USAA Casualty Insurance Company v. Hensley , 251 Va. 177 ( 1996 )

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and
Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 950729 SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING
January 12, 1996
MICHAEL STEVEN HENSLEY, et al.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Gerald B. Lee, Judge
In this appeal, we decide whether an insured's family
automobile liability policy provided liability coverage for a
named operator's use of a non-owned automobile.
I.
In 1989, Vanessa Magdelena Hoang and her husband, John Paul
Hoang, moved from California to Jidda, Saudi Arabia where Mr.
Hoang was employed by Saudi Airlines. While in Jidda, the Hoangs
lived in a house with their four children.
No further education was available to the Hoang children in
Saudi Arabia after the ninth grade. Accordingly, the parents
sent their two oldest children, Paul and George, to live with
Mrs. Hoang's mother, Thaun Tuk Jones, in Centreville, Fairfax
County, Virginia to continue their education.
George, who was 15 at the time, came to Centreville in the
summer of 1990. In March 1992, Michelle Jones, Mrs. Hoang's
half-sister, also came to live in the Centreville single family
house with her mother, Paul, George, and two of her mother's
other children.
George ate, slept, and kept his belongings at his
grandmother's house, and he spent all but one of his vacations
there. While living in his grandmother's house, George assisted
around the house by running errands, cleaning parts of the house,
mowing the lawn, and cooking. He worked in the Centreville area
during the summer of 1992, using his grandmother's address for
employment and tax purposes.
Excluding the 1991-92 school year, when his parents sent him
to a military academy in Front Royal, and a vacation to various
cities in the United States with his parents in 1992, George
lived continuously in his grandmother's house. He never visited
his parents in Saudi Arabia after he came to Virginia.
George talked on the telephone frequently and corresponded
infrequently with his parents in Saudi Arabia while he was living
in Virginia. Mrs. Hoang returned from Saudi Arabia to her
mother's house several times a year for visits of several days
each to oversee her two sons' activities. She and her husband
continued to support George and pay his educational expenses
while he was in Virginia.
In July 1992, Mrs. Hoang contacted representatives of USAA
Casualty Insurance Company (USAA) * seeking automobile liability
coverage on a Volvo automobile she had recently purchased in
Virginia, primarily for use by Paul and George. Based on
information furnished by Mrs. Hoang, USAA listed her on the
policy as the named insured, and listed her, her husband, Paul,
*
Although Hensley described USAA as "United States
Automobile Association" in the caption of his "Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment," the parties agree that the policy was
issued by USAA Casualty Insurance Company, a wholly owned
subsidiary of United Services Automobile Association.
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and George as the operators of the insured vehicle.
Additionally, Mrs. Hoang advised USAA that the insured vehicle
was to be principally garaged at Mrs. Jones's house and that each
operator had a Virginia driver's license. Shortly after buying
the Volvo and the USAA insurance, Mrs. Hoang traded the Volvo for
an Oldsmobile automobile, and USAA transferred coverage to the
Oldsmobile.
In November 1992, Michelle asked George to take her Porsche
automobile (covered by a separate USAA liability policy issued to
Michelle) to a filling station to be refueled. While driving the
Porsche to the filling station, George collided with a car driven
by Michael Steven Hensley.
Hensley was injured in the collision and brought a personal
injury action against George. Hensley also brought this
declaratory judgment action against USAA, Mrs. Hoang, Michelle,
and George to obtain a declaration that the USAA policy on Mrs.
Hoang's Oldsmobile provided additional liability coverage to
George in the personal injury action beyond the coverage provided
by the USAA policy on the Porsche.
Upon attaining the age of 18 and after the accident, George
registered to vote in Virginia and applied for admission to a
state university, where he was accepted as an in-state student
and charged the reduced tuition rate for Virginia residents.
After hearing evidence ore tenus and considering the
depositions of additional witnesses, the trial court entered a
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declaratory judgment in conformity with Hensley's request. USAA
appeals.
II.
We resolve the issue in this appeal by considering the
pertinent language in the USAA policy on the Oldsmobile.
