Local Pages v. Plumb Line , 2024 UT App 70 ( 2024 )

2024 UT App 70THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE LOCAL PAGES OF NEVADA, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
PLUMB LINE MECHANICAL, INC.,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20220339-CA
Filed May 9, 2024
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Laura Scott
No. 190901187
D. Scott Crook, Attorney for Appellant
Jordan K. Cameron, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 Plumb Line Mechanical, Inc. (Plumb Line), a plumbing and
HVAC company, had advertised for many years in the local
phone book printed by The Local Pages of Nevada, LLC (Local
Pages). In negotiating ads for the 2014 edition, Local Pages
emailed a proposal to Plumb Line. The contract form, which was
included as an attachment, contained a handwritten note that
could be interpreted to mean the contract was for a fixed term of
five years. But the text of the email to which the form was attached
said that it was for a term of “up to 5 years”—arguably an option
contract for five years, renewable annually. Plumb Line canceled
its advertising after three years, and Local Pages sued. Since these
two terms stood in direct contradiction to one another, the district
court allowed extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. The
jury determined that the contract was renewable annually.
Local Pages v. Plumb Line
Alleging a number of errors, Local Pages appeals. We affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Beginning around 2005, Plumb Line advertised annually in
a telephone directory printed by Local Pages. Each year, Plumb
Line would “go through the negotiation process” with Local
Pages’ owner (Owner) about the “size and location” of ad
placement in the directory.
¶3 Around 2013, Plumb Line contemplated pulling out of this
advertising because it had become increasingly ineffective. Plumb
Line met with Owner and said it was not “planning to
advertise in [the] forthcoming issue 14,” meaning the 2014
directory (Issue 14). But Owner offered “incentives to induce
Plumb Line to advertise in that issue.” Plumb Line claimed that
Owner “dropped the price substantially and said that he would
hold the pricing up to five years if [Plumb Line] advertised that
year.”
¶4 On April 17, 2013, Owner sent an email (April 17 Email) to
Plumb Line’s service manager that stated, in relevant part, “I
propose the following. . . . Rather than the [$]1999 a month[,] . . . I
will go [$]1499 a month and leave all ads the same as last year. I
will honor this deal for up to 5 years with no increase for you
also.” Notably, the previous year’s contract and, indeed, all the
previous contracts between Local Pages and Plumb Line were for
one year and identified only one issue of the phone book. The
email concluded with these terms, “A simple reply to this
email will suffice[.] I trust you guys[;] we don’t need to sign
contracts and all that jazz. I also attached the contract for your
review.”
20220339-CA 2 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
¶5 The April 17 Email came with a three-page printed contract
(Advertising Contract) attached to it. 1 The first two pages, which
were identical in every respect except for descriptions of the ads
and were the same as had been used in previous years,
contained details of the ads that Plumb Line would purchase, and
the third page consisted of boilerplate terms and conditions. As
relevant here, the Advertising Contract included the following
provisions:
• A box labeled “ISSUE” that said “14,” presumably in
reference to the issue for the year 2014;
• A handwritten line on the second page that said, “5 year
agreement at same rate each year”;
• A printed box reading, “SUBTOTAL 12 PMTS OF” with
nothing written next to it;
• A printed box reading, “TOTAL 12 PAYMENTS OF” with
“1,499.00” handwritten next to it;
• A printed box with handwriting on the second page (as
indicated here with italics) reading, “$0 Now 12 Pmts. of
$1,499.00 Starting MC”;2 and
1. In the record, we have encountered a version of the contract
with two additional pages featuring columns that appear to
provide extra space for the description of ads. The record is
unclear as to whether these additional pages were included in the
attachment, but we observe that they contain no material terms
that would play a role in our analysis if we were to consider them.
Moreover, neither party appears to attach any significance to
these additional pages.
2. “MC” was identified as the “PAY CODE,” presumably in
reference to a credit card.
20220339-CA 3 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
• On the terms and conditions page, a printed provision
stating, “The advertising space specified on the face of this
contract is for insertion into the next possible issue of the
indicated directory as determined by publisher. . . . The
advertiser agrees to pay the charges as indicated on the face
of this contract . . . . Unless otherwise specified in writing,
terms are payment in full upon contract signing.”
