In re B.D. ( 2024 )

2024 UT App 104THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF B.D.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
N.D.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20230620-CA
Filed August 1, 2024
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable David L. Johnson
No. 1224298
Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson,
Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce and Heath R. Haacke,
Guardians ad Litem
JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY
concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 In this case, we are asked to determine whether a child’s
unproven and apparently unsupported allegations of abuse
against a parent, coupled with the child’s stated desire not to live
with that parent, are enough to support a determination that the
child is “dependent” as to that parent. On the record before us, we
conclude that the facts do not support a dependency adjudication
In re B.D.
as to the parent in question, and we therefore reverse the juvenile
court’s conclusion to the contrary.
BACKGROUND 1
Child’s Hospitalization and Abuse Allegations
¶2 N.D. (Father) and R.D. (Mother) are the natural parents of
four children. 2 B.D. (Child)—born in 2008—is the oldest of the
four children and was fourteen years old during the events that
gave rise to this appeal. Although Father and Mother are still
married, they have been separated since March 2020 and now live
in different counties. After the separation and until April 2023,
Mother was the primary caregiver for the children and Child
resided primarily with her.
¶3 In April 2023, Child experienced “depression and suicidal
ideations,” and on April 11 he took twenty-two over-the-counter
pain pills, prompting Mother to rush him to a local emergency
room. Later that same day, Mother and Father—together—took
Child to Huntsman Mental Health Institute (Huntsman) in Salt
Lake City for further treatment and observation.
1. “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court findings.” In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, n.1, 463 P.3d 66(quotation simplified).
2. The parties inform us that R.D. (who now uses the initials A.D.)
is Child’s biological father but identifies as female, and that Child
refers to this parent as “Mom.” We are also informed that N.D.,
Child’s biological mother, identifies as male, and that Child refers
to this parent as “Dad.” In this opinion, in keeping with our
understanding of the parties’ preferences and usage, we refer to
N.D. as “Father” and R.D. as “Mother.”
20230620-CA 2 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
¶4 Two days later, while Child was still at Huntsman, the
Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) received
information suggesting that Child had been sexually abused.
According to the referral, Child had been abused by both Mother
and Father’s father (Grandfather); Grandfather had allegedly
“touched [Child] inappropriately when [Child] was younger,”
and Mother had allegedly touched Child inappropriately in
“private areas ‘below the belt’” on several occasions “until [Child]
was about 5 or 6 years old.” The next day, a DCFS caseworker
spoke with Child, who asserted that Mother had “touched
[Child’s] private parts inappropriately.” Child also indicated that
Mother would throw things when she was upset, and Child also
described one incident in which Mother “threw a cup” at Child
and then hit him “on the mouth.” During this interview, Child
made no allegations against Father despite being “given
opportunities to describe if anyone else did anything” to him.
¶5 On April 27, two weeks after Child’s DCFS interview,
Child “completed a forensic interview” with a police detective at
Huntsman “outside the presence of the parents.” During this
interview, Child asserted that he had been repeatedly raped by
Mother, specifically stating that Mother would take Child’s
“clothes off and put her ‘thing’ inside of [Child].” 3 Child then
recounted one incident in which Mother raped him in his bed and,
while this was happening, Mother’s mother “looked in the room
and looked at [Child] like [he] was crazy” and then “left and did
not do anything about it.” During this interview, Child—for the
first time—implicated Father in the abuse allegations. Child told
the detective that, on one occasion, Father “held down [Child’s]
arms” while Mother raped him. Child stated that Father “tried to
bribe [Child] with chocolate to stop moving,” but Child
“screamed and called out for help.” Before the interview ended,
3. Child indicated that this abuse occurred “before [Mother]
transitioned to female.”
20230620-CA 3 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
Child indicated that the last time Mother had raped him was
“about 8 years” earlier, when Child was in first grade.
¶6 The following day, a DCFS caseworker called Father and
informed him of Child’s most recent allegations. In response,
Father denied that he had ever abused Child, and he “was
cooperative in providing names of support individuals and
attempting to [create] a safety plan.”
¶7 A few days later, on May 1, staff at Huntsman were
prepared to discuss discharging Child from their care, but Child
“threatened self-harm” if he was “to return home with [Mother],”
with whom Child had been living before the hospitalization.
Sometime later, Child informed a DCFS caseworker that he “did
not want to return home to either [Mother] or [Father].”
The State’s Petition and Shelter Hearing
¶8 On May 1, the State filed a petition with the juvenile court,
recounting Child’s abuse allegations and asserting that Child “is
an abused, neglected or dependent child.” With regard to Father,
the petition—as amended—was careful to phrase Child’s abuse
claims as allegations and not as facts; in particular, the petition
stated that Child “alleged [that Father] held down [Child’s] arms
while [Mother] raped [Child], and that [Father] tried to bribe
[Child] with chocolate to stop moving.” The petition also stated
that Father “denies that he has ever physically or sexually
abused” Child. The State requested that DCFS “or an appropriate
relative” be given “custody and guardianship” of Child and that
the court appoint a guardian ad litem to represent Child. The State
later filed an amended petition, requesting that “DCFS or an
appropriate relative” also be granted custody of Child’s three
siblings, who were all under the age of twelve at the time.
