McBride v. Bennett ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • PRESENT: All the Justices
    CAROLYN McBRIDE, AS
    ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
    DONNELL EARL WORSLEY, DECEASED
    OPINION BY
    v.   Record No. 131301                  JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL
    OCTOBER 31, 2014
    JOEY GAYLAN BENNETT, JR.,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN EMPLOYEE
    OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK, ET AL.
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NORFOLK
    Jerrauld C. Jones, Judge
    Carolyn McBride (“McBride”), the administrator for the
    estate of Donnell Worsley (“Worsley”), appeals the trial court’s
    judgment that sovereign immunity bars her wrongful death action
    against Joey Gaylan Bennett, Jr. (“Bennett”) and Derek Michael
    Folston (“Folston”).
    I.   BACKGROUND
    On July 25, 2010, Bennett and Folston were on-duty police
    officers working for the City of Norfolk.     At around 1:00 a.m.,
    Folston received a call to transport a prisoner.     Shortly
    thereafter, Bennett was dispatched to a domestic disturbance
    call in the Tidewater Gardens area of Norfolk.     Folston
    overheard the dispatcher assign Bennett to investigate the
    domestic disturbance call and decided to provide backup for
    Bennett rather than respond to the transport call.     Folston
    later explained that he decided to go because he was near
    Officer Bennett’s location while the unit actually assigned to
    backup Bennett was “across the city,” and the police department
    required a backup unit for domestic disturbance calls.
    In assigning Bennett to investigate the domestic
    disturbance call, the dispatcher did not assign a response code.
    According to Norfolk Police Department General Order OPR-710
    (“OPR-710”), “[w]hen no specified response code is assigned to
    the message, response Code 3 will be used.”   OPR-710 also
    dictates that, on calls designated Code 3, “[e]mergency lights
    and/or siren will not be used.   All posted signs and traffic
    laws will be observed.”   In addition to delineating Response
    Codes, OPR-710 also establishes when a police officer is
    authorized to engage in “emergency vehicle operation.” 1
    In responding to the call, both officers began to drive
    across the Campostella Bridge.   While Bennett did not know how
    fast he was traveling, Folston admitted to exceeding the speed
    limit after being passed by Bennett and to falling in line
    behind him as they drove up the bridge.   At no point did either
    officer activate his emergency lights or sirens.
    After cresting the crown of the bridge, Bennett began
    slowing down.   At that point, Bennett saw Worsley riding on his
    bicycle, swerving, in the middle of the left lane, which was the
    same lane in which Bennett was driving.   Upon seeing Worsley,
    1
    The operation of emergency equipment and driving in excess
    of the speed limit are considered aspects of “emergency vehicle
    operation.”
    2
    Bennett came to a quick stop.    Worsley subsequently swerved his
    bicycle into the right lane, where he was then hit by Folston,
    who had maneuvered into that lane to avoid hitting Bennett's
    vehicle.   Tragically, Worsley died as a result of injuries
    sustained when he was struck by Folston’s vehicle.
    McBride, as Administrator of Worsley’s estate, filed a
    simple negligence 2 claim against Bennett and Folston,
    individually and as employees of the City of Norfolk, seeking
    damages for Worsley’s wrongful death as a result of their
    misconduct.   Bennett and Folston filed special pleas in bar on
    the grounds of sovereign immunity.    After hearing testimony from
    Bennett and Folston at an ore tenus hearing, the trial court
    sustained the special pleas in bar.   The trial court held that
    Bennett and Folston were entitled to sovereign immunity because
    they had exercised discretion in determining whether and how to
    respond to the dispatch.
    McBride appeals.
    II.   ANALYSIS
    The issue of whether a municipal employee is entitled to
    sovereign immunity is a question of law that we review de novo.
    City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham, 
    268 Va. 624
    , 633, 
    604 S.E.2d 420
    , 426 (2004).   Although we review the trial court’s decision
    2
    McBride initially filed a gross negligence claim but later
    amended her complaint, withdrawing the gross negligence claim
    and proceeding on a claim of simple negligence.
    3
    de novo, we also recognize that, when evidence is presented “on
    [a] plea ore tenus, the circuit court’s factual findings are
    accorded the weight of a jury finding and will not be disturbed
    on appeal unless they are plainly wrong or without evidentiary
    support.”   Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 
    279 Va. 566
    , 577, 
    692 S.E.2d 226
    , 233 (2010).
    Where a municipal employee is charged with simple
    negligence, this Court has established a four factor test for
    determining whether sovereign immunity applies.   James v. Jane,
    
    221 Va. 43
    , 53, 
    282 S.E.2d 864
    , 869 (1980).   These factors are:
    (1) the nature of the function performed by the employee; (2)
    the extent of the state’s interest and involvement in the
    function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by
    the state over the employee; and (4) whether the act complained
    of involved the use of judgment and discretion.     
    Id. In the
    present case, only the fourth factor is at issue.
    Recognizing that “[v]irtually every act performed by a
    person involves the exercise of some discretion,” 
    James, 221 Va. at 53
    , 282 S.E.2d at 869, this Court has explained that there
    are additional considerations involved in assessing the use of
    judgment and discretion in driving situations.    With regard to
    the fourth factor, this Court has explained that “[t]he defense
    of sovereign immunity applies only to acts of judgment and
    discretion which are necessary to the performance of the
    4
    governmental function itself.”    Heider v. Clemons, 
    241 Va. 143
    ,
    145, 
    400 S.E.2d 190
    , 191 (1991).       In situations involving the
    exercise of judgment and discretion by government employees
    while driving, we look to whether the means of effectuating the
    applicable government function involves “ordinary driving in
    routine traffic” versus driving that requires a “degree of
    judgment and discretion beyond ordinary driving situations in
    routine traffic.”    Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 
    268 Va. 384
    , 390-
    91, 
    601 S.E.2d 591
    , 595 (2004).    Sovereign immunity attaches in
    the latter situation, but not in the former.       Id.; Colby v.
    Boyden, 
    241 Va. 125
    , 129, 
    400 S.E.2d 184
    , 187 (1991).
    In further refining the analysis applied in determining the
    types of driving to which sovereign immunity attaches, this
    Court has acknowledged that “[u]nlike the driver in routine
    traffic, [a government employee in an emergency situation] must
    make difficult judgments about the best means of effectuating
    the governmental purpose by embracing special risks.”      
    Colby, 241 Va. at 129-30
    , 400 S.E.2d at 187.      When embracing special
    risks, government employees are necessarily called upon to make
    “split-second decisions balancing grave personal risks, public
    safety concerns, and the need to achieve the governmental
    objective.”   