¶6 On April 23, Plumb Line’s service manager responded by
email, saying that the proposal “doesn’t sound bad” and asking
for “the break down on all that.” Owner responded by email
about thirty minutes later, describing the size, location, and
features of the ads. On April 24, the service manager responded
by email, saying that he had printed the attachment and that he
and Plumb Line’s owner would “review” the proposal and would
let Owner know that morning. About an hour later, the service
manager sent Owner another email (April 24 Email), writing, “We
are a go in your phone book.” The Advertising Contract was
never signed by either party.
¶7 After these exchanges, Plumb Line paid Local Pages over
the next three years for print advertising. But in June 2016, Plumb
Line informed Local Pages by phone, email, and letter that it
would not be renewing the contract. Local Pages responded by
asserting that under the terms of the contract, Plumb Line had
only three days from the date of acceptance to cancel. Since this
date had long passed, Local Pages maintained that Plumb Line
could not cancel the contract and continued to publish Plumb
Line’s advertisements in the next two annual issues of the
phonebook. Local Pages sued Plumb Line for breach of contract,
asserting that the contract was for five years (2014 through 2018)
and claiming damages of nearly $36,000 arising from the two
unpaid years, along with a claim for attorney fees and costs.
¶8 After discovery was completed, Local Pages filed a motion
for summary judgment. Local Pages argued that summary
20220339-CA 4 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
judgment was appropriate on its breach of contract claim, along
with damages, because the undisputed facts established (1) that a
valid contract was formed between Local Pages and Plumb Line
and (2) that the contract was for five years with twelve
installments of $1,499 each year. The district court largely denied
the motion. The court concluded that, based on undisputed facts,
the “April 24 Email was an acceptance of the offer communicated
in the April 17 Email.” The court also stated that “[b]ecause the
attachment to the April 17 Email was not signed, the contract
between the parties [could not] be understood without reference
to the April 24 Email.” The court concluded,
The April 24 Email and the [Advertising Contract
attached] to the April 17 Email, viewed together, do
not set forth unambiguous terms that the [court] can
interpret and apply as a matter of law. Among other
reasons, this is because the offer in the April 17
Email to “go [$]1499 a month and leave all ads the
same as last year” and to “honor this deal for up to
5 years with no increase” can be reasonably
interpreted to refer to a five-year option agreement
which gave Plumb Line the right to renew, at the
same rate each year, a one-year contract to advertise
in [Local Pages’] phone book. However, the offer
could also be reasonably interpreted to refer to a
five-year, fixed term agreement that bound Plumb
Line to advertise in [Local Pages’] phone book for a
total of five years.
¶9 Moreover, the court concluded that even if the Advertising
Contract formed the entire contract, it did “not set forth
unambiguous terms” that could be interpreted and applied as a
matter of law. Specifically, the court noted that the handwritten
line that stated, “‘5 YEAR AGREEMENT AT SAME RATE EACH
YEAR,’ when viewed in light of the other terms” in the
20220339-CA 5 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
Advertising Contract, could refer to either a five-year option
agreement or a five-year, fixed-term agreement.
¶10 Thus, the court concluded that
genuine issues of material fact preclude summary
judgment on the critical issue of whether the parties
agreed to a one-year contract which included a five-
year option agreement which gave Plumb Line the
right to renew, at the same rate each year, its one-
year commitment (as Plumb Line contends) or
whether the parties agreed to a five-year, fixed term
agreement that bound Plumb Line to advertise in
[Local Pages’] phone book for a total of five years (as
[Local Pages] contends).
¶11 The court further concluded that “[b]ecause the written
record of the parties’ contract [was] ambiguous, extrinsic
evidence should be used to resolve the ambiguities if possible.”
This extrinsic evidence, the court stated, would include, but not
be limited to, the testimony of the contracting parties. 3
¶12 At a jury trial, Owner, Local Pages’ director of finance,
Plumb Line’s owner, Plumb Line’s office manager, and Plumb
Line’s service manager testified. Especially relevant here, Plumb
Line also called a third-party witness (Customer) who had
entered into a similar advertising contract with Local Pages. Local
Pages had moved to exclude Customer on a variety of evidentiary
grounds, but the court denied that motion, finding that
Customer’s testimony “regarding the handwritten phrase ‘5
YEAR DEAL AT SAME RATE EACH YEAR’ in [Customer’s]
contract [was] relevant and probative of the proper interpretation
3. The court partially granted the motion for summary judgment
on the issue of damages and attorney fees, concluding that if Local
Pages prevailed at trial on its breach of contract claim, it would be
entitled to damages and attorney fees.
