Williams v. Commonwealth ( 2015 )

PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and
Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J.
TONY WILLIAMS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 141046 CHIEF JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
April 16, 2015
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals
erred by "inferring" that the trial court took judicial notice
that the situs of an offense was within its territorial
jurisdiction. We also consider under what circumstances an
appellate court may properly take judicial notice of a fact not
clearly noticed in the trial court. Finally, we decide whether
the evidence was sufficient to prove venue in this case.
I. Facts and Proceedings
The appellant, Tony Williams ("Williams"), was tried in
the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk ("trial court") and
convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine
(third offense) in violation of Code § 18.2-248. At trial,
Norfolk Police Investigator Issoufou Boubacar ("Investigator
Boubacar") testified that he was working as an undercover
narcotics officer on the night of March 1, 2013, when he came
into contact with Williams in the 1700 block of O’Keefe Street,
which he testified is located in the City of Norfolk.
Investigator Boubacar told Williams he wanted to buy "hard" 1
cocaine, and Williams "agreed to assist . . . in buying [the]
crack cocaine."
Williams got into Investigator Boubacar's vehicle and
instructed him "to drive to the 800-block of Fremont Street."
Investigator Boubacar testified that the two men "drove over
there." Once they arrived, Investigator Boubacar told Williams
he wanted to buy 20 dollars' worth of cocaine and gave Williams
20 dollars of "Norfolk City recorded money."
Investigator Boubacar watched Williams get out of the
vehicle and meet another man to make the purchase. Williams
and the other individual were approximately 10 to 15 feet away
from Investigator Boubacar during the transaction. When
Williams returned to the vehicle, he handed Investigator
Boubacar "two plastic [bags] containing [an] off-white hard
substance," which later testing confirmed to be approximately
0.2 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance.
Williams then instructed Investigator Boubacar to return to the
1700 block of O'Keefe Street. When Investigator Boubacar and
Williams returned to that location, an arrest team took
Williams into custody.
1
Testimony explained that "hard" is a street name for
crack cocaine.
2
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, Williams
moved to strike on two grounds: (1) that the Commonwealth
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish chain of
custody 2 and (2) that the Commonwealth failed to prove venue. 3
Williams argued that the Commonwealth failed to establish venue
because, while Investigator Boubacar testified that the initial
place of meeting – the 1700 block of O'Keefe Street – was in
Norfolk, the Commonwealth never proved that the 800 block of
Fremont Street was also located within the corporate limits of
the City of Norfolk. Williams maintains that the evidence
established that all the elements of the offense were committed
in the 800 block of Fremont Street, therefore, the evidence was
insufficient to prove venue.
The Commonwealth responded by arguing that Investigator
Boubacar's testimony was sufficient for the trial court to take
judicial notice of venue, stating, "I think it's reasonable for
the Court to take judicial notice that [Investigator Boubacar
and Williams] were still within the City of Norfolk" when the
drug transaction took place because Investigator Boubacar had
testified "to initially coming into contact with the defendant
2
This question is not before the Court.
3
While want of venue is properly raised by a motion to
dismiss the indictment, we have impliedly upheld the use of a
motion to strike the evidence to challenge venue. See Randall
v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 182, 185, 31 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1944).
In the present case, the Commonwealth has not challenged the
procedural mechanism used in raising this issue.
3
in the City of Norfolk on O'Keefe Street, and . . . to the
relatively short drive to Fremont Street." The trial court
overruled both motions to strike at the conclusion of the
parties' arguments, stating, "I overrule the motions," without
commenting on judicial notice.
Williams presented no evidence and renewed his motions to
strike, which the trial court again denied. The court
immediately thereafter found the defendant guilty of the
offense and ordered a presentence report. On August 16, 2013,
following presentation of the presentence report, the trial
court sentenced Williams to ten years' imprisonment, and an
additional one year suspended conditioned on one year of post-
release supervision.