    Id. Such split-second
    decisions may lead to
    negligent acts, which can result in death or serious injury, as
    the present case demonstrates.    At the same time, the failure to
    5
    make such split-second decisions could similarly result in death
    or serious injury, and one of the purposes served by sovereign
    immunity is to “eliminate[] public inconvenience and danger that
    might spring from officials being fearful to act.”    Messina v.
    Burden, 
    228 Va. 301
    , 308, 
    321 S.E.2d 657
    , 660 (1984).
    Therefore, our jurisprudence is clear that, in the context of
    driving a vehicle, whether the act in question involves the
    requisite exercise of discretion such that sovereign immunity
    applies depends on whether that act embraces “special risks” in
    order to effectuate a governmental purpose.
    Applying this standard, we have recognized that sovereign
    immunity applies to an officer engaged in vehicular pursuit,
    
    Colby, 241 Va. at 130
    , 400 S.E.2d at 187, or a firefighter
    responding to a car fire, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
    Catlett Volunteer Fire Co., 
    241 Va. 402
    , 413-14, 
    404 S.E.2d 216
    ,
    222 (1991), but does not apply to a deputy serving judicial
    process, 
    Heider, 241 Va. at 144-45
    , 400 S.E.2d at 190-91, or a
    firefighter engaged in “ordinary driving in routine traffic”
    while responding to a nonemergency, “public service call,”
    
    Friday-Spivey, 268 Va. at 390
    , 601 S.E.2d at 594.    In each case,
    the application of sovereign immunity turned on whether a
    government employee exercised judgment and discretion in
    determining what actions to take, whether the actions taken were
    6
    necessary to effectuate a governmental purpose and whether those
    actions inherently required them to embrace “special risks.”
    In cases like the present one, the proper application of
    sovereign immunity should not be based upon a court second-
    guessing a split-second decision made by a government employee
    effectuating a governmental function by embracing special risks.
    If that were the case, sovereign immunity would be rendered
    meaningless.   Rather, the proper application of sovereign
    immunity requires a court to make an objective determination as
    to whether the decision made and the actions taken pursuant
    thereto were necessary to the performance of a governmental
    function and embraced special risks.   In other words, the
    application of sovereign immunity in a case involving the
    operation of a motor vehicle by a government employee is an
    objective determination considered in light of all the
    circumstances including the government employee’s assessment 3 of
    3
    While not dispositive, a government employee’s assessment
    is still relevant to the application of sovereign immunity. The
    government employee’s assessment of the situation provides
    valuable context relating to what governmental function was
    being effectuated (e.g., an officer on routine patrol versus
    responding to a crime in progress) and whether the actions taken
    were “necessary to the performance of the governmental function
    itself.” 
    Heider, 241 Va. at 145
    , 400 S.E.2d at 191. Context
    also addresses the question of whether the government employees
    were exercising judgment and discretion in deciding how best to
    discharge their duties.
    Indeed, we have recognized that one cannot meaningfully
    divorce the reason why a government employee responded to a
    particular situation from how the government employee responded.
    7
    the situation.   Nonetheless, the test is objective in nature.
    The driver’s evaluation of the situation must be objectively
    reasonable to permit the application of sovereign immunity.
    In the present case, Bennett and Folston determined that it
    was necessary for them to respond to the domestic disturbance
    call in an emergency manner and proceeded to do so.   In so
    doing, Bennett and Folston exercised their judgment and
    discretion.   See 
    Colby, 241 Va. at 130
    , 400 S.E.2d at 187
    (recognizing that “[t]he exercise of discretion is involved even
    in the initial decision to undertake [a particular course of
    action]”).    Furthermore, determining the proper response to a
    criminal act (e.g., a domestic disturbance) and implementing
    that response clearly involve the exercise of judgment and
    discretion in the performance of a governmental function.
    Similarly, the operation of their vehicles in an emergency
    manner involved speeds in excess of the speed limit and, thus,
    went beyond “ordinary driving in routine traffic.”    Friday-
    See Burns v. Gagnon, 
    283 Va. 657
    , 676-77, 
    727 S.E.2d 634
    , 646
    (2012) (analyzing a government employee’s assessment of the
    situation to explain why the employee’s actions (or lack
    thereof) demonstrated an exercise of judgment and discretion).
    Thus, a government employee’s assessment of the situation is a
    relevant consideration. However, that consideration must
    necessarily be tempered by an objective examination of the
    circumstances. See 
    Friday-Spivey, 268 Va. at 390
    -91, 601 S.E.2d
    at 595 (determining that the facts of the case did not support
    the defendant’s classification of the situation as an
    “emergency”).
    8
    Spivey, 268 Va. at 
    390, 601 S.E.2d at 594
    .      Therefore, in
    exercising their judgment and discretion about the best means of
    effectuating a governmental function by embracing the requisite
    special risks, Bennett and Folston triggered the application of
    sovereign immunity.
    McBride further takes issue with the fact that the officers
    had no specific knowledge about the particular call because the
    domestic disturbance call was not initially declared to be an
    emergency by the dispatcher.   McBride asserts that sovereign
    immunity cannot apply because, under those circumstances,
    Bennett and Folston had no authority to engage in emergency
    vehicle operation under OPR-710.       While the existence of such a
    policy may be relevant to any internal disciplinary actions that
    Bennett and Folston may face, it is not dispositive of the
    present issue.   Rather, OPR-710 merely demonstrates that the
    City of Norfolk Police Department has exercised administrative
    control and supervision over the officers.      See 
    Colby, 241 Va. at 129
    , 400 S.E.2d at 187.
    In Colby, this Court held that policies or guidelines like
    OPR-701 “do not, and cannot, eliminate the requirement that a
    police officer, engaged in the delicate, dangerous, and
    potentially deadly job of vehicular pursuit, must make prompt,
    original, and crucial decisions in a highly stressful
    situation.”   
    Id. This holding
    implicitly acknowledges the fact
    9
    that no policy can account for every situation a police officer
    may face.   Indeed, at least one court has recognized that there
    may be situations where the strict application of such policies
    may not be the most prudent course of action.     See Muse v.
    Schleiden, 
    349 F. Supp. 2d 990
    , 997-98 (E.D. Va. 2004).        Rather,
    such decisions are best left to the judgment and discretion of
    the officer.     