¶9 On May 2, the matter came before the juvenile court for a
shelter hearing. At that hearing, Father and Mother were each
appointed an attorney to represent them, and those attorneys
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were present. At this time, Child was still at Huntsman receiving
treatment, and the other three children were being cared for by
Father’s mother (Grandmother). Presumably because Child was
still at Huntsman receiving necessary care, Father did not make
any request that the court order Child to be discharged from
Huntsman and sent home with him; indeed, Father’s counsel
“submitted as to the shelter findings,” including a finding that
removal of all four children from their parents’ custody was
“reasonable in that there is a serious danger to the physical health
or safety of the children and [that] the children cannot be
protected without removal from the custody of [Father].” At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court found that removal was in the
best interest of the children and ordered all of them to be “placed
in the custody of” DCFS. But none of the children was moved to
a different place: the younger children remained with
Grandmother, and Child remained at Huntsman.
¶10 After a failed mediation, Father filed a notice demanding
that an adjudication trial be scheduled “on or before July 1, 2023,”
which was sixty days after the shelter hearing. Mother objected to
any expedited trial schedule and, instead, asked that her trial
schedule be “bifurcated” from Father’s. The court granted
Mother’s request and, since then, the matters pertaining to each
parent have proceeded separately; only Father’s adjudication is at
issue in this appeal.
¶11 On June 8, Child was discharged from Huntsman and was
temporarily placed at a short-term emergency children’s shelter
while he waited for a more permanent placement. The record
submitted to us is unclear whether Father was allowed to, or did,
visit with Child while he was in the short-term shelter. But during
this time, Father made “consistent” weekly supervised visits with
the younger children and was “engaged” during the visits; he also
“attended every Child and Family Team meeting[] and . . . asked
questions and interacted during the meetings.” At some point in
June, the three younger children were placed with Father (instead
of Grandmother), and DCFS noted that “[t]he parents have the
20230620-CA 5 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
resources and knowledge to meet all of the children’s needs and
they are able to keep them safe.” Soon thereafter, the State moved
to dismiss the petition as to the three younger children, and the
court granted this motion. The court specifically indicated that it
was terminating its “temporary and preliminary jurisdiction”
over the younger children, leaving only the State’s allegations
regarding Child for further proceedings.
Father’s Adjudication
¶12 On June 27, the juvenile court held a hearing to consider
and adjudicate the State’s allegations, as to Father, regarding
Child. The court began the hearing by engaging in a colloquy with
Father about his rights and, in particular, what the implications
would be if he were to admit—or not contest—the facts as alleged
in the State’s petition. During this discussion, the court informed
Father that if he were to “admit” or “answer to the allegations in
the petition”—the latter presumably a reference to a no-contest
response pursuant to rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile
Procedure 4—then the court could have “jurisdiction or authority
over” Father and Child and “could enter orders” regarding Child
that potentially involve “parental rights.” In response, Father
acknowledged that he understood.
¶13 Once the juvenile court had finished with its colloquy, it
then asked Father how he would “like to answer” the petition.
Father decided not to contest any of the facts alleged in the State’s
petition; instead, he admitted the allegations contained in twelve
paragraphs, and he entered a “rule 34(e) response” to the
allegations in the remaining paragraphs. Those facts have been
described earlier in this opinion. See supra ¶¶ 3–7. But he argued
4. Under rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, “[a]
respondent may answer by admitting or denying the specific
allegations of the petition, or by declining to admit or deny the
allegations. Allegations not specifically denied by a respondent
shall be deemed true.” Utah R. Juv. P. 34(e).
20230620-CA 6 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
that the (now-uncontested) facts alleged in the State’s petition did
not add up to “dependency,” as that term is statutorily defined.
¶14 Father acknowledged that Child had made allegations of
abuse against him, but he noted that the State’s petition simply
stated that allegations had been made and did not directly allege
that he had abused Child, and he pointed out that no finding had
yet been made as to the veracity of those allegations. Indeed, one
of the twelve paragraphs in the State’s petition whose allegations
Father admitted stated that Father “denies that he has ever
physically or sexually abused” Child, and that Father “agrees that
[Child] needs ongoing psychiatric care.” At the hearing, Father’s
counsel acknowledged that “services” are needed and indicated
that Father agreed with the State that Child “needs care, . . .
including mental health care.” But counsel noted that the fact that
Child needed special mental health treatment “doesn’t necessarily
mean that there’s anything wrong with the parents or that the
State needs to step in.” Indeed, counsel emphasized that Father
had been “active” and “involved” in getting Child the necessary
care, including assisting in the Huntsman admission, and asserted
that Father remained ready, willing, and able to provide the care
Child needed. Father’s counsel therefore requested that the court
enter a “no finding” as to Father—meaning that Child was not
abused, neglected, or dependent as to Father. Counsel then
further emphasized that entering “a no finding” would not
necessarily be the end of juvenile court proceedings related to
Child because Mother “still ha[d] yet to be adjudicated,” and
Father anticipated that there would “be a finding related to her.”5
¶15 In response, the appointed guardian ad litem (the GAL)
asked for a dependency adjudication, and referenced the
admitted allegations contained in one particular paragraph of the
State’s amended petition: that Child had “threatened self-harm if
5. While not relevant to this appeal, we note that an adjudication
order was eventually entered pertaining to Mother wherein the
juvenile court found Child “dependent as to [Mother].”
20230620-CA 7 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
he [was] to return home with [Mother]” and that Child “later told
the caseworker he did not want to return home to either [Mother]
or [Father].” In particular, the GAL argued that the fact that Child
“does not want to return home” to either parent results in a
situation “that falls within the dependency finding that [Father] is
not capable . . . of caring for [Child] at this time.”