20220339-CA 6 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
of the phrase ‘5 Year Agreement at same rate each year’ in the
Plumb Line written contract under the Utah Rules of Evidence.”
In denying the motion, the court set strict parameters for the scope
of Customer’s testimony. The court said that Customer’s
testimony would consist of showing Customer the contract,
having him “identify” that it was between his business and Local
Pages, and asking him “whether he discussed the handwritten
language on that contract” with Owner and, if so, what Owner
told him about it. The court clarified that Customer’s testimony
was relevant only insofar as it addressed what Owner told him
the handwritten “language meant.” Customer’s testimony was, in
fact, brief at trial. On direct examination, Customer was asked,
“Did [Owner] tell you what he was writing on the contract?” He
responded, “The writing on the contract is what [Owner] said
would guarantee I could have the same rate if I renewed my
contract.”
¶13 After both sides rested, the jury was excused, and the court
entertained a motion from Local Pages for judgment as a matter
of law. Local Pages’ counsel (Counsel) stated,
I have a motion [for judgment as a matter of law].
[T]he motion for summary judgment that we
[previously filed] was denied premised on the fact
that there was an ambiguity with respect to the five-
year agreement at the same rate each year.
It was premised on the argument . . . that Plumb
Line had reviewed the five-year agreement at same
rate each year and found it ambiguous based on the
email.
The testimony that [the service manager] just gave
was that he never read the contract at the time he
said let’s move ahead. . . . [A]nd he also admitted in
his testimony that five-year agreement meant a
fixed year term if he disregarded everything else.
20220339-CA 7 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
Counsel then cited McBroom v. Child, 2016 UT 38, 392 P.3d 835, for
the proposition—as articulated by Counsel—that a “party can’t
rely on the representations of another party if they have access to
the agreement.” See id. ¶ 23 (“A person who, having the capacity
and an opportunity to read a contract, is not misled as to its
contents and . . . cannot avoid the contract on the ground of
mistake if he signs it without reading it, at least in the absence of
special circumstances excusing his failure to read it.” (cleaned
up)). Counsel argued that Plumb Line acknowledged it had
received and had in its possession the Advertising Contract, as
well as that Plumb Line was “approving of the agreement when
[it] sent” the April 24 Email. The court denied the motion, noting
that Plumb Line “didn’t sign the contract.” Rather, “[t]hey
responded to an email, said, ‘We’re good to go in the phonebook’
in response to an email that purported to describe what the deal
was which said ‘up to five years.’”
¶14 Before the jury deliberated, the court informed the jury of
the following facts to which Plumb Line and Local Pages had
agreed:
(1) On April 17, 2013, [Owner], acting on behalf of
[Local Pages], sent an email to [the service
manager], who was an employee of [Plumb
Line].
(2) The [April 17 Email] also included an
attachment.
(3) On April 24, 2013, [the service manager], acting
on behalf of [Plumb Line] sent an email to
[Owner] stating “We are a go in your phone
book.”
(4) After these exchanges, [Plumb Line] paid [Local
Pages] for three years of print advertising.
20220339-CA 8 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
Since the parties have agreed on these facts, you
must accept them as true for purposes of this case.
¶15 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plumb Line. Plumb
Line subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees and costs in the
amount of $112,182.45. Based on a stipulation and on Utah’s
reciprocal attorney fee statute, see Utah Code § 78B-5-826, the
court granted the motion but reduced the award by $13,560. Local
Pages appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶16 Local Pages raises three issues on appeal. First, it asserts
that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as
a matter of law. An appellate “court’s standard of review of a
judgment as a matter of law is the same as that imposed” on a
district court. Sheppard v. Geneva Rock, 2021 UT 31, ¶ 24, 493 P.3d
632 (cleaned up). And a district “court is justified in granting a
judgment as a matter of law only if, examining all evidence in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-
moving party’s favor.” Id. (cleaned up); see also SME Indus., Inc. v.
Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., 2001 UT 54, ¶ 9, 28 P.3d
669 (“In deciding whether the trial court correctly granted
judgment as a matter of law, we give no deference to the trial
court’s view of the law; we review it for correctness.” (cleaned
up)).
