Lindsey v. Commonwealth , 293 Va. 1 ( 2017 )

PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Mims, McClanahan, Powell, and Kelsey, JJ., and Koontz,
S.J.
JAMES LINDSEY
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 151111 CHIEF JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
JANUARY 19, 2017
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a
defendant’s due process rights were not violated by a jury instruction concerning willful
concealment of goods or merchandise while on the premises of a store.
I. Facts and Proceedings
James Lindsey (“Lindsey”) was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of Arlington County
(“trial court”) upon an indictment charging petit larceny, third or subsequent offense. He was
found guilty and sentenced to seven days in jail.
Bryan Knott (“Knott”), an employee at a retail store dealing in clothing for hiking and
outdoor wear in Arlington, testified at trial that he observed Lindsey conceal at least two hats
under his jacket while in the store. Knott notified his manager and another employee regarding
what he had witnessed. The manager, Brad Dana, contacted police while the other employee,
Steve Lappat (“Lappat”) confronted Lindsey. When confronted by Lappat, Lindsey denied
concealing the hats and demanded to speak to the manager. After the police arrived, an
altercation occurred between Lindsey and Lappat. Lindsey was subsequently arrested.
Over Lindsey’s objection, the trial court gave Instruction 16 to the jury, which read:
Willful concealment of goods or merchandise while still on the
premises of a store is evidence of an intent to convert and defraud
the owner of the value of the goods or merchandise, unless there is
believable evidence to the contrary.
This instruction came from the Virginia Model Jury Instructions. 2 Virginia Model Jury
Instructions – Criminal, No. 36.840 (2011 repl. ed.). Lindsey had proposed an alternate
instruction, Instruction O, which the trial court rejected. Instruction O read:
You may infer that willful concealment of goods or merchandise
while still on the premises of a store is evidence of an intent to
convert and defraud the owner of the value of the goods or
merchandise.
Lindsey appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals and contended, among other
things *, that he suffered a denial of due process resulting from the challenged jury instruction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in an unpublished per curiam order.
Lindsey v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1558-14-4 (April 16, 2015). The Court of Appeals
determined that Instruction 16 merely suggested to the jury a possible conclusion it could draw
from predicate facts. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the challenged instruction did
not violate Lindsey’s due process rights because it informed the jury only about a permissive
inference, not a mandatory presumption. Lindsey appealed to this Court, and we granted his
appeal on the following assignment of error:
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s giving of
Jury Instruction 16, and denying proffered Instruction O, because
Instruction 16 impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the
defense, in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Whether a jury instruction accurately reflects the relevant law is itself a question of law,
which we review de novo. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 228, 738 S.E.2d 847, 870
*
Lindsey also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, but that question is not at issue
in this appeal.
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(2013); Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy Assocs. v. Summit Group Props., 283 Va. 777,
782, 724 S.E.2d 718, 721 (2012). In determining whether this jury instruction violates the
defendant’s due process rights, we must consider whether the instruction creates a mandatory
presumption or merely a permissive inference. Dobson v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 71, 75, 531
S.E.2d 569, 571 (2000) (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985)).
B. Due Process Clause
On appeal, Lindsey argues that Instruction 16 contained a mandatory, rebuttable
presumption that shifted the burden of proof to him, thereby violating his due process rights.
Relying on Francis v. Franklin, he argues the instruction was constitutionally invalid because the
jury would have understood the instruction to mean that if they found evidence of concealment,
they were required to find intent to defraud unless the defendant convinced them otherwise.
The Due Process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Mandatory presumptions violate the Due
Process clause because they instruct the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State
proves certain predicate facts, which relieves the State of the burden of persuasion on an element
of an offense. Dobson, 260 Va. at 75, 531 S.E.2d at 572.
The Due Process Clause, however, does not prohibit the use of a permissive inference.
Id. at 74, 531 S.E.2d at 571. A permissive inference is “a procedural device that shifts to a
defendant the burden of producing some evidence contesting a fact that may otherwise be
inferred, provided that the prosecution retains the ultimate burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 74-75, 531 S.E.2d at 571. “A permissive inference does not relieve the State of its
burden of proof because it still requires the State to convince the jury that the suggested
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conclusion should be inferred based on the predicate facts provided.” Id. at 75, 531 S.E.2d at
572 (quoting Francis, 471 U.S. at 314).