¶16 For its part, the State responded by asserting that, if the
court “were to make a ‘no finding,’” then Child “would be
returned to [Father’s] care immediately.” The State did not assert
that Father was “at fault,” and it even acknowledged that Father
had been “cooperative” and “helpful” throughout the process,
but it nevertheless argued that “we’re in this unique situation
where . . . we’re all in agreement that [Child] needs that ongoing
care,” and that “if there’s a ‘no finding,’ [DCFS] would be forced
to return [Child] to [Father’s] care immediately.” The State
concluded by stating that Child “cannot return safely to [Father’s]
care where [there are] threats of self harm,” and by asserting that
“if [Child] were to return” to Father’s care, then Child “would be
in a worse mental state.” Notably, neither the State nor the GAL
asked the juvenile court to make a dependency finding on the
basis of any statement Father made or action Father took at either
the shelter hearing or the adjudication hearing.
¶17 In rebuttal, Father asserted that “the State’s argument
would result in a dependency finding every single time a child
says ‘I don’t want to go home.’” At no point during the hearing
did the State or the GAL argue that the juvenile court was
somehow restricted from entering a “no finding” as to Father, nor
did they argue that a “no finding” as to Father would result in the
dismissal of the case as to Mother or in the complete loss of
jurisdiction over the case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
juvenile court took the matter under advisement.
¶18 A few days later, the court issued two written rulings: one
prepared with the assistance of counsel that contained the court’s
findings of fact, all of which were taken directly from the
20230620-CA 8 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
uncontested facts alleged in the State’s petition; and the other
apparently prepared by the court, on its own, that contained the
court’s legal reasoning regarding whether the uncontested facts
amounted to dependency. In the legal ruling, the court concluded
that Child was dependent as to Father. The court noted that it had
“not found [Child’s] sexual abuse allegations to be true”; indeed,
it stated that, “for reasons yet to be known,” Child had “felt it
necessary to allege” that Mother, Father, and Grandfather had
“subjected [Child] to sexual abuse.” 6 But the court found that
Child’s allegations—even if untrue—had “led to a fundamental
breakdown in this family unit,” and it noted that Child “has
refused to return to the family home and has threatened self-harm
if forced to return.” The court “share[d]” Father’s concerns that a
dependency finding in this situation might “lead the way for any
child who refuses to go home [to be considered] a ‘dependent
child,’” but in the court’s view this case presented more than
“simply a disagreement between a young teenager and [his]
parents.” The court acknowledged that Father “asserts [that] he
can take care of [Child’s] needs,” but nevertheless identified two
facts that it believed differentiated this situation from one
involving a mere “standoff between children and their parents”:
(1) Child had “an ongoing need for psychiatric care,” and (2)
Child “continues to threaten self-harm.” In the court’s view, these
two facts “create a situation where it would be unsafe—at least for
now—to reunite this family.” Notably, the court did not ground
its dependency determination in any statement Father made or
action Father took at either the shelter or adjudication hearing.
¶19 Ultimately, the court concluded that Child “is a dependent
child . . . , in that [Child] lacks proper care through no fault of
[Father].” The court noted that Child “needs ongoing mental
health treatment and support,” and stated that “the allegations
6. It is unclear from the record what the basis was for the juvenile
court’s statement that it had “not found” Child’s allegations of
sexual abuse to be true.
20230620-CA 9 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
levied by [Child]—while not found to be true—present a barrier
to a safe and harmonious reintegration into the family unit.”
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶20 Father now appeals the juvenile court’s dependency
adjudication, and he asserts that the uncontested facts do not
amount to dependency. “When the facts are stipulated, we review
the conclusions drawn by the juvenile court for correctness.” In re
K.T., 2023 UT App 5, ¶ 7, 524 P.3d 1003 (quotation simplified), cert.
denied, 528 P.3d 327 (Utah 2023).
¶21 In addition to contesting Father’s arguments on their
merits, the State and the GAL contend that there are alternative
grounds upon which we can affirm the adjudication order. They
argue that Father is precluded from challenging the dependency
adjudication because, at various hearings in the juvenile court, he
“conceded the need for juvenile court jurisdiction over [Child]”
and because he “waived or conceded claims and even invited
error at the trial level.” “[I]n determining whether the juvenile
court had subject matter jurisdiction” over a case, we “apply a
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the juvenile
court.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 18, 201 P.3d 985. A determination
about whether there was a waiver on Father’s part “presents a
mixed question of law and fact.” Mower v. Nibley, 2016 UT App
174, ¶ 11, 382 P.3d 614. We review whether a court “employed the
proper standard of waiver” for correctness, “but the actions or
events allegedly supporting waiver” are reviewed deferentially.
Id. (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
¶22 We begin our analysis by addressing the arguments raised
by the State and the GAL that Father’s appellate claims are barred
as a result of his actions at the shelter hearing and the adjudication
20230620-CA 10 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
hearing. Because we determine that Father’s claims are not
barred, we then turn to the merits of his challenge to the juvenile
court’s adjudication order.
I. Preliminary Issues
¶23 As we understand them, the preliminary arguments
presented by the State and the GAL are based on several factual
premises. First, they note that, at the shelter hearing, Father
submitted to the juvenile court’s shelter findings, for purposes of
that hearing, and did not request that he be given immediate
custody of Child. Second, the State notes that, at the outset of the
adjudication hearing, the juvenile court informed Father that, if
he “admit[ted]” or “answer[ed] to the allegations in the petition,”
that would “give the [c]ourt jurisdiction” over Child. And third,
the State and the GAL point to Father’s acknowledgment, made
at the adjudication hearing, that Child requires ongoing
“services.” From these factual premises, the State and the GAL
make various jurisdiction- and waiver-related arguments. In
particular, the State and the GAL contend that Father, by
“submitt[ing] himself to juvenile court jurisdiction and to [DCFS]
supervision,” has at least implicitly conceded that Child was a
dependent child within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. In
addition, the GAL asserts that by not arguing for immediate
custody early on, Father “waived or conceded claims and even
invited error at the trial level.” Based on these arguments, the
State and the GAL ask us to affirm the juvenile court’s
adjudication order without reaching the merits of Father’s appeal.