Williams appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned
error to the trial court's finding that the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence to establish venue. In a
published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed Williams's
conviction, holding that it could infer that the trial court
had taken judicial notice of the fact that the 800 block of
Fremont Street is located within the corporate limits of the
City of Norfolk and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to
prove venue. Williams v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 458, 466-
67, 758 S.E.2d 553, 557 (2014). The Court of Appeals held that
while the trial court never explicitly stated that it was
4
taking judicial notice of the fact that the 800 block of
Fremont Street was in Norfolk, in overruling William's motion
to strike on venue, the Commonwealth specifically requested the
trial court to do so and, therefore, it "can be safely
inferred" that the trial court took judicial notice of that
fact. Id. at 466, 758 S.E.2d at 557.
Williams appealed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to
this Court, and we awarded an appeal on the following
assignments of error:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court
had taken judicial notice that the situs of the possession
with intent to distribute was within the City of Norfolk
and therefore within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Court.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court
had venue over the offense of conviction because the
evidence of record did not establish a strong presumption
that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court.
II. Analysis
A. Venue and Judicial Notice
The burden is on the Commonwealth to establish venue.
Ware v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 520, 522, 201 S.E.2d 791, 793
(1974). A criminal charge cannot be sustained unless the
evidence furnishes the foundation for a "strong presumption"
that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Harding v. Commonwealth, 132 Va.
5
543, 548, 110 S.E. 376, 378 (1922); Butler v. Commonwealth, 81
Va. 159, 163 (1885).
"The taking of judicial notice is generally within the
discretion of the trial court." Ryan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
439, 446, 247 S.E.2d 698, 703 (1978). However, the question
whether the Court of Appeals erred by inferring that the trial
court took judicial notice that the situs of the offense was
within the corporate limits of the City of Norfolk is a mixed
question of law and fact, which this Court reviews de novo.
See Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 76, 705 S.E.2d 503, 505
(2011)("We review questions of law de novo, including those
situations where there is a mixed question of law and
fact")(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Judicial notice is a short cut to avoid the necessity for
the formal introduction of evidence in certain cases where
there is no need for such evidence." Williams v. Commonwealth,
190 Va. 280, 291, 56 S.E.2d 537, 542 (1949). Whether a trial
court will exercise its discretion to take judicial notice of a
fact "depends partly on the nature of the subject, the issue,
the apparent justice of the case, partly on the information of
the court and the means of information at hand, and partly on
the judicial disposition." Randall v. Commonwealth, 183 Va.
182, 186, 31 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1944).
6
It is well-established that a trial court may take
"judicial notice of geographical facts that are matters of
common knowledge, or shown by maps in common use." McClain v.
Commonwealth, 189 Va. 847, 853, 55 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1949). Such
notice may supplement other facts proved to establish venue, or
in some circumstances, "the judge may, by judicial notice,
dispense with proof" of venue. See Randall, 183 Va. at 188, 31
S.E.2d at 573 (holding that a trial court did not abuse its
discretion in taking judicial notice of the fact that the half-
way house referred to in evidence was located in York County,
because the trial court's "certificate [was] a statement that
its location in that county was a matter of wide public
knowledge" within the limits of that court's territorial
jurisdiction).
i. Taking Judicial Notice in Trial Court
In Keesee v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 174, 217 S.E.2d 808
(1975), the evidence at trial proved that all of the offenses
took place at "'Hill's Department Store' and on its adjacent
parking lot" but no evidence was offered to prove that "Hill's
Department Store" was located in the City of Lynchburg. 216
Va. at 175, 217 S.E.2d at 809-10. We recognized that
geographical facts that are matters of common knowledge in a
jurisdiction can be judicially noticed, but stated that in this
case "the record fail[ed] to show that the trial court took
7
judicial notice of the location of the store property." Id. at
175, 217 S.E.2d at 810. Because the record failed to show that
judicial notice of the store's location had been taken by the
trial court, the evidence was insufficient to establish venue,
and the conviction was reversed and remanded. Id.