C. Instruction 16
Lindsey maintains that the language in Instruction 16 is similar to the language declared
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Francis. In Francis, the defendant shot
and killed the victim while attempting to flee from police. 471 U.S. at 309-12. The defendant’s
sole defense was that the shooting was an accident and he lacked the requisite intent to kill. Id.
at 311. The following jury instructions were given at his trial:
[1] The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed
to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption may be
rebutted.
[2] A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend
the natural and probable consequences of his acts but the
presumption may be rebutted.
Id. at 309.
The defendant was convicted of murder, and on appeal he challenged these instructions
as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the instructions impermissibly
created mandatory rebuttable presumptions. Id. at 318. The Court found that the language “is
presumed” and “are presumed” was “cast in the language of command” and undermined the
factfinder’s responsibility at trial to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 316.
Lindsey argues that the language in Instruction 16, “willful concealment … is evidence of an
intent to convert and defraud,” is also “cast in the language of command” and directs the jury to
find intent to defraud if the jury finds willful concealment.
We find that Instruction 16 is not similar to the instructions at issue in Francis; rather, it
is like language of the jury instruction that was challenged in Dobson. Dobson was charged with
grand larceny of an automobile, and the jury was instructed that:
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Proof of the exclusive personal possession by the defendant of
recently stolen goods is a circumstance from which you may
reasonably infer that the defendant was the thief unless the
defendant offers a reasonable account of possession consistent with
innocence which the Commonwealth has failed to prove untrue.
260 Va. at 74, 531 S.E.2d at 571. Dobson appealed his conviction, arguing that this instruction
created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that he was the thief if he was unable to
provide a reasonable explanation for his possession of the vehicle. Id. We rejected his argument
and held that this instruction merely informed the jury that it could draw an inference from
certain facts, if proved, provided the defendant did not reasonably explain his possession of the
recently stolen property. Id. at 76, 531 S.E.2d at 572. The jury was not required to draw any
conclusion from the facts proved by the Commonwealth in the absence of such contrary evidence
from the defendant. Id. We further held that the challenged instruction actually benefitted the
defendant because it effectively informed the jury that it could not infer that the defendant was a
thief if he offered a reasonable explanation of his possession consistent with his innocence. Id.
In this case, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Lindsey willfully concealed
the merchandise, and did so with the intent to convert the merchandise to his use without having
paid for the merchandise. The relevant portion of Code § 18.2-103 provides:
Whoever, without authority, with the intention of converting goods
or merchandise to his own or another’s use without having paid the
full purchase price thereof, or of defrauding the owner of the value
of the goods or merchandise, (i) willfully conceals or takes
possession of the goods or merchandise of any store or other
mercantile establishment… when the value of the goods or
merchandise involved in the offense is less than $ 200, shall be
guilty of petit larceny… The willful concealment of goods or
merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, while
still on the premises thereof, shall be prima facie evidence of an
intent to convert and defraud the owner thereof out of the value of
the goods or merchandise.
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The language of Instruction 16 merely instructed the jury that willful concealment of
goods while on the premises of a store is evidence of intent to convert and defraud. It provided
that the jury could consider the concealment of merchandise as evidence of criminal intent, along
with any other evidence that was presented to it. Under Code § 18.2-103, willful concealment is
prima facie evidence of intent to convert or defraud. This instruction was a proper statement of
the law. Moreover, this instruction did not relieve the Commonwealth of its burden of proving
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The remaining language of the
instruction, “unless there is believable evidence to the contrary,” reinforced that the
Commonwealth had the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The
instruction did not state that willful concealment alone satisfies the Commonwealth’s burden of
proof as to the element of intent. Like the instruction in Dobson, this instruction merely created
a permissible inference that the jury was free to reject. Significantly, the instruction did not
indicate or suggest that the jury was required to draw any conclusion from the facts proved by
the Commonwealth. Accordingly, because Instruction 16 contained a permissive inference and
not a mandatory presumption, the trial court did not err in giving it to the jury.