    Id. It is
    this exercise of judgment and
    discretion, even in violation of policy, that allows for the
    invocation of sovereign immunity. 4
    III.   CONCLUSION
    In National Railroad Passenger Corp., we concluded that
    sovereign immunity attached because we could not “logically
    distinguish the act of crossing a railroad track without
    stopping in order to extinguish a fire from running a red light
    in order to apprehend a traffic 
    offender.” 241 Va. at 413
    , 404
    S.E.2d at 222.    Similarly, we cannot logically distinguish the
    act of speeding to respond to a domestic disturbance call.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
    4
    We further observe that each police department in the
    Commonwealth likely has different policies or guidelines. A
    standard for determining sovereign immunity that relied heavily
    on such policies or guidelines would result in an inconsistent
    application of this doctrine: the acts of an officer in one
    jurisdiction might be covered by sovereign immunity, while the
    same acts of another officer in the exact same situation but in
    a different jurisdiction would not.
    10
    CHIEF JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins,
    concurring.
    As reflected by the various views expressed in this case
    and in Anders v. Kidd, Record No. 131891 (this day decided), the
    application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity over the years
    to ever-changing circumstances has produced less than clear
    guidelines for the resolution of future cases.   The majority's
    resolution of the case before us adds to the complexity that
    permeates the law of sovereign immunity by adding a new factor,
    whether "the government employee's assessment of the situation"
    in deciding "how" to respond is objectively reasonable.   Our
    precedent does not support second-guessing "how" an individual
    seeking the protection of sovereign immunity responded in a
    particular situation, even if judged by an objective standard.
    Instead, we have made an objective determination by asking
    whether effectuating the governmental purpose of the
    individual's employer required the exercise of discretion and
    judgment.   Applying that analysis in this case, I conclude that
    the circuit court correctly held that the defendants, Joey
    Gaylan Bennett, Jr. and Derek Michael Folston, were protected by
    sovereign immunity.   Thus, I respectfully concur.
    To determine whether an individual working for an immune
    governmental entity is entitled to the protection of sovereign
    immunity, we apply a four-part test first enunciated in James v.
    Jane, 
    221 Va. 43
    , 53, 
    282 S.E.2d 864
    , 869 (1980).   See Messina
    v. Burden, 
    228 Va. 301
    , 313, 
    321 S.E.2d 657
    , 663 (1984).     The
    four factors are: "(1) the nature of the function the employee
    performs; (2) the extent of the government's interest and
    involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and
    direction exercised over the employee by the government; and (4)
    whether the act in question involved the exercise of discretion
    and judgment."   Colby v. Boyden, 
    241 Va. 125
    , 129, 
    400 S.E.2d 184
    , 186-87 (1991); accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hylton,
    
    260 Va. 56
    , 63, 
    530 S.E.2d 421
    , 424 (2000); Stanfield v.
    Peregoy, 
    245 Va. 339
    , 342, 
    429 S.E.2d 11
    , 12 (1993).
    In the present case, only the fourth prong of the test is
    at issue.   Since we enunciated this test, we have addressed the
    fourth prong, whether a particular act involved the exercise of
    discretion and judgment, in a multitude of factual scenarios.
    See, e.g., Burns v. Gagnon, 
    283 Va. 657
    , 677, 
    727 S.E.2d 634
    ,
    646 (2012) (holding that a high school vice principal's response
    (or lack thereof) to a student's report about an impending fight
    "involved the exercise of judgment and discretion" because he
    had to decide whether to respond, when to respond, and how to
    respond); 1 Gargiulo v. Ohar, 
    239 Va. 209
    , 215, 
    387 S.E.2d 787
    ,
    1
    In Burns, we did not examine whether the vice-principal's
    decision about "how" to respond was objectively reasonable. We
    only recognized that he necessarily had to exercise discretion
    and judgment in deciding whether, when, and how to respond.
    12
    791 (1990) (concluding that in performing duties as a fellow in
    a research project, a physician exercised discretion and
    judgment in diagnosing and treating participating patients);
    Lentz v. Morris, 
    236 Va. 78
    , 83, 
    372 S.E.2d 608
    , 611 (1988)
    (holding that "a teacher's supervision and control of a physical
    education class . . . clearly involves, at least in part, the
    exercise of judgment and discretion by the teacher"); 
    Messina, 228 Va. at 313
    , 321 S.E.2d at 664 (granting sovereign immunity
    to a chief of the operations division of a county public works
    department because his supervisory activities "clearly involved
    judgment and discretion").
    In situations involving the operation of a motor vehicle by
    an employee of an immune governmental entity, we have
    recognized, however, that every person driving a vehicle "must
    make myriad decisions" and thus have held that "in ordinary
    driving situations the duty of due care is a ministerial
    obligation."   Heider v. Clemons, 
    241 Va. 143
    , 145, 
    400 S.E.2d 190
    , 191 (1991).   In deciding whether the operation of a vehicle
    in a particular situation was ministerial or discretionary, we
    repeatedly have focused on whether the "operation of [the]
    vehicle involved special risks arising from the governmental
    activity and the exercise of judgment or discretion about the
    proper means of effectuating the governmental purpose of the
    defendant's employer."   
    Stanfield, 245 Va. at 344
    , 429 S.E.2d at
    13
    13-14; see also 
    Colby, 241 Va. at 129
    , 400 S.E.2d at 187 (asking
    whether a police officer in vehicular pursuit of a fleeing
    lawbreaker had to make "difficult judgments about the best means
    of effectuating the governmental purpose by embracing special
    risks").   We have differentiated between drivers in situations
    necessarily requiring "discretionary, split-second decisions
    balancing grave personal risks, public safety concerns, and the
    need to achieve the governmental objective," 
    Colby, 241 Va. at 129-30
    , 400 S.E.2d at 187, and drivers involved in "the simple
    operation of a vehicle in routine traffic."   Smith v. Settle,
    
    254 Va. 348
    , 353 n.7, 
    492 S.E.2d 427
    , 430 n.7 (1997).   While the
    former is deemed conduct involving the exercise of discretion
    and judgment and thus protected by sovereign immunity against
    charges of simple negligence, the latter is not.
    For example, in Colby, a law enforcement officer was
    pursuing a motorist who had violated a traffic 
    law. 241 Va. at 127
    , 400 S.E.2d at 185-86.   During the pursuit, the officer
    proceeded to cross an intersection against a red traffic light,
    colliding with another vehicle.    
