In re Estate of Wright , 2024 UT App 146 ( 2024 )

2024 UT App 146THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
SHEILA ANNE WRIGHT,
AHMAD RAY SHAYESTEH,
Appellant,
v.
GABRIELLE D. ANDERSON,
Appellee.
Opinion
Nos. 20220582-CA; 20220883-CA
Filed October 10, 2024
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Kent R. Holmberg
Nos. 214901690
213900751
Ahmad Ray Shayesteh, Appellant Pro Se
Matthew N. Evans, Jessica A. Ramirez, and Jacob G.
Roberts, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.
OLIVER, Judge:
¶1 Following the death of Sheila Anne Wright, Ahmad Ray
Shayesteh asserted that he and Wright had been in an
unsolemnized marriage and that he was therefore entitled to
inherit her estate. Wright’s sister, Gabrielle D. Anderson, on the
other hand, asserted that she was the sole heir to whom Wright
had left her estate by virtue of Wright’s will and trust. After a
bench trial on Shayesteh’s Petition to Recognize a Relationship as
a Marriage (the Marriage Case), the district court found that
Shayesteh and Wright’s relationship did not meet the statutory
In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
requirements for an unsolemnized marriage and that the relevant
statute—Utah Code section 30-1-4.5 1—is not unconstitutionally
vague. After a bench trial concerning the administration of
Wright’s estate (the Estate Case), the district court dismissed
Shayesteh’s claims against the estate for lack of standing, for
violation of the statute of frauds, and for insufficient evidence. In
separate appeals that we consider together in this opinion,
Shayesteh challenges the district court’s findings from both trials.
For the reasons set forth below, we find no merit in either appeal
and affirm the district court’s rulings in both cases.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In July 2011, Wright and her husband created The Gary and
Sheila Wright Trust (the Trust), which holds title to their house
(the House) and other assets. In 2014, Wright’s husband passed
away, and the following year, Wright designated Anderson as the
personal representative, trustee, and beneficiary of the Trust.
¶3 In May 2018, Wright met Shayesteh. Two months later, he
moved in with her. In January 2020, Wright made Shayesteh the
sole beneficiary of her individual retirement account, listing his
relationship to her as a “significant other.”
¶4 In March 2021, Wright passed away. Shortly after her
death, Shayesteh filed the Marriage Case, asking the court to
establish the date of his marriage to Wright as the day he moved
in with her. Meanwhile, in the Estate Case, the court appointed
Anderson as the personal representative of Wright’s estate. In that
capacity, she gave Shayesteh written notice to vacate the House,
but he refused.
1. Because our Legislature has since amended this statute, we cite
the version of the Utah Code in effect at the relevant time.
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 2 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
¶5 The following month, Anderson, as the personal
representative of Wright’s estate (the Estate), filed an unlawful
detainer complaint against Shayesteh to remove him from the
House. 2 The district court consolidated the unlawful detainer
action with the Marriage Case and ordered Shayesteh to
“immediately vacate” the House or post a $10,000 bond if he
wished to stay there “on an interim basis until the trial” in the
Marriage Case. The following month, Shayesteh filed a change of
address with the court.
The Marriage Case Trial
¶6 In September 2021, the Marriage Case proceeded to a one-
day, remote bench trial. When the first witness had trouble
connecting to the virtual trial, the court stated, “I don’t have any
objection or any problem with [the witness] attending by phone.
But if she’s central to your case in any way, I have no way to
assess—well, I have very little way to assess credibility without
seeing her.” Shayesteh’s counsel responded, “I understand, Your
Honor. I’d ask to just kind of do [your] best, and the Court will
have to give it the appropriate weight.” The court replied,
“Okay.” Shayesteh and Anderson were each represented by
counsel, and neither party lodged any objections to the
proceeding.
¶7 Shayesteh called four witnesses in his case—Wright’s
manicurist (Manicurist), two next-door neighbors, and a friend—
and testified on his own behalf. Manicurist testified she knew
Wright well, had never met Shayesteh, but understood that they
loved each other and were cohabitating. Manicurist was not
aware of any marriage ceremony between Wright and Shayesteh
and stated that she and Wright were “good enough friends that if
[Wright] were getting married or thinking about getting married,
2. Shayesteh does not appeal any rulings made in the unlawful
detainer action.
