.” That is not an accurate
characterization. Contrary to seeking a permanent injunction
“regardless of” water available, Second Big Springs expressly asks
for a permanent injunction “to the extent necessary to stop the
11. The Kimball Decree, dated February 21, 1922, is the result of a
general adjudication of the Little Bear River in Cache County. See
Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co.,
137 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1943).
12. The Wellsville court reached its conclusion “without thought of
laying down any line at which a so-called private suit may in
reality become or take on the aspects of a general adjudication.”
Id. at 637.
20210207-CA 20 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
ongoing interference with [Second Big Springs’] senior rights.”
(Emphasis added.) And that request does not, under these facts,
implicate a general adjudication. We understand Millard
County’s argument to challenge this point, contending that the
court’s determination of curtailment requires an adjudication of
water rights. If the parties’ rights had not already been
established, perhaps that would be true, insofar as curtailment
presupposes a water right already in existence (namely, that which
it will or will not curtail). But again, Second Big Springs alleged its
and Granite Peak’s precise water rights, which Granite Peak did
not deny. Thus, the court can curtail Granite Peak’s water usage
without disturbing its existing water rights. No determination of
water rights is required, here. 13
¶37 As for Granite Peak, its pleading requests that the court
enjoin the third-party defendants according to their “percentage
of fault” and according to the “Utah law of priority.” Again,
perhaps a request for relief such as this could, in another context,
require an adjudication of water rights. To determine the extent
of a defendant’s fault in interfering with a plaintiff’s water rights,
a court must make factual findings not only of how much water a
13. Millard County also argues that Second Big Springs’ request
for injunctive relief “differs from a standard interference claim
because” the relief sought is not only to stop interference, but to
protect “the source of supply.” Again, Second Big Springs’
request is taken out of context. Specifically, it asked the court to
“enjoin[] [Granite Peak’s] diversions so as not to diminish,
impound, obstruct, or impede in any manner the free and natural
flow of the water of Lake Creek, and the springs that feed it, to
which [Second Big Springs] [is] entitled at [its] several points of
diversion.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, Second Big Springs
does not seek to protect “the water source itself.” Instead, it seeks
to protect the portions of the water source to which it is entitled.
That is precisely the sort of relief requested in an interference
action.
20210207-CA 21 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
user draws but also, and importantly, how much the user is
entitled to draw. If that entitlement were not already established,
the court may be put in a position where it must do so. 14 But that
is not our situation. The state engineer already determined each
third-party claimant’s entitlements. Granite Peak alleged as
much, detailing in its complaint the water right number, holder,
priority date, allowance (in acre-feet 15 or an equivalent unit, down
to the second decimal point), point of diversion, and any use
limitation associated with each third-party defendant’s water
right. Thus, Granite Peak cannot ask the court to adjudicate rights.
Instead, it asks the court to enforce, by way of apportionment,
already-existing rights. 16
14. Whether such a determination would be sufficiently
“comprehensive” to require statutory proceedings, we need not
decide, because all the third-party defendants’ water rights in this
case have already been established.
15. “[T]he standard unit of measurement of the volume of water
shall be the acre-foot, being the amount of water upon an acre
covered one foot deep, equivalent to 43,560 cubic feet.” Utah Code
§ 73-1-2.
16. To the extent that the County’s argument asserts that a
determination of curtailment is, itself, a determination under the
statute, the general adjudication statute does not support that
contention. A determination, as the statute uses the term,
“establish[es] the rights to the use of the water of said river system
or water source.” See Utah Code § 73-4-12 (emphasis added). A
determination of curtailment does not do this. To the contrary, and
as mentioned earlier, curtailment presupposes the existence of a
water right. Thus, when a court orders a water user to curtail its
use by some quantity, the court is not creating, but instead
enforcing, a water right. Our caselaw also supports that
conclusion insofar as Millard County’s interpretation, carried to
(continued…)
20210207-CA 22 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
C. Declaratory Judgment
¶38 As with injunctive relief, declaratory judgments are
available in several contexts. Compare Meridian Ditch Co. v.
Koosharem Irrigation Co., 660 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1983), with In re
Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶ 27, 133 P.3d 410, abrogated on other
grounds by Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Group Ltd., 2014 UT
13, 325 P.3d 70. And in interference and statutory actions alike, a
declaratory judgment is generally pleaded to enforce water rights
already established. See, e.g., Meridian Ditch Co., 660 P.2d at 219,
223; Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 2020 UT
47, ¶ 11, 469 P.3d 1003; In re Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶¶ 18, 27.
Still, causes of action are distinguishable. Where the effect of a
declaratory judgment “begins and ends with” the parties, the
request need not implicate a general adjudication. See In re Uintah
Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶ 57. But where the effect of the judgment
draws on an issue of first impression and has the “potential[] [to]
reverberate[]” and affect “many downstream appropriators,” the
matter is “appropriate for resolution under Utah’s general
adjudication statute.” See id. ¶¶ 57, 61.
¶39 In Meridian Ditch Co. v. Koosharem Irrigation Co., 660 P.2d
217 (Utah 1983), for instance, Meridian sought a judgment
declaring its entitlement, “formerly designated in the Cox
Decree,” 17 “of the Otter Creek waters.” Id. at 219, 223. That request
its logical end, would render injunctive relief essentially
unavailable in interference actions. Indeed, enjoining a
rightsholder will almost always require the court to “determine”
the quantity by which the user must reduce its use. Otherwise, it
would be challenging or even impossible to know one was in
compliance. But our caselaw makes clear that injunctive relief is
available in interference proceedings. See supra ¶ 30.
17. The Cox Decree, entered in 1936, is the result of a general
adjudication of the Sevier River. See Meridian Ditch Co. v.
Koosharem Irrigation Co., 660 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah 1983).
20210207-CA 23 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
proceeded through a non-statutory action. See id. In Rocky Ford
Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 2020 UT 47, 469 P.3d 1003,
water user Rocky Ford alleged, among other things, water right
interference against Kents Lake, asserting “that its water rights
had been injured by Kents Lake’s . . . failure to measure water
usage in accordance with the 1931 [Beaver River] Decree.” Id. ¶ 11.
Rocky Ford requested, in part, a declaratory judgment clarifying
both “the priority of the parties’ rights and Kents Lake’s
[measurement] obligations” under the decree. See id. ¶ 1. That
request likewise proceeded non-statutorily. See id.
¶40 But the declaratory relief requested in Uintah Basin is
different in kind. See In re Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶¶ 3, 15, 27.
There, Strawberry River water users sued the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, seeking a declaration of “equitable title to
[Strawberry River Project] water” and, within that ownership
interest, “the right to recapture return flows.” See id. ¶ 27.
Specifically, the water users sought to recapture 64,400 acre-feet
of return flows. Id. ¶ 22. In a competing claim, the United States
sought to recapture 49,200 acre-feet. Id. Critically, Strawberry
River Project water was imported, traveling from the Colorado
River drainage to the Great Basin, and one’s right to recapture
return flow from imported water is an unsettled area of law. See
id. ¶¶ 49, 58. The supreme court thus found these claims
“ambitious” and involving “issues and impacts . . . too expansive
to allow” the suit to proceed privately. See id. ¶ 57 & n.14. Indeed,
the effect of recapturing those waters that “augment[] the supply
of water available for beneficial use in both Utah Valley and the
Salt Lake Valley” could “reverberate[] all” along the Wasatch
Front. See id. ¶¶ 49, 57. Moreover, the court suggested that to settle
the issues privately would be unfair to other users who may also
have a stake in the matter. See id. ¶ 57 n.14.“This is not just a
‘private dispute,’” the court concluded, “but potentially impacts
many downstream appropriators and involves important water
law issues of first impression.” Id. ¶ 61.
20210207-CA 24 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
¶41 Second Big Springs asks the court for a declaratory
judgment confirming (1) that its rights are senior to those of
Granite Peak and, therefore, that Granite Peak has a duty of non-
interference; (2) that Big Springs Creek, Lake Creek, Big Springs,
and Dearden Springs “are fully appropriated”; and (3) that
Granite Peak has “no rights to those sources.” The first of these is
the most straightforward. As we see it, a judgment declaring
Granite Peak’s relative priority as to Second Big Springs, and the
duties that accompany that junior position, “begins and ends
with” the parties. See In re Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶ 57. Indeed,
a court can declare the relative priority of water rights in the
context of a private interference action. See generally Rocky Ford,
2020 UT 47, ¶¶ 32–34. This makes sense given that priority is often
an element in interference actions. See Arave v. Pineview West Water
Co., 2020 UT 67, ¶ 30, 477 P.3d 1239.
