State v. Edwards , 2023 UT App 23 ( 2023 )

2023 UT App 23THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
BRUCE CONWAY EDWARDS,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20210063-CA
Filed March 9, 2023
Second District Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Camille L. Neider
No. 181902968
Emily Adams and Freyja Johnson,
Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Karen A. Klucznik,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.
TENNEY, Judge:
¶1 After pleading no contest to one count of aggravated
assault, Bruce Edwards requested and received a seven-week
continuance of his sentencing so that he could confer with his
counsel about potentially moving to withdraw his plea. Through
no fault of Edwards’s own, that seven-week continuance
stretched into four months. When the delayed sentencing hearing
later began, however, Edwards requested an additional
continuance—this time for 24 hours—so that he could prepare a
written motion to withdraw the plea. The court denied the motion
and sentenced Edwards that same day.
State v. Edwards
¶2 Edwards now raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues
that the court abused its discretion when it denied his request for
an additional 24-hour continuance. Second, Edwards argues that
the court erred by not making findings about some alleged
inaccuracies in his presentence investigation report (PSR). For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm the court’s decision to deny the
continuance, but we reverse on the PSR issue and remand for
additional findings.
BACKGROUND
¶3 Edwards was charged with aggravated kidnapping,
obstruction of justice, aggravated assault, and damage to or
interruption of a communication device. The charges stemmed
from an incident in which Edwards allegedly attacked and
detained a prior roommate.
¶4 After several continuances, Edwards entered a not guilty
plea, and his trial was scheduled for early 2020. The district court
struck the trial dates when Edwards obtained new counsel,
however, and Edwards and the State soon agreed to a plea
bargain. In February 2020, Edwards entered a no contest plea to
aggravated assault in exchange for the State dismissing the
remaining charges.1
1. The plea agreement stated that Edwards was entering an
“Alford plea,” and at the change of plea hearing, Edwards
repeatedly expressed this understanding too. An “Alford plea is a
type of guilty plea in which a defendant does not expressly admit
his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes
the court for purposes of the case to treat him as if he were guilty.”
State v. Walton, 2019 UT App 187, ¶ 1 n.1, 455 P.3d 1066 (quotation
simplified). But at the change of plea hearing and in the written
minutes, the district court chose to accept the plea as being a “no
(continued…)
20210063-CA 2 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
¶5 The district court initially scheduled a sentencing hearing
for April 2020, but the court later pushed sentencing back to
August 31, 2020, due to the COVID-19 outbreak. At that August
sentencing hearing, Edwards’s counsel informed the court that
“Edwards had talked to [him] about possibly attempting to
withdraw the plea.” Counsel accordingly requested a continuance
of sentencing so that he could confer with Edwards about “what
the result might be and whether or not he actually wants to do
that.” The State objected to the request, noting that the “plea was
entered back in February, and it’s been continued several times.”
The district court granted the request, however, so that counsel
could “assess” and “advise[]” Edwards about whether there were
contest” plea. A no contest plea is commonly understood as being
a plea in which the defendant concedes that the State has
“sufficient evidence to prove the elements” of the offense in
question. State v. Hedgcock, 2019 UT App 93, ¶ 20, 443 P.3d 1288.
Edwards’s principal argument on appeal is that he should
have been granted an additional continuance before sentencing to
file a written motion to withdraw his plea. In the prejudice portion
of that argument, Edwards claims that he could have shown that
his lack of knowledge about whether the plea was an Alford plea
or instead a no contest plea rendered the plea unknowing. For its
part, however, the State maintains that there is no difference
between the two and that this provided no basis for withdrawing
the plea.
We have no need to determine whether there is indeed any
such difference. As detailed in Part I, the court was not required
to grant Edwards any additional time to prepare a written motion
to withdraw his plea. Because Edwards has provided no other
basis for withdrawing the plea, the plea accordingly stands.
We also note that a no contest plea and an Alford plea both
result in a conviction. See, e.g., Utah Code § 77-13-2(3); State v.
Archuleta, 2019 UT App 136, ¶ 5 n.2, 449 P.3d 223. In light of this,
and for ease of reference, we’ll refer to the plea as being a no
contest plea throughout this opinion.
20210063-CA 3 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
“grounds to withdraw the plea.” The court scheduled a new
hearing for late October (a delay of about seven weeks), and the
hearing was later postponed again until late December 2020 (in
part because Edwards had been experiencing health issues).