Liability coverage for the operation of a non-owned automobile is
provided to the named insured or "any relative" of the named
insured. And a "relative" is defined in the policy as "a
relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same
household." (Emphasis added.)
USAA argues that, because George was a resident of his
grandmother's household in Centreville, he was not a resident of
the same household as his mother. Thus, USAA argues that George
was not a relative as defined in the policy. On the other hand,
the other parties successfully contended in the trial court, and
contend on this appeal, that George qualified as a relative under
the policy definition because he was a resident of his mother's
household in Saudi Arabia. We agree with USAA.
III.
We have considered similar policy language in a number of
other cases. In doing so, we said:
The meaning of "resident" or "residence", a
prolific source of litigation, depends upon the context
in which it is used. . . . Here, we must interpret the
meaning of "resident", when followed by "of the same
household". The word "household", . . . connotes a
settled status; a more settled or permanent status is
indicated by "resident of the same household" than
would be indicated by "resident of the same house or
apartment".
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 231 Va. 358, 361, 344 S.E.2d 890,
892 (1986)(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 206
Va. 280, 285, 142 S.E.2d 562, 565-66 (1965)). Continuing, we
also said:
Whether the term "household" or "family" is used,
the term embraces a collection of persons as a single
group, with one head, living together, a unit of
permanent and domestic character, under one roof; a
"collective body of persons living together within one
curtilage, subsisting in common and directing their
attention to a common object, the promotion of their
mutual interests and social happiness".
Patterson, 231 Va. at 362, 344 S.E.2d at 892 (quoting Smith, 206
Va. at 285 n.6, 142 S.E.2d at 565-66 n.6).
And, as we noted in Patterson, a person's intent is
important in determining whether he qualifies as a resident of a
household. 231 Va. at 363, 344 S.E.2d at 893. However, since
George was an unemancipated minor at the time of the accident, we
must also consider his parents' intent in this determination.
See Code § 16.1-334 (unemancipated minor cannot establish his own
residence); see also Code § 16.1-333 (parent must consent to
minor's emancipation); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 581-
82, 74 S.E.2d 170, 173-74 (1953) (intent of parent determines
whether minor is emancipated), overruled on other grounds by
Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). Here,
there is no evidence of an intent on the part of George or his
parents that he would return to Saudi Arabia to rejoin their
household there. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that
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his parents intended that George become a part of his
grandmother's household until they returned from Saudi Arabia.
There is no evidence that George left any of his belongings in
Saudi Arabia, that he maintained a room in his former residence
there, that he ever returned to visit, or that he had anything
more than telephone and mail contact with his parents while they
were in Saudi Arabia.
After George came to live with his grandmother, his parents
saw him only in Virginia and on their vacation in the summer of
1992. His parents supplied George with a car titled in Virginia
and registered at his grandmother's address, and they permitted
him to get a Virginia driver's license. Furthermore, George was
allowed to spend his vacations in Virginia, work there during the
summer, and apply for admission to a Virginia university as a
Virginia resident. Additionally, George's parents must have
known that George was more than a mere boarder at his
grandmother's house, as evidenced by his activities in
contributing to the common burdens associated with the operation
of a household.
Even though George testified that his grandmother's house
was not his "home," the extended period of his residence there
with no apparent intention on his or his parents' part for him to
return to his parents' home in Saudi Arabia, as well as his
activities at his grandmother's house, gainsay this conclusion.
Instead, we think this evidence indicates that George was living
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with his relatives in a unit of permanent and domestic character,
subsisting in common, in which each household member, including
George, participated in the promotion of their mutual interests
and social happiness. See Patterson, 231 Va. at 362, 344 S.E.2d
at 892. Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that
reasonable persons could not differ in concluding that, at the
time of the collision, George was a member of his grandmother's
household in Virginia, and was no longer a member of his mother's
household in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, we think that the trial
court erred in concluding that Mrs. Hoang's USAA policy on the
Oldsmobile provided additional coverage against George's possible
liability to Hensley.
Therefore, we will reverse the trial court's judgment and
enter final judgment in this Court declaring that George was not
covered by Mrs. Hoang's USAA policy when he operated his aunt's
Porsche and collided with Hensley.
Reversed and final judgment.
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