Erda Community Assn v. Grantsville ( 2024 )

2024 UT App 126THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ERDA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION INC., RYAN SORENSEN, KALEM
SESSIONS, AND DENISE MOODY-MARTIN,
Appellants,
v.
GRANTSVILLE CITY,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20220760-CA
Filed September 12, 2024
Third District Court, Tooele Department
The Honorable Teresa Welch
No. 200301207
Janet M. Conway, Attorney for Appellants
Robert C. Keller, Dani N. Cepernich,
Nathanael J. Mitchell, and Brett M. Coombs,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY
concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 At issue in this case is whether Grantsville City
(Grantsville) lawfully annexed 550 acres of land (the Property)
into its boundaries in August 2020. Both Grantsville and the
owner of the Property were in favor of the annexation. But the
Property was located, at the time, inside the boundaries of a
proposed new city: Erda. Vehemently opposed to the annexation
stood certain members of the community who supported Erda’s
ongoing and then-incomplete incorporation process, including
appellants Ryan Sorensen, Kalem Sessions, and Denise Moody-
Martin (collectively, Sponsors)—three of the sponsors of the Erda
Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
incorporation petition—and including other community
members who had formed appellant Erda Community
Association Inc. (the Association).
¶2 Just a few weeks after Grantsville finalized the annexation,
Sponsors and the Association (collectively, Appellants) filed a
petition in district court challenging it. Eventually, however, the
court dismissed the petition on summary judgment, concluding
(among other things) that Appellants lacked statutory standing to
challenge Grantsville’s annexation of the Property. Appellants
contest that dismissal order and point out that they brought both
statutory and constitutional challenges to Grantsville’s
annexation. We agree with the district court, and with Grantsville,
on the question of whether Appellants have statutory standing to
bring statutory challenges to the annexation: they do not. But the
district court did not assess whether Appellants have traditional
standing to bring constitutional challenges to the annexation, and
we therefore remand the case to the district court for that
assessment to occur in the first instance.
BACKGROUND 1
Incorporation of the New City of Erda
¶3 Appellants describe Erda as “a rural, agriculture-based
area” situated in Tooele County between the cities of Grantsville
and Tooele. In 2018, Erda was a town located within
unincorporated Tooele County, see Tooele County v. Erda Cmty.
Ass’n, 2022 UT App 123, ¶ 1 n.1, 521 P.3d 872, and some of its
residents were “concerned about their area being developed into
a higher density residential area” and wanted more flexibility to
1. “When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the
facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below,” and we
recite the facts accordingly. Turley v. Childs, 2022 UT App 85, n.1,
515 P.3d 942 (quotation simplified).
20220760-CA 2 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
be able “to protect open space and their rural, agricultural
community.” To this end, Sponsors initiated the process of
incorporating a new city, known as Erda, and in October 2018
they asked the lieutenant governor’s office to conduct a study
aimed at ascertaining whether incorporation of the new city
would be feasible. See generally Utah Code §§ 10-2a-101 to -510
(2018) (the Incorporation Code). 2 With the request, Sponsors
submitted proposed municipal boundaries for the new city, and
the study—which was conducted over the next year or so—used
the proposed boundaries as parameters for measuring feasibility.
¶4 The feasibility study was completed in February 2020, and
it concluded that incorporation of the new city was “feasible and
would not place an additional tax burden on property owners in
the proposed incorporation area.” Thereafter, two public hearings
were held, one on March 23 and the other on March 30, where the
results of the study were presented to members of the public.
After that, Sponsors set about gathering the requisite number of
signatures from property owners inside the proposed
incorporation area. See id. § 10-2a-202(2)(a). Finally, on June 2,
2020, after they had gathered enough signatures, Sponsors
officially submitted to the lieutenant governor a petition
(Incorporation Petition) “to place Erda’s incorporation measure
on the ballot.” Shortly thereafter, the lieutenant governor’s office
certified the Incorporation Petition as valid and complete, and it
placed the matter on the ballot for the November 2020 general
election. In that election, the voters inside the proposed
2. The Incorporation Code indicates that if a “feasibility request
for incorporation of a city” was filed before May 14, 2019, then the
“process for incorporating the city” is subject to the law that was
in effect on the day the feasibility request was filed. Utah Code
§ 10-2a-106(1) (2023). Unless otherwise indicated, we therefore
refer to the 2018 version of the Incorporation Code, which was in
effect when Sponsors filed their feasibility request.
20220760-CA 3 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
incorporation area voted in favor of incorporation, and Erda
officially became a city in January 2022.
Grantsville’s Annexation of the Property
¶5 While most landowners inside the proposed incorporation
area were—as shown by the results of the election—in favor of
forming a new city, one particular corporate landowner
(Landowner) was not. In the spring of 2020, right after the
feasibility study was completed, Landowner—who owned the
Property—began to take steps to have the Property annexed into
neighboring Grantsville and thereby excluded from the
boundaries of the proposed new city of Erda. The Property is
rectangular in shape, and it is located mostly well inside the
boundaries of the proposed city of Erda, as those boundaries were
depicted in the feasibility study. However, for a short distance,
the southwest corner of the Property touches Grantsville’s eastern
boundary. 3 In March 2020, Landowner submitted a petition
(Annexation Petition) to Grantsville asking it to annex the
Property into Grantsville. See generally id. §§ 10-2-401 to -429
(2020) (the Annexation Code). 4
3. It is unclear from the record exactly how much of the Property,
pre-annexation, shared a boundary with Grantsville. But during
oral argument before this court, counsel for Appellants
represented that the Property was contiguous with Grantsville for
only about one hundred feet and characterized the Property as
“basically an island” inside Erda’s boundaries.
4. Absent one of the narrow exceptions enumerated by our
supreme court, such as a statutory provision that “is expressly
declared to be retroactive,” “courts must apply the law in effect at
the time of the occurrence regulated by that law.” State v. Clark,
2011 UT 23, ¶ 11, 251 P.3d 829 (quotation simplified). Because the
(continued…)
20220760-CA 4 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
¶6 After learning of the Annexation Petition, Sponsors
(through counsel) contacted Grantsville and urged Grantsville to
reject the Annexation Petition on the grounds that it did not
contain certain items and information required by the Annexation
Code. For instance, and among other asserted deficiencies,
Sponsors pointed out that the Annexation Petition did not contain
“an accurate and recordable map, prepared by a licensed
surveyor, of the area proposed for annexation.” See id. § 10-2-
403(3)(c). After hearing from Sponsors, Grantsville informed
Landowner that its Annexation Petition was indeed incomplete
and that it must submit additional information—including a final
plat map—required by the Annexation Code before its petition
could move forward. Landowner submitted an updated
Annexation Petition, including the previously missing map, on
May 28, 2020, five days before Sponsors submitted their
Incorporation Petition to the lieutenant governor’s office.
¶7 Grantsville then certified the Annexation Petition and
scheduled a public hearing of its city council, to be held on August
5, at which the Annexation Petition could be discussed. See id.
§ 10-2-418(5)–(6). On July 31, a member of the Association
submitted a written protest of the Annexation Petition, but this
protest misidentified the proposed annexed area. And on August
5, at some point prior to the hearing, Sponsors submitted a letter
to Grantsville opposing the annexation, outlining what they
believed to be legal grounds to deny the Annexation Petition and
asserting that Grantsville’s annexation of the Property would
have a deleterious effect on their pending Incorporation Petition.