    Id. at 127,
    400 S.E.2d at 186.
    Affirming the trial court's judgment sustaining the officer's
    plea in bar based on sovereign immunity, we concluded that "a
    police officer, engaged in the delicate, dangerous, and
    potentially deadly job of vehicular pursuit, must make prompt,
    original, and crucial decisions in a highly stressful
    14
    situation."    Id. at 
    129, 400 S.E.2d at 187
    .    Although his
    municipal employer exercised "administrative control and
    supervision over [the officer's] activities through the
    promulgation of guidelines governing actions taken in response
    to emergency situations," we determined that those guidelines
    could not eliminate the need for the officer to make
    discretionary decisions during the course of vehicular pursuit.
    
    Id. Thus, we
    held that, "unlike the driver in routine traffic,"
    the police officer was cloaked with the protection of sovereign
    immunity.     
    Id. Similarly, in
    National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Catlett
    Volunteer Fire Co., 
    241 Va. 402
    , 
    404 S.E.2d 216
    (1991), we
    addressed whether a volunteer fireman was immune from liability
    under the doctrine of sovereign immunity for an accident that
    occurred while the fireman was driving a fire truck to the site
    of a fire.     
    Id. at 405,
    404 S.E.2d at 217.   The fireman
    proceeded through a railroad crossing without stopping, and a
    train struck the fire truck.     
    Id. The railroad
    company asserted
    that the fireman was not entitled to the defense of sovereign
    immunity because his act of crossing the railroad tracks without
    first stopping "was a ministerial act, not a discretionary act
    to which sovereign immunity attaches."     Id. at 
    413, 404 S.E.2d at 222
    .   Disagreeing, we concluded that, like the police officer
    in Colby, the fireman was exercising discretion and judgment
    15
    about the best means of effectuating the governmental purpose
    and in doing so was embracing special risks.    
    Id. See also
    Smith, 254 Va. at 353 
    n.7, 492 S.E.2d at 430 
    n.7 (holding that
    an ambulance driver traveling to a location where he could
    establish radio contact with his other squad members to
    determine whether he was needed at the scene of an emergency was
    not engaged in "the simple operation of a vehicle in routine
    traffic" because the trip "involved the exercise of discretion
    and judgment required by a person performing a governmental
    function in operating a vehicle in response to an emergency").
    We again applied the same analysis in Stanfield, which did
    not involve an emergency situation.   There, the defendant-driver
    was operating a city truck and spreading salt during a snowstorm
    when his truck collided with another 
    vehicle. 245 Va. at 340
    ,
    429 S.E.2d at 11.   In concluding that the driver was entitled to
    the protection of sovereign immunity, we stated that "the
    conduct of driving and spreading salt combined [is] an integral
    part of the governmental function of rendering the city streets
    safe for public travel" and that "the operation of this vehicle
    involved special risks arising from the governmental activity
    and the exercise of judgment or discretion about the proper
    means of effectuating the governmental purpose."      Id. at 
    344, 429 S.E.2d at 13
    -14.   We explained that if the "accident had
    happened as defendant was driving his truck en route to the area
    16
    he was assigned to plow and salt, or if it occurred when he was
    returning to his . . . headquarters after completing his
    function of plowing and salting, he would have been engaged in
    'the simple operation' of the truck 'in routine traffic,' a
    ministerial act."    Id. at 
    344, 429 S.E.2d at 13
    (quoting 
    Heider, 241 Va. at 145
    , 400 S.E.2d at 191 and 
    Colby, 241 Va. at 129
    , 400
    S.E.2d at 187).     Compare Wynn v. Gandy, 
    170 Va. 590
    , 595, 
    197 S.E. 527
    , 529 (1938) (holding that driving a school bus while
    not transporting children did not involve judgment or discretion
    but was purely ministerial) and 
    Heider, 241 Va. at 145
    , 400
    S.E.2d at 191 (holding that a police officer who was involved in
    an accident while operating his vehicle after serving judicial
    process was not exercising "judgment and discretion about the
    proper means of effectuating the governmental purpose of" his
    employer but was engaged in "the simple operation of an
    automobile [that] did not involve special risks arising from the
    governmental activity") with Linhart v. Lawson, 
    261 Va. 30
    , 36,
    
    540 S.E.2d 875
    , 878 (2001) (holding that a school bus driver's
    act of transporting children did involve the exercise of
    judgment and discretion).
    In none of these cases did the Court look at "how" the
    defendant chose to respond and decide whether the response was
    objectively reasonable.    For example, in Stanfield, we did not
    ask whether the defendant's decision, as he was spreading salt
    17
    on a city street, to attempt to stop at a stop sign located at
    an intersection was objectively 
    reasonable. 245 Va. at 342
    , 429
    S.E.2d at 12.   Instead, the driver was exercising the requisite
    discretion and judgment because, to effectuate the governmental
    purpose, he had to decide not only "whether a particular street
    needed to be salted, plowed, or a combination of both" but also
    whether to spread salt on the entire street and how much salt to
    spread.   
    Id. Thus, we
    concluded that "[t]he operation of the
    truck in snow and ice to effectuate a governmental purpose
    clearly involved, at least in part, the exercise of judgment and
    discretion by the driver."    
    Id. at 343,
    429 S.E.2d at 13.   See
    also 
    Smith, 254 Va. at 353
    n.7, 492 S.E.2d at 430 
    n.7; National
    R.R. Passenger Corp., 241 Va. at 
    413, 404 S.E.2d at 222
    ; 
    Colby, 241 Va. at 129
    , 400 S.E.2d at 187.
    Obviously, the facts and circumstances in each case are
    relevant to understanding the precise governmental function at
    issue and whether effectuating that function requires the
    exercise of discretion and judgment.   But, we have not looked
    past that point and examined "how" the driver chose to respond.
    Instead, we simply asked whether an employee of an immune
    governmental entity, while driving an automobile, was engaged in
    routine driving or driving that involved the exercise of
    judgment and discretion.