¶17 Second, Local Pages asserts that the district court erred in
allowing the limited testimony of Customer as extrinsic evidence
regarding the meaning of ambiguous terms of the contract. “We
grant a trial court broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence
and will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion. Thus, we
will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on evidence unless the ruling
was beyond the limits of reasonability.” Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT
51, ¶ 21, 190 P.3d 1269 (cleaned up).
20220339-CA 9 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
¶18 Third, Local Pages contends that the district court erred in
awarding attorney fees. “Whether attorney fees are recoverable in
an action is a question of law, which we review for correctness.”
Daniels v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, 2021 UT App 105, ¶ 27, 500
P.3d 891 (cleaned up). Regarding the reasonableness of fees, a
district court “is in a better position than an appellate court to
gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the
complexity of the litigation.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,
317 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up). Accordingly, “calculation of
reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial
court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a
clear abuse of discretion.” Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,
988 (Utah 1988) (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
I. Judgment as a Matter of Law
¶19 Local Pages asserts that the district court erred in denying
its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, Local
Pages argues that the district court was required to enter
judgment as a matter of law because Plumb Line’s testimony
established that it “was not legally entitled to use the defense of
ambiguity.” Local Pages bases this assertion on the premise that
Plumb Line “representatives admitted that they never read the
Advertising Contract . . . before entering into it.” Local Pages
claims that since Plumb Line admitted to not reading the
Advertising Contract, “Utah law is clear—[Plumb Line] could not
argue that the contract language was ambiguous.” While Local
Pages concedes that “no Utah case has explicitly held that a
defendant cannot defend against the enforcement of a contract
because a term of a contract the defendant has not read is
ambiguous,” it argues that “the rule should be extended to apply
in this case.” To be clear, on appeal, Local Pages does not directly
take issue with the district court’s conclusion that the contract was
ambiguous, although it clearly states that it does “not agree” with
20220339-CA 10 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
that determination. Rather, it argues that Plumb Line waived the
defense of ambiguity because Plumb Line—according to Local
Pages’ take on the testimony—admitted to not reading the
Advertising Contract.
¶20 A district court is justified in granting a motion for
judgment as a matter of law “only if, examining all evidence in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-
moving party’s favor.” Sheppard v. Geneva Rock, 2021 UT 31, ¶ 24,
493 P.3d 632 (cleaned up). Given the evidence presented, we see
no error in the district court’s denial of Local Pages’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
¶21 First, as to the ramifications of Plumb Line allegedly not
reading the Advertising Contract, it is well-established that
common law defenses, such as ambiguity, fraud, and mistake,
remain available to a party who fails to read a contract. While a
party who fails to read a contract may still be bound by its terms,
a party who has not read a contract may still argue about the
implications of ambiguous terms if an integrated contract is
ambiguous or, as here, a collection of documents read together is
open to multiple interpretations. For example, in John Call
Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987), our
supreme court said that “[a] party may not sign a contract and
thereafter assert . . . failure to read the contract as a defense.” Id.
at 1208. But the John Call court was quick to point out that a party
“is ordinarily bound” provided that “the contract is plain and
unequivocal in its terms.” Id. (cleaned up). And our supreme court
has pointed out that a failure to read a contract does not deprive
a party of common law remedies: “In the absence of fraud or mistake
[a party] will be bound by all [of a contract’s] provisions, even
though [the party] has not read the agreement and does not know
its contents.” Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, ¶ 12, 982 P.2d 578(cleaned up). Here, there is no doubt that the terms of the contract
were equivocal, leading to ambiguity about whether the contract
20220339-CA 11 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
was for a five-year term or was an option contract with terms
good for up to five years. Accordingly, Local Pages’ assertion,
insofar as it is true, that Plumb Line did not read the Advertising
Contract is largely immaterial to a determination of ambiguity. 4
¶22 Second, Local Pages concedes that in denying the motion
for summary judgment, the district court “determined that the
contract as formed included all of the language found in (a) the
Advertising Contract . . . , (b) the language of [the April 17 Email]
enclosing the Advertising Contract . . . , and (c) [the April 24
Email].” To be fair, Local Pages does not—as it explicitly stated at
oral argument—agree that the contract consisted of these three
elements. But it does acknowledge that the district court made
this very determination—a determination that Local Pages has
not challenged on appeal. Indeed, the scope of Local Pages’
appeal is limited to the contention that the district court erred in
denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Local Pages
makes no attempt in its briefing on appeal to attack the earlier
denial of summary judgment in which the court concluded that
the contract consisted of the three parts—a conclusion that led to
the ambiguity determination. And in its articulation of the issues
4. For the sake of addressing Local Pages’ argument, we assume
that the evidence showed that the principal or agents of Plumb
Line did not read the attached Advertising Contract; however, the
record does not support this assertion. Plumb Line’s service
manager admitted only that he did not “recall whether [he]
reviewed the printout” of the Advertising Contract with Plumb
Line’s owner, instead saying that he “believe[ed]” that they “just
reviewed” the April 17 Email together. At most, this testimony
addresses the service manager’s recollection of reviewing the
Advertising Contract with Plumb Line’s owner. In no way did the
service manager admit that he did not read the Advertising
Contract. To the contrary, he testified that he likely printed out
the Advertising Contract when he asked Owner for clarification
about billing codes featured on the Advertising Contract.