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 3 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
she would tell” her. Wright’s neighbors testified they had
socialized with Wright and Shayesteh several times. They
described Shayesteh helping with household tasks, such as
grocery shopping and yard maintenance. But they had never
heard Wright say she was married to Shayesteh or planned to
marry him. Wright’s friend testified she had known Wright for
twenty years and thought Wright sounded happy about her
relationship with Shayesteh, but she had never heard Wright
claim to be married to him.
¶8 Shayesteh testified that he and Wright had an “informal
marriage ceremony” performed on August 3, 2018, by a
murshid—a spiritual guide in Sufism—who came to the House to
perform what Shayesteh called a “Sufi bond.” 3 When asked why
the murshid was not testifying, Shayesteh claimed the murshid
was “a very mystic character” who did not “want to be a part of
it all.” According to Shayesteh, Wright did not tell her friends and
family they were married because “she was shy” but she would
tell “people [they met] on the road” that he was her husband. On
cross-examination, Shayesteh was questioned more specifically
about his work history and admitted he had been released from
prison in 2014 after serving over nineteen years. Shayesteh
claimed he worked as a freelance writer but could only come up
with the name of one entity that bought his work. He also
conceded that he and Wright never obtained a marriage
certificate. Shayesteh presented no receipts or physical evidence
of money he claimed to have spent on home repairs or
remodeling, and he confirmed that he had no joint bank account
or property he jointly owned with Wright.
3. Murshids are “respected spiritual guides” in Sufism, an
“inward-looking, mystical dimension of Islam.” See Sufi Orders,
Pew Rrch. Ctr., https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/09/1
5/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-sufi-ord
ers/ [https://perma.cc/EDJ6-Z8QR].
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 4 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
¶9 Anderson testified in her case-in-chief and called her son
and daughter as witnesses. Anderson stated she was Wright’s
younger sister and the beneficiary and trustee of the Trust.
Anderson testified she had never heard Wright mention getting
married to Shayesteh. Anderson first heard of him when Wright
described how she had “met a fellow, and he seemed to be hard
on his luck,” so she decided to “let him into her home to stay.”
Anderson’s son testified he used to speak with his aunt about
six to eight times a year, even after Wright had met Shayesteh,
but he had never heard her mention being married to, or
agreeing to marry, Shayesteh. Finally, Anderson’s daughter
testified that Wright had regularly sent her holiday cards signed
by both Wright and her husband before he passed away and that
she has never received a card with Shayesteh’s name on it;
instead, the cards were more recently signed with just Wright’s
name.
¶10 After trial, the district court issued a detailed oral ruling
that was later memorialized into its written findings and
conclusions. After setting forth the requirements of Utah’s
unsolemnized marriage statute (the Statute), see Utah Code § 30-
1-4.5, the court ruled that Shayesteh “failed to provide sufficient
evidence that he and [Wright] held themselves out as having a
uniform general reputation as husband and wife” and that “there
was no evidence presented of a written agreement of a marriage.”
The district court further explained that consent to enter into a
marriage-like relationship “may be establish[ed] by evidence of
certain circumstances in the parties’ relationship such as
maintenance of joint bank accounts and credit accounts,” “filing
of joint tax returns,” or “speaking in the presence of third parties
as being married.” But since Shayesteh presented no evidence of
any such means to prove consent, the district court concluded that
“there [was] insufficient evidence to establish the parties had a
legal and valid marriage under [the Statute]” and dismissed the
case with prejudice.
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 5 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
¶11 Immediately after trial, Shayesteh—now representing
himself—filed three motions: a motion to disqualify the judge, a
motion to vacate Anderson’s appointment as the personal
representative, and a motion to reconsider. The district court
declared all three to be “without merit,” and it awarded attorney
fees to Anderson because the motions were “filed in bad faith as
a tactic being used only for the purpose of harassment or delay.”