    18
    If it is necessary for the government employee to
    demonstrate on an objective basis that the actions taken were
    reasonable, this new factor introduced by the majority
    essentially deprives the doctrine of sovereign immunity of its
    purpose: it will only provide government employees with immunity
    from negligence claims if they were not negligent in responding
    to the circumstances they faced. 2   See Litchford v. Hancock, 
    232 Va. 496
    , 499, 352 S.E.2d. 335, 337 (1987) (stating that the
    driver of a vehicle is negligent if the driver fails "to use
    ordinary care to observe other vehicles on the highway, to see
    what a reasonable person would have seen, and to react as a
    reasonable person would have reacted under the circumstances to
    avoid a collision"); Smith v. Lamar, 
    212 Va. 820
    , 823, 
    188 S.E.2d 72
    , 74 (1972) (holding that "reasonable care" or
    "ordinary care" is that "degree of care which an ordinary
    2
    Sovereign immunity protects a defendant working for an
    immune governmental entity against only claims for simple
    negligence. See Green v. Ingram, 
    269 Va. 281
    , 290, 
    608 S.E.2d 917
    , 922 (2005); National R.R. Passenger 
    Corp., 241 Va. at 414
    ,
    404 S.E.2d at 222. Thus, when "a defendant's actions are
    clothed with sovereign immunity, a plaintiff must establish
    gross negligence in order to prevail." 
    Colby, 241 Va. at 130
    ,
    400 S.E.2d at 187. In exercising judgment and discretion to
    effectuate a governmental purpose, if a defendant does so in
    such a manner that shows "indifference to others as constitutes
    an utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of
    the safety of [another], that is, such a degree of negligence as
    should shock fair minded men although something less than
    willful recklessness," the defendant is liable for gross
    negligence. Laster v. Tatum, 
    206 Va. 804
    , 807, 
    146 S.E.2d 231
    ,
    233 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 
    Green, 269 Va. at 290-91
    , 608 S.E.2d at 922.
    19
    prudent person would exercise under the same or similar
    circumstances to avoid injury to another").    Also, if a
    government employee has successfully demonstrated that the
    actions taken were objectively reasonable, I question whether
    that employee could ever then be liable for gross negligence.
    At a minimum, if this new factor is appropriate, the
    majority should acknowledge its departure from our precedent and
    explain why it is necessary.   Moreover, in the case before us,
    the majority does not apply this new factor.    The majority never
    decides whether the decisions by Bennett and Folston to drive
    their vehicles in excess of the speed limit without lights and
    sirens were objectively reasonable.   Instead, the majority
    concludes, by utilizing the approach supported by our precedent,
    that "determining the proper response to a criminal act (i.e., a
    domestic disturbance) and implementing that response clearly
    involves the exercise of judgment and discretion in the
    performance of a governmental function."
    Nevertheless, I conclude, like the majority, that the
    circuit court did not err in sustaining the special pleas in bar
    based on sovereign immunity filed by Bennett and Folston.      As
    police officers, they were effectuating the governmental
    function of responding to a domestic disturbance call.      Like the
    police officer in Colby and the driver spreading salt in
    Stanfield, the operation of their respective vehicles entailed
    20
    "special risks arising from the governmental activity and the
    exercise of judgment or discretion about the proper means of
    effectuating the governmental purpose."   
    Stanfield, 245 Va. at 344
    , 429 S.E.2d at 14.   For that reason, they are entitled to
    the protection of sovereign immunity.   Whether their decisions
    about "how" to respond were objectively reasonable, even though
    the dispatch assigned no response code to the call, is not
    determinative.
    I recognize, however, that this Court utilized a different
    approach in Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 
    268 Va. 384
    , 
    601 S.E.2d 591
    (2004).   There, a fire truck collided with a motor vehicle
    after the fire truck driver failed to yield the right-of-way.
    
    Id. at 386,
    601 S.E.2d at 592.   The fire technician was
    responding to a "Priority 2" dispatch regarding an infant locked
    in a vehicle.    
    Id. at 387,
    601 S.E.2d at 592.   Under that
    protocol, the technician "was required to proceed without
    activating warning devices, i.e., 'no lights and no sirens,' and
    to obey all statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles."
    
    Id. In reversing
    the trial court's judgment holding that this
    driver was protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
    Court relied on both the protocol and the technician's
    testimony, admitting "that, based on what he knew at the time,
    'there was no danger' involved in the call to which they were
    21
    responding and he understood that 'when [he] got a [Priority 2]
    call, [he was] to respond in a nonemergency manner and conform
    to all the traffic regulations.'"     Id. at 
    390, 601 S.E.2d at 594
    .   When asked whether "there [was] any difference in the way
    you respond to a call for a cat in a tree versus an infant
    locked in a car, according to [the] regulations," he responded,
    "[my] regulations, no."    
    Id. The Court's
    reliance on the fire department operating
    procedures and the fire technician's testimony admitting that he
    knew there was no danger involved in the call represented a
    departure from our precedent applying the doctrine of sovereign
    immunity.   We specifically had rejected the use of guidelines
    and operating procedures in Colby and National Railroad
    Passenger Corp.    And, in determining whether the operation of a
    vehicle involved the exercise of discretion and judgment, the
    Court had not previously examined a driver's subjective
    assessment about the nature of the specific situation at issue
    and how to respond in deciding whether the driver was protected
    by sovereign immunity.    In my view, the approach followed in our
    cases before Friday-Spivey should be applied in the case before
    us, and to the extent that Friday-Spivey suggests that the
    application of sovereign immunity turns on such subjective
    assessments or internal policies and operating procedures, it
    should be overruled.
    22
    For these reasons, I respectfully concur and would affirm
    the circuit court's judgment.
    JUSTICE MIMS, dissenting.
    Because a public employee who flagrantly violates a direct
    order is acting outside the limits of his or her permissible
    judgment and discretion, I dissent.
    Facts
    Donnell Worsley spent much of the last day of his life at
    his mother's house with family.    In the early evening, he
    attended the birthday party of a family friend.      He returned to
    his mother's house and then rode his bike home.      The night was
    clear.   The roads were dry and well-lit.
    Worsley never made it home.       As he pedaled his bike on the
    Campostella Bridge, two police cruisers were approaching at high
    speed behind him.
    Officer Bennett had received a call for a "disorderly
    trespasser or disturbance or something of that nature" in the
    Tidewater Gardens community.    Officer Folston had previously
    received a call from dispatch to transport a prisoner.      He
    disregarded that call without permission when he overheard
    Officer Bennett take the call for the "disturbance."
    The cruiser was "full throttle," "pedal down to the floor"
    as Folston drove up the bridge.    Coming down, the officers began
    23
    to slow slightly, because they were going too fast to make an
    upcoming turn.   Suddenly, Bennett hit his brakes and came to a
    complete stop as he encountered Worsley.     Folston swerved to
    avoid rear-ending Bennett's cruiser.      As he did, he struck
    Worsley.   The impact threw Worsley onto the windshield, which
    shattered.   Folston's cruiser dragged the crumpled bicycle more
    than 200 feet.
