Gregory v. Northam (ORDER) ( 2021 )


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  • VIRGINIA:
    In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the
    City of Richmond on Thursday the 2nd day of September, 2021.
    Present: All the Justices
    William C. Gregory,                                                                    Appellant,
    against        Record No. 201307
    Circuit Court No. 20-2441
    Ralph S. Northam, in his Official Capacity
    as Governor of Virginia, et al.,                                                      Appellees.
    Upon an appeal from a judgment
    rendered by the Circuit Court of the City of
    Richmond.
    In this case, we awarded William C. Gregory (Gregory) an appeal from a judgment of the
    Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. In that judgment, the circuit court ruled that Gregory had
    not articulated a legally viable cause of action in the complaint he filed seeking declaratory and
    injunctive relief concerning the governor’s order to the Department of General Services to
    remove the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond, Virginia (Lee Monument) from property
    owned by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and
    argument of counsel, for the reasons set forth below, the Court is of opinion that there is no
    reversible error in the judgment.
    In the relevant complaint before the circuit court, Gregory elaborates upon his lineage
    and asserts that pursuant to the wills of Bettie F. Allen Gregory and Roger Gregory, and pursuant
    to the wills of their heirs, he has inherited the rights of the “covenantees” of deeds signed by
    Bettie and Roger Gregory in 1887 and 1890 (respectively, the 1887 Deed and the 1890 Deed),
    which conveyed ownership of the Lee Monument and the circular parcel of land where it was
    erected to the Commonwealth of Virginia. Gregory emphasizes a particular provision (the
    provision) in the 1890 Deed, which states that:
    The State of Virginia, party of the third part acting by and through the Governor
    of the Commonwealth and pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Special
    Statute herein before mentioned executes this instrument in token of her
    acceptance of the gift and of her guarantee that she will hold said Statue and
    pedestal and Circle of ground perpetually sacred to the Monumental purpose to
    which they have been devoted and that she will faithfully guard it and
    affectionately protect it.
    Gregory asserts that, as an heir of Bettie and Roger Gregory, he has a legal right, based
    upon the language in this provision of the 1890 Deed, to compel the Commonwealth to keep the
    Lee Monument where it currently sits. He also claims that removal of the Lee Monument from
    its current location would result in irreparable harm to him. As evidence of his claim of
    irreparable harm, he describes his familial pride in the Lee Monument, which sits on property
    previously owned by his ancestors.
    Governor Ralph S. Northam (Governor Northam) and Joseph F. Damico, Director of the
    Virginia Department of General Services (Director Damico), were named as defendants in
    Gregory’s complaint. They filed a demurrer in response. In the demurrer, they assert that
    Gregory held no enforceable property right that would entitle him to the relief he sought.
    Specifically, Governor Northam and Director Damico explain that because Gregory did not
    claim current title to any property neighboring the Lee Monument, the property interest he
    claims, as authority for his right to prevent the Commonwealth from moving its monument,
    would have to be based upon him being a beneficiary of an easement in gross. They contend that
    the language in the 1890 Deed to the Commonwealth did not create an easement in gross, and
    therefore Gregory’s claim should fail as a matter of law. Governor Northam and Director
    Damico further assert that even if the 1890 Deed created an easement in gross, Gregory would
    not have inherited that interest. Additionally, they aver that in any event a perpetual restriction
    on the Commonwealth’s use of land, which it owns, would be unenforceable.
    The circuit court, after considering the deeds and the ownership of land surrounding the
    monument, concluded that the parties to the 1887 Deed and the 1890 Deed intended to create an
    easement appurtenant, not an easement in gross. Consequently, the circuit court held that
    Gregory failed to state a claim that he possessed the legal right to prohibit the Commonwealth
    from moving its monument from its property. The circuit court sustained the demurrer and
    dismissed Gregory’s claims, with prejudice.
    2
    “[A]n easement in gross, sometimes called a personal easement, is an easement which is
    not appurtenant to any estate in land, but in which the servitude is imposed upon land with the
    benefit thereof running to an individual.” United States v. Blackman, 
    270 Va. 68
    , 77 (2005). On
    the other hand, “an easement appurtenant ‘runs with the land,’ which is to say that the benefit
    conveyed by or the duty owed under the easement passes with the ownership of the land to
    which it is appurtenant.” 
    Id.
    Gregory alleges that the Commonwealth, and therefore Governor Northam and Director
    Damico, have legal and contractual obligations to him personally because of the provision in the
    1890 Deed. Specifically, he claims that as a descendant of the signatories to the 1887 Deed and
    the 1890 Deed, he has a claim of action against Governor Northam and Director Damico because
    of his alleged right to ensure the Commonwealth fulfills its duty to hold the Lee Monument
    “perpetually sacred,” pursuant to the terms of the 1890 Deed to the Commonwealth. The
    property right Gregory attempts to assert can only be understood to be an easement in gross.
    Notably, a court will never presume that an easement is an easement in gross; it must
    plainly appear from the granting instrument or deed that the parties intended to create an
    easement in gross. Prospect Dev. Co., Inc. v. Bershader, 
    258 Va. 75
    , 90 (1999). As we have
    explained, “[i]t is the intent of the parties, . . . as gathered from the language of the easement
    itself, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances, . . . that controls a determination
    as to whether an easement is appurtenant or gross.” Lester Coal Corp. v. Lester, 
    203 Va. 93
    , 98
    (1961) (citing Hardy v. McCullough, 
    64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 251
    , 260 (1873) and Stephen Putney Co.
    v. R.F. & P.R. Co., 
    116 Va. 211
    , 217 (1914)). Nevertheless, “if the language used attempts to
    create a right which may violate an established rule of property law, or purports to grant
    something which, in law, may not be granted, then effect cannot be given to the language, plain
    though it may be.” 
    Id.
     (citing Tardy v. Creasy, 
    81 Va. 553
    , 562 (1886)).
    The granting instruments relied upon by Gregory, the 1887 Deed and the 1890 Deed, do
    not plainly state an intent to create an easement in gross, and the circuit court did not err in
    concluding that they do not do so. Cf. Blackman, 
    270 Va. at 73-74
     (construing deed language
    stating that “the [g]rantors . . . do hereby grant and convey to the [g]rantee . . . an easement in
    gross restricting in perpetuity, in the manner hereinafter set forth, the use of the following
    described tracts of land, together with the improvements erected thereon” as creating an
    3
    easement in gross). For purposes of argument, we assume that at most, the parties to the 1887
    Deed and 1890 Deed intended to create an easement appurtenant.
    Not only did Gregory not claim an easement appurtenant, the facts in the record do not
    support a finding that Gregory has any ownership interest in any land to which any benefit
    conveyed by the deeds would be appurtenant. Thus, Gregory has no property right, related to the
    Lee Monument, to enforce against the Commonwealth. As a result, the circuit court correctly
    found that Gregory failed to articulate a legally viable cause of action against Governor Northam
    and Director Damico, and it did not err in granting their demurrer and dismissing Gregory’s
    claim with prejudice. *
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond and
    any requests made for injunctive relief are hereby denied.
    This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and certified to the Circuit Court of
    the City of Richmond.
    A Copy,
    Teste:
    Acting Clerk
    *
    Further, in Taylor v. Northam, 300 Va. ___ (2021) (this day decided), this Court ruled
    that any property interest that may have been created by the 1887 Deed or the provision in the
    1890 Deed would be unenforceable against the Commonwealth.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 201307

Filed Date: 9/2/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/2/2021