We find the proffered arguments unpersuasive, on this record,
and we therefore decline that invitation.
A Jurisdictional Arguments
¶24 Juvenile courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over proceedings that involve a child who is abused, neglected, or
dependent. Utah Code § 78A-6-103(2)(a)(i); see also In re K.F., 2009
UT 4, ¶ 22, 201 P.3d 985. Ordinarily, parents enjoy a “parental
20230620-CA 11 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
presumption” to make decisions for their children and “to
prevent the transfer of [their children’s] custody to a nonparent,”
including the State. See In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 66 (quotation
simplified). But “[i]n cases in which abuse, neglect, or
dependency is established, the usual parental presumption that
prevents the State (a nonparent) from intervening in parental
decision-making no longer applies, and the State (supervised by
the juvenile court) may take custody of children, even over their
parents’ objections, and place them appropriately.” In re A.T.,
2020 UT App 50, ¶ 14, 464 P.3d 173. Thus, it is well-established
that, after a determination has been made—by clear and
convincing evidence at the adjudication phase of juvenile court
proceedings—that a child is abused, neglected, or dependent, the
juvenile court has jurisdiction over that child and may make
decisions regarding that child, even over a parent’s objection.
¶25 But even before adjudication—and based solely on the
filing of a petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency—a
juvenile court has limited and temporary jurisdiction over the
child “for purposes of adjudicating the allegations in the
petition.” See In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 69 (“[T]he petition alone is
sufficient to overcome the parental presumption for purposes of
adjudicating the allegations in the petition.”); see also In re R.D.,
2024 UT App 91, ¶ 26 (stating that the “juvenile court’s
jurisdiction commenced on the filing of the [State’s] petition—
which alleged abuse, neglect, and dependency”). Thus, the source
of a juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a child, during the period
between the filing of a petition and the court’s eventual
adjudication determination, is simply the fact that a petition has
been filed alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency.
¶26 During this interim pre-adjudication period, the juvenile
court may—and in many cases must—hold a hearing to consider
whether orders regarding the temporary custody of the child
should be made. See Utah Code § 80-3-203(2) (requiring in certain
situations the scheduling of an “expedited hearing,” held after the
filing of “an abuse, neglect, or dependency petition,” to consider
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“whether a child should be placed in temporary custody”); see id.§ 80-3-301(1) (requiring a juvenile court to “hold a shelter hearing
to determine the temporary custody of a child” if certain
conditions are met, including in cases where the child has already
been “remov[ed] . . . from the child’s home by” DCFS); see also In
re M.V., 937 P.2d 1049, 1050 (Utah 1997) (stating that “the shelter
hearing order is a temporary order entered pending adjudication
of the factual allegations of the petition”). Because at the time
these pre-adjudication shelter or temporary custody hearings are
held there is (by definition) a pending petition alleging abuse,
neglect, or dependency, the juvenile court has jurisdiction over
the child for the purpose of making temporary custody orders,
and the court may make such orders even over a parent’s
objection. See Utah Code §§ 80-3-203(1), -302. At such hearings, the
juvenile court’s custody or removal decisions (excepting, of
course, decisions to dismiss a pending petition) do not carry
jurisdictional implications, because jurisdiction over the child
exists—at that point in the proceedings—merely by virtue of the
existence of the not-yet-adjudicated petition, and does not depend
on the specific outcome of the custody or removal determination.
¶27 In this case, the State filed a petition on May 1 alleging that
Child was abused, neglected, or dependent. The very next day,
the juvenile court held a shelter hearing. At that point, the court’s
jurisdiction over Child—as well as the other three children—was
based on the existence of the State’s petition. Thus, short of
making some argument for dismissal of the petition at the shelter
stage—something neither the State nor the GAL asserts Father
was obligated to do in this case—there was nothing Father could
have said or done during the shelter hearing to challenge the
court’s jurisdiction over Child.
¶28 And while it is possible for a parent to make factual or legal
admissions, in the context of a shelter hearing, that could
constitute a concession to ongoing juvenile court jurisdiction over
a child throughout a case, that did not happen here. At the time
of the shelter hearing, Child was still at Huntsman, receiving care
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that Father had helped Child obtain and that Father continued to
believe was necessary. Moreover, the hearing occurred just one
day after the State’s petition was filed, and it was the very hearing
at which Father was appointed counsel for the first time. In
context, then, Father’s decision not to challenge Child’s current
placement is understandable, and we are therefore not as eager as
the State and the GAL are to hold Father’s shelter hearing
position—that Child should remain at Huntsman rather than be
placed with him in his home—against him now.
¶29 Nor do we think Father’s decision not to contest the
specific shelter findings entered here constituted a concession that
the juvenile court had ongoing jurisdiction over Child throughout
the entire case. Certainly, none of the shelter hearing findings
necessarily indicated that abuse, neglect, or dependency had
occurred at all, let alone as to Father (as differentiated from
Mother). To be sure, Father did elect not to contest the finding that
removal of the children from his and Mother’s custody was
“reasonable” because there existed “a serious danger to the
physical health or safety of the children.” But this finding carried
no jurisdictional implications, both because (a) as already noted,
jurisdiction—at that stage—was based on the filing of the State’s
as-yet-unadjudicated petition, and jurisdiction (if any) following
adjudication would be based on the findings made at an eventual
adjudication hearing, and (b) that specific finding, in the context
of this case, was not equivalent to a finding of abuse, neglect, or
dependency as to Father, let alone one that was necessarily made
for purposes not just of that hearing but for all subsequent ones.