    The officers were not using their sirens or emergency
    lights.    There is evidence that the cruisers reached speeds
    between eighty and eighty-eight miles per hour.
    Bennett and Folston were each indicted on one charge of
    involuntary manslaughter and two charges of reckless driving.
    In Bennett's case, the involuntary manslaughter charge and one
    of the two charges of reckless driving were nolle prossed. The
    Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk convicted Bennett of the
    remaining reckless driving charge. Folston entered an Alford
    Plea to one of the reckless driving charges, and the remaining
    charges were nolle prossed.
    Discussion
    The majority concludes that sovereign immunity attached to
    the officers’ actions while responding to the uncategorized
    disturbance call, despite the clear and express order issued by
    the Norfolk Chief of Police to treat such calls as nonemergency
    responses while observing "[a]ll posted signs and traffic laws."
    Because they violated an express order that dictated the limits
    of their permitted judgment and discretion in the performance of
    24
    this government function, our precedent dictates that they
    cannot hide behind the shield of sovereign immunity.
    1.   Norfolk Police Department General Order OPR-710
    The majority opinion fails to give due regard to Norfolk
    Police Department General Order OPR-710 (“General Order”).    As
    the Court has explained: "Whether the act performed involves the
    use of judgment and discretion is a consideration, but it is not
    always determinative. . . . Of equal importance is the degree of
    control and direction exercised by the [governmental body] over
    the employee whose negligence is involved."   James v. Jane, 
    221 Va. 43
    , 53, 
    282 S.E.2d 864
    , 869 (1980) (emphasis added).    The
    General Order exercises clear control and direction for the
    emergency operation of police vehicles, which constrains
    officers' otherwise-permitted judgment and discretion.    Bennett
    and Folston flagrantly disregarded this order and, therefore,
    were acting outside the limits of their authority.   They
    exercised no permissible "judgment and discretion" in
    unilaterally choosing to speed recklessly without sirens or
    emergency lights.
    The structure of the General Order makes it clear that
    there are four situations in which “emergency vehicle operation”
    is authorized.   If one of those four situations applies, then
    police officers may assess ten factors to determine the
    appropriate response to the emergency situation.
    25
    The relevant sections of the General Order (I, II, and V)
    are printed in their entirety below:
    I.    Policy
    Sworn personnel will operate police vehicles
    in   emergency   situations   in  the   safest
    possible    manner,    consistent  with    law
    enforcement     responsibilities,   and     in
    accordance with the procedures contained in
    this order.
    II.   Emergency Operation of Police Vehicles
    In    undertaking    any   emergency    vehicle
    operation,    officers   must    balance    the
    seriousness    of   the  situation    and   the
    importance of the law enforcement objective
    involved against the hazards to the safety of
    citizens and police personnel involved.
    A. Emergency vehicle operation is authorized
    during the following:
    1.     When the immediate presence of the
    police is required in order to protect
    a person from possible death or serious
    injury.
    2.     When the telecommunicator dispatches a
    message with a response Code 1 or 2.
    3.     When    directly    authorized   by    a
    supervisor.
    4.     When engaged in a vehicular pursuit.
    B. Officers are expected to exercise good
    judgment   as    to   the   necessity   and
    justification for operating their vehicles
    under emergency conditions.     Factors and
    conditions to be assessed by officers prior
    to and during the emergency operation of
    the police vehicle include, but are not
    limited to, the following:
    26
    1.  Nature and seriousness of offense or
    call
    2. Weather conditions
    3. Road surface conditions
    4. Traffic conditions
    5. Time of day
    6. Knowledge of area
    7. Ability to control vehicle
    8. Type of vehicles involved
    9. Availability of assisting units
    10. Geographic     location     –  school,
    residential, business, etc.
    . . . .
    V.   Response Codes
    A. Code 1- With due regard for safety,
    emergency lights and siren must be used at
    all times when operating a vehicle in
    excess of the speed limit, or contrary to
    other traffic regulations, regardless of
    the time of day or the location.      Speed
    limits will not be exceeded by more than 15
    mph, except during pursuits.
    B. Code 2- With due regard for safety,
    emergency lights must be used at all times
    and siren used as necessary. Police units
    will come to a full stop at each red light,
    then proceed through the intersection only
    if it is possible to do so without danger
    to pedestrians or vehicles.      All other
    traffic controls will be approached with
    extreme caution. Speed limits will not be
    exceeded by more than 5 mph.
    C. Code 3- Emergency lights and/or siren will
    not be used. All posted signs and traffic
    laws will be observed.    When no specified
    response code is assigned to the message,
    response Code 3 will be used.
    Pursuant to the plain language of subsection (II)(A) of the
    General Order, an officer is authorized to engage in “emergency
    27
    vehicle operation” in only four scenarios: (1) when his or her
    immediate presence is required to protect a person from possible
    death or serious injury; (2) when the dispatch has a response
    Code 1 or 2; (3) when directly authorized by a supervisor; or
    (4) when engaged in a vehicular pursuit.    Only if one of these
    four scenarios applies does the officer then have authority to
    exercise independent judgment and discretion to disregard
    traffic laws.   To guide officers in the exercise of this
    judgment and discretion, subsection (II)(B) provides a list of
    ten factors for consideration.   But these factors do not come
    into play unless the officer is first authorized to engage in
    “emergency vehicle operation” pursuant to one of the four prongs
    of subsection (II)(A).
    In this case, the domestic disturbance call from the
    dispatcher was not assigned a code, and therefore it was
    required to be treated as Code 3.     It did not involve vehicular
    pursuit.   The officers were not authorized by their supervisors
    to treat it as an emergency situation.
    Thus, the only possible basis for engaging in “emergency
    vehicle operation” under the policy was if “the immediate
    presence of the police [wa]s required in order to protect a
    person from possible death or serious injury.”    The majority
    opinion makes no attempt to argue that scenario applies.
    Indeed, the majority makes the conclusory assertion that
    28
    "Bennett and Folston determined that it was necessary for them
    to respond to the domestic disturbance call in an emergency
    manner."   However, there are no facts in the record to support
    that conclusion.   To the contrary, the dispatcher, who was aware
    of the facts, decided not to code the response.   That was a
    factual determination that the officers' "immediate presence"
    was not required to prevent death or serious injury.