¶8 On August 5, the public hearing went forward as
scheduled. At the hearing, Grantsville’s mayor read aloud the
Association member’s protest as well as the letter Grantsville had
received from Sponsors. The mayor then “asked if there were any
Annexation Petition was filed in early 2020, we apply and refer to
the 2020 version of the Annexation Code throughout this opinion.
20220760-CA 5 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
other comments” relevant to the Annexation Petition, and when
none were offered, he “closed the public hearing.” Later, during
the private portion of the hearing, the Grantsville City Council
voted to approve the annexation and to adopt “Ordinance 2020-
23,” thereby annexing the Property into Grantsville.
The Litigation
¶9 On September 2, 2020, Appellants initiated this action by
filing, in the district court, a “Petition for Judicial Review of Land
Use Decision and Declaratory Relief.” In their petition, Appellants
named Grantsville as respondent, 5 and they set forth two
“counts.” In their first count, they sought “judicial review” of a
“land-use decision” that they considered “illegal,” invoking
Utah’s Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management Act
(MLUDMA). See id. §§ 10-9a-101 to -1005. This claim is entirely
statutory: in essence, Appellants assert that Grantsville’s
annexation of the Property violated various provisions of the
Annexation Code. In their second count, Appellants made
constitutional claims, asserting that Grantsville’s annexation of
the Property had violated their due process rights under both the
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. In their
prayer for relief, Appellants asked for a declaration—having
earlier invoked Utah’s Declaratory Judgment Act, see id. §§ 78B-6-
401 to -412—that the annexation was “without authority, contrary
to law, in violation of [Appellants’] constitutional rights, and
void.” They also asked for “[e]xtraordinary relief in the form of an
order requiring” Grantsville to repeal the annexation ordinance,
and for attorney fees.
5. Appellants also named as respondents several individual
government officials. The district court eventually dismissed the
individual respondents—leaving Grantsville as the sole
respondent—and Appellants have not challenged that ruling.
20220760-CA 6 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
¶10 In the months following the filing of the petition, the
district court denied both Appellants’ motion for a preliminary
injunction and Grantsville’s motion to dismiss, and the case
moved through the discovery phase. After completion of
discovery, Grantsville and Sponsors filed dueling motions for
summary judgment. 6
¶11 In its motion, Grantsville requested that the petition be
dismissed in its entirety. In particular, Grantsville argued that
Appellants lacked standing to assert their MLUDMA claim
because “they are not within the zone of interests protected by the
relevant statutes” and because “they failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies.” What’s more, Grantsville reasserted its
position that even if Appellants could establish that they had
statutory standing to bring their claim, their challenges would
“fail on the merits” because Grantsville “complied with the
relevant statutory requirements” set forth in the Annexation
Code. As for Appellants’ due process claim, Grantsville argued
that it was entitled to summary judgment in its favor because
Appellants “cannot show the existence or deprivation of a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.”
¶12 In their competing motion, Sponsors asserted that while
their “initiative measure to incorporate Erda was pending on the
ballot, Grantsville certified an invalid, untimely, and legally
deficient annexation application,” and they asked the court to
declare the annexation “void ab initio” and to order Grantsville to
repeal the annexation ordinance. In response to Grantsville’s
motion, Appellants argued that they had standing to bring their
claims because the annexation had harmed their incorporation
efforts. And they asserted that “[t]he doctrine of administrative
exhaustion does not apply” to bar their petition, and even if it did,
6. The petitioner-side motion was filed only by Sponsors; the
Association—although it is included as a petitioner in Appellants’
petition—was specifically excluded as a movant.
20220760-CA 7 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
“unusual circumstances [exist] that necessitate application of
established exceptions to that doctrine.” In response to the
assertion that they had no protectable interest in the annexation
process, Appellants invoked their constitutional claim and argued
that the annexation had deprived them of due process. But due
process was not the only constitutional interest Appellants
referenced in their response to Grantsville’s motion. For the first
time in the litigation, Appellants invoked two other provisions of
the Utah Constitution: the citizen initiative right guaranteed by
Article VI, Section 1, and the open courts provision contained in
Article I, Section 11.7 Specifically, they asserted that Sponsors had
an interest in having the citizens of Erda vote on the Incorporation
Petition—for which they had gathered signatures to secure its
place on the general election ballot—using the proposed city
boundaries that had been presumed during the feasibility study.
And they asserted that if they were not allowed the “right to bring
legal action to challenge Grantsville’s illegal actions,” then their
rights to openly access the courts would be violated.
¶13 After full briefing and oral argument, the district court took
the matter under advisement, and a few weeks later it issued a
written ruling. The district court first concluded that Appellants
lacked statutory standing under the Annexation Code and
therefore could not bring a statutory challenge to Grantsville’s
annexation of the Property. The court noted that “the plain
language” of the Annexation Code indicated that a protest to an
annexation petition “may only be filed by” certain categories of
individuals and entities, including a “legislative body or
governing board of an affected entity” and an “owner” of certain
“rural real property.” See id. § 10-2-407(1). The court then
concluded that Appellants did not fall within any of the
7. During oral argument before this court, Appellants
acknowledged that the due process clauses (of both the federal
and state constitutions) were the only constitutional provisions
they mentioned in their petition.
20220760-CA 8 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
applicable categories, and that they could not “circumvent the
plain language” of the Annexation Code “by relying on other
unrelated” constitutional and statutory provisions. The court
completed this section of its analysis by stating that, “[f]or this
reason alone,” Grantsville’s motion to dismiss the petition should
be granted. However, the court did not assess whether Appellants
might have standing, under the separate traditional standing test,
to bring independent constitutional claims.
¶14 Alternatively, the district court concluded that Appellants
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, because none of
them had filed “a timely protest of” the Annexation Petition. And
it concluded that none of the exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement were applicable here, and that exhaustion
constituted an independent alternative basis for granting
Grantsville’s motion.
¶15 Finally, even though it noted “that it need not reach the
merits” of this matter, the court nevertheless indicated that it was
“persuaded by [Grantsville’s] argument that the plain language”
of the Annexation Code, specifically section 10-2-403, “created a
statutory window”—after a feasibility study had been completed
but before a final incorporation petition was filed with the
lieutenant governor’s office—within which an annexation
petition could lawfully be filed, notwithstanding the presence of
ongoing incorporation efforts.
¶16 On this basis, the district court denied Sponsors’ motion for
summary judgment and granted Grantsville’s, and it later entered
judgment in Grantsville’s favor.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶17 Appellants now appeal, and they challenge the district
court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Grantsville. In
general, “we review the district court’s summary judgment ruling
20220760-CA 9 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
for correctness and view all facts and reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party.” See GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Utah
State Univ., 2023 UT App 124, ¶ 18, 538 P.3d 933 (quotation
simplified). But when the decision has to do with standing,
governing case law is a bit murkier: we are to review the district
court’s “legal determinations relevant to” standing “for
correctness,” see Summit County v. Town of Hideout, 2024 UT 16,
¶ 28, and we “defer to the district court’s factual determinations,”
if any (although in the summary judgment context there shouldn’t
be), see Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. State, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 42.