As the Court of Appeals has correctly observed, Keesee
stands for the proposition that
[while] a trial court need not intone the words
"judicial notice" in order to notice a fact, the
evidence, the arguments of the parties and the
statements of the trial court must demonstrate
clearly that the trial court has taken judicial
notice of the fact before a party may rely upon such
notice on appeal.
Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 197, 201, 597 S.E.2d 210,
212 (2004)(quoting Dillard v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 340,
346-47, 504 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998)); see also Sutherland v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 378, 383, 368 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1988).
Turning to the record in this case, the Commonwealth
argued to the trial court:
Investigator Boubacar did testify initially to coming
into contact with the defendant in the City of
Norfolk on O'Keefe Street, and I believe testified to
the relatively short drive to Fremont Street. Based
on that, Your Honor, I think it's reasonable for the
Court to take judicial notice that they were still
within the City of Norfolk.
(Emphasis added.) While the Commonwealth asked the trial court
to take judicial notice "that [Investigator Boubacar and
Williams] were still in the City of Norfolk" when the offense
8
occurred, the Commonwealth did not argue that the location of
the 800 block of Fremont Street was a matter of common
knowledge, nor did the Commonwealth request that the trial
court take judicial notice that the address was located within
the corporate limits of the City of Norfolk by reference to a
map of common use. The Commonwealth argued that the evidence
already in the record was sufficient for the trial court to
find that venue had been established.
Because the trial court subsequently denied the motion to
strike the evidence on venue without commenting on the issue of
judicial notice, we are unable to discern whether the trial
court decided to take judicial notice of the location of the
offense, or whether the trial court simply accepted the
Commonwealth's sufficiency argument on the issue of venue,
based upon the evidence adduced from testimony.
Additionally, because the trial court did not indicate
that it was taking judicial notice of the fact that the 800
block of Fremont Street was within its territorial
jurisdiction, it deprived Williams of the opportunity to object
to the trial court's action or dispute the accuracy of any
"facts" noticed prior to the trial court's ruling on his
motion. See Va. R. Evid. 2:201(c)(a party is entitled upon
request "to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of
taking judicial notice"). Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
9
v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 497, 318 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1984)(holding
that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice sua sponte
of certain facts that were not included in the parties'
stipulation because "State Farm had no prior opportunity to be
heard either to dispute the 'facts' or to object to the court's
action"). Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred
in inferring that the trial court had taken judicial notice
that the situs of the offense was located within its
territorial jurisdiction.
ii. Taking Judicial Notice in Appellate Court
While we have determined that we cannot hold that the
trial court took judicial notice that the situs of the offense
was within the City of Norfolk, that does not end our analysis.
The Court of Appeals also observed in a footnote, and the
Commonwealth has argued on appeal to this Court, that an
appellate court also "has the discretionary power to take
judicial notice of the official municipal street maps of the
City of Norfolk." Williams, 63 Va. App. at 466-67 n.6, 758
S.E.2d at 557 n.6.
Rule 2:201(b) states: "Judicial notice may be taken at any
stage of the proceeding." We have recognized that appellate
courts may take judicial notice of geographical facts that are
so well known that they are matters of common knowledge in the
Commonwealth. See, e.g., Buttery v. Robbins, 177 Va. 368, 374,
10
14 S.E.2d 544, 546 (1941)(taking judicial notice that the
"Skyline Drive is in the Shenandoah National Park" because
"[t]hat is a matter of common knowledge"). However, as we
stated in Keesee, there is a range of procedural postures in
which issues arise, and the existence of differing records, and
hence some geographical facts will not be the subject of
judicial notice on appeal. See 216 Va. at 175, 217 S.E.2d at
810 (reversing conviction because the record did not show that
the location of "Hill Department Store" was a "matter of common
knowledge susceptible of being judicially noticed"). We have
also declined to take judicial notice of certain documents when
they were not relied upon in the trial court. See Commonwealth
v. Woodward, 249 Va. 21, 23, 452 S.E.2d 656, 657 (1995).