¶6 At the outset of the December sentencing hearing,
Edwards requested another continuance based on his concerns
about a letter the victim had recently written to the court in
advance of sentencing. After the State objected, the district court
denied the request, noting that Edwards was not required to
“have notice of a victim’s statement” before sentencing.
Edwards’s counsel then informed the district court that Edwards
wanted to withdraw the plea. Counsel stated that he “was just
given notice of this—specific notice of this, this morning right
before 9:30 a.m.” and said that he had “not had time” to “formally
file a motion in writing with the Court.” Counsel then asked the
court to give him 24 hours to “formally file a motion in writing.”
The State objected to this request too, arguing that there was no
good faith basis for withdrawing the plea.
¶7 The court construed the comment from Edwards’s counsel
as being an oral motion to withdraw the plea. The court then
denied the motion, ruling that Edwards had provided no basis for
withdrawing the plea and accepting the State’s representation
that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
¶8 The court also denied Edwards’s request for additional
time to prepare a written motion to withdraw the plea. The court
noted that at the August sentencing hearing, Edwards’s counsel
had requested a continuance for the same reason—i.e., so that he
could “file a motion to withdraw the plea.” Because Edwards had
already had “since August 31, 2020,” to prepare the motion, the
court declined to give him any additional time to file a written
motion.
¶9 Moving past the continuance and plea withdrawal issues,
Edwards’s counsel identified several alleged inaccuracies in
20210063-CA 4 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
the PSR. The court did not make findings about the alleged
inaccuracies, nor did it grant time for the parties to resolve the
alleged inaccuracies. The court then sentenced Edwards to a
suspended prison sentence on the aggravated assault conviction.
¶10 Edwards timely appealed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶11 Edwards first argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his oral motion to withdraw his
plea without granting him a continuance to allow his counsel
time to file a formal written motion. We overturn a
sentencing court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea “only
when we are convinced that the court has abused its discretion.”
State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ¶ 7, 140 P.3d 1288. To the extent
that Edwards’s challenge turns on the court’s failure to
continue sentencing, that decision is likewise reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Sharp, 2021 UT App 90, ¶ 23, 498
P.3d 9.
¶12 Edwards next argues that the court erred when it failed to
resolve the alleged inaccuracies in the PSR. “Whether the trial
court properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record
the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports is a
question of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Irey, 2017
UT App 178, ¶ 5, 405 P.3d 876 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
I. Request for Plea Withdrawal
¶13 As noted, the district court construed the statements from
Edwards’s counsel as an oral motion to withdraw the plea, and it
then denied that motion from the bench. The court also denied the
20210063-CA 5 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
request from Edwards’s counsel for an additional 24 hours in
which to prepare a written motion to withdraw the plea. On
appeal, Edwards does not challenge the denial of his oral motion
on substantive grounds—i.e., Edwards does not argue that he
demonstrated at the hearing that his plea was unknowing or
involuntary. Cf. Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(a) (“A plea of guilty or no
contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.”).
Instead, Edwards argues that before ruling on that motion, the
court was required to grant his request for a continuance so that
Edwards could prepare a written motion detailing his reasons for
seeking to withdraw the plea.
¶14 Edwards bases this argument on our decision in State v.
Ferretti, 2011 UT App 321, 263 P.3d 553. There, we held that a
district court must afford a defendant a “reasonable amount of
time to prepare a written motion to withdraw” a plea. Id. ¶ 11.
From this, we held that the district court in that case had abused
its discretion by failing to continue the defendant’s sentencing “to
allow for adequate briefing in support of his plea-withdrawal
request.” Id. ¶ 16. In Edwards’s view, there was a similar abuse of
discretion here. We disagree.2
2. Ferretti’s rule was based, in part, on the due-process-derived
guarantee of the “opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.”
State v. Ferretti, 2011 UT App 321, ¶ 12, 263 P.3d 553 (quotation
simplified). In light of this, Edwards claims that the alleged error
in this case was constitutional in nature. But even so, Edwards
agrees that the question of whether the court was required to
grant his continuance request should be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. In response, the State acknowledges (as it must, given
the record) that Edwards requested a continuance below. The
State still argues, however, that the more particular constitutional
argument that Edwards now makes on appeal is unpreserved.