The ultimate question of whether standing is present—even in
procedural contexts where no evidentiary hearing was held—is
“a mixed question of fact and law” because that question involves
“the application of a legal standard to a particularized set of
facts,” and on that question our supreme court has instructed us
to “give minimal discretion to” a court’s final determination “of
whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for
standing.” Id. (quotation simplified) (reviewing a standing
determination made in the context of a preliminary injunction);
see also Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶¶ 10–
11, 424 P.3d 95 (reciting the “minimal discretion” standard, even
in the context of reviewing a decision made on a motion to
dismiss). In the end, though, because this particular mixed
question is thought to be “primarily a question of law,” we follow
our supreme court’s lead in reviewing “the district court’s
determination for correctness.” See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan
River Restoration Network, 2018 UT 62, ¶ 19, 435 P.3d 179 (quotation
simplified); see also McKitrick v. Gibson, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 14, 496 P.3d
147 (stating that “the question of whether a specific individual has
standing to assert a claim is primarily a question of law”).
ANALYSIS
¶18 Appellants brought both statutory-based and
constitutional-based claims for relief, and the district court
20220760-CA 10 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
dismissed all of those claims for lack of standing. Appellants
appeal that ruling, and we begin our analysis with a general
discussion of standing, as it applies to both statutory and
constitutional claims. Thereafter, we address the merits of
Appellants’ arguments, discussing the statutory claims first and
then the constitutional claims.
I. Standing
¶19 The term “standing” is “a word of many, too many,
meanings.” See Environmental Barrier Co. v. Slurry Sys., Inc., 540
F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968) (“Standing has been called one of the m[o]st amorphous
concepts in the entire domain of public law.” (quotation
simplified)). “Everything from the fundamental requirement
imposed by Article III [of the United States Constitution] that
there must be a ‘case or controversy’ between the parties seeking
relief in federal court, to various prudential doctrines such as the
restrictions on invoking the rights of third parties, to the inquiry
whether a statute is designed to protect the rights of the person
before the court, has been swept into the word ‘standing.’”
Environmental Barrier, 540 F.3d at 605. Because it is a word that can
carry different meanings, bench and bar should take care to use
the term “standing” carefully and with precision.
¶20 In particular, one must take care to differentiate between
the sort of “standing” that carries jurisdictional implications and
the sort of “standing” that does not. As applicable here, there exist
material differences between “constitutional standing” and
“statutory standing.”
A. Constitutional Standing
¶21 Although the Utah Constitution—unlike the federal
constitution—does not contain a “case or controversy”
requirement and therefore “includes no express limitation” on
20220760-CA 11 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
Utah courts’ jurisdiction, our supreme court has stated that the
Utah Constitution “nevertheless mandates certain standing
requirements, which emanate from the principle of separation of
powers.” See Laws v. Grayeyes, 2021 UT 59, ¶ 33, 498 P.3d 410(quotation simplified); see also Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149–
50 (Utah 1983). And “to ensure this separation,” our constitution
“require[s] a plaintiff to demonstrate a personal stake in the
outcome of a dispute,” a requirement that “limits the jurisdiction
of the courts to those disputes which are most efficiently and
effectively resolved through the judicial process.” Laws, 2021 UT
59, ¶ 34 (quotation simplified).
¶22 Because this type of standing implicates Utah courts’
“judicial power” to hear cases—a power stemming from Article
VIII of the Utah Constitution—it carries jurisdictional
implications. See Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 2010 UT
29, ¶ 14, 232 P.3d 999 (stating that, “in Utah, standing is a
jurisdictional requirement” because “a challenge to a party’s
standing raises fundamental questions regarding a court’s basic
authority over the dispute” (quotation simplified)); see also
Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 69, 299 P.3d 1098 (Lee, J.,
concurring) (stating that “standing, like mootness, places well-
defined, principled limitations on the scope of Article VIII’s grant
of judicial power”); Zion Village Resort LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC,
2020 UT App 167, ¶ 53, 480 P.3d 1055 (“The type of ‘standing’ that
implicates subject-matter jurisdiction is standing of the
constitutional variety . . . .” (quotation simplified)). If this sort of
“constitutional standing”—also often referred to as “traditional
standing”—is not present, then Utah courts lack the judicial
power to adjudicate the case. Thus, all claimants—regardless of
the nature of their specific claims—must demonstrate that they
have constitutional standing to bring their claims.
¶23 Despite the fact that the Utah Constitution does not contain
the same “case or controversy” requirement found in the federal
constitution, our “‘traditional standing’ requirements mimic
20220760-CA 12 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
those imposed by the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the federal constitution.” Planned Parenthood
Ass’n of Utah v. State, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 47 n.5; accord Carlton v. Brown,
2014 UT 6, ¶ 23, 323 P.3d 571. As articulated by our supreme court,
the test for constitutional standing “is often referred to as the
distinct and palpable injury requirement.” See Utah Chapter of the
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 19, 148 P.3d 960(quotation simplified). This test involves a “three-step inquiry”:
(1) “the party must assert that it has been or will be adversely
affected by the challenged actions”; (2) “the party must allege a
causal relationship between the injury to the party, the challenged
actions and the relief requested”; and (3) “the relief requested
must be substantially likely to redress the injury claimed.” Id.(quotation simplified). Simply put, traditional standing requires a
claimant to show injury, causation, and redressability.
¶24 “Under the first prong of the traditional test, the
petitioning party must allege that it has suffered or will suffer
some distinct and palpable injury that gives it a personal stake in
the outcome of the legal dispute.” City of Grantsville v.
Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ¶ 14, 233 P.3d 461(quotation simplified). As for the second and third prongs,
“[t]here must also be some causal relationship alleged between
the injury to the plaintiff, the [challenged] actions and the relief
requested.” Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. And “[b]ecause standing
questions are usually raised prior to the introduction of any
evidence,” courts are often left having to make a judgment as to
the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to establish both a
causal relationship and that “the relief requested is substantially
likely to redress the injury claimed.” Id.
B. Statutory Standing
¶25 “Statutory standing” is a concept distinct from “traditional
standing,” and which arises only when the claim in question is
20220760-CA 13 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
statutory in nature—that is, the claim seeks relief under a statute
or asserts that statutory requirements have been violated.
¶26 In that situation, claimants must demonstrate both
statutory standing and traditional standing. See Bleazard v. City of
Erda, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 43, 552 P.3d 183 (stating that, in an “action to
enforce a statute, statutory standing is an initial ‘hurdle’ that a
plaintiff must clear before a court proceeds to examine whether
the plaintiff has shown traditional standing”); McKitrick v. Gibson,
2021 UT 48, ¶ 48, 496 P.3d 147 (stating that “statutory standing is
mandatory for statutory claims,” and that “traditional or
alternative standing cannot excuse a lack of statutory standing
where the petitioner is a statutory claimant”).
¶27 When our legislature enacts a statute, it is entitled—within
constitutional bounds—to enact “statutory requirements,” and “it
is entitled to designate, as it sees fit, how those requirements are
to be enforced.” Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 42 (quotation simplified).