In addition to Instruction 16, the trial court also instructed the jury that the
Commonwealth had the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant was presumed innocent until proven guilty, that the presumption of
innocence remained with him throughout trial, and that he had no burden to produce any
evidence. (App. 4-7). In particular, the jury was given Instruction M, the “finding instruction.”
(App. 7). This instruction provided that:
Mr. Lindsey is charged with the crime of petit larceny by willful
concealment of goods or merchandise third or subsequent offense.
The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
of the following elements of that crime:
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1. That Mr. Lindsey willfully concealed the merchandise of
Hudson Trail Outfitters; and
2. That Mr. Lindsey intended to convert the merchandise to his
own or another’s use without having paid the full purchase price
thereof; and
3. That Mr. Lindsey had no authority to do so; and
4. That the merchandise was of some value; and
5. That Mr. Lindsey has a least two (2) prior larceny convictions.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the crime
charged, then you shall find Mr. Lindsey guilty, but not fix the
punishment until further evidence is heard by you.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the first four elements of the
crime charged but has proved only one prior conviction, then you
shall find Mr. Lindsey guilty of the crime of petit larceny second
offense, but you shall not fix the punishment until your verdict has
been returned and further evidence has been heard by you.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the first four elements but has
failed to prove any prior convictions, then you shall find Mr.
Lindsey guilty of the crime of petit larceny first offense, but you
shall not fix punishment until your verdict has been returned and
further evidence has been heard by you.
If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt any of the first four elements of the crime, then
you shall find Mr. Lindsey not guilty. (App. 7).
The finding instruction made perfectly clear that the jury was instructed that, notwithstanding the
permissive inference set forth in Instruction 16, the Commonwealth was still required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense, including the element of intent.
“When granted instructions fully and fairly cover a principle of law, a trial court does not
abuse its discretion in refusing another instruction relating to the same legal principle.” Daniels
v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 460, 466, 657 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2008) (quoting Stockton v.
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Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 145, 314 S.E.2d 371, 384 (1984)). In this case, Instruction 16
fully and fairly covered the inferences permitted from evidence presented of willful concealment.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to give Instruction O.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE GOODWYN, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s conclusion that Instruction 16 contains a permissive
inference is belied by the plain language of Instruction 16 and by United States Supreme Court and
Virginia precedent.
Instruction 16 states,
Willful concealment of goods or merchandise while still on the premises of a
store is evidence of an intent to convert and defraud the owner of the value of the
goods or merchandise, unless there is believable evidence to the contrary.
“The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to this kind
of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the presumption it describes.” Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979). As noted by the majority, “In determining if a jury
instruction violates a defendant’s due process rights, a court must consider whether the
instruction creates a mandatory presumption or merely a permissive inference.” Dobson v.
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 71, 75, 531 S.E.2d 569, 571 (2000).
In making the determination, the “[a]nalysis must focus initially on the specific language
challenged,” but “the potentially offending words must [also] be considered in the context of the
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charge as a whole.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 (1985). The key question is “what a
reasonable juror could have understood the [instruction] as meaning.” Id. at 316.
The United States Supreme Court has described mandatory presumptions as those that
instruct the jury “that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts.”
Id. at 314. A rebuttable mandatory presumption “does not remove the presumed element from
the case but nevertheless requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant
persuades the jury that such a finding is unwarranted.” Id. at 314 n.2. On the other hand, “[a]
permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves
predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion.” Id. at 314. For this
reason, a mandatory presumption is a
far more troublesome evidentiary device. For it may affect not only the strength
of the “no reasonable doubt” burden but also the placement of that burden; it tells
the trier that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact,
at least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the
presumed connection between the two facts.
Ulster Cnty. Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
Considering the elements of the crime expressed in Code § 18.2-103, * in Instruction 16
the presumed elemental fact is “intent to convert or defraud the owner,” and the basic or
predicate fact is “willful concealment of goods and merchandise.” Instruction 16 is cast in the
language of a command. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 316. It requires the jury to find that willful
concealment is evidence of intent to convert or defraud, unless there is believable evidence to the
contrary. Because the plain language of the Instruction requires the jury to find the elemental
* The relevant portion of Code § 18.2-103 provides:
Whoever, without authority, with the intention of converting goods or
merchandise to his own or another’s use without having paid the full purchase
price thereof, or of defrauding the owner of the value of the goods or
merchandise, (i) willfully conceals . . . the goods or merchandise of any store or
other mercantile establishment . . . when the value of the goods or merchandise
involved in the offense is less than $200, shall be guilty of petit larceny.