    The majority concludes that Folston's unilateral and
    unauthorized decision to back up Bennett (even though the
    dispatcher had already assigned back up), coupled with their
    collective, unauthorized decision to speed recklessly to the
    call without sirens or lights--again, unauthorized--was enough
    to trigger sovereign immunity.   I disagree. 1
    Whether a dispatch falls within one of the General Order’s
    authorizations for “emergency vehicle operation” is an objective
    1
    In fact, the officers did not comply with the General
    Order's mandates for Code 1 or Code 2 emergency operation
    either. In other words, Bennett and Folston did not respond in
    any sort of authorized manner; they just drove fast. As the
    accident report indicates, the speed limit in the area was 30
    mph, and Folston surmised that he was probably driving 45-50 mph
    at the time of the crash (despite having the "pedal down to the
    floor" going up the bridge), while Bennett indicated that he
    reached speeds around 60 mph. Code 1 operation requires that
    "[s]peed limits will not be exceeded by more than 15 mph, except
    during pursuits." Under Code 1, "emergency lights and siren
    must be used at all times when operating a vehicle in excess of
    the speed limit . . . regardless of the time of day or the
    location." Under Code 2, which requires use of lights and
    requires intermittent use of sirens, "[s]peed limits will not be
    exceeded by more than 5 mph."
    29
    determination that must be based on the specific facts about
    that particular dispatch known by the officer at the time of
    response.    Generalized knowledge regarding the character of the
    area or the type of call cannot suffice.   Otherwise, an officer
    could overrule a dispatcher’s assigned response code and treat
    the call as an emergency based on nothing more than after-the-
    fact, self-serving conjecture.   Such a result would effectively
    nullify the Norfolk Police Department’s established system of
    response codes and nullify the direct order of the Norfolk Chief
    of Police.
    2.   Friday-Spivey v. Collier Controls this Case
    These facts place this case squarely within the rule of
    Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 
    268 Va. 384
    , 
    601 S.E.2d 591
    (2004),
    which the Court decided a mere decade ago.   It remains binding
    authority in the Commonwealth; it has not been overruled or
    limited.    Therein, the Court drew a clear line between driving
    in emergency conditions that embraces "special risks" and
    "ordinary driving situations," derived from the Fairfax County
    Fire and Rescue Department Standard Operating Procedures.
    In Friday-Spivey, we refused to grant sovereign immunity to
    a fire truck driver who collided with a motorist while
    responding to a "Priority 2" call indicating that an infant was
    locked in a parked car. 
    Id. at 390-91,
    601 S.E.2d at 594-95.
    Under the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department Standard
    30
    Operating Procedures, the driver was "required" to proceed
    without emergency equipment and "to obey all statutes governing
    the operation of motor vehicles."     
    Id. at 387,
    601 S.E.2d at
    592.   Similar to the facts in this case, the driver was not
    using his emergency lights or siren, but failed to yield the
    right of way to another vehicle.      
    Id. at 386-87,
    601 S.E. at
    592-93.   He testified that he had exercised his discretion to
    determine the “quickest route possible” because he “just [did
    not] know what to expect when [he got] there.”      
    Id. at 387,
    601
    S.E.2d at 593.   The Court held that, “[d]espite a natural
    inclination to classify the report of a child in a locked car as
    an ‘emergency,’” he was not required to “exercise . . .
    discretion beyond that required for ordinary driving in routine
    traffic situations.”    Id. at 
    390, 601 S.E.2d at 594
    .   Thus, the
    driver was performing a ministerial function to which sovereign
    immunity did not apply. 
    Id. at 391,
    601 S.E.2d at 595.
    The majority makes no attempt to distinguish the facts of
    Friday-Spivey from the facts of this case.     Moreover, there is
    little effort to address the officers' disobedience of the
    General Order.   Rather, the majority sidesteps the officers'
    unjustified insubordination with a quote from Colby v. Boyden,
    
    241 Va. 125
    , 129, 
    400 S.E.2d 184
    , 187 (1991): "[T]hose
    guidelines do not, and cannot, eliminate the requirement that a
    police officer, engaged in the delicate, dangerous, and
    31
    potentially deadly job of vehicular pursuit, must make prompt,
    original, and crucial decisions."     However, this ignores a
    significant factual distinction.      In Colby, there were known,
    objective facts of an emergency situation.      Colby applied
    immunity to a police officer who had observed a traffic
    infraction committed in his presence, after which the
    perpetrator fled at a high rate of speed, and who initiated
    vehicular pursuit.   
    Id. at 127,
    130, 400 S.E.2d at 185-187
    .    In
    fact, in the present case vehicular pursuit is one of the four
    prongs in the General Order that would have permitted the
    officers to exercise such judgment and discretion.     As discussed
    in more detail below, and like the driver in Friday-Spivey,
    Bennett and Folston could point to no specific facts of a
    defined emergency situation.    They had no knowledge that would
    permit judgment and discretion to speed recklessly without
    emergency lights or sirens. 2
    Nothing about the call indicated that the immediate
    presence of the officers was needed to protect anyone from
    “possible death or serious injury.”     In fact, when Bennett was
    2
    Further, unlike the General Order, which requires Norfolk
    police officers to treat calls with no specific response code as
    Code 3 nonemergency calls, Virginia Beach Police Department
    General Order 8.01, addressed in Colby, expressly authorized
    officers to judge the response required according to the
    information available to the officer at the time. City of
    Virginia Beach Police Department, General Order 8.01, at 5,
    Colby v. Boyden, 
    241 Va. 125
    , 129, 
    400 S.E.2d 184
    , 187 (1991).
    32
    questioned by his supervisors shortly after the accident, he
    stated that “[t]here was no like excuse or reason for [speeding
    to get to the scene].”   And at the hearing before the circuit
    court, Bennett agreed that his decision was "not based on any
    exigent emergency circumstance."
    Similarly, Folston, who was not even assigned to respond to
    the call, acknowledged that there was only "an unidentified
    problem" and that "[t]here may or may not be a danger."   Like
    the driver in Friday-Spivey who "just [did not] know what to
    expect when [he got] there,” Folston posited that this "unknown"
    presented an exigent circumstance.    Yet the officers could have
    addressed that exigent circumstance without speeding recklessly
    through the city and endangering the lives of innocent
    civilians.   For example, they could have learned about the
    specific facts of the call--or even verified the code--by
    accessing the computer in the vehicle.   Unlike in Colby, based
    on the specific information available to the officers at the
    time of the response, there was no emergency involved in the
    call to which they were responding.   Consequently, the General
    Order mandated that the officers respond to the call in a
    nonemergency manner. 3
    3
    This is distinguishable from Muse v. Schleiden, 
    349 F. Supp. 2d 990
    (E.D. Va. 2004), in which the court held that
    sovereign immunity applied to an officer responding to a
    domestic violence call. In Muse, the responding officer had
    33
    Although the majority opinion cites Friday-Spivey five
    times, it utterly fails to meaningfully address the importance
    that we attached to the departmental policy governing emergency
    vehicle operation in that case.     See 268 Va. at 
    391, 601 S.E.2d at 595
    ("[Defendant] was in routine traffic under a mandate 'to
    respond in a nonemergency manner and conform to all the traffic
    regulations.'") (emphasis added).      Make no mistake, the majority
    opinion vitiates the rule of Friday-Spivey and leaves it with
    little to no vitality.   In effect, it is overruled sub silentio.