In some situations, our legislature has limited the categories of
individuals or entities who are authorized to seek redress under a
statute. And in those situations, a claimant “has [statutory]
standing only if he [or she] is within the class of parties that the
legislature authorized to file suit.” Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39,
427 P.3d 1155 (Lee, J., concurring); accord McKitrick, 2021 UT 48,
¶ 48; cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572
U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (stating that whether a party has the requisite
standing to assert “a statutory cause of action” is dependent on
whether the interests of that petitioner “fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked” (quotation simplified)).
¶28 When the claim at issue is statutory, our supreme court has
instructed courts to begin the standing analysis with statutory
standing, and then move to an examination of traditional
standing only if statutory standing is present. See McKitrick, 2021
UT 48, ¶ 48 (“If a plaintiff is asserting a statutory claim, the
constitutional standing question arises if and only if the plaintiff
20220760-CA 14 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
has statutory standing.” (quotation simplified)); see also Haik, 2018
UT 39, ¶ 41 (Lee, J., concurring) (“Constitutional standing is a
backstop, in other words—a set of secondary requirements that
are relevant only if the plaintiff can first show that the legislature
has authorized him [or her] to file suit . . . .”).
¶29 Although our supreme court has not been entirely precise
on this point, 8 our understanding is that the statutory standing
inquiry—unlike the traditional/constitutional standing inquiry—
is not jurisdictional, because it does not implicate the
constitutional power of the judiciary but, rather, consists merely
of examining whether a plaintiff has met statutory prerequisites.
See In re adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 124, 417 P.3d 1 (stating that
any “deficiency in this or any other [statutory] prerequisite falls
outside the traditional scope of subject-matter jurisdiction”);
Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Fite Candy Co., 168 P. 427, 428 (Utah
1917) (stating that “[t]he objection that the plaintiff has not legal
capacity to sue, or to maintain or prosecute an action” is “like one
that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,” and does not
implicate subject-matter jurisdiction but, rather, is an objection
8. For instance, our supreme court has recently stated that a claim
of a party who lacks statutory standing “is not justiciable.” See
Bleazard v. City of Erda, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 37, 552 P.3d 183; see also Estate
of Faucheaux v. City of Provo, 2019 UT 41, ¶¶ 24–25, 449 P.3d 112(leaving open the question of whether “a plaintiff’s lack of
capacity to sue is an affirmative defense subject to forfeiture,” or
whether it “raise[d] a jurisdictional question that would not be
subject to waiver”). But the court has not explained why statutory
standing—as opposed to constitutional standing—would raise
justiciability concerns; accordingly, and until instructed
otherwise, we consider the court’s use of the term “not justiciable”
in this context to have simply been a way of stating that a
statutory claim cannot go forward in the absence of statutory
standing, and not necessarily indicating that statutory standing
raises any constitutional justiciability concerns.
20220760-CA 15 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
“that, under all of the codes, must be taken at the proper time and
in the proper manner or it will be deemed waived”); see also
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4 (opining that the absence of “statutory
standing . . . does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the
court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case”
(quotation simplified)); Norris v. Causey, 869 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir.
2017) (holding that a question whether a plaintiff is the proper
party to bring suit is one of “contractual or statutory standing and
does not go to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction”).
¶30 At root, questions surrounding statutory standing are
questions of statutory interpretation. See Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 46
(“Whether a party has a statutory private right of action is a
question of statutory interpretation.” (quotation simplified)); see
also McKitrick, 2021 UT 48, ¶¶ 33–43 (interpreting the language of
the relevant statute and generally discussing whether it allowed
the petitioner to seek redress). If the statute that the claimant
invokes expressly allows that claimant—as opposed to just the
State or other categories of individuals—to seek redress, then the
claimant has statutory standing. See Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 43
(stating that statutory standing exists if the claimant is “within the
class of parties that the legislature authorized to file suit for such
a statutory violation”).
¶31 If the statute that the claimant invokes does not expressly
allow that claimant to seek redress, then the claimant must show
that there exists a “clearly implied” right of redress in the
statutory language. See Conner v. Department of Com., 2019 UT App
91, ¶ 27, 443 P.3d 1250 (“The creation of such a right must be either
express or clearly implied from the text of the statute.” (quotation
simplified)). But Utah courts are reluctant to recognize such
implied rights. Indeed, our supreme court recently had this to say
on the subject:
In the absence of language expressly granting a
private right of action in the statute itself, the courts
20220760-CA 16 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
of this state are reluctant to imply a private right of
action based on state law. Our reluctance is
amplified when, for example, discerning a right of
action would require us to infer language and
meaning that does not appear on the face of the
statute or when doing so would be inconsistent with
the Legislature’s statutory scheme. As a result, we
are not generally in the habit of implying a private
right of action. In fact, Utah courts have rarely, if
ever, found a Utah statute to grant an implied
private right of action.
Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 47 (quotation simplified); see also Touchard
v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71, ¶ 21, 148 P.3d 945 (“Utah courts are
reluctant to imply a private statutory cause of action in the
absence of express statutory language.”). And our supreme court
has recently declined invitations to recognize implied rights of
action from “oblique” statutory references, see Bleazard, 2024 UT
17, ¶ 55, or from a “statute’s broad statements of purpose,” see
Summit County v. Town of Hideout, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 43. Thus,
generally speaking, if a claimant does not fall within the class of
persons identified in the statute as authorized to seek redress, that
claimant will lack statutory standing and will not be allowed to
maintain any claims arising under that statute. See Bleazard, 2024
UT 17, ¶ 56; Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 43; see also Jensen v. IHC
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 335 (Utah 1997) (stating that the
decedent’s children could not bring a wrongful death claim
because the decedent had a guardian at the time of her death and
the relevant statute at the time only allowed such an action to be
brought by a personal representative or guardian of the
decedent); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183,
1185–87 (Utah 1996) (concluding that the grandparents of an
unborn child were not within the class of individuals entitled to
bring a wrongful death claim where the legislature indicated such
claims could only be brought by a “parent” or “guardian”).
20220760-CA 17 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
C. The Interplay Between Constitutional and Statutory Standing
¶32 Finally, we briefly discuss some aspects of the interplay
between constitutional and statutory standing. First, as noted,
statutory standing is a concept that applies only to claims that
seek redress under a statute; it does not apply to other types of
claims, including common-law claims and constitutional claims,
and claimants who bring these other types of claims do not need
to demonstrate statutory standing. See Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 39 (Lee,
J., concurring) (stating that statutory standing is required only
“[i]f the plaintiff is asserting a statutory claim”); see also Bleazard,
2024 UT 17, ¶ 41 (engaging in only a statutory standing analysis
because the claimants did not make any common-law or
constitutional claims); Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 34 (same).
¶33 Second, and relatedly, the traditional standing test—and
not the statutory standing test—is applicable where a party raises
a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. See Planned
Parenthood Ass’n of Utah, 2024 UT 28, ¶ 52 (applying traditional
standing to the plaintiff’s challenge to a Utah statute that
threatened criminal prosecution and licensing penalties to
physicians providing certain types of abortion care); see also State
v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶¶ 44–52, 345 P.3d 1226 (examining a
party’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal
statute under the traditional standing test); Carlton v. Brown, 2014
UT 6, ¶¶ 24–25, 323 P.3d 571 (concluding that a father with
traditional standing could challenge the constitutionality of the
Utah Adoption Act even though he “lacked [statutory] standing
. . . because he did not have any rights to the child in the first
place”). Indeed, our supreme court rejected as “circular[]” the
argument that a claimant who lacks statutory standing is thereby
barred from challenging the relevant statute on constitutional
grounds, and stated:
If a plaintiff wishes to challenge the constitutionality
of a statute and has adequately shown harm,
20220760-CA 18 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
causation, and redressability, the allegedly
unconstitutional statute cannot then be used as
grounds for denying that plaintiff standing. For if it
could be so utilized, it would be impossible to raise
a constitutional challenge to any statute, no matter
how unconstitutional, provided that the statute
itself denied standing to putative plaintiffs who
wish to challenge it.