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fact of intent upon proof of the predicate fact of concealment, according to United States
Supreme Court precedent, Instruction 16 contains an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.
Examination of the language used in Instruction 16 against the precedential description of
a permissive inference is conclusive in demonstrating that Instruction 16 does not contain a
permissive inference.
The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or
presumption, which allows—but does not require—the trier of fact to infer the
elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no
burden of any kind on the defendant. . . . Because this permissive presumption
leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the
burden of proof, it affects the application of the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier
could make the connection permitted by the inference.
Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
Unlike prior cases in which an instruction was found to contain a permissive inference,
Instruction 16 did not inform the jury that it was allowed to infer that the basic fact
(concealment) was evidence of the elemental fact (intent), but rather informed the jury that it was
required to infer that proof of concealment was evidence of intent. In this instance, the jury
instruction did not permit the jury to weigh the evidence and use its judgment to determine
whether to infer that proof of concealment was evidence of intent to convert and defraud; it
required the jury to make that inference, unless there was evidence presented to the contrary.
Thus, the inference was not permissive, but mandatory. According to the United States Supreme
Court, such an instruction improperly shifts the Commonwealth’s burden of persuasion regarding
whether, upon weighing the evidence, the jury believes willful concealment is evidence of intent
to convert or defraud.
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In Francis, the Supreme Court stated,
A mandatory rebuttable presumption is perhaps less onerous from the defendant’s
perspective, but it is no less unconstitutional. Our cases make clear that “[such]
shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems
so important that it must be either proved or presumed is impermissible under the
Due Process Clause.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S., at 215. In Mullaney v.
Wilbur, we explicitly held unconstitutional a mandatory rebuttable presumption
that shifted to the defendant a burden of persuasion on the question of intent. 421
U.S. at 698-701. And in Sandstrom we similarly held that instructions that might
reasonably have been understood by the jury as creating a mandatory rebuttable
presumption were unconstitutional. 442 U.S. at 524.
Francis, 471 U.S. at 317.
The reliance of the majority opinion upon Dobson for support of its conclusion that
Instruction 16 contains a permissive inference is misplaced. In its analysis, the majority states
the Instruction in this case is similar to that found to be a permissive inference in Dobson, 260
Va. at 74, 76, 531 S.E.2d at 571-72. However, the majority opinion fails to consider that the
instructions in the two cases are dissimilar in one extremely important manner. In Dobson, we
noted that the jury was not required, by the subject instruction, to draw any conclusion from the
facts proved by the Commonwealth. Instruction 16, on the other hand, requires the jury to draw
a conclusion, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
The instruction in Dobson specifically informed the jury that it “may reasonably infer”
the elemental fact of the defendant being the thief, unless the defendant offered “a reasonable
account of possession consistent with innocence.” Id. at 74, 531 S.E.2d at 571. Unlike in this
case, the instruction in Dobson did not require that proof of a basic fact (exclusive personal
possession of the stolen property by the defendant) be accepted by the jury as evidence of the
elemental fact (that the defendant was the thief). Thus, I disagree with the majority’s
determination that Dobson supports its conclusion that Instruction 16 contained a permissive
inference.
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A closer examination of our Dobson opinion would seem to make it clear that Instruction
16 does not fit the criteria our Court cited as important in concluding that the instruction given in
Dobson included a permissive inference. In Dobson, we stated that
[a] mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if
the State proves certain predicate facts. A permissive inference suggests to the
jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves the predicate facts, but
does not require the jury to draw that conclusion. . . . Mandatory presumptions . . .
violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the State of the burden of
persuasion on an element of an offense . . . . A permissive inference does not
relieve the State of its burden of persuasion because it still requires the State to
convince the jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on the
predicate facts proved.
Id. at 75, 531 S.E.2d at 572 (quoting Francis, 471 U.S. at 314).