¶42 Second Big Springs’ second requested declaration is the
most contentious. The state engineer’s amicus brief contends that
the state engineer, and not the court, has exclusive authority to
decide whether water is available for appropriation. Accordingly,
the state engineer not only asserts that the general adjudication
statute does not “permit the court to determine whether water is
available for appropriation,” but suggests that Second Big
Springs’ relief cannot be granted in a private action either. Granite
Peak agrees that the authority to address water availability lies
“exclusively” with the state engineer. But, contrary to the state
engineer’s argument, Granite Peak asserts that the engineer is
permitted by statute to address water availability within a general
adjudication. Second Big Springs itself asserts that, at the very
least, its request would not trigger a general adjudication, because
“whether an area is open or closed to new appropriations is
irrelevant to the determination of the ongoing water use evaluated
in a determination case.” We agree that the state engineer, and not
the district court, determines water availability. See Utah Code
§ 73-3-8(1)(a) (providing that it is “the duty of the state engineer
to approve an application [to appropriate water] if there is reason
to believe” (among other things) that “there is unappropriated
20210207-CA 25 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
water in the proposed source”). Accordingly, if the state engineer
has not already declared Big Springs Creek, Lake Creek, Big
Springs, and Dearden Springs “fully appropriated,” the district
court lacks the authority to do so in the first instance. In such a
case, Second Big Springs would not be entitled, in a non-statutory
action, to a declaration involving water availability.
¶43 But transforming that action into a general adjudication
does not help Second Big Springs. Indeed, general adjudication
proceedings “provide[] no remedy for any relief except the
determination of rights to the use of water” (and injunctive relief
as provided in Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346, 351 (Utah
1944)). An assessment of the water available in a source is an
inquiry wholly distinct from determining the rights to the use of
water. Nothing in the general adjudication statute instructs the
court to include in its final judgment an assessment of water
availability. See Utah Code § 73-4-12. To be sure, an adjudication
of all the claims in a source can be done without assessing how
much water is left. Thus, Second Big Springs’ request that certain
sources be declared fully appropriated does not require this action
to proceed under the general adjudication statute. If that request
can be granted at all, it would be pursuant to an interference
proceeding.
¶44 Second Big Springs further requested that the district court
declare that Granite Peak has no rights in Big Springs Creek, Lake
Creek, Big Springs, and Dearden Springs. That request is
consistent with an interference action to the extent it is, at base, a
request to enforce rights already established. If the district court
found the declaration justified, the court could declare Second Big
Springs’ priority without thought of affecting other appropriators
downstream. See In re Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶ 61. Indeed, the
only party that declaration would affect is Granite Peak. And that
question does not implicate an “ambitious” or “expansive” issue
of first impression. See id. ¶ 57 & n.14. The question it poses is this:
Of those rights held by Granite Peak, as set forth in Second Big
Springs’ complaint, where is Granite Peak entitled to divert
20210207-CA 26 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
water? That is a matter appropriately settled in an interference
proceeding. And in any case, Granite Peak conceded as much in
its amended answer. 18
¶45 Granite Peak requested a “judgment declaring [the]
[t]hird-[p]arty [d]efendants responsible for their proportionate
share of damages attributable to their respective fault” in harming
Second Big Springs. Admittedly, that request affects downstream
appropriators. But that fact alone is not enough to liken the
request to the Strawberry River water user’s request in In re Uintah
Basin. Divvying up harm according to previously determined
water rights is not as ambitious or as novel as recapturing the
return flows of imported water. The effects of that relief will not
reverberate across the Snake Valley but will remain with those
third-party defendants, if any, who are responsible for the harm
Second Big Springs claims it has endured and continues to
endure.
¶46 In sum, none of Second Big Springs’ or Granite Peak’s
requests implicate an adjudication of rights. Instead, these
requests for relief reveal the non-statutory nature of the action,
sounding only in tortious interference. The district court abused
its discretion in proceeding otherwise. See Anderson, 148 P.2d 346,
350 (Utah 1944). The Tooele County general adjudication does
not—and indeed, cannot—bar the Fourth District Court from
exercising jurisdiction over the matter. 19
18. Specifically, Second Big Springs alleged in paragraph 40 of its
complaint that Granite Peak has “no rights to appropriate the
waters of Lake Creek or the springs that form the flow of Lake
Creek.” Granite Peak’s amended answer “admit[ted] the
allegations in Paragraph 40 of the Complaint.”
19. Relying on Conant v. Deep Creek & Curlew Valley Irrigation Co.,
66 P. 188, 189 (Utah 1901), Granite Peak contends that, to the
(continued…)
20210207-CA 27 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
II. Substantial Sameness
¶47 Even if Second Big Springs’ or Granite Peak’s requests for
relief could be construed as requests for a general adjudication,
the Tooele County general adjudication still would not bar the
Fourth District Court from exercising jurisdiction. For a court to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a general adjudication, the
suits in question must be “substantially the same.” See Smith v.