Carlton, 2014 UT 6, ¶ 25.
II. Appellants’ Specific Challenges
¶34 With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of
Appellants’ specific challenges to the district court’s order
dismissing both their statutory claims and their constitutional
claims for lack of standing. We agree with Grantsville that the
court correctly dismissed Appellants’ statutory claims for lack of
statutory standing. But we reach a different conclusion with
regard to the court’s dismissal of Appellants’ constitutional
claims, because it is not apparent from this record that Appellants
lack traditional standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
Annexation Code.
A. Statutory Claims
¶35 As noted already, Appellants’ main grievance is statutory:
they assert that Grantsville violated certain provisions of the
Annexation Code during its annexation of the Property. They seek
redress for these asserted statutory violations in two respects.
First, they ask for a judicial order—a declaratory judgment—
stating that Grantsville’s annexation of the Property was in
violation of the Annexation Code and was therefore “without
authority, contrary to law, . . . and void.” Second, they seek
judicial review of Grantsville’s annexation ordinance pursuant to
MLUDMA, which allows an “adversely affected party” to seek
judicial review of “a land use decision.” See Utah Code § 10-9a-
20220760-CA 19 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
801(1), (2)(a). These claims for redress are entirely statutory, and
therefore Appellants must demonstrate statutory standing in
order to bring them. But they have not made that showing.
1. The Annexation Code and the Declaratory Judgment Act
¶36 Our legislature has “the authority to determine municipal
boundaries,” a subject that includes the ability to regulate land
annexation, “which is the extension of town or city boundaries
into unincorporated areas.” Summit County v. Town of Hideout,
2024 UT 16, ¶ 6. To this end, our legislature has enacted the
Annexation Code, pursuant to which it has “delegated” certain
annexation powers “to local governments,” see id., and has set
forth the particulars of when and how cities may annex land into
their municipal boundaries, see Utah Code §§ 10-2-401 to -429.
And in so doing, our legislature has put restrictions in place
regarding how a city’s annexation decisions can be challenged,
including restrictions on who is entitled to raise such challenges.
See id. § 10-2-407(1); see also Bleazard v. City of Erda, 2024 UT 17,
¶ 42, 552 P.3d 183 (“Where the legislature creates statutory
requirements, it is entitled to designate, as it sees fit, how those
requirements are to be enforced.” (quotation simplified)).
¶37 Under the plain language of the version of the Annexation
Code in effect in 2020, a “protest to an annexation petition . . . may
be filed by” anyone who fits within one of three categories:
(1) “the legislative body or governing board of an affected entity”;
(2) “the owner of” certain “rural real property” as defined in a
different statute; or (3) for annexations “within a county of the
first class,” “the owners of private real property” that meets
certain conditions. Utah Code § 10-2-407(1). The district court
determined that Appellants do not fit within any of these
categories. And Appellants do not challenge that determination
here on appeal; that is, they do not contest the court’s ruling that
they do not “fall within the class of parties that the legislature
authorized to file suit to enforce the statutory scheme,” see
20220760-CA 20 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 37 (quotation simplified), and that they
therefore have no statutory right to file a protest of Grantsville’s
annexation of the Property. Thus, Appellants acknowledge that
they lack statutory standing to seek redress pursuant to the
Annexation Code.
¶38 Instead, Appellants turn to the Declaratory Judgment Act,
and contend that they don’t need to “rely upon obtaining
statutory standing” from the Annexation Code because, in their
view, the Declaratory Judgment Act affords them the necessary
statutory standing. But this argument is directly foreclosed by our
supreme court’s recent holdings in Bleazard and Summit County. 9
In those cases, the court held that “parties may bring actions
under the Declaratory Judgment Act only if they can show that
the justiciable and jurisdictional elements requisite in ordinary
actions—including standing—are present.” Summit County, 2024
UT 16, ¶ 33 (quotation simplified); see also Bleazard, 2024 UT 17,
¶ 39 (“To bring a declaratory judgment action, a plaintiff must
show that the justiciable and jurisdictional elements requisite in
ordinary actions are present.” (quotation simplified)). The court
pointed out that one of the requirements that must be satisfied in
order to succeed on a Declaratory Judgment Act claim is that the
party “seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the
controversy,” something that—for a statutory claim—exists only
when the claimant has “an express or implied statutory right of
action.” Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶¶ 33, 35. And the court
made clear that a party who complains that a statute has been
violated, but who is not within the class of persons authorized to
seek relief under that statute, cannot use the Declaratory
Judgment Act to circumvent its lack of statutory standing.
9. After our supreme court issued these two opinions, we invited
the parties “to address the applicability of these cases in
simultaneously-filed supplemental briefs.” Both parties took the
opportunity to submit such briefing; we appreciate the parties’
input and have considered their submissions.
20220760-CA 21 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
Instead, the court held that “[p]laintiffs who seek a declaration
that statutorily created requirements have been violated—and
who do not invoke legal rights protected elsewhere, such as in the
common law or the constitution—must show that they have so-
called ‘statutory standing.’” Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 37; accord
Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 35.
¶39 Appellants here do not contest the district court’s
determination that they do not fit within any of the categories of
individuals authorized under the Annexation Code to file a
protest to a municipal annexation. Because of this, Appellants not
only lack statutory standing under the Annexation Code, but they
also lack any “legally protectible interest” that would allow them
to seek a declaratory judgment regarding any alleged violation of
the Annexation Code. Accordingly, Appellants lack standing to
seek redress for such statutory violations, regardless of whether
they ground their complaints in the Annexation Code or the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
2. MLUDMA
¶40 Alternatively, Appellants invoke MLUDMA and assert a
statutory right, as an “adversely affected party,” to seek judicial
review of Grantsville’s “land use decision” to annex the Property.
See Utah Code § 10-9a-801(1), (2)(a). 10 But in order to meaningfully
analyze whether Appellants have standing to bring this claim, we
must identify Appellants’ underlying complaint about what it is
they think was wrong with Grantsville’s annexation of the
Property. After all, the MLUDMA provision they invoke—section
10-9a-801—simply sets forth a procedural mechanism for obtaining
10. For purposes of this section of our opinion, we assume
(without deciding) that Appellants qualify as parties that were
“adversely affected” by Grantsville’s annexation of the Property,
and that Grantsville’s decision to annex the Property was a “land
use decision” within the meaning of section 10-9a-801(2)(a).
20220760-CA 22 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
review of a land use decision; it does not set forth any substantive
standards about the propriety of such decisions. See id. § 10-9a-
801. The substantive standards by which a district court would,
on review, assess the legality of the challenged land use decision
must come from somewhere else in the law. And as we
understand their claim, Appellants assert, in their MLUDMA
claim, that judicial relief would be appropriate because
Grantsville’s annexation of the Property violated certain
provisions of the Annexation Code.