¶12 Undeterred, Shayesteh filed a motion for a new trial,
alleging he was entitled to a new trial because of “extreme
technical difficulties” during the trial, because he had “newly
discovered material evidence” consisting of Wright’s death
certificate and a post-trial declaration from Manicurist, and
because the district court’s findings were based on insufficient
evidence. The district court denied the motion, confirming it “was
able to hear all parties, witnesses, testimony, and was able to
judge their credibility” and noting there were “no objections to
proceeding” or any “motion to continue the proceeding” to show
concerns about testimony being taken remotely. The district court
also concluded that “none of the evidence identified by Shayesteh
is new evidence” since it was available to him at the time of trial,
and that its findings were “supported by the evidence at trial.”
The Estate Case Trial
¶13 In June 2022, the district court held a bench trial in the
Estate Case to resolve Shayesteh’s remaining claims. Shayesteh
argued that Anderson had not established she was Wright’s sister,
claimed that the Estate owed him $18,200 for money he had
purportedly loaned Wright, and claimed that he, not the Trust,
was the rightful owner of the House.
¶14 In support of his creditor claim, Shayesteh produced a
photocopy of an uncashed check for $12,100 that had his name
and the amount typed, not handwritten, that was supposedly
signed by Wright. Shayesteh claimed Wright gave him the check
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 6 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
for money he had loaned her to invest in a restaurant in Mexico,
but he produced no evidence to support this allegation; in fact, no
one else had heard Wright discuss this investment, Shayesteh
could not produce the original check, and he claimed to not have
any bank records showing he loaned Wright money.
¶15 Regarding Shayesteh’s claim he owned the House, he
produced only his own testimony that Wright “wanted to make a
will” to make him a beneficiary of the Estate and orally promised
to give him ownership of the House. Anderson, on the other hand,
submitted the Trust documents, including a quitclaim deed from
2011, affirming the Trust’s ownership of the House.
¶16 After the trial, the district court ruled as follows:
• “Anderson is . . . Wright’s sister and her sole
living heir.”
• “Shayesteh’s creditor claim of $18,200 lacks
credibility and there is insufficient evidence
to support the claim.”
• “Shayesteh is not married to . . . Wright, nor
is he an heir of [Wright]. He therefore lacks
standing to assert a number of the claims, if
not all of the claims he has asserted in this
case.”
• “Even if Shayesteh did have standing to
object to [Anderson] being Personal
Representative of the Estate of [Wright], his
testimony, evidence and argument lack[]
credibility.”
• “There is insufficient evidence to establish
that [Wright] assigned or transferred [the
House] to Shayesteh . . . and Utah’s Statute of
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 7 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1, precludes
Shayesteh from claiming that he was
assigned or transferred [the House] as there
is no writing to establish a transfer . . . .”
• “[The Utah Probate Code] also states that a
will must be in writing and there is no such
written will in favor of [Shayesteh] executed
by [Wright] which also precludes
Shayesteh’s claim that he was transferred
[the House] via a will.”
The district court dismissed all of Shayesteh’s claims with
prejudice, noting it had addressed “all of the remaining issues in
this case.”
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶17 Shayesteh raises several issues on appeal. We first address
his challenges to the district court’s rulings in the Marriage Case.
Shayesteh contends the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a new trial based on technical
irregularities and newly discovered evidence. “We review a
[district] court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial under an abuse
of discretion standard.” State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT 17, ¶ 9, 311
P.3d 995. Indeed, “we must give great deference to the [district]
court, which is in a much better position than this court to
evaluate the parties’ conduct, the context in which the [claimed]
irregularity occurred, and the [fact-finder]’s reaction.” Bohman
Aggregates LLC v. Gilbert, 2021 UT App 35, ¶ 44, 486 P.3d 77(cleaned up).
¶18 Next, Shayesteh contends the district court made clearly
erroneous findings. “We review challenges to factual findings for
clear error, reversing only if the findings are in conflict with the
clear weight of the evidence, or if this court has a definite and firm
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 8 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Dole v. Dole, 2018 UT
App 195, ¶ 3, 437 P.3d 464 (cleaned up).
¶19 Shayesteh also contends the Statute is unconstitutionally
vague. “We review the constitutionality of a statute for
correctness, giving no deference to the lower court’s
interpretation, presuming the statute is constitutional and
resolving any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.” In
re Childers-Gray, 2021 UT 13, ¶ 14, 487 P.3d 96 (cleaned up).