20220339-CA 12 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
of appeal, Local Pages explicitly states that the district court erred
in denying its motion for the judgment as a matter of law, making
no mention of the denial of summary judgment. 5
¶23 And while Local Pages has not challenged the district
court’s summary judgment determination, we nevertheless see no
error in the court’s conclusion that the contract was ambiguous.
“Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, we look to
the language of the contract to determine its meaning and the
intent of the contracting parties. We also consider each contract
provision in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving
effect to all and ignoring none.” McNeil Eng’g & Land Surveying,
5. To the extent that Local Pages contends it is challenging the
denial of summary judgment, the issue is inadequately briefed.
While it is true that when “appealing from an entire final
judgment . . . , it is not necessary to specify each interlocutory
order of which the appellant seeks review,” Scudder v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1994), it is equally true that an
appellant is required to at least identify the aspects of a summary
judgment decision with which it takes exception. As we read
Local Pages’ brief, nowhere does it address the court’s
determination on summary judgment that the contract consisted
of three parts—a determination that supported the court’s
conclusion that the contract was ambiguous. The closest Local
Pages comes is saying that it “did not agree that the district court
had correctly concluded that the ‘5 Year Agreement’ language
was ambiguous.” So, instead of taking on the court’s ambiguity
determination, Local Pages’ argument is entirely focused on the
effect of Plumb Line’s alleged failure to read the Advertising
Contract. We decline to address arguments made only in passing.
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (“The argument must explain, with
reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and
the record, why the party should prevail on appeal.”); see also
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 46,
70 P.3d 904.
20220339-CA 13 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
LLC v. Bennett, 2011 UT App 423, ¶ 8, 268 P.3d 854 (cleaned up).
“If the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, the parties’ intentions are determined from the
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may
be interpreted as a matter of law.” WebBank v. American Gen.
Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, ¶ 19, 54 P.3d 1139 (cleaned up).
“Only if the language of the contract is ambiguous will we
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.” Café Rio, Inc. v.
Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ¶ 25, 207 P.3d 1235. And
“a contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain
meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.”
Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 25, 190 P.3d 1269 (cleaned up).
¶24 Admittedly, if the contract had consisted of only the April
17 Email and the April 24 Email, there would have likely been no
ambiguity. But in that scenario, the lack of ambiguity would have
cut in the opposite direction from what Local Pages advocates.
Recall the words of the April 17 Email: “I will go [$]1499 a month
and leave all ads inside the same as last year. I will honor this deal
for up to 5 years with no increase for you also.” Two
characteristics stand out. First, Owner says that the deal will be
“the same as last year,” which, as noted, had been for one year.
Second, Owner said that he would “honor this deal for up to five
years.” (Emphasis added.) We can see few other ways to
understand the “up to” portion of the proposal to mean anything
other than an offer for a five-year option agreement that Plumb
Line had the right to renew each year—especially considering that
the parties signed a one-year contract in the previous year. In
other words, here, the only reasonable interpretation of “up to” is
that Plumb Line could exit the relationship if it wished to before
five years passed.
¶25 The ambiguity in the contract crept in not from the April
17 Email but from the attached Advertising Contract—and more
specifically from the single, handwritten line that said, “5 year
20220339-CA 14 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
agreement at same rate each year.” In isolation, a natural reading
of this line is that the contract was for a fixed term of five years.