The fact that the 800 block of Fremont Street is in the
City of Norfolk is not a matter of common knowledge susceptible
of being judicially noticed by this Court. While it is true
that a street address is a geographical fact that is typically
ascertainable by reference to a map of common use, no map was
proffered or referenced in the trial court. In this case we
will not exercise our discretion to take judicial notice.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, we review "whether the evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to
11
support the [trial court's] venue findings." Cheng v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990).
Code § 19.2-244 provides that "the prosecution of a
criminal case shall be had in the county or city in which the
offense was committed." As noted earlier, the Commonwealth has
the burden "to prove venue by evidence which is either direct
or circumstantial." Pollard v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 723, 725,
261 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1980). Such evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, must give rise to a
"'strong presumption' that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court." Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va.
798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007)(quoting Cheng, 240 Va. at
36, 393 S.E.2d at 604).
"The failure to clearly prove venue is usually due to
inadvertence, flowing naturally from the familiarity of court,
counsel, witnesses, and jurors with the locality of the crime";
therefore this Court "will generally and properly lay hold of
and accept as sufficient any evidence in the case, direct or
otherwise, from which the fact may be reasonably inferred."
Randall, 183 Va. at 187, 31 S.E.2d at 573 (quoting West v.
Commonwealth, 125 Va. 747, 750, 99 S.E. 654, 654-55 (1919) and
Byrd v. Commonwealth, 124 Va. 833, 839, 98 S.E. 632, 634
(1919)).
12
Neither the allegation of venue set forth in the
indictment, nor the fact that the Norfolk police conducted the
investigation in this case, standing alone, may support an
inference that the crime took place within the trial court's
territorial jurisdiction. See Keesee, 216 Va. at 175, 217
S.E.2d at 810 ("The mere fact that the local police department
was involved in the investigation of the crimes and that
warrants recited proper venue, standing alone as they do here,
will not suffice.").
The Commonwealth failed to present evidence concerning
whether the 800 block of Fremont Street, where Williams
possessed and sold the crack cocaine, is located within the
City of Norfolk. Although the Commonwealth argued to the trial
court that Investigator Boubacar had "testified to the
relatively short drive to Fremont Street" from O'Keefe Street,
the evidence does not support this argument. Investigator
Boubacar testified that he met Williams in the 1700 block of
O'Keefe Street, in the City of Norfolk; that he and Williams
"drove over there," – referring to the 800 block of Fremont
Street; and that after the transaction was completed they
returned to the 1700 block of O'Keefe Street, where an arrest
team took Williams into custody. Williams's signed confession
introduced into evidence only indicates that he met
Investigator Boubacar in the 1700 block of O'Keefe Street and
13
does not mention the 800 block of Fremont Street or whether the
crime occurred within the City of Norfolk. Nothing in the
record indicates the distance between the two locations, the
route of travel, or even the duration of the entire encounter.
Even with all reasonable inferences drawn in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, we hold that this evidence
was insufficient to create a "strong presumption" that the
offense was committed in the City of Norfolk. Therefore, the
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof regarding venue
in this case.
III. Conclusion
The record does not clearly reflect that the trial court
took judicial notice that the situs of the offense was within
the corporate limits of the City of Norfolk, and absent such
judicial notice, the evidence was insufficient to prove venue.