¶20 In the Estate Case, Shayesteh first argues that Anderson
was not Wright’s sister and that Wright’s death certificate was
“newly discovered evidence” supposedly proving as much.
Second, Shayesteh argues the House was not owned by the Trust.
Because Shayesteh raised these two issues before the district court
as neither spouse nor heir, we must assess whether Shayesteh has
standing in this matter. “Standing is generally a mixed question
of fact and law because it involves the application of a legal
standard to a particularized set of facts.” Hinkle v. Jacobsen, 2019
UT 72, ¶ 18, 456 P.3d 738 (cleaned up). “We review the factual
determinations made by a [district] court with deference” but
“afford minimal discretion to the [district] court on a
determination of whether a given set of facts fits the legal
requirements for standing.” Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West
Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 10, 424 P.3d 95 (cleaned up).
¶21 Shayesteh also contends that Wright orally promised the
House to him and that the district court erred by dismissing his
claim for violating the statute of frauds. “The applicability of the
statute of frauds is a question of law, which we review de novo.”
Coleman v. Stuart, 2019 UT App 165, ¶ 24, 451 P.3d 658 (cleaned
up).
¶22 Finally, Shayesteh contends the district court should not
have denied his creditor claim against Wright’s estate for $18,200
for insufficient evidence. “When reviewing a bench trial for
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 9 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the [district] court’s
judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence,”
and “we will not second guess a court’s decision about
evidentiary weight and credibility if there is a reasonable basis in
the record to support them.” Koehler v. Allen, 2020 UT App 73,
¶¶ 13, 17, 466 P.3d 738 (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
I. The Marriage Case
A. Motion for a New Trial
¶23 Shayesteh contends he is entitled to a new trial for two
reasons: first, some of his witnesses had technical difficulties
during the remote trial, which he claims prevented the district
court from properly evaluating their testimony, and, second, he
argues Wright’s death certificate and Manicurist’s declaration
qualify as newly discovered evidence under rule 59(a)(4) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We disagree on both fronts.
¶24 Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in
relevant part, that “a new trial may be granted to any party on any
issue for any of the following reasons,” including, among others,
“(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court . . . by which a
party was prevented from having a fair trial,” or “(4) newly
discovered material evidence that could not, with reasonable
diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial.” Utah
R. Civ. P. 59(a). Shayesteh fails to demonstrate that either of these
reasons applies here.
¶25 First, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that the fact that some of the witness testimony during the remote
trial was presented through audio only did not amount to the type
of “irregularity in the proceedings” that would warrant a new
trial. Shayesteh, through his trial counsel, expressly assured the
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 10 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
court he did not have any concerns about Manicurist testifying
without video. There is no evidence to indicate the witnesses were
not able to fully and completely testify, and the district court
confirmed it “was able to hear all parties, witnesses, testimony,
and was able to judge their credibility.”
¶26 Yet even if Shayesteh had demonstrated there was an
irregularity in the proceeding, his claim fails because he does not
establish how he was harmed by it. See Peterson v. Hyundai Motor
Co., 2021 UT App 128, ¶ 31, 502 P.3d 320 (explaining that “rule 59
is, by its terms, limited by rule 61, the rule discussing harmless
error” (cleaned up)); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 61 (stating courts
“must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties”). Without
articulating a particularized harm, Shayesteh is not entitled to a
new trial, and the district court therefore acted well within its
discretion in concluding that the audio-testimony issue did not
warrant a new trial in this case.
¶27 Second, the district court likewise did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Wright’s death certificate and
Manicurist’s declaration were not “newly discovered material
evidence” that Shayesteh could not have “discovered and
produced at trial.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(4). Shayesteh does not
dispute that Wright’s death certificate was produced in
Anderson’s pretrial disclosures. But he claims that the image of it
was “illegible and undecipherable,” and he asserts that it was “the
deciphering of [Wright’s] death certificate,” which he chose to do
after trial, that constitutes the newly discovered evidence.
Shayesteh also claims that a declaration he obtained from
Manicurist after trial stating it was Wright’s “intention to allocate
[the House] to Shayesteh” should be considered newly discovered
evidence. Neither of these documents meet the criteria under rule
59(a)(4) because “with reasonable diligence” both could “have
been discovered and produced at the trial.” See id. Therefore, the
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 11 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shayesteh’s
motion for a new trial.