But that is not what happened here because this line was not to
be—indeed could not have been—read in isolation. As the district
court determined on summary judgment, the contract did not
consist of this one line. Rather, it included the language of the
April 17 Email and the other language in the Advertising
Contract. As we have already noted, the “up to 5 years” language
of the April 17 Email certainly implies that the contract was
renewable year-to-year, especially when considered in the context
of the previous line that said the deal was “the same as last year.”
¶26 Moreover, the handwritten note doesn’t just clash with the
April 17 Email; it also conflicts with the multiple references to
twelve months and to a single issue (namely, Issue 14) in the
Advertising Contract itself. And given that the contract offer
consisted of the April 17 Email and the Advertising Contract,
Local Pages does not enjoy the luxury of reading “5 year
agreement at same rate each year” in isolation from everything
else that created the contract. Instead, this phrase must be read “in
relation to all of the [contract provisions], with a view toward
giving effect to all and ignoring none.” McNeil Eng’g, 2011 UT
App 423, ¶ 8 (cleaned up). And when read in the context of the
entirety of the contract, this provision is ambiguous because “it is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation,” Daines, 2008
UT 51, ¶ 25 (cleaned up), created by the inconsistent manner in
which the length of the contractual-agreement term is described
in the April 17 Email, the references to twelve payments in the
Advertising Contract, and the handwritten notation.
¶27 Here, the court’s denial of Local Pages’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law rested on a solid factual foundation.
These facts established that the terms of the contract were
inherently equivocal and susceptible to two mutually exclusive
interpretations: a five-year fixed term versus a five-year option.
Given this factual landscape, we see no error in the court’s denial
20220339-CA 15 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
of Local Pages’ motion because there was ample evidence to
support a verdict in Plumb Line’s favor.
II. Extrinsic Evidence
¶28 Local Pages also asserts that the district court erred in
allowing the limited testimony of Customer as extrinsic evidence
to resolve the ambiguity created by the handwritten note. “A trial
court has broad discretion in deciding whether evidence is
relevant, and we review a trial court’s relevance determination for
abuse of discretion.” Schreib v. Whitmer, 2016 UT App 61, ¶ 15, 370
P.3d 955 (cleaned up). Local Pages argues that the “only thing
relevant” to the meaning of the note “was the understanding of
the parties to the negotiations.” Because Customer was a party to
a different negotiation, Local Pages contends that Customer
“could not provide testimony that would help the jury decide
what the phrase at issue meant to [Plumb Line] and Local Pages.”
¶29 In making this argument, Local Pages ignores the very
limited and specific scope of Customer’s testimony. In no way
was he asked to testify about the meaning of the handwritten
phrase in the Advertising Contract. Rather, as the district court
made abundantly clear, Customer’s testimony was strictly limited
to showing Customer his contract with Local Pages, asking him
whether he and Owner discussed the handwritten language of that
contract, and asking him what Owner told him about that
language.
¶30 “Where there are two reasonable interpretations of a
contractual provision, we look to extrinsic evidence.” Brady v.
Park, 2019 UT 16, ¶ 54, 445 P.3d 395 (cleaned up). That is precisely
the case here. There were two reasonable interpretations
regarding the length of the contract’s term, namely, whether it
was for a five-year term or an annual term renewable for up to
five years. Given this ambiguity, the district court invited
“extrinsic evidence bearing on the intentions of the parties to the
contract concerning the ambiguity.” Id. ¶ 65 (cleaned up). This
20220339-CA 16 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
extrinsic evidence included the testimony of representatives of
Local Pages and Plumb Line. And it also included Customer’s
testimony, which was proper because in the face of contractual
ambiguity “a court is not limited to the document itself” but “may
look to all the attendant circumstances surrounding the execution
of the document.” Novell, Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App
162, ¶ 21, 92 P.3d 768 (emphasis added). In this context,
Customer’s testimony was relevant to resolving the ambiguity
based on what Owner said about a nearly identical handwritten
phrase on a similar phone book advertising contract between
Local Pages and one of its customers. Because the court “should
. . . consider any credible evidence offered to show the parties’
intention,” id. (cleaned up), the jury properly considered this
evidence as addressing Owner’s understanding of the similar
provision in the other contract. When asked if Owner told him
“what he was writing on the contract,” Customer responded,
“The writing on the contract is what [Owner] said would
guarantee I could have the same rate if I renewed my contract.”