Therefore, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
However, "[p]roof of venue . . . is not regarded as
material, so far as the merits of the prosecution are
concerned, and so the allegation of venue is not a part of the
crime." Randall, 183 Va. at 187, 31 S.E.2d at 573. Because
failure to offer proof establishing proper venue "did not stem
from evidentiary insufficiency with respect to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant," Pollard, 220 Va. at 726, 261
14
S.E.2d at 330, we will remand the case to the Court of Appeals
with directions that it remand the case to the circuit court
for a new trial, if the Commonwealth be so advised.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion
that the Court of Appeals erred by “inferring” that the trial
court took judicial notice that the situs of the offense was
within the City of Norfolk. In my opinion, the trial court
implicitly took judicial notice of venue by overruling
Williams’ motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence after
the Commonwealth stated the trial court could and should take
judicial notice that the 800 block of Fremont Street is located
within the boundaries of the City of Norfolk.
As the majority recognizes, the trial court did not need
to explicitly state it was taking judicial notice of the
location of Fremont Street.
“[A] trial court need not intone the words
‘judicial notice’ in order to notice a
fact, [however] the evidence, the arguments
of the parties and the statements of the
trial court must demonstrate clearly that
the trial court has taken judicial notice
of the fact before a party may rely upon
such notice on appeal.”
15
Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 197, 201, 597 S.E.2d 210,
212 (2004) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dillard v. Commonwealth,
28 Va. App. 340, 347, 504 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998)). Here the
evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the statements of the
trial court all clearly demonstrate that the trial court took
judicial notice of the location of the 800 block of Fremont
Street. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
The evidence in this case shows that Norfolk Police
Investigator Boubacar met Williams on O’Keefe Street in the
City of Norfolk and arranged the drug deal. The deal itself
occurred on the 800 block of Fremont Street. Williams was
indicted in the City of Norfolk. The trial court did not
question whether the 800 block of Fremont Street was outside of
the City of Norfolk once Williams raised the venue issue. The
addition of the street name draws a distinction between
evidence that is insufficient to support the inference, and
evidence that is sufficient for that purpose.
Indeed, our jurisprudence clearly supports a finding that
the evidence is sufficient to support an inference when the
street name is provided, coupled with the often pronounced
legal principle that
[a] trial court may take judicial notice of
those facts that are either (1) so
“generally known” within the jurisdiction
16
or (2) so “easily ascertainable” by
reference to reliable sources that
reasonably informed people in the community
would not regard them as reasonably subject
to dispute.
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 1, 7-8, 502 S.E.2d 113,
116, (1998) (quoting Ryan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 439, 445,
247 S.E.2d 698, 703 (1978)) (citing 2 McCormick on Evidence
§ 328 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Charles E.
Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, § 19-2 (3d ed. 1988)).
In West v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 747, 99 S.E. 654 (1919),
we stated:
[i]n the case at bar there is no direct
proof that the crime was committed at
Petersburg, but the following circumstances
fully warrant the inference that it did
take place there: The indictment charged
that the property was stolen in the city of
Petersburg, and belonged either to E. A.
Robertson or to his wife. The case was
tried at Petersburg, and the witness
Worrell testified that he was employed as a
detective with “the local police force,”
went with Wilkerson, another police
officer, to investigate the case, found the
stolen property at the prisoner’s home,
then went to the home of Mrs. Robertson and
brought her to the prisoner’s home to
identify the property. Wilkerson testified
“that he was employed as a detective with
the local police department, and went to
see Mrs. E. A. Robertson in response to a
telephone call from her advising him that
certain articles were missing from her
home, and went with the officer, Worrell,
to the home of Frances West and found the
alleged stolen articles there; that he
remained at her home while Officer Worrell
went to get Mrs. Robertson to identify the
17
various stolen articles.” C. E. Perkinson
testified “that he was employed as a
detective with the local police department,
and assisted in the investigation of the
West case.” E. A. Robertson and wife
testified that the property was stolen from
their home on Sycamore street.
Id. at 750-51, 99 S.E. at 655. From these facts, this Court
upheld a finding of venue stating,
[t]he record in this case shows that the
court, counsel, jurors and witnesses must
necessarily have been familiar with the
location of the Robertson home on Sycamore
street.