The instruction in Dobson suggested to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn (the
defendant was the thief), but did not require the jury to draw that conclusion. Instruction 16
includes a mandatory presumption that informed the jury that it was required to infer the
presumed fact (evidence of intent) if the Commonwealth proved the predicate fact (willful
concealment).
Instruction 16 violates the Due Process Clause by relieving the Commonwealth of the
burden of persuasion concerning whether concealment was, in this instance, evidence of intent to
convert or defraud the store owner. In contrast, the subject instruction in Dobson did not relieve
the Commonwealth of its burden of persuasion because it still required the Commonwealth to
convince the jury that the suggested conclusion (that the defendant was the thief) should be
inferred based on the predicate facts (defendant was found in possession of the stolen property).
We explained in Dobson that
[t]he challenged instruction in the present case . . . informed the jury that it “may”
reasonably draw an inference from certain facts, if proved, provided that the
defendant did not reasonably or satisfactorily explain his possession of the
recently stolen property. Thus, the challenged Instruction here created only a
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permissive inference that the jury was free to reject, irrespective of whether the
defendant offered a reasonable explanation consistent with his innocence. The
jury was not required to draw any conclusion from the facts proved by the
Commonwealth in the absence of such contrary evidence from the defendant.
Id. at 76, 531 S.E.2d at 572.
Unlike in Dobson, Instruction 16 did not invoke a permissive inference that the jury was
free to reject, irrespective of believable evidence to the contrary. Rather, Instruction 16 required
the jury to draw a conclusion about the evidence from the facts proven by the Commonwealth, in
the absence of the production of contrary evidence.
The majority opinion’s additional attempts to bolster its conclusion that the language in
Instruction 16 constitutes a permissive inference are also unavailing. The opinion points out that
Instruction 16 does not state that the Commonwealth is relieved of its burden of proving each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the Instruction did not state that
willful concealment alone satisfies the Commonwealth’s proof. That is true, but similar
arguments could be made in support of the instruction found to be unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in Francis. In Francis, the Supreme Court found the challenged
instruction to be unconstitutional because it contained a rebuttable presumption which could
have misled the jury concerning the applicable burden of persuasion despite other instructions
concerning burden of proof. 471 U.S. at 318. In this instance, as in Francis, the fact that the
Instruction did not facially state that it was relieving the Commonwealth of its burden of proving
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt is not helpful in making the
determination of whether the instruction contains a mandatory presumption that might mislead a
jury.
As regards the dependent clause included in Instruction 16, the majority opinion claims,
“[t]he remaining language of the instruction, ‘unless there is believable evidence to the contrary,’
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reinforced that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable
doubt.” I disagree. Because the independent clause in Instruction 16 included language in the
nature of a command that required the jury to draw the conclusion that concealment was
evidence of an intent to convert or defraud, unless the jury was presented with evidence to the
contrary, the “remaining language,” rather than reinforcing the Commonwealth’s burden of
proof, indicates that rebuttal evidence was necessary to overcome the stated presumption
regarding intent.
“The believable evidence to the contrary” referenced in Instruction 16, if indeed such
evidence could have been presented, logically would have been presented by the defendant. It
strains common sense to believe that the Commonwealth would have offered such evidence, as it
had no obligation or incentive to do so. Rather, the jury would have expected such evidence to
be offered by the defendant. The United States Supreme Court noted this issue in deciding that
the instruction offered in Francis was unconstitutional.
In Francis, the Court explained that when preceded by mandatory language, the
instruction that a presumption may be rebutted could be read as telling the jury that it was
required to make the inference unless the defendant persuaded it otherwise. 471 U.S. at 318.
Such an instruction is unconstitutional because it may be understood as indicating that the
“defendant bore an affirmative burden of persuasion once the State proved the underlying act
giving rise to the presumption.” Id.
There is no authority for the majority’s implied proposition that proper finding and
burden of proof instructions may render an unconstitutional instruction harmless. In this
instance, the constitutional question is whether “a reasonable juror could have understood [the
instruction] as a mandatory presumption that shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion on
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the element of intent once the [Commonwealth] had proved the predicate acts.” Id. at 316.
Instruction 16 contains mandatory language that a jury might reasonably have understood as
creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion to the
defendant. It is therefore unconstitutional. Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial, if the Commonwealth be so
advised.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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