¶30 Finally, we find unpersuasive the State’s assertion that
Father effectively conceded juvenile court jurisdiction over Child
at the adjudication hearing by (a) admitting that Child needed
“services” or (b) electing not to contest the facts as alleged in the
State’s petition. As to the State’s first point, we simply read the
record differently than the State does. Notably, just three
sentences after stating that it was “clear” that Child needed
“services,” Father’s counsel stated that “many children do need
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care of all kinds, including mental health care,” and that the mere
fact that a child needs such care “doesn’t necessarily mean that
there’s anything wrong with the parents or that the State needs to
step in.” In context, then, Father’s statement that Child needed
“services” was simply an acknowledgment that Child needed
ongoing and continuing mental health treatment. We do not view
this statement as a concession that Child needed ongoing services
from the State, or as a concession to ongoing juvenile court
jurisdiction over Child.
¶31 As to the State’s second point, it is certainly true that, in
many cases—for instance, where the State’s petition contains a
direct allegation of abuse, neglect, or dependency—a decision not
to contest the factual assertions set forth in the State’s petition
might have the effect of conceding juvenile court jurisdiction over
a child. But here, as already noted, the State phrased its allegations
carefully, and did not directly allege abuse, neglect, or
dependency; instead, it asserted that Child “alleged [that Father]
held down [Child’s] arms while [Mother] raped [Child], and that
[Father] tried to bribe [Child] with chocolate to stop moving.”
Father entered a rule 34(e) response to this specific paragraph, and
thereby did not contest that Child had made those allegations. But
a decision not to contest the fact that allegations were made is not
equivalent to an admission that the allegations are true. Indeed,
Father’s position at the adjudication hearing was that the
uncontested facts simply did not amount to dependency as a
matter of law. Under these circumstances, Father’s
acknowledgment during the juvenile court’s colloquy with him at
the adjudication hearing—that failure to contest facts could result
in the court being able to enter orders regarding Child—was not
inconsistent with this position and did not constitute a concession
that the court had continuing jurisdiction over Child.
¶32 Accordingly, we reject the argument, advanced by the
State and the GAL, that Father—through his actions during
hearings in the juvenile court—conceded that Child was and
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would be subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile
court throughout the pendency of the entire case.
B. Waiver Arguments
¶33 Next, we address the GAL’s argument that Father “waived
or conceded claims and even invited error at the trial level.”
According to the GAL, when Father submitted to the shelter
findings, he “resisted providing proper parental care” and
therefore “conceded” or “waived” his right to argue, at the
adjudication hearing, that Child was not dependent as to Father.
¶34 As we understand this argument, it is grounded in the
common law doctrine of waiver, and in that context, our supreme
court has made clear that “waiver” is “the intentional
relinquishment of a known right.” Soter’s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 857 P.2d 935, 939–40 (Utah 1993) (quotation
simplified). There are “three elements” to waiver: “(1) an existing
right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3)
an intention to relinquish the right.” Id. at 940. The question of
whether “intentional relinquishment” was demonstrated is a
“legal question” that “is intensely fact dependent,” id., and “the
legal conclusions underlying” a trial court’s waiver
determination, even one made on summary judgment, “are
reviewed with some measure of deference,” IHC Health Services,
Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, ¶ 6, 73 P.3d 320.
¶35 But no party raised a waiver argument before the juvenile
court at any point; that is, neither the State nor the GAL argued
that the court should find Child dependent as to Father based on
the actions (or inactions) Father took at either the shelter hearing
or the adjudication hearing. There are thus no findings addressing
whether Father ever intentionally relinquished a known right.
And as we read the record, it is far from clear that Father—by his
actions at the hearings—intended to relinquish his right to contest
the State’s assertion that Child was dependent. While this court
“may affirm a judgment on an unpreserved alternate ground,” we
20230620-CA 16 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
may only do so “where the alternate ground is apparent on the
record and when the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient
to sustain the decision of the trial court on the alternate ground.”
Angel Invs., LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ¶ 38, 216 P.3d 944(quotation simplified). On this record, the merit of the GAL’s
waiver-based alternative argument is far from clear. 7 We
therefore decline to exercise our discretion to affirm the juvenile
court’s adjudication order on this alternative basis.
¶36 We also reject the GAL’s argument, made in passing, that
Father “invited error at the trial level.” “The invited-error doctrine
precludes a party from taking advantage of an error committed at
trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.”
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2017 UT App 68, ¶ 20,
397 P.3d 772. But it is unclear from the GAL’s briefing what the
“error” was, exactly, that Father invited the court to commit. For
the reasons already explained, it wasn’t error for the court to
assume jurisdiction over the proceeding and, for purposes of the
shelter hearing, over Child simply based on the existence of the
State’s petition. No party assigns error to any of the findings the
court entered at the shelter hearing; instead, Father simply asserts
the right to take a different position as to custody and removal at
7. In this vein, we note that the GAL has not pointed us to
anything in statute, rule, or case law that supports the proposition
that the position a party takes at a shelter hearing might adversely
impact that party’s ability to take a different position later, in
advance of a future adjudication hearing. This is certainly not true
for the State—and wasn’t in this case with regard to the three
younger children, whom the State agreed to return to Father’s
custody after the shelter hearing—and because of the nature of
shelter hearings, there exist sound reasons why parents should
not always and irrevocably be held to the positions they take at a
shelter hearing with regard to the propriety of removal. But we
need not consider these issues further in this case, because we
decline to exercise our discretion to affirm on this alternate basis.