    The majority opinion establishes a lamentable precedent by
    casting adrift the determination of "judgment and discretion"
    from its firm moorings within authority granted by well-reasoned
    departmental guidance such as the General Order.     There are
    three reasons to give such guidance due deference.
    First, a speeding emergency vehicle is a dangerous weapon,
    capable of killing innocent civilians, as occurred in this
    tragic case.   Departmental policies limit that danger: in this
    instance by requiring activation of sirens and emergency lights
    to warn unsuspecting motorists and bicyclists when speeding up
    specific information regarding the circumstances of the call.
    The dispatch reflected that the caller’s daughter had struck him
    in the face, was standing next to him at the time of the call,
    and was “out of control.” 
    Id. at 992.
    From those facts, the
    officer reasonably determined that an assault was in progress
    and that he needed to get to the call as quickly as possible.
    
    Id. at 996.
    34
    to fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit and prohibiting
    speeds in excess of that, except during pursuit.
    Second, such policies--particularly when expressed as
    commands such as the General Order--limit the authority, and
    therefore the permitted judgment and discretion, of public
    employees for good purpose.   They are intended to prevent free-
    lancing, and ensure respect for the chain of command.   In this
    instance, a superior officer could have authorized emergency
    operation, but no such request was made.
    Third, though courts may desire a single statewide standard
    that neatly categorizes "judgment and discretion" in all
    instances, proper judicial respect for local policies reflects
    due consideration of the Commonwealth's diversity.   Judgment and
    discretion on the crowded city streets of Norfolk or the
    sprawling highway network of Fairfax County will necessarily
    involve different factors than on the less-traveled rural roads
    of Lee County.   Departmental orders and policies reflect the
    unique traffic conditions that are likely to be faced in each
    locality.   The Chief of Police in the City of Norfolk is better
    able to provide useful guidance to officers than a court one
    hundred miles away.   And when that guidance is flagrantly
    violated, no court should provide a shield of immunity from
    civil consequences.
    35
    3.   An Objective Determination Regarding the Application of
    Sovereign Immunity
    I agree with the majority's proposition that "the proper
    application of sovereign immunity requires a court to make an
    objective determination as to whether the decision made and the
    actions taken pursuant thereto were necessary to the performance
    of a governmental function and embraced special risks."
    However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Bennett
    and Folston possessed or exercised sufficient judgment and
    discretion to trigger application of sovereign immunity.   Their
    Chief of Police had already issued an order that required a
    nonemergency response, thereby significantly limiting such
    judgment and discretion.
    Moreover, I disagree that their decision was "necessary."
    The Norfolk Chief of Police had already made the "necessary
    decision" that controlled how officers must respond.   The only
    decision Bennett and Folston had to make was whether to act
    within their authority and abide by the General Order or whether
    to engage in insubordination.   They chose to ignore the order,
    and Donnell Worsley's tragic and preventable death was the
    result.
    According to the majority's logic:
    [T]he operation of their vehicles in an emergency
    manner involved speeds in excess of the speed limit
    and, thus, went beyond "ordinary driving in routine
    traffic." . . .     Therefore, in exercising their
    36
    judgment and discretion about the best means of
    effectuating a governmental function by embracing
    the requisite special risks, Bennett and Folston
    triggered the application of sovereign immunity.
    This reasoning is circular.   Bennett and Folston treated a Code
    3, nonemergency situation as an emergency, without authorization
    from their superiors or justification based on specific,
    objective facts known to them but not their supervisor.    They
    unjustifiably drove their vehicles at excessive, reckless speeds
    without sirens or emergency lights. Thus, they created the
    "special risks" that triggered the application of sovereign
    immunity.   This reasoning permits government employees to assume
    an emergency into existence and respond in a manner that poses
    "special risks" to themselves and the public while hiding behind
    the shield of civil immunity.
    Officers who obey the orders of their superiors and are
    engaged in the dangerous and potentially deadly job of
    responding to emergency situations must make prompt and crucial
    decisions in the midst of highly stressful conditions.    “Such
    situations involve necessarily discretionary, split-second
    decisions balancing grave personal risks, public safety
    concerns, and the need to achieve the governmental objective.”
    
    Colby, 241 Va. at 129-30
    , 400 S.E.2d at 187.   That principle is
    sacrosanct.   However, the Norfolk Police Department, through the
    General Order, also requires its officers to make and execute
    37
    certain decisions according to clear direction.   The General
    Order represents the chain-of-command within the police
    department. It provides an objective means for evaluating
    official action.   In other words, denying immunity under these
    circumstances is consistent with internal expectations and
    standards.    This is not a question of courts second guessing
    legitimate official actions.   Here, the rules were established
    beforehand.
    As Colby recognizes, there are scenarios where exigent
    circumstances can authorize an officer to exercise a level of
    refined discretion that exceeds the language of a policy.      Id.
    at 
    129, 400 S.E.2d at 187
    .   However, raising the shield of
    sovereign immunity must require a basis in fact, rather than
    generalization, speculation, or post hoc rationalization.      See
    
    id. The absence
    of specific facts triggering the need for
    "prompt, original, and crucial decisions" distinguishes this
    case from Colby, because the "original" decisions dictating the
    manner of response under these circumstances had already been
    made by Bennett's and Folston's superiors.
    Conclusion
    Officers Bennett and Folston were under a sworn duty to act
    within the authority conferred by their badges.   That authority
    was expressed clearly in the General Order.   That order
    expressed the policy of their chain of command regarding the
    38
    judgment and discretion they were authorized to exercise while
    driving.   They flagrantly breached their sworn duty when they
    disregarded the General Order.   They acted far outside their
    authority.   They ignored their chain of command.
    Friday-Spivey is the law of the Commonwealth.   It governs
    the facts of this case.   It dictates reversal and remand to the
    trial court for a full trial on the merits.
    I dissent.
    39