Jones v. Commonwealth , 821 S.E.2d 540 ( 2018 )


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  • PRESENT: All the Justices
    ROBERT LEE JONES
    OPINION BY
    v. Record No. 180052                                JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH
    December 6, 2018
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Robert Lee Jones challenges his conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle under
    Code § 18.2-154. He argues that, to secure a conviction under this statute, the prosecution must
    prove that the shooter was positioned outside of the occupied vehicle. Because in the incident
    giving rise to the present charges, Jones was located inside the vehicle at the time he fired
    multiple shots, he urges us to vacate his conviction. We conclude that the plain language of the
    statute does not require the prosecution to prove that the shooter was located outside of the
    vehicle when he fired shots at an occupied vehicle. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the
    Court of Appeals upholding this conviction.
    BACKGROUND
    Jones, accompanied by Antoine Myler, sought to purchase some pills, evidently pain
    medications, from Jabari Lee. Jones and Myler climbed into Lee’s vehicle. While inside the
    vehicle, Jones shot Lee. Lee was struck several times and died of his gunshot wounds. Police
    recovered bullets from the window frame of one of the doors and from the top center console of
    the vehicle.
    Jones was charged with, among other things, maliciously shooting at an occupied vehicle
    in violation of Code § 18.2-154. Counsel moved to strike the charge of shooting at an occupied
    vehicle. The trial court denied that motion. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals
    affirmed appellant’s conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle, Jones v. Commonwealth, 
    68 Va. App. 304
    (2017), and this appeal followed.
    ANALYSIS
    Code § 18.2-154 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who maliciously shoots
    at . . . any motor vehicle . . . when occupied by one or more persons, whereby the life of any
    person . . . in such motor vehicle . . . may be put in peril, is guilty of a Class 4 felony.”
    “Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo
    review by this Court.” Washington v. Commonwealth, 
    272 Va. 449
    , 455 (2006).
    Jones argues that this statute essentially criminalizes the act of “shooting into an occupied
    vehicle” and that “one cannot violate this statute unless he is aiming in the direction of the car
    while standing outside of said car.” Appellant’s Br. at 6 (emphasis in original). He also points
    to the existence of Code § 18.2-286.1, which makes it a felony to discharge a weapon while
    seated in a vehicle. In his view, allowing a conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle when
    the shooter is located inside the vehicle would render Code § 18.2-286.1 superfluous.
    “We must presume that the General Assembly chose, with care, the words that appear in
    a statute, and must apply the statute in a manner faithful to that choice.” Johnson v.
    Commonwealth, 
    292 Va. 738
    , 742 (2016). “When the language of a statute is plain and
    unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that statutory language.” Alston v.
    Commonwealth, 
    274 Va. 759
    , 769 (2007). The word “at” is straightforward enough as it is used
    in this statute. In this context, “at” is “used as a function word to indicate that which is the goal
    of an action or that toward which an action or motion is directed .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 136 (1993). “Nothing in the language
    of this statute is inherently difficult to comprehend, of doubtful import, or lacking in clarity and
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    definiteness. Accordingly, it is not necessary to look beyond the plain language of the statute to
    ascertain its underlying legislative intent.” Harrison & Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assocs. Ltd.
    P’ship, 
    253 Va. 364
    , 369 (1997).
    The statute contains no requirement that the shooter be located outside of the vehicle.
    When a shooter who is inside the vehicle discharges his weapon so as to strike the occupied
    vehicle, he is, within the literal language of the statute, shooting at an occupied vehicle. The
    General Assembly could have prohibited, for example, shooting “into” an occupied vehicle. It
    did not. “This Court may not construe the plain language of a statute ‘in a manner that amounts
    to holding that the General Assembly meant to add a requirement to the statute that it did not
    actually express.’” Commonwealth v. Amos, 
    287 Va. 301
    , 307 (2014) (quoting Vaughn, Inc. v.
    Beck, 
    262 Va. 673
    , 679 (2001)). The location of the shooter is not an element of the offense
    under this statute. Whether the shooter is outside or inside the car, the discharge of a firearm at
    an occupied vehicle presents a significant danger of grave harm or death to the occupants of the
    vehicle. Bullets can unpredictably ricochet off one of the vehicle’s surfaces and strike an
    occupant. Accordingly, we reject the argument that a shooter must be positioned outside of the
    vehicle to be convicted of shooting “at” an occupied vehicle under Code § 18.2-154. *
    Jones argues that such a construction of Code § 18.2-154 would render a different statute,
    Code § 18.2-286.1, “duplicative and superfluous.” We disagree.
    Code § 18.2-286.1 provides that “[a]ny person who, while in or on a motor vehicle,
    intentionally discharges a firearm so as to create the risk of injury or death to another person or
    *
    This case does not call upon us to decide what intent the prosecution must establish to
    secure a conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle, i.e., whether the perpetrator must intend
    to shoot at the occupied vehicle or whether it is sufficient that the perpetrator maliciously fired
    the gun and the shots happened to strike an occupied vehicle.
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    thereby cause another person to have a reasonable apprehension of injury or death shall be guilty
    of a Class 5 felony.”
    First, the existence of a similar but not identical statute does not alter our obligation to
    construe the applicable statute according to its plain language. Second, although there is some
    overlap between the conduct prohibited by the two statutes, they are textually and conceptually
    different. Textually, the lives endangered under Code § 18.2-154 must be those in the motor
    vehicle. Code § 18.2-286.1 does not contain this restriction, although, practically speaking, most
    of the lives endangered will be those located outside of the vehicle. Furthermore, Code
    § 18.2-154 requires malice. Code § 18.2-286.1 does not contain this requirement. In addition,
    the punishment for the two offenses is different. From a conceptual standpoint, as the Court of
    Appeals aptly noted, “Code § 18.2-154 focuses on the direction of the shot, while Code
    § 18.2-286.1 focuses on the location of the shooter.” 
    Jones, 68 Va. App. at 312
    . More broadly,
    “the fact that separate statutes may overlap in their proscription of specific conduct does not
    detract from their independent enforcement except when double jeopardy concerns are
    implicated.” McDonald v. Commonwealth, 
    274 Va. 249
    , 259 (2007).
    The plain language of Code § 18.2-154 contains no requirement that the shooter who
    maliciously shoots at an occupied vehicle must be positioned outside of the vehicle. Therefore,
    we affirm Jones’s conviction.
    CONCLUSION
    We will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the conviction under
    Code § 18.2-154.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: Record 180052

Citation Numbers: 821 S.E.2d 540

Judges: STEPHEN McCULLOUGH

Filed Date: 12/6/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024