¶41 Assuming that we are correctly interpreting Appellants’
MLUDMA claim, it fails for the same reason (discussed above)
that their Declaratory Judgment Act claim fails: for lack of
statutory standing to complain about violations of the Annexation
Code. Regardless of whether their entrée to the district court
comes by way of the Declaratory Judgment Act or by way of
MLUDMA’s judicial review provision, Appellants’ underlying
complaint is the same: they contend that Grantsville’s annexation
of the Property violated the Annexation Code. And for the reasons
already explained, they lack statutory standing to complain about
Grantsville’s alleged noncompliance with those statutory
requirements. Appellants are not permitted to use MLUDMA’s
procedural judicial review provision as an end run around their
lack of statutory standing under the Annexation Code. 11
¶42 But even assuming that we aren’t correctly interpreting
Appellants’ MLUDMA claim and that the underlying grievance
11. In other words, if Appellants had statutory standing to protest
Grantsville’s annexation, and if they had exhausted their
administrative remedies by doing so, then they may be able to
invoke MLUDMA’s judicial review provision to seek judicial
examination of their complaint that Grantsville violated the
Annexation Code by annexing the Property (assuming, of course,
that they are an “adversely affected party” and that Grantsville’s
annexation was a “land use decision,” see supra note 10).
20220760-CA 23 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
for which Appellants seek judicial review concerns some
unspecified violation for which they would have statutory
standing to complain, they failed in that event to exhaust their
administrative remedies. MLUDMA has a strict statutory
exhaustion requirement, which mandates that “[n]o person may
challenge in district court a land use decision until that person has
exhausted the person’s administrative remedies . . . .” Id. § 10-9a-
801(1). Appellants do not contend that they complied with this
requirement, and they acknowledge that they did not file any
administrative challenge to the annexation of the Property.
Instead, they assert that their failure to exhaust is excused by
either of two of the established exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement. In particular, Appellants assert that exhaustion
would have been a futile exercise, and that exhaustion is excused
here because Grantsville “acted outside the scope of its defined,
statutory authority.” See Tooele County v. Erda Cmty. Ass’n, 2022
UT App 123, ¶ 23, 521 P.3d 872 (stating that the recognized
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement include situations
“where exhaustion would serve no purpose, or is futile” and
“where an administrative agency or officer has acted outside the
scope of its defined, statutory authority” (quotation simplified)).
¶43 Appellants’ futility argument is premised on the notion
that filing a protest would have been futile because “they were
aware that they did not have statutory standing to file a protest,”
and filing a protest without statutory standing is a futile exercise.
We certainly can’t argue with the logic of that statement. But it
doesn’t help Appellants here: as discussed above, Appellants’
lack of statutory standing means they have no right to complain,
to either administrative bodies or to the district court, about
Grantsville’s alleged violation of the Annexation Code. If
Appellants lack statutory standing, then their claim fails
regardless of any exhaustion requirement. The exhaustion
requirement is only potentially relevant here if we indulge the
assumption—which may be wrong—that Appellants’ claim for
judicial review might be based on something other than the
20220760-CA 24 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
Annexation Code and for which they might have statutory
standing. Yet Appellants make no argument that any such claim
would be futile.
¶44 And we simply reject Appellants’ contention that
Grantsville, by annexing the Property, “acted outside the scope of
its defined, statutory authority.” See id. (quotation simplified).
Inquiries about whether a municipality acted outside the scope of
its authority are to be analyzed “at a categorical level, rather than
a granular one.” Id. ¶ 37. There is no doubt that Grantsville
possesses statutory authority to annex land into its boundaries.
The mere fact that “certain procedures may not have been
followed, or requirements met,” in exercising its statutory
authority “does not mean that the action falls [outside] the
agency’s authority” for purposes of the exhaustion exception. See
Salt Lake City Mission v. Salt Lake City, 2008 UT 31, ¶ 12 n.2, 184
P.3d 599; see also Tooele County, 2022 UT App 123, ¶ 36.
¶45 Thus, Appellants’ MLUDMA claim fails because either
Appellants lack statutory standing to bring it or they failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies. In short, Appellants have
no statutory standing to complain about any alleged violations of
the Annexation Code that may have occurred during Grantsville’s
annexation of the Property. Appellants thus have no cognizable
statutory claims, and the district court did not err by dismissing
all their statutory claims on summary judgment. 12
12. Appellants also challenge the district court’s rulings—which it
did not need to make, given its dismissal on standing grounds—
that discussed the merits of their assertions that Grantsville
violated the Annexation Code in annexing the Property, including
the district court’s ruling that our legislature, in enacting the
Annexation Code, “created a statutory window”—after a
feasibility study had been completed but before a final
(continued…)
20220760-CA 25 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
B. Constitutional Claims
¶46 But Appellants’ claims also include grievances rooted not
in statutes but in constitutional provisions. The district court
dismissed these claims, along with the statutory claims, on the
basis that Appellants could not “circumvent the plain language”
of the Annexation Code “by relying on other unrelated”
constitutional provisions. At some level, we sympathize with the
district court, because Appellants’ constitutional claims are not
very clearly pleaded. But we ultimately agree with Appellants
that the district court prematurely dismissed these claims without
engaging in an analysis of whether Appellants have traditional
standing to assert them.
¶47 As best we can ascertain (construing Appellants’ claims
liberally, as we must, see Zubiate v. American Family Ins. Co., 2022
UT App 144, ¶¶ 11–16, 524 P.3d 148), Appellants take issue with
the constitutionality of two aspects of the Annexation Code. 13
incorporation petition was filed with the lieutenant governor’s
office—within which an annexation petition could lawfully be
filed, notwithstanding the presence of ongoing incorporation
efforts. But since we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Appellants’ statutory claims on standing grounds, we do not need
to weigh in on the correctness of the court’s merits-related rulings
regarding those claims.
13. Indeed, during oral argument before this court, Appellants’
counsel indicated that Appellants were challenging the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Annexation Code.
Utah law requires a party making such a challenge to “notify the
Attorney General of such fact by serving the notice on the
Attorney General,” Utah R. Civ. P. 24(d)(1), and, again during oral
argument, Appellants’ counsel asserted that she had notified the
Attorney General of Appellants’ challenge. We are unable to
(continued…)
20220760-CA 26 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
First, they challenge the provision that limits the parties entitled
to file a “protest to an annexation petition.” See Utah Code § 10-2-
407(1). Second, they challenge the provisions containing the so-
called “statutory window,” see id. § 10-2-403(5), which the district
court interpreted as creating a window of time—after a feasibility
study has been completed but before a final incorporation petition
is filed with the lieutenant governor—during which annexation
petitions can be filed regarding land within proposed city
boundaries, even if incorporation efforts are ongoing.
¶48 These two aspects of the Annexation Code, according to
Appellants, violate three distinct constitutional rights: (1) the right
to due process, see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Utah Const.
art. I, § 7; (2) the open courts clause, see Utah Const. art. I, § 11;
and (3) the right to put forth a citizen initiative, see id. art. VI, § 1. 14
Below, we provide a brief summary of Appellants’ claims, as we
understand them, related to each of these rights.
locate evidence of any such notice in the record submitted to us,
but since Grantsville did not raise this issue on appeal, we leave
this matter to be resolved, if necessary, on remand.