B. Sufficiency of the Findings
¶28 Shayesteh argues the district court made clearly erroneous
factual findings after the bench trial in the Marriage Case. At the
outset, we note that Shayesteh failed to marshal the evidence to
support this challenge. “A party challenging a district court’s
factual findings on appeal bears a heavy burden of persuasion in
demonstrating that the court’s findings are clearly erroneous.”
Pankhurst v. Pankhurst, 2022 UT App 36, ¶ 15, 508 P.3d 612(cleaned up). “And a party will almost certainly fail to carry its
burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal the evidence
sufficient to overcome the healthy dose of deference owed to
factual findings.” Id. (cleaned up). In addition, “we review
challenges to factual findings for clear error, reversing only if the
findings are in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, or if
this court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.” Dole v. Dole, 2018 UT App 195, ¶ 3, 437 P.3d 464(cleaned up). We have no such conviction here.
¶29 The district court made detailed findings based on the
evidence presented at trial and explained where it found
credibility lacking or evidence insufficient. The court’s finding
that Shayesteh “failed to provide sufficient evidence that he and
[Wright] held themselves out as having a uniform general
reputation as husband and wife” as required by the Statute was
supported by the testimony presented that proved “just the
opposite.” None of the witnesses were under the impression that
Wright and Shayesteh were married, nor did they ever hear them
refer to each other as husband or wife. The court did not find
Shayesteh’s testimony that Wright had “told unknown strangers”
he was her husband credible when Wright’s friends, neighbors,
and family who testified said she had never described Shayesteh
as her husband. Regarding the required consent to be married, the
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 12 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
court’s finding of insufficient evidence that consent had been
established was supported by the lack of “joint bank accounts and
credit accounts,” of “filing of joint tax returns,” or of “speaking in
the presence of third parties as being married.” Volk v. Vecchi, 2020
UT App 77, ¶ 27, 467 P.3d 872. “In a bench trial or other
proceeding in which the judge serves as fact finder, the court has
considerable discretion to assign relative weight to the evidence
before it” and “is in the best position to judge the credibility of
witnesses and is free to disbelieve their testimony.” SA Group
Props. Inc. v. Highland Marketplace LC, 2017 UT App 160, ¶ 24, 424
P.3d 187 (cleaned up). Shayesteh has failed to carry his burden of
persuasion on appeal to show that the district court’s findings are
clearly erroneous.
C. Constitutional Challenge to the Statute
¶30 Shayesteh contends the Statute is “unconstitutionally
vague” because it leaves open to interpretation key terms such as
“marital rights, duties, obligations,” and “a uniform and general
reputation as husband and wife.”
¶31 In relevant part, the Statute states,
A marriage which is not solemnized according to
this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes that the marriage
arises out of a contract between a man and a woman
who . . . mutually assume marital rights, duties, and
obligations; and . . . who hold themselves out as and
have acquired a uniform and general reputation as
husband and wife.
Utah Code § 30-1-4.5(1).
¶32 “When we consider constitutional challenges to a statute,
we presume the statute to be constitutional, resolving any
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.” Planned
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 13 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. State, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 216 (cleaned up).
“The party attacking the constitutionality of a statute has the
burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the statute is
unconstitutional.” Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2024
UT 11, ¶ 27, 548 P.3d 865 (cleaned up). “This is a heavy burden,
requiring a party to provide a sufficient basis for such challenge,
and not merely a murky basis for setting the statute aside.” Id.(cleaned up).
¶33 Shayesteh’s constitutional challenge here founders in
murky waters. He proposes no alternative language or specific
examples of discriminatory effect. At most, Shayesteh critiques
the Statute as favoring “European/Christian culture” in using the
terms “husband” and “wife” rather than “soul mate,” which he
claims, without evidentiary support, would better correspond
with the Sufi faith. But this contention is no more than a bald
assertion that fails to analyze how the Statute’s language is not
“sufficiently definite so as to discourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 50, 99
P.3d 820.