20230620-CA 17 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
the adjudication hearing than he took at the shelter hearing.
And—as discussed below, see infra ¶ 45 & n.12—the juvenile court
did not rest its dependency determination on anything Father
said or did at either of the hearings. Accordingly, we find the
GAL’s invited-error argument inapposite here.
¶37 In summary, the State and the GAL have not persuaded us
that we can affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication order as to
Father on any of the alternative grounds they identify.8 We
therefore decline their invitation to affirm on an alternative basis,
and we now turn to the merits of Father’s appellate arguments. 9
8. During oral argument before this court, the GAL also took the
position that the juvenile court could not have entered a “no
finding” because that concept is a “legal fiction,” and both the
State and the GAL conveyed their belief that if the court had not
found Child dependent at Father’s adjudication hearing, then the
State’s petition would have had to be dismissed in its entirety,
including the portions about Mother (whose adjudication hearing
had not yet been held). These arguments, however, were not
presented to the juvenile court, and the first time that they were
raised on appeal was during oral argument. Not only do we
decline to consider arguments that were first raised during oral
argument, see Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 33, 416 P.3d 487,
but we are also unable to affirm on the strength of this alternative
argument because its merit is not apparent from the record, see
Angel Invs., LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ¶ 38, 216 P.3d 944.
9. We acknowledge an additional procedural argument raised by
the GAL, namely, that Father “has not demonstrated preservation
per [r]ule 24(a)(5)” of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
GAL points out that Father’s brief uses the phrase “preserved by
appeal” to demonstrate preservation for each issue, but that rule
24(a)(5) mandates that the appealing party also include a “citation
to the record,” see id., which Father did not do in the preservation
(continued…)
20230620-CA 18 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
II. Dependency
¶38 Father’s primary argument on appeal is that the
uncontested facts, as set out in the State’s petition, do not
constitute “dependency,” as that term is statutorily defined. We
find merit in Father’s argument.
¶39 Under Utah law, a “[d]ependent child” is defined as “a
child who is without proper care through no fault of the child’s
parent, guardian, or custodian.” Utah Code § 80-1-102(21). Thus,
unlike abuse or neglect—which both, by definition, involve some
fault or failing on the part of the affected parent—dependency can
occur even when no parent or guardian has done anything
worthy of being called “fault.” See In re A.T., 2020 UT App 50, ¶ 16,
464 P.3d 173 (stating that the no-fault aspect of the definition of
“dependent child” makes a dependency finding “significantly
different from a finding of abuse or neglect”).
¶40 The juvenile court correctly recognized that Utah’s
statutory definition of dependency contains two parts: (1) the
child in question must be “without proper care,” and (2) that
status must have arisen “through no fault of” the parent. See Utah
Code § 80-1-102(21). In this case, all parties—including the State
and the GAL—agree that (in the absence of any finding by the
juvenile court that Child’s sexual abuse allegations are true)
Father is not at fault for Child’s situation, and we therefore
assume, for purposes of our analysis, that Father is indeed not at
part of the statement of the issues set forth in his brief. But the rest
of Father’s brief—including the section containing the factual
recitation and procedural history—contains plenty of citations to
the record, and upon review of those citations it is obvious that
Father preserved his main appellate argument—that the
stipulated facts do not support a dependency finding—for our
review. We therefore decline the GAL’s invitation to affirm the
juvenile court’s adjudication order on the basis of these asserted
briefing deficiencies on Father’s part.
20230620-CA 19 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
fault. Under these circumstances, then, the relevant question is
whether Child is “without proper care.”
¶41 As the juvenile court correctly observed, there is “a dearth
of guiding case law” interpreting either the general statutory
definition of “dependent child” or the specific phrase “without
proper care.” 10 But as we understand it, the term “dependent” is
10. In its ruling, the juvenile court cited and relied on Judge
Thorne’s dissenting opinion in In re A.W., 2002 UT App 159, 48
P.3d 257. The court’s opinion in that case took the form of a
memorandum decision in which the majority determined that the
juvenile court erred in making a dependency finding because the
State never actually argued, in the juvenile court, that the child
was dependent, and therefore the parents hadn’t had a chance to
rebut any such argument. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. The majority’s decision was
very brief, consisting of just five paragraphs, and does not include
any recitation of the relevant facts. See id. ¶¶ 1–5. In dissent, Judge
Thorne opined that “the State presented sufficient evidence . . . to
support a finding of dependency” and that the parents had
“adequate notice [of] and an opportunity to respond to the facts”
that supported such a finding. Id. ¶ 9 (Thorne, J., dissenting). In
one paragraph, Judge Thorne recited some of those facts,
including that the child—a seventeen-year-old—had alleged
physical abuse by her father and had threatened to run away if
forced to return to the family home, but that the juvenile court had
not found sufficient “evidence to determine whether abuse had
occurred.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 10. In Judge Thorne’s view, these facts
resulted in “a fundamental breakdown in [the] family unit” and
raised a danger that the child would run away and become “a
homeless child without the proper care of a parent or guardian.”
Id. ¶¶ 10–11. But neither Judge Thorne nor the majority recited
any facts about the extent to which the parents—despite the abuse
allegations—remained ready, willing, and able to provide proper
care for the child or what that care might entail. And the majority
(continued…)
20230620-CA 20 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
usually used to connote a child who—for reasons that do not
involve parental abuse or neglect—is nevertheless “dependent
upon the public for support.” See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 18 (2024)
(stating that a “dependent child” is one “who must be supported
by a person or persons other than his or her natural guardian as
where a child is dependent upon the public for support”). As a
general matter, children are considered “dependent” if their
parents or guardians “are unable” to provide “adequate care and
supervision,” see 47 Am. Jur. 2d Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 47 (2024),
and for that reason they must depend on the State to provide the
necessary care. A child may, of course, become reliant on State-
based aid due to abuse or neglect, but the definition of
“dependency”—as distinguished from “abuse” or “neglect”—
seems intended to capture situations in which a child develops a
need for State-based aid due to reasons unconnected to the fault
of any parent or guardian. See id. (“[A] dependency adjudication
focuses not on the fault of the parents, but on the child’s
environment, including the condition of the home itself and the
availability of necessities.”).