Given the similarity between the two contracts, Customer’s
testimony thus assisted the jury in determining what Owner
meant by including the handwritten note in Plumb Line’s
contract.
¶31 In sum, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision
to allow the extrinsic evidence in the form of Customer’s
testimony to resolve the ambiguity created by Owner’s
handwritten note on the Advertising Contract. 6
6. Local Pages also complains that Customer’s testimony was
prejudicial because it caused the jury to “not believe” Owner. At
the risk of stating the obvious, we point to the oft repeated
principle that making credibility determinations is what a jury
does. See Holland v. Brown, 394 P.2d 77, 79 (Utah 1964) (“Short of
capriciously or arbitrarily rejecting credible evidence when there
(continued…)
20220339-CA 17 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
III. Attorney Fees
¶32 Local Pages’ final claim is that the district court erred in
awarding any attorney fees. In support of this claim, Local Pages
asserts that Plumb Line failed to properly categorize its fees
because “it did not differentiate between fees that were incurred
in pursuing issues unrelated to the contract, fees for motions it
had lost or abandoned before filing, fees for transition between
law firms, etc.”
¶33 The Utah Supreme Court has “mandated that a party
seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its
underlying claims.” Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998).
More specifically,
the party must categorize the time and fees
expended for (1) successful claims for which there
may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2)
unsuccessful claims for which there would have
been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims
been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement to attorney fees. Claims must also be
categorized according to the various opposing
parties.
Id. (cleaned up).
¶34 Here, there was one and only one claim made against
Plumb Line: breach of contract. Thus, contractually, Plumb Line
was entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending itself
against this single claim. Foote requires that fees be categorized by
claims and by parties. That is precisely what Plumb Line did here.
Indeed, it could have scarcely done anything else since there was
is no sound reason for doing so, it is the exclusive province of the
jury to determine the credibility of witnesses.”). Accordingly, we
reject Local Pages’ prejudice argument.
20220339-CA 18 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
only one claim involving one other party. Given this litigation
landscape, we fail to see how Plumb Line’s categorization of its
fees was improper or fell short under the standard Foote sets
down. 7
¶35 Finally, “it is well-settled that a provision for payment of
attorney fees in a contract includes attorney fees incurred by the
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is
brought to enforce the contract.” Tronson v. Eagar, 2019 UT App
212, ¶ 39, 457 P.3d 407 (cleaned up). “Having received attorney
fees in the underlying action and under the conclusions reached
in this opinion,” Plumb Line is “entitled to recover reasonable
attorney fees incurred on appeal.” See Phillips v. Skabelund, 2021
UT App 2, ¶ 69, 482 P.3d 237. Accordingly, we grant Plumb Line’s
“request for fees and costs on appeal and remand for the district
court to calculate the award.” See Thomas v. Thomas, 2021 UT App
8, ¶ 45, 481 P.3d 504.
7. Local Pages resists this conclusion by citing Dale K. Barker Co.
PC CPA Profit Sharing Plan v. Turner, 2021 UT App 119, 500 P.3d
940, cert. denied, 509 P.3d 768 (Utah 2022), for the assertion that the
district court abused its discretion in awarding “any fees” to
Plumb Line. Local Pages misreads Dale K. Barker, making its
reliance on the case misplaced. Dale K. Barker is about a party
seeking fees for a discrete singular item on which it did not fully
prevail. Id. ¶ 40. Dale K. Barker is not about what Local Pages
asserts on appeal: that the failure to categorize its fees between
pretrial motions it won and lost precludes an award of any fees to
a party who prevails on a single claim against a single party. At
most, Dale K. Barker supports the proposition that an award of fees
may be reduced by amounts related to an unsuccessful motion.
As such, Dale K. Barker is inapposite here.
20220339-CA 19 2024 UT App 70Local Pages v. Plumb Line
CONCLUSION
¶36 All of Local Pages’ claims fail. The district court did not err
in denying Local Pages’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The district court did not exceed its discretion in allowing the
limited testimony of Customer as extrinsic evidence to resolve the
ambiguity inherent in the contract. Finally, the district court did
not err in awarding attorney fees, and we remand the matter to
the district court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney
fees incurred by Plumb Line on appeal.
¶37 Affirmed.
20220339-CA 20 2024 UT App 70