¶34 Furthermore, Shayesteh has not met his heavy burden of
proving vagueness because he is challenging a civil, not criminal,
statute, which provides a conditional, not absolute, marriage
right. As our supreme court has explained, “vagueness questions
are essentially procedural due process issues” and, generally
speaking, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” Id. ¶ 43 (cleaned up). But the “constitution tolerates
a greater degree of vagueness in civil statutes than in criminal
statutes.” Id. And here, the Statute provides an opportunity for
individuals to demonstrate the existence of an unsolemnized
marriage by using broader, rather than narrower, terms to
describe the relationship. Indeed, were the Statute narrower in its
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 14 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
requirements, it may risk excluding more individuals from the
benefit of the Statute. Thus, Shayesteh falls short of clearing the
high hurdle inherent in challenging the constitutionality of a civil
statute.
II. The Estate Case
A. Standing
¶35 In his claimed capacity as Wright’s unsolemnized spouse,
Shayesteh challenged Anderson’s role as the personal
representative of the Estate and the Trust’s ownership of the
House. In its detailed written findings of fact and conclusions of
law issued after the bench trial, the district court concluded,
“[Shayesteh] is not married to [Wright], nor is he an heir of
[Wright]. He therefore lacks standing to assert a number of the
claims . . . he has asserted in this case.” We agree.
¶36 “Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must be
satisfied before a court may entertain a controversy between two
parties.” Laws v. Grayeyes, 2021 UT 59, ¶ 27, 498 P.3d 410 (cleaned
up). Our supreme court has set forth a three-part test to assess
whether a party has traditional standing:
First, the party must assert that it has been or will be
adversely affected by the challenged actions.
Second, it must allege a causal relationship between
the injury to the party, the challenged actions, and
the relief requested. And third, it must request relief
that is substantially likely to redress the injury
claimed.
Id. (cleaned up). Shayesteh cannot meet the first part of this test.
“To be adversely affected,” a plaintiff “must demonstrate a
particularized injury that gives [the plaintiff] a personal stake in
the outcome of the dispute.” Id. ¶ 28 (cleaned up). Shayesteh “falls
short of this” because—given that his claims in the Marriage Case
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 15 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
were properly rejected—“he can assert only a general interest he
shares in common with members of the public at large.” Id.(cleaned up). Shayesteh is neither a spouse nor an heir of Wright.
Accordingly, he cannot show how he would be any more
“adversely affected” than any other member of the public
regarding whether Anderson is Wright’s sister or whether the
House was owned by the Trust. Without a legal relationship to
Wright that would entitle him to any of her assets, Shayesteh has
no “personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute” and no
more right than a “member[] of the public at large” to assert a
claim to her property. Id. (cleaned up). Thus, without an injury,
we need not reach the remaining parts of the test, and Shayesteh’s
claims against the Estate regarding Anderson’s status and
whether the House was owned by the Trust fail for lack of
standing.
B. Ownership of the House
¶37 In addition to Shayesteh’s claim that he is entitled to
inherit the House as Wright’s unsolemnized spouse, see supra
¶¶ 34–35, Shayesteh also claims that Wright orally promised to
leave the House to him and that it was her “will and intention to
designate Shayesteh as the sole beneficiary of [the] House.” This
claim fails because Shayesteh never provided any documentation
to support the claim, which is required under Utah law.
¶38 Generally, “statutes of frauds are intended to bar
enforcement of certain agreements that the law requires to be
memorialized in writing.” Coleman v. Stuart, 2019 UT App 165,
¶ 29, 451 P.3d 658 (cleaned up). Under Utah’s statute of frauds,
“any contract conveying an interest in land in which the
agreement has not been reduced to writing and signed by the
person relinquishing the property is unenforceable.” Id. (cleaned
up); see also Utah Code § 25-5-1 (“No estate or interest in real
property . . . shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared [except] by deed or conveyance in writing . . . .”). “The
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 16 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
high evidentiary standard of the statute of frauds” speaks to its
“primary purpose,” which is “to require reliable evidence of the
existence and terms of the contract and to prevent enforcement
through fraud or perjury of contracts never in fact made.” WDIS,
LLC v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n, Phase II, 2022 UT 33,
¶ 33, 515 P.3d 432 (cleaned up). Similarly, Utah’s probate code
requires a will to be “in writing.” Utah Code § 75-2-502(1)(a).
