State v. Jones ( 2024 )

2024 UT App 13THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
DEREK RANDALL JONES,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20220444-CA
Filed February 1, 2024
Fourth District Court, Heber Department
The Honorable Jennifer A. Brown
No. 181500109
Debra M. Nelson and Wendy Brown, Attorneys for
Appellant, assisted by law student
Mitchell C. Roundy 1
Sean D. Reyes and Natalie M. Edmundson,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 Derek Randall Jones pleaded guilty to sexual battery, a
class A misdemeanor. Approximately one month later, the district
court placed Jones on probation and sentenced him to 180 days in
jail as an initial condition of his probation. The court also declined
to credit Jones for good behavior time on his jail sentence. Jones
now appeals his sentence, arguing that the sentence was illegal
because the plain language of the statute allows the court to order
jail as a condition of probation only in felony cases and that the
1. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 14-807 (governing law student practice
in the courts of Utah).
State v. Jones
court abused its discretion by declining credit for good behavior
time. The State, however, contends that this matter is moot
because Jones completed his jail sentence in 2022 and therefore
this court “cannot grant [Jones] any relief.” We agree with the
State and dismiss the appeal as moot.
¶2 Mootness is a jurisdictional issue and courts will generally
not resolve an issue that becomes moot. See Utah Transit Auth. v.
Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶¶ 19–20, 27,
32, 289 P.3d 582. An issue becomes moot “if during the pendency
of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is
eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or
of no legal effect.” Id. ¶ 14 (quotation simplified).
¶3 Here, the issue raised by Jones is moot because the
requested relief—i.e., relief from the jail component of Jones’s
sentence—has been rendered “impossible or of no legal effect”
because Jones has already completed his sentence, thereby
changing the circumstances “so that the controversy is
eliminated.” Id. (quotation simplified). In other words, this court
lacks capacity “to order a remedy that will have a meaningful
impact on the practical positions of the parties.” Id. ¶ 24.
¶4 Although this issue is technically moot, Jones contends that
we should nevertheless reach the merits of his challenge to the jail
time the district court imposed because it falls within a recognized
exception to the mootness doctrine. See Widdison v. State, 2021 UT
12, ¶ 12, 489 P.3d 158 (“As a general rule, if our decision cannot
affect the rights of the parties before us, the matter is moot and,
absent an exception to our mootness doctrine, we will not hear the
matter.”). Recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine
include the public interest exception and the collateral legal
consequences exception. Under the public interest exception, “we
will decide a moot issue when a litigant can demonstrate that the
issue will (1) affect the public interest, (2) be likely to recur, and
(3) because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, be
likely to evade review.” Id. ¶ 14 (quotation simplified). And under
20220444-CA 2 2024 UT App 13State v. Jones
the collateral legal consequences exception, a court may consider
an issue that is technically moot “where collateral legal
consequences may result from an adverse decision.” Towner v.
Ridgway, 2012 UT App 35, ¶ 6, 272 P.3d 765 (quotation simplified).
This exception “is chiefly applied in criminal cases,” and “unless
a party is challenging a criminal conviction, we will not presume
that such collateral consequences exist.” Id. ¶ 7 (quotation
simplified). The burden of demonstrating that an exception to the
mootness doctrine applies “falls upon the party invoking the
exception.” State v. Seat, 2022 UT App 143, ¶ 33, 523 P.3d 724.
¶5 Jones has not carried his burden to demonstrate that either
exception to the mootness doctrine should apply. First, Jones has
not persuaded us that the public interest exception is applicable.
Although we agree with Jones that his appeal raises an issue that
affects the public interest and is likely to recur, we are not
convinced the issue is likely to evade review. “Issues that are
likely to evade judicial review are those that are inherently short
in duration such that a court will likely be unable to hear the issue
when it still presents a live controversy.” State v. Steed, 2015 UT
76, ¶ 9, 357 P.3d 547. Here, however, Jones had a legal avenue by
which he could pursue a stay of the imposition of his sentence,
and he did not avail himself of that option. Rule 27 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a “defendant sentenced, or
required as a term of probation, to serve a period of incarceration
in jail” to “file a written motion in the trial court requesting a stay
of the sentence term of incarceration.” Utah R. Crim. P. 27(b); see
also Utah Code § 77-20-302. Among other things, the motion must
“identify the issues” for appeal and explain why “those issues
raise a substantial question of law or fact reasonably likely to
result in . . . a sentence that does not include a term of
incarceration in jail.” Utah R. Crim. P. 27(b)(2)(A). Given that we
agree with Jones that this issue affects the public interest precisely
because it raises a “substantial question of law,” see id., we are not
convinced that a timely rule 27 motion would be futile.
Accordingly, there is no reason that this issue is likely to evade
20220444-CA 3 2024 UT App 13State v. Jones
appellate review in a case where the defendant properly avails
himself of all available legal remedies. 2
¶6 Second, Jones has not demonstrated that the complained of
jail sentence “gave rise to the sort of long-term effects that would
bring [his] situation within the collateral consequences exception
to the mootness doctrine.” See State v. Fanton, 2016 UT App 239,
¶ 12, 391 P.3d 283. Jones briefly asserts that this exception should
apply because a conviction can be used in future court
proceedings to impeach character and because an incarceration
results in economic losses. But where, as here, the appellant is
challenging only a sentencing decision rather than the underlying
criminal conviction, “we will not presume the existence of
collateral legal consequences.” Id. Jones’s cursory briefing on the
matter is not sufficient to carry his “burden of demonstrating that
collateral legal consequences will flow from the challenged issue.”
State v. Legg, 2016 UT App 168, ¶ 18, 380 P.3d 360, aff’d, 2018 UT
12, 417 P.3d 592.
¶7 Because Jones completed the jail sentence of his probation
in 2022, and because he has not carried his burden of
demonstrating that an exception to the mootness doctrine should
apply, we dismiss the appeal.
2. In a related vein, Jones complains that the “process to request a
stay is nearly as long as the appeal itself” and that, in any event,
“it is not a given that a court will grant a stay, which is nearly
always opposed by the State and subject to the trial court’s
discretion.” But our supreme court has flatly rejected similar
arguments, recently noting that “the fact that the process is
challenging does not mean that the issue is ‘likely to evade
review.’” Widdison v. State, 2021 UT 12, ¶ 59, 489 P.3d 158(quotation simplified). Rather, Jones must convince this court
“that the hurdles [he] notes are likely to prevent us from having
another opportunity to address the issues [he] raises.” See id.20220444-CA 4 2024 UT App 13