(continued…)
20210063-CA 6 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
¶15 An “abuse of discretion occurs only if it can be said that no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district
court.” State v. Sanchez, 2017 UT App 229, ¶ 2, 409 P.3d 156(quotation simplified). Moreover, discretionary decisions (and an
appellate court’s review of them) are necessarily context specific.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Nelson, 2017 UT App 230, ¶ 20, 409 P.3d 149(discouraging a bright-line abuse of discretion rule and noting
that a prior decision had concluded that there was an abuse of
discretion only “under the facts and circumstances of that
particular case” (quotation simplified)); Florez v. Schindler Elevator
Corp., 2010 UT App 254, ¶ 46, 240 P.3d 107 (reviewing a
“discretionary decision” from a court about comments made
during “opening and closing arguments” and noting that the
“comments were, by and large, not improper in the context in
which they were made”); Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, ¶ 30, 138
P.3d 84 (determining that a district court’s “analysis of the facts
specific to the case” was not an abuse of discretion).
¶16 Here, the relevant context is that Edwards had already
been given ample time to consider and prepare any motion to
withdraw his plea before the court denied the continuance request
at issue in this appeal. At the original August 2020 sentencing
hearing, Edwards’s counsel asked the court for “a little bit of time
to actually go through [a recent filing] and advise [Edwards]” as
to “what the result might be and whether or not he actually wants
Where “the merits of a claim can easily be resolved in favor
of the party asserting that the claim was not preserved, we readily
may opt to do so without addressing preservation.” State v.
Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28, 484 P.3d 415 (quotation simplified).
This is so here. Because Edwards agrees that even the
constitutional version of his argument turns on whether the court
abused its discretion, and because we conclude that the court did
not, we need not address whether Edwards properly preserved
this constitutional argument when he asked for a continuance of
sentencing more generally.
20210063-CA 7 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
to [withdraw his plea].” The district court granted that request
and gave Edwards a seven-week continuance, and it explained
that it was doing so to allow Edwards’s counsel time to “assess if
there are grounds to withdraw the plea.” Due in part to concerns
about Edwards’s health, that continuance was later extended for
several more months.
¶17 As a result, when the court denied the continuance request
at issue, Edwards had just had four months to discuss and prepare
a potential plea withdrawal motion. Given this, we disagree with
Edwards’s assertion that the court was required to give him
additional time beyond that.
¶18 Edwards nevertheless points to Ferretti and argues that it
compels a different result. We disagree, largely because the
circumstances involved in the two cases are dissimilar in
important ways.
¶19 Ferretti was told in writing in a document provided by the
State that he could file a written motion to withdraw his plea
“within 30 days” after he had “been sentenced and final
judgment” had been entered. 2011 UT App 321, ¶ 4. At the
sentencing hearing, Ferretti orally informed the court that he
wanted to withdraw his plea. Id. ¶ 7. Ferretti’s counsel then told
the court that he “was unaware of Ferretti’s desire to withdraw
his plea until the morning of the hearing,” that he and Ferretti had
only spoken for about “ten minutes[] in the holding cell about the
foundation and the legal requirements that are needed to make
that withdrawal of plea,” and that he had not “had the time to go
through determining the possible basis for a withdrawal motion.”
Id. ¶¶ 7, 13 (quotation simplified). Based on this, the court
“accept[ed] the verbal—oral motion to withdraw to be followed
up by a written motion,” and it then gave Ferretti two weeks to
prepare the written motion. Id. ¶ 7. After a short recess, however,
the court accepted a request from the prosecutor to
“require[] . . . Ferretti himself” to first “articulate a good faith
20210063-CA 8 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
basis for why he believed he should be allowed to withdraw his
plea.” Id. ¶ 8. When Ferretti’s unprepared response failed to
satisfy the court that there was a “good faith basis” for
withdrawing the plea, the court denied the motion outright. Id.
Ferretti’s counsel then objected and requested a continuance so
that he could “make meaningful arguments” about why Ferretti
should be allowed to withdraw his plea, but the court denied that
motion to continue and sentenced Ferretti. Id. ¶ 9.
¶20 On appeal, we held that the court abused its discretion by
not granting the request for a continuance. Id. ¶ 11. This was so,
we explained, because Ferretti was not given “a reasonable
amount of time to prepare a written motion to withdraw.” Id.