Id. at 752, 99 S.E. at 655. The Court also noted that the
facts in West “raise[d] a violent presumption that the
Robertson house was within the local jurisdiction of the court,
and we do not feel warranted in reversing the judgment upon
this point.” Id.
A review of the evidence in West demonstrates that in
addition to testimony regarding the location charged in the
indictment and the fact that police officers from the relevant
jurisdiction investigated the crime, the only other fact
related to the issue of venue was a street name.
Keesee v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 174, 217 S.E.2d 808
(1975), provides additional support for the proposition that
evidence of venue set forth in the indictment and evidence that
the local police department conducted the investigation,
coupled with a street name and the fact that a trial court may
18
take judicial notice of facts that are “generally known” or
“easily ascertainable” are sufficient to establish venue.
Ryan, 219 Va. at 445, 247 S.E.2d at 703. In finding the facts
establishing that the local police department investigated the
crime, the car was towed to the local impound lot, and the
warrants identified the city and the name of the establishment
were insufficient, we specifically stated, “[t]he record fails
to reveal even the street on which the store is located.”
Keesee, 216 Va. at 175, 217 S.E.2d at 810 (emphasis added).
The clear implication was that this fact would have made a
difference to the Court’s decision.
Similarly, in Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 109 S.E.
582 (1921), emphasis was placed upon the fact that the victim
lived “on a certain road,” was “going along said road from her
home toward her place of work . . . , and that the point in the
road at which she was assaulted was on the side of the road
‘coming to Staunton.’” Id. at 735, 109 S.E. at 584. The Court
found that “when the facts proved . . . are considered along
with the fact of which the court will take judicial notice
. . . it appears that the venue has been proved by the
Commonwealth beyond any reasonable doubt.” Id. at 739, 109
S.E. at 586. The Court also noted that
it is a geographical fact, shown by any map
in common use, and thus a matter of common
knowledge, that the city of Staunton is
19
located within the county of Augusta, and
is so located therein that the county of
Augusta surrounds, and, beyond all
question, extends for a distance of over
fifteen miles to the west of the corporate
limits of the city of Staunton. The court
will, therefore, take judicial notice of
that fact.
Id. at 735-36, 109 S.E. at 584-85. Therefore, the evidence
supports a finding that the trial court took judicial notice of
venue and properly did so.
Likewise, in the instant case, the arguments of the
parties and the statements of the trial court demonstrate that
the trial court took judicial notice of the fact of venue. At
the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Williams made a
motion to strike on two bases, venue and chain of custody. In
response to the venue argument, the Commonwealth made one
assertion, that the trial court should take judicial notice of
the location of the 800 block of Fremont Street. With only one
argument raised regarding venue and one response given, the
trial court’s response was, “I overrule the motions.” As the
Court of Appeals found, the only logical conclusion is that the
trial court, in response to the venue challenge, actually took
judicial notice that the 800 block of Fremont Street is in
Norfolk.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Powell, 227
Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d 393 (1984) is inapposite because in that
20
case, the trial court took judicial notice of certain facts sua
sponte, thereby depriving the defendant of the opportunity to
be heard and to object. Id. at 497-98, 318 S.E.2d at 395.
Here, Williams was heard and indeed raised the issue of venue.
The Commonwealth’s only response was to ask the trial court to
take judicial notice of the fact of venue. After overruling
Williams’ motion, the trial court asked, “Anything else, Mr.
Pollack?” to which Williams’ counsel responded, “No, Your
Honor.” Clearly, Williams had an opportunity to be heard, to
dispute the facts, and to object.
Therefore, the evidence indicates that the trial court
took judicial notice of the fact of venue and that based on our
precedent, it properly did so. See Hart, 131 Va. at 735-36,
739, 109 S.E. at 584-86; West, 125 Va. at 750-52, 99 S.E. at
655. I would therefore find that the Court of Appeals did not
err in affirming the trial court’s judgment and would decline
to address Williams’ second assignment of error as moot.
21