14. In their petition, Appellants made mention only of the due
process right; their petition is entirely devoid of any mention of
the open courts clause or the citizen initiative right. There is,
therefore, some question in our minds as to whether Appellants
properly pleaded constitutional challenges related to the open
courts clause or the initiative right. But Grantsville raised no issue,
either before the district court or on appeal, regarding the
adequacy of Appellants’ pleadings regarding these claims, and
has chosen, in its brief, to challenge Appellants’ standing
arguments head-on. Thus, we follow Grantsville’s lead and
assume—without rendering any decision on the matter—that
Appellants’ constitutional claims are adequately pleaded, and we
leave any questions in this regard to be resolved on remand.
20220760-CA 27 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
¶49 Appellants’ due process claim is apparently procedural,
not substantive. And procedural due process “requires notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.” Migliore v. Livingston
Fin., LLC, 2015 UT 9, ¶ 27, 347 P.3d 394 (quotation simplified); see
also McBride v. Utah State Bar, 2010 UT 60, ¶ 16, 242 P.3d 769(“Procedural due process requires, at a minimum, timely and
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
way.” (quotation simplified)). According to Appellants, they
should have been afforded “a meaningful opportunity to be
heard” before Grantsville annexed nearly 550 acres from within
the proposed incorporation boundaries. And they claim that the
Annexation Code, which does not allow them to file a protest of
Grantsville’s annexation of the Property and, instead, limits them
to simply commenting at the annexation hearing along with other
members of the public, does not provide them any meaningful
opportunity to be heard.
¶50 Appellants also invoke the open courts clause of the Utah
Constitution, Utah Const. art. I, § 11, which has been interpreted
to provide some procedural protections but also, significantly, to
“secure[] substantive rights, thereby restricting the legislature’s
ability to abrogate remedies provided by law.” Tindley v. Salt Lake
City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 13, 116 P.3d 295. Appellants argue
that “[a]t common law,” they “originally would have been
entitled to a legal remedy” that would have allowed them to
protest the annexation of the Property. In particular, Appellants
claim that “[a]dversely affected land-owners” have long been
afforded a common-law remedy “relating to annexations.” Thus,
Appellants contend that the Annexation Code, by not allowing
them to protest Grantsville’s annexation of the Property,
effectively abrogated their alleged common-law right to challenge
the annexation, and therefore violates the open courts clause of
the Utah Constitution.
20220760-CA 28 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
¶51 Finally, Appellants invoke the citizen initiative right found
in the Utah Constitution, Utah Const. art. VI, § 1, which “vests in
the voters of Utah the power to pass legislation through the
initiative process.” League of Women Voters of Utah v. Utah State
Legislature, 2024 UT 21, ¶ 2. While our legislature “exercises its
[legislative] power by passing laws during legislative sessions,”
the citizens of this state “exercise their [legislative] power by
voting during elections on initiatives that have qualified for the
ballot.” Id.; see also Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 25, 54 P.3d
1069 (“Initiative is the power of a voter to directly legislate via
exercising the right to vote.”). Appellants assert that they were in
the process of exercising their citizen initiative right by following
the Incorporation Code and having the city of Erda officially
incorporated. And, according to Appellants, this gave them “a
cognizable interest distinct from the residents at large to protect
their initiative[],” which as they see it meant “protecting the fixed
boundaries that form the basis of their successful ballot measure.”
They believe that those efforts were undermined when
Grantsville annexed the Property while Appellants were in the
process of gathering the requisite signatures. In their view, the
citizen initiative provisions of the Utah Constitution mandate
that, “at the time [a] petition for incorporation is circulated for
signature gathering, the boundaries must be definite and certain.”
¶52 In its ruling on the competing motions for summary
judgment, the district court concluded that Appellants lacked
statutory standing to assert their claims and then went on to state
that they could not “circumvent the plain language” of the
Annexation Code “by relying on other unrelated” constitutional
provisions. But, as noted above, see supra ¶ 33, our supreme court
has rejected as “circular[]” the argument that a claimant who lacks
statutory standing would be barred from challenging the relevant
statute on constitutional grounds. See Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6,
¶ 25, 323 P.3d 571; see also Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 41 (rejecting the
petitioners’ claims for lack of statutory standing but noting that
the petitioners had not alleged “that the [challenged action]
20220760-CA 29 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
violated their constitutional rights”); Summit County, 2024 UT 16,
¶ 34 (same). Moreover, as already noted, see supra ¶ 33, the
traditional standing test—and not the statutory standing test—is
applicable where a party raises a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute. Thus, to the extent that Appellants have raised
claims challenging the constitutional validity of the Annexation
Code, Appellants should be able to proceed with those claims if
they can establish that they have traditional standing to do so.
¶53 The district court did not engage with the question of
whether Appellants have traditional standing to bring these
constitutional challenges. We must therefore remand the case to
the district court to undertake that analysis, unless it is clear from
the record that Appellants do not possess traditional standing. See
Olguin v. Anderton, 2019 UT 73, ¶ 20, 456 P.3d 760 (“It is within
our discretion to affirm a judgment on an alternative ground if it
is apparent in the record.” (quotation simplified)). Here, we do
not think it is readily apparent from the record submitted to us
that Appellants lack traditional standing.
¶54 Traditional standing requires an assessment of whether a
plaintiff has alleged facts showing that the plaintiff satisfies each
aspect of the traditional standing test—injury, causation, and
redressability. See Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality
Board, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 19, 148 P.3d 960. In our view, it is not
apparent, in this record, that Appellants are unable to meet the
first aspect of this test. Here, Appellants allege that they have been
injured by Grantsville’s annexation of the Property during their
ongoing incorporation process. See id. (stating that “the
petitioning party must allege that it has suffered or will suffer
some distinct and palpable injury that gives it a personal stake in
the outcome of the legal dispute” (emphasis added) (quotation
simplified)). Appellants point out that the feasibility study was
conducted based on the proposed municipal boundaries for the
new city of Erda, and they argue that the removal of the Property
from within its boundaries means they are “unable to rely upon
20220760-CA 30 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
projections contained in Erda’s feasibility study,” something they
allege “undermin[ed] confidence in . . . the continued viability of
the fledgling city.” According to Appellants, the study “hinged on
the continuity of this area, and it took into account property tax
revenue, and business tax revenue that identified the businesses
that existed in the community.” And “because [the Property] is
essentially an island within Erda, Erda is responsible for the road
maintenance and public safety surrounding [the Property],”
which Appellants explain is a burden and financial cost that will
have to be borne by the citizens of Erda “without the benefit of the
revenue from development and additional property, sales, and
business taxes.” Appellants also identify potential environmental
concerns that are contingent on whether Grantsville allows the
Property to be used for commercial purposes. Based on those
assertions, it is not clear, on this record, that Appellants—who are
all residents of the new city of Erda and whose ranks include
several sponsors of the Incorporation Petition—will not be able to
show a particularized injury sufficient to satisfy the first prong of
the traditional standing test.