¶21 Contrary to Edwards’s assertion, however, the
circumstances here are different from those presented in Ferretti
on at least two key fronts. First, Ferretti had been told in writing
(in a document prepared by the State, no less) that he could file a
motion to withdraw within 30 days of sentencing. Id. ¶ 4. As a
result, Ferretti had written reason to believe that he would have
more time after sentencing to prepare any such motion, and the
court’s subsequent denial of his continuance request was at odds
with this assurance. Here, however, Edwards points to no similar
assurance (written or otherwise), so there is no similar basis for
Edwards to claim that he was caught off guard. Indeed, to the
contrary, Edwards’s signed plea agreement states, “I understand
that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is
announced.”3 (Emphases added.) Thus, unlike Ferretti, Edwards
3. This language is consistent with Utah’s plea withdrawal statute,
which requires that “[a] request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest . . . shall be made by motion before sentence is
announced.” Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(b).
20210063-CA 9 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
was on notice that he was required to present any such arguments
in writing before sentencing.
¶22 Second, there was no indication that Ferretti had ever
informed his counsel of his desire to withdraw his plea until the
morning of the sentencing hearing. By contrast, Edwards’s
counsel told the court in August 2020 that “Edwards had talked
to [him] about possibly attempting to withdraw the plea.” This is
why the court then continued that sentencing hearing—i.e., for
the express purpose of allowing Edwards and his counsel more
time to confer about this very issue. As a result, if Edwards’s
counsel was indeed surprised to learn, on the morning of the
December 2020 sentencing hearing, that Edwards now wanted to
withdraw his plea, this surprise wouldn’t have been because the
two had not previously discussed the issue. In any event, the
point remains: unlike the circumstances involved in Ferretti, this
case involves a defendant who had just been given several months
to discuss this very issue with his counsel.
¶23 And that’s what ultimately matters. Again, we’re
reviewing a decision that’s left to the discretion of the district
court, and the resultant decision must now be evaluated in light
of the relevant circumstances of the particular case. Here, the
court had already given Edwards several months to confer with
his counsel about whether to withdraw his plea. When Edwards
decided (apparently at the last minute) that he wanted to file the
motion, and when he then needed more time to prepare a written
motion as a result of his own last-minute decision, the court was
not obligated to grant his request. Instead, because Edwards had
already been given “a reasonable amount of time to prepare a
written motion articulating the reasons why he should be allowed
to withdraw his plea,” Ferretti, 2011 UT App 321, ¶ 17, it was
within the court’s discretion to deny this request.
¶24 To be clear, we are not holding that a defendant is never
entitled to a continuance in order to prepare a written motion—
20210063-CA 10 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
Ferretti makes it clear that, under some circumstances, a
defendant must be given one. We also are not holding that a
defendant is only entitled to a continuance in the particular
circumstances involved in Ferretti—there may well be other
circumstances in which a court would abuse its discretion by
denying such a request. We’re simply holding that Edwards
wasn’t entitled to an additional continuance under the
circumstances at issue here.
¶25 In short, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial
of Edwards’s continuance request. Because this is the sole basis on
which Edwards assails the court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his plea, we affirm that decision.
II. Alleged Inaccuracies in the Presentence Investigation Report
¶26 At sentencing, Edwards informed the district court of
several alleged inaccuracies in the PSR. Under the version of
Utah law in effect at the time of Edwards’s sentencing, a court
could grant the parties additional time to resolve any alleged
inaccuracies in the PSR, and the court was then required to resolve
any unresolved inaccuracies by making “a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record.” Utah Code § 77-18-1(6)(a)
(2020)4; see also State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ¶ 44, 973 P.2d 404.
¶27 Edwards argues that the court erred by not making any
findings about the alleged inaccuracies, and the State concedes
that this was an error. Given this acknowledged error, we reverse
and remand with instructions for the court to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies.
4. This statute has since been renumbered, and the current statute
contains continuance and resolution components as well. See Utah
Code § 77-18-103(4)(a). While the State asserts that the resolution
components of the current statute are substantively different, we
have no need here to weigh in on any such difference.
20210063-CA 11 2023 UT App 23State v. Edwards
CONCLUSION
¶28 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Edwards’s request for a continuance to file a written motion for a
plea withdrawal. But the court did err when it failed to resolve the
alleged inaccuracies in the PSR, so we remand for the court to
address the claimed errors.
20210063-CA 12 2023 UT App 23