District Court, 256 P. 539, 542 (Utah 1927), modified on other grounds
by Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346 (Utah 1944). As to what
constitutes substantial sameness, our supreme court has provided
the following guidance:
There must be the same parties, or at least such as
represent the same interest, there must be the same
rights asserted, and the same relief prayed for. This
relief must be founded on the same facts, and the
title or essential basis of the relief sought must be the
same. The identity in these particulars should be
such that if the pending case had already been
disposed of, it could be pleaded as a former
adjudication of the same matter between the same
parties.
Id. at 543 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 715
(1871)). Smith thus provides at least three avenues for evaluating
the dissimilarity of two cases: parties’ interests, rights asserted, or
relief requested. We focus on the last of these, as it is the relief
requested that we see as most readily distinguishing the case
before us from that pending in the Third District Court.
extent this case requires a determination of Granite Peak’s
Nevada water rights, “no Utah court has jurisdiction” to hear this
case. We need not decide if Granite Peak’s interpretation of Conant
is correct, because we find that the case at hand does not require
a determination of water rights to begin with.
20210207-CA 28 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
¶48 In Smith, our supreme court held that a pending
adjudication bars a subsequent case “when, and only when, all the
relief sought in the second action is obtainable in the first.” Id. at
544 (quotation simplified). In that case, a water claimant filed suit
in Morgan County against another water user. See id. at 539.
Collectively, the parties sought an adjudication of their rights, an
injunction, and, importantly, monetary damages. See id. at 543.
The district court “declined to proceed” in light of a pending
adjudication in Weber County. See id. at 540. On appeal, the
supreme court considered whether “the two cases [were] so
nearly identical . . . as to bring the cases within” Weber County’s
exclusive jurisdiction. See id. at 542. It determined they were not.
See id. at 543. Specifically, the court found a lack of substantial
identity in the remedies sought within the suits, pointing in part
to the fact that both parties sought monetary damages. See id.
Because that remedy is not available in statutory proceedings, the
court reasoned that “neither plaintiff nor defendant . . . could, in
the Weber [C]ounty action, obtain the full relief prayed for in their
respective pleadings.” Id. Thus, the suits were not substantially
the same. See id.
¶49 Likewise, in the case before us, neither Second Big Springs
nor Granite Peak could in the Tooele County general adjudication
“obtain the full relief prayed for in their respective pleadings.” See
id. Second Big Springs and Granite Peak both ask for an award of
damages. But a district court presiding over a general
adjudication is not empowered to grant such relief. See id.
Accordingly, if the action before us were consolidated with the
Tooele County general adjudication, both parties would be barred
from full relief. See id. Because not “all the relief sought in the
second action is obtainable in the first,” we cannot say that the
action before us is “substantially the same” as the one pending in
the Third District Court. See id. Thus, the Tooele County general
adjudication cannot deprive the Fourth District Court of
20210207-CA 29 2023 UT App 22Second Big Springs Irrigation v. Granite Peak Properties
exercising jurisdiction over these proceedings. It was error for the
court to hold otherwise. 20
CONCLUSION
Because none of Second Big Springs’ or Granite Peak’s requests
for relief implicate a general adjudication of water rights, the
district court abused its discretion in converting the action into a
statutory suit. Further, because neither party can receive full relief
in the Tooele County general adjudication, that action cannot,
under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, deprive the Fourth
District Court of jurisdiction. For either reason, the court erred in
dismissing the action without prejudice. The case is remanded for
such proceedings as may now be in order.
20. Second Big Springs argues that Granite Peak’s appellate brief
and its motion to join parties and file a third-party complaint
“repeatedly delayed this case with frivolity.” Thus, Second Big
Springs asks this court to award rule 33 damages. See Utah R.
App. P. 33(a) (permitting the court to award “just damages”
where “the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay”). “[A] frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other document is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.”
Id. R. 33(b). “An appeal, motion, brief, or other document
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing
the appeal, motion, brief, or other document.” Id. “This is a high
bar” that requires “egregious” conduct. Pang v. International
Document Services, 2015 UT 63, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d 1190 (quotation
simplified). Water law cases are complex, and we do not conclude
that Granite Peak’s conduct is so egregious as to warrant an award
of damages under rule 33.
20210207-CA 30 2023 UT App 22