¶42 The phrase “without proper care” comes unaccompanied
by further statutory definition and, to our knowledge, there exists
no Utah case law interpreting this phrase in the dependency
context. On its face, the phrase “proper care” is “vague and
conducive to a variety of reasonable interpretations.” See In re
A.B., 2022 UT 39, ¶¶ 29, 41, 523 P.3d 168 (interpreting the similar
phrase “lack of proper parental care” found in Utah’s statutory
resolved the matter, as noted, on procedural grounds without
reaching the merits of the dependency question. See id. ¶¶ 1–5
(majority opinion). For these reasons, we find In re A.W. to be of
limited assistance in resolving this appeal or in interpreting the
statutory definition of “dependent child” under Utah law.
20230620-CA 21 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
definition of “neglect”). 11 For instance, it is not clear from the face
of the statute whether the phrase refers “to any parental conduct
that falls short of ideal,” or whether it refers “only to parental
conduct that causes a child to lack basic necessities.” Id. ¶ 41.
¶43 But we have recently noted—in the neglect context—that
the phrase “proper care” must “naturally incorporate notions of
reasonableness.” See In re A.S., 2024 UT App 52, ¶¶ 31–32, 548 P.3d
181, petition for cert. filed, June 11, 2024 (No. 20240626). This makes
just as much sense in the dependency context as it does in the
neglect context. Indeed, incorporation of reasonableness concepts
into the statutory definition of “proper care” aligns with courts’
and commentators’ reliance on community standards in the
dependency context, see 47 Am. Jur. 2d Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 47
(2024) (“Proper parental care means the minimum standards of
care which the community will tolerate.”), and it allows for the
individual child’s situation and needs to be taken into account, cf.,
e.g., In re H.F., 2019 UT App 204, ¶ 14, 455 P.3d 1098 (“The best
interest test is broad, and is intended as a holistic examination of
all the relevant circumstances that might affect a child’s
situation.” (quotation simplified)). Thus, we interpret “proper
care,” in the dependency context, to mean the level of care and
attention that the child reasonably needs under the circumstances.
11. The only material difference between the phrase used in the
statutory definition of neglect (“lack of proper parental care”) and
the phrase used in the statutory definition of dependency
(“without proper care”) is the neglect provision’s inclusion of the
term “parental.” Compare Utah Code § 80-1-102(58)(a)(ii), with id.
§ 80-1-102(21). The exclusion of the term “parental” from the
dependency definition allows for the possibility that dependency
may occur in situations where no parent exists at all, such as
where a child is homeless or abandoned. But the words “proper”
and “care” are common to both definitions, and we thus draw
guidance, in this dependency case, from Utah courts’ previous
decisions interpreting those words in the neglect context.
20230620-CA 22 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
¶44 Putting these pieces together, then, we conclude that a
child is “without proper care,” and therefore “dependent,” where
that child has no parent or guardian at all or where the child’s
parent or guardian—through no fault of their own—is unable to
provide the level of care and attention that the child reasonably
needs under the circumstances.
¶45 In the case before us, the juvenile court noted that Father
“asserts [that] he can take care of [Child’s] needs,” and it
acknowledged—in its separate findings—that Father was
involved in and supportive of admitting Child to Huntsman for
necessary psychiatric care; indeed, the court specifically found
that Father “agrees that [Child] needs ongoing psychiatric care.”
But despite these findings, the court nevertheless concluded,
based on the uncontested facts, that Child was a “dependent
child” within the meaning of the relevant statute. The court
concluded that Child’s allegations of abuse, including those that
related to Father, “have led to a fundamental breakdown in this
family unit.” In its dependency ruling, the court stated that Child
had “refused to return to the family home and ha[d] threatened
self-harm if forced to return,” but in its separate findings the court
stated matters less broadly, finding that Child “threatened self-
harm if he is to return home with [Mother]” (emphasis added), and
that Child told a DCFS caseworker that he “did not want to return
home to either [Mother] or [Father].” 12
12. It is important here to again point out that the juvenile court’s
dependency finding was in no way based on anything Father said
or did at the shelter hearing or the adjudication hearing. Had
Father—by acknowledging that Child needs ongoing mental
health treatment and “services”—really been making a concession
that Child needed ongoing care from the State that Father was
incapable of providing, that concession would indeed have
formed a basis, by itself, for a finding of dependency. But the
juvenile court didn’t interpret Father’s comments that way,
(continued…)
20230620-CA 23 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
¶46 In its dependency ruling, the court acknowledged Father’s
argument that reaching a “dependency” conclusion in this
situation might “lead the way for any child who refuses to go
home [to be] a ‘dependent child,’” but the court nevertheless
concluded that Child was a “dependent child,” offering two bases
upon which it believed this case could be distinguished from a
simple “standoff between children and their parents.” First, the
court stated that Child “has an ongoing need for psychiatric care.”
And second, the court noted that Child “continues to threaten
self-harm.” Father asserts that these two factors are insufficient,
on this record, to constitute dependency. We agree with Father.