¶55 As for causation and redressability, it is likewise not
apparent from the record that Appellants are unable to meet these
requirements. Because these issues are often “raised prior to the
introduction of any evidence,” courts are often left having to make
a judgment as to the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to
establish both a causal relationship and that “the relief requested
is substantially likely to redress the injury claimed.” Jenkins v.
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). And while “a plaintiff
claiming standing under the traditional criteria does not need to
prove causation to the same extent it will be required to prove it
at trial,” Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 32, there is
nothing in the district court’s ruling in this matter for us to review
related to this prong of the traditional standing test. The same is
true for redressability, and we are unable to conclude on this
record that Appellants can, or cannot, satisfy this prong. For these
reasons, we decline Grantsville’s invitation to affirm the district
20220760-CA 31 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
court’s dismissal of Appellants’ constitutional claims on the
alternative—and heretofore unexamined—ground that
Appellants lack traditional standing to bring those claims.
¶56 Finally, we address—and reject—Grantsville’s contention
that Appellants’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should also result in the dismissal of their constitutional claims (in
addition to their statutory claims). Grantsville is correct when it
asserts that litigants may not sidestep an exhaustion requirement
simply by characterizing their claims as having some
constitutional dimension. See Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003
UT 7, ¶ 18, 67 P.3d 466 (rejecting a party’s categorical argument
that exhaustion was never required for “state constitutional
claims”); see also Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234,
1237 (Utah 1980) (stating that “the mere introduction of a
constitutional issue” does not necessarily “obviate the need for
exhaustion of administrative remedies”). The analysis is more
complex than that, as we discuss. But ultimately we agree with
Appellants that they did not need to exhaust administrative
remedies before bringing these constitutional claims.
¶57 Grantsville correctly posits that, sometimes, litigants are
required to exhaust administrative remedies even when their
claims have some constitutional dimension. For instance, litigants
must exhaust when their claim might be resolved at the
administrative level in a way that would avoid the constitutional
question altogether. See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT
74, ¶ 17, 34 P.3d 180 (holding that a litigant needed to exhaust
administrative remedies when one of its claims was that the Tax
Commission lacked constitutional authority to impose a specific
interest rate, because “the Tax Commission could have
determined that the imposition of the interest rate was
unwarranted” and such a conclusion would have “avoided the
constitutional questions”). And when the relevant administrative
rules or processes incorporate constitutional concepts, litigants
must exhaust administrative remedies for claims that implicate
20220760-CA 32 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
those constitutional concepts. See Demill v. Peace Officer Standards
& Training Council, 2023 UT App 56, ¶¶ 15–23, 531 P.3d 781.
¶58 But the situation is different when the gravamen of a
litigant’s claim is a request that a legislative enactment be struck
down as unconstitutional, because only courts of law, which
possess judicial power, have “the power to rule on the
constitutionality of statutes.” See Renn v. Utah State Board of
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995) (stating that the Utah Court
of Appeals, and not just the Utah Supreme Court, “has the power
to rule on the constitutionality of statutes” because this court
“exercises Article VIII judicial power”). Administrative agencies
and municipal boards do not possess judicial power and,
accordingly, do not have the power to declare legislation
unconstitutional. See ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009
UT 36, ¶ 12, 211 P.3d 382 (stating, in a case involving a claim that
the underlying taxation statute was unconstitutional, that “raising
the state constitutional claim in the administrative proceeding
would not have served any useful purpose related to notice
because the [Tax] Commission had no authority to address any of
the constitutional claims”); Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237 (stating that
“[a]dministrative agencies do not generally determine the
constitutionality of their organic legislation”); State Tax Comm’n v.
Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1979) (“It is not for the Tax
Commission to determine questions of legality or
constitutionality of legislative enactments.” (quotation
simplified)); see also Muddy Boys, Inc. v. Department of Com., 2019
UT App 33, ¶ 18, 440 P.3d 741 (“[A]dministrative tribunals do not
possess judicial power . . . .”). For these reasons, litigants whose
claim is that statutory provisions should be declared
unconstitutional need not—at least not where such claims cannot
be avoided by a different resolution of the administrative process,
see Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 17—exhaust administrative remedies
before bringing such claims to court. See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy
City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (“Regarding a
facial—as opposed to an as-applied—attack [to a city ordinance],
20220760-CA 33 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
the challenger need not seek a final decision regarding the
application of the [ordinance] . . . before the government entity
charged with its implementation.” (quotation simplified)).
¶59 Appellants’ constitutional claims, as we understand them,
fit this bill: they are asking for certain provisions of the
Annexation Code to be declared unconstitutional, and these
claims could not have been avoided by a different resolution at
the municipal level. Grantsville had no power to do anything
other than apply the statutory provisions as written, and there is
no realistic possibility that the outcome of any municipal protest
would have resulted in avoidance of Appellants’ constitutional
grievances. Indeed, we agree with Appellants that any attempt to
exhaust would have been futile here, where Grantsville was
tasked with applying a statute that clearly gave Appellants no
right to protest. In this situation, the correct place to bring a
constitutional challenge to the Annexation Code was district
court, not the Grantsville City Council.
¶60 For all of these reasons, we are unable to affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Appellants’ constitutional claims on any of
the alternative grounds suggested by Grantsville. We therefore
conclude that the prudent course of action is to remand the matter
to the district court so that it can apply the traditional standing
analysis to these constitutional claims in the first instance. 15
15. It should go without saying that our decision to remand this
case to the district court for further consideration of Appellants’
constitutional claims should not be taken as an indication of any
opinion on our part, one way or the other, as to the merits of those
claims. Simply put, the district court did not reach the merits of
those claims—as opposed to the statutory claims—and neither do
we. It is of course possible for litigants to have standing to raise
claims that end up being deemed unmeritorious after full
(continued…)
20220760-CA 34 2024 UT App 126Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City
CONCLUSION
¶61 The district court correctly dismissed Appellants’ statutory
claims—whether stated under the Annexation Code, the
Declaratory Judgment Act, or MLUDMA—for lack of statutory
standing. But Appellants’ constitutional claims cannot be
dismissed for lack of statutory standing, and the district court
erred in dismissing those claims on that basis. Accordingly, we
affirm the court’s dismissal of Appellants’ statutory claims but
reverse its dismissal, at this procedural stage, of Appellants’
constitutional claims, and we remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including
analysis of whether Appellants possess traditional standing to
bring their constitutional claims. 16
adjudication. See Southern Utah Wilderness All. v. San Juan County
Comm’n, 2021 UT 6, ¶ 26, 484 P.3d 1160 (“As courts have
consistently recognized, a plaintiff can have standing despite
losing on the merits.” (quotation simplified)). At various places in
its briefing, Grantsville includes brief commentary and argument
about the merits of Appellants’ constitutional claims, but we
decline Grantsville’s invitation to address those arguments here,
in the first instance, and we leave all such questions for
consideration on remand as necessary.
16. In their briefing on appeal, Appellants also asserted that the
district court had abused its discretion by “refusing,” once it had
concluded that Appellants lacked statutory standing, to convert
the action into “one brought under [r]ule 65B” of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure that seeks an extraordinary writ. Because we
are reversing the dismissal of Appellants’ constitutional claims,
we need not reach this issue in this opinion. Appellants are, of
course, free to pursue that request on remand, if necessary.
20220760-CA 35 2024 UT App 126