¶39 Here, Shayesteh produced “no evidence to contradict the
fact that [the Trust] owns the [House]” as established by the
quitclaim deed, which Anderson introduced into evidence at trial.
Manicurist’s belated testimony that Wright intended to change
her will and give Shayesteh the House does not suffice. As the
district court noted, “It is one thing to simply say that you are
going to create a will, and another thing to actually create the
will.” Shayesteh produced no evidence of a will that transferred
the House to him. In sum, Utah’s statute of frauds and probate
code preclude Shayesteh’s claim that he is the rightful owner of
the House when he has not produced a single document in
support.
C. Creditor Claim
¶40 Finally, Shayesteh contends the district court erred in
denying his creditor claim of $12,100 against the Estate. 4
Regardless of the legal status of his relationship with Wright,
Shayesteh claims that Wright owed him money related to a
business investment in Mexico. He bases this claim on the
uncashed check in that amount “written” out to him and
supposedly signed by Wright. Because Shayesteh failed to
produce any other document, including the original check, to
support this claim, the district court concluded, “Shayesteh’s
4. Shayesteh originally filed a document entitled “Creditor Claim
Against the Estate of Sheila Anne Wright” claiming $18,200, but
his briefing on appeal mentions only $12,100.
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 17 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
creditor claim of $18,200 lacks credibility and there is insufficient
evidence to support the claim.”
¶41 “Factual determinations are accorded a high degree of
deference.” In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 15, 496 P.3d 58. This is so
“because a lower court often has a comparative advantage in its
firsthand access to factual evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).
Accordingly, “we will not second guess a court’s decisions about
evidentiary weight and credibility if there is a reasonable basis in
the record to support them.” Koehler v. Allen, 2020 UT App 73,
¶ 17, 466 P.3d 738 (cleaned up); see also Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT
App 160, ¶ 27 n.6, 542 P.3d 935 (“We review [district] courts’
credibility determinations with a high level of deference, given
their advantaged position in making that assessment.”).
¶42 Here, it was more than reasonable for the district court to
conclude Shayesteh’s self-serving, uncorroborated testimony that
Wright owed him $18,200 “lack[ed] credibility.” The photocopy
Shayesteh presented was of an uncashed check for $12,100 that
had his name and the amount typed, not handwritten, that was
supposedly signed by Wright. Shayesteh could not produce the
original check, and he admitted that he did not have any bank
records showing that he had loaned Wright money.
¶43 Moreover, Shayesteh’s briefing contains no analysis or
caselaw to support his claim that the district court erred in its
ruling on this issue. Our rules of appellate procedure require
parties to “explain, with reasoned analysis by citations to legal
authority and the record, why the party should prevail on
appeal.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8). “A party may not simply point
toward a pile of sand and expect the court to build a castle. In both
district and appellate courts, the development of an argument is
a party’s responsibility, not a judicial duty.” Lamb v. Lamb, 2024
UT App 16, ¶ 17, 545 P.3d 273 (cleaned up). Even as a pro se
litigant, Shayesteh had a duty before the district court at trial and
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 18 2024 UT App 146In re Estate of Wright; Anderson v. Shayesteh
before us in his briefing to provide more than his self-serving
testimony to support this claim. Accordingly, the claim fails.
CONCLUSION
¶44 With respect to the Marriage Case, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Shayesteh’s motion for a new trial
and its findings were squarely supported by the evidence and not
clearly erroneous. We further conclude Shayesteh failed to meet
his burden in challenging the Statute as unconstitutionally vague.
¶45 Regarding the Estate Case, Shayesteh lacks standing—
being neither spouse nor heir—to challenge the Estate and
Anderson in her role as its personal representative, so the district
court correctly dismissed those claims. We also agree with the
district court’s dismissal of Shayesteh’s remaining claims against
the Estate on the merits, concluding his ownership claim to the
House is precluded by the statute of frauds and the probate code
and his creditor claim suffers from insufficient evidence and
credibility issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
rulings in all respects.
20220582-CA; 20220883-CA 19 2024 UT App 146