¶47 With regard to the first factor upon which the juvenile
court relied, all parties agree—and the court appropriately
found—that Child needs ongoing psychiatric care. But not all
children who need ongoing psychiatric care—or, for that matter,
any sort of special or extraordinary care—are “dependent”
children; the relevant question, as to dependency, isn’t whether a
child needs a particular type of care, but rather whether the parent
stands ready, willing, and able to provide the necessary care. And
on this record, there is no indication that Father is unable to
provide—or capably arrange for the provision of—the ongoing
psychiatric care Child needs.
¶48 Father (with Mother) recognized, after the overmedication
incident, that Child had a need for psychiatric care, and Father
participated in transporting Child to Huntsman to obtain that
care. Indeed, at all stages of this case, Father has been supportive
of Child’s need for ongoing psychiatric care, and the State even
acknowledged—at the adjudication hearing—that Father had
been “cooperative” and “helpful” throughout the process.
because it based its dependency determination on entirely
different grounds. As already noted, see supra ¶ 30, we agree with
the court’s interpretation of the record; that is, we likewise do not
view any of Father’s statements or actions at the hearings as a
concession that Child was dependent on the State for future care.
20230620-CA 24 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
Moreover, as noted, the court found, in its ruling, that Father
“agrees that [Child] needs ongoing psychiatric care.” 13 We
therefore agree with Father that Child’s ongoing need for such
care does not necessarily mean that Child is “dependent.” In order
for Child’s care needs to become relevant to the dependency
inquiry, there would have to be some evidence that Father is
unable to meet those needs, thus leaving Child “without proper
care” for purposes of the dependency statute. And on this record,
there is no such evidence, let alone a specific finding to that effect.
¶49 With regard to the juvenile court’s second factor, we begin
by acknowledging that a child’s threats of self-harm should be
given serious consideration by everyone in the child welfare
system, including the juvenile court, and the court here treated
those threats with appropriate gravity. Where a child credibly
threatens self-harm if they are returned to the custody of a
particular parent, that may—in appropriate cases—contribute to
a determination that the parent in question cannot provide
“proper care” to the child.
¶50 But here, the juvenile court’s findings regarding self-
harm—drawn from the uncontested facts alleged in the State’s
petition—were quite specifically limited to the situation in which
Child would be returned to Mother’s custody. The State’s petition,
as amended, asserts that Child “threatened self-harm if he is to
return home with [Mother].” (Emphasis added.) Father did not
contest that allegation, and the juvenile court made a finding in
keeping with it, specifically finding that Child “threatened self-
harm if he is to return home with [Mother].” (Emphasis added.)
We note, again, that Father and Mother have not resided together
since 2020, and the court’s reference to “return[ing] home with
13. This stands in apparent contrast to the juvenile court’s finding
regarding Mother. Although the wording is not entirely clear, the
court appears to have found that Mother “is unable to care for
[Child’s] mental health needs at this time.” The court made no
such finding as to Father.
20230620-CA 25 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
[Mother]” can only be a reference, on these facts, to a placement
with Mother and not a placement with Father. 14 On this record,
there is not even any allegation, let alone a judicial finding, that
Child had ever threatened self-harm if he were to be placed in
Father’s custody. We therefore agree with Father that the court’s
findings about self-harm simply do not support the conclusion
that Father—as differentiated from Mother—is unable to provide
proper care to Child.
¶51 To be sure, the juvenile court did find that Child “told [a
DCFS] caseworker [that] he did not want to return home to either
[Mother] or [Father].” But a child’s stated desire not to live with a
parent is not, by itself, necessarily an indication that the child is
“without proper care.” Drawing that conclusion would lead us
perilously close to the situation of which the court was wisely
wary, namely, the situation in which “any child who refuses to go
home” would be considered a “dependent child.” In order for a
child’s stated desire not to live with a parent to be relevant to a
dependency inquiry, there must be evidence linking the child’s
desire to an inability, on the parent’s part, to provide the care that
the child reasonably needs under the circumstances. And in this
case, the juvenile court made no findings linking Child’s stated
desire to any inability, on Father’s part, to care for Child.
14. For this reason, we are somewhat confused by the court’s
reference to a “family home” and by the court’s statement that
Child’s allegations had “led to a fundamental breakdown in this
family unit.” In this case, there had been no “family home” shared
by Father and Mother since 2020 and, with Father and Mother
living separately since then, the “family unit” had seemingly
already broken down long before Child’s allegations came to
light. And more to the point, the breakdown of a family unit—
something that happens in every divorce case—is not necessarily
a sign that a child is “without proper care.” Here, the court made
no findings connecting the breakdown of this family’s unit to any
inability on Father’s part to provide Child the care he needed.
20230620-CA 26 2024 UT App 104In re B.D.
¶52 For the foregoing reasons, the uncontested facts cannot
support a determination that Child is “without proper care” from
Father. Thus, the juvenile court erred when it determined, on this
record, that Child was dependent as to Father. 15
CONCLUSION
¶53 Father did not make statements or take actions that
conceded that Child was dependent, nor did he waive his right to
contest the State’s assertion of dependency. And on the merits of
Father’s claims, he has the better of the argument: the juvenile
court erred in concluding that the uncontested facts supported a
determination that Child was “without proper care” from Father.
Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order adjudicating Child
dependent as to Father, and we remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
15. Father raised an alternative argument on appeal, namely, that
the “statutory definition of ‘dependency’ is unconstitutional as
applied” to him. The State and the GAL assert that Father failed
to preserve this argument for our review. But because we find
merit in Father’s main argument, we need not reach the merits of
Father’s alternative argument or make any decision about
whether that argument was properly preserved.
20230620-CA 27 2024 UT App 104