John C. Holland Enterprises v. Southeastern Pub. Service Auth. , 273 Va. 716 ( 2007 )


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  • PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and
    Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J.
    JOHN C. HOLLAND ENTERPRISES, INC.
    OPINION BY
    v.   Record No. 061085   SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
    April 20, 2007
    SOUTHEASTERN PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
    Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge
    In this appeal, which presents a case of first impression,
    we determine whether the trial court erred in determining that
    Code § 15.2-5121(A) does not apply to a municipally created
    waste authority that enters into a new service.
    I
    This matter was decided on demurrer; therefore, the facts
    are as alleged in the bill of complaint as follows.   Since 1979,
    the plaintiff, John C. Holland Enterprises, Inc. (Holland), has
    owned and operated a construction, demolition, and debris waste
    (CDD) landfill in the City of Suffolk.   The landfill is operated
    pursuant to a permit issued by the Commonwealth of Virginia. The
    defendant, Southeastern Public Service Authority (SPSA), is a
    refuse collection and disposal authority created under the
    provisions of the Virginia Water and Waste Authorities Act, Code
    § 15.2-5100, et seq.
    In 1985, SPSA opened its regional municipal solid waste
    (MSW) landfill for the purpose of providing MSW services to its
    member cities and counties and to the public.    MSW consists of
    household garbage and other household refuse of the type
    normally collected by cities and sent to a MSW landfill.
    A different type of landfill handles CDD.     CDD is generally
    comprised of concrete, bricks, wood, drywall, wires, electrical
    fixtures, shingles, and similar materials.
    In 2003, SPSA made an unannounced entry into the arena of
    CDD services by offering CDD services to one private company,
    defendant Bay Disposal, Inc.   SPSA did not offer CDD services to
    the general public, and it did not put CDD services on the
    public service charge list.    When this unannounced activity
    became known, Holland complained.     Ultimately, SPSA extended the
    CDD services to the general public over Holland's objections.
    SPSA did not make any of the findings mandated by Code § 15.2-
    5121(A) before offering this new service.
    II
    On April 22, 2005, Holland filed its bill of complaint,
    asking the trial court to enjoin SPSA's CDD services until it
    and its member localities made the requisite findings mandated
    by Code § 15.2-5121(A).   Code § 15.2-5121(A), in pertinent part,
    provides the following:
    No authority shall operate . . . a refuse
    collection and disposal system for any political
    subdivision . . . unless the authority, and
    subsequently the locality's governing body find: (i)
    that privately owned and operated refuse collection
    2
    and disposal services are not available on a voluntary
    basis by contract or otherwise, (ii) that the use of
    such privately owned services has substantially
    endangered the public health or has resulted in
    substantial public nuisance, (iii) that the privately
    owned refuse collection and disposal service is not
    able to perform the service in a reasonable and cost-
    efficient manner, or (iv) that operation by such
    authority . . . , in spite of any potential anti-
    competitive effect, is important in order to provide
    for the development and/or operation of a regional
    system of refuse collection and disposal for two or
    more units.
    SPSA filed a demurrer, contending that Holland "fails to
    state a cause of action because [Code §] 15.2-5121 is not
    implicated or violated under the facts alleged."   The trial
    court sustained SPSA's demurrer, stating the following:
    It is clear to the Court from a reading of the
    statute that the CDD waste program operated by SPSA is
    a service, and not a system as provided for in the
    statute. Otherwise, the inclusion of both terms,
    "service" and "system" in [Code] § 15.2-5136 would be
    unnecessarily redundant and meaningless.[ 1 ] I consider
    this plain language as evincing a legislative intent
    to treat the separate terms, "systems" and "services",
    as describing different functions. Specifically,
    therefore, I hold that the term "service" is an
    included component of, and thus part and parcel of, a
    "system."
    Accordingly, I hold that the extension of SPSA's
    waste disposal operation to include CDD waste was not
    a new system requiring the [Code] § 15.2-5121
    statutory findings. It was simply a new service.
    SPSA was therefore free to institute the new service
    without making the [Code] § 15.2-5121 findings.
    1
    Code § 15.2-5136 governs the fixing and revising of rates,
    fees, and other charges for the services furnished or to be
    furnished by various systems. Subsection F thereof permits an
    authority to establish rates and charges "for the services and
    facilities of . . . a refuse collection and disposal system."
    3
    We awarded Holland this appeal, limited to one assignment
    of error, which reads as follows:
    The trial court erred in determining that Va.
    Code § 15.2-5121(A) does not apply to a municipally-
    created waste authority and its member communities
    that operate a landfill and then later enter into a
    new service, without making any of the findings
    required by the statute.
    III
    "Interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law
    subject to de novo review by this Court."     Virginia Polytechnic
    Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv., 
    271 Va. 304
    ,
    309, 
    626 S.E.2d 436
    , 438 (2006); accord Renkey v. County Bd. of
    Arlington County, 
    272 Va. 369
    , 373, 
    634 S.E.2d 352
    , 355 (2006);
    Ainslie v. Inman, 
    265 Va. 347
    , 352, 
    577 S.E.2d 246
    , 248 (2003).
    When we interpret a statute, we must determine the General
    Assembly's intent from the words used in the statute, unless the
    language of the statute is ambiguous or would lead to an absurd
    result.     Cummings v. Fulghum, 
    261 Va. 73
    , 77, 
    540 S.E.2d 494
    ,
    496 (2001).    We also do not question whether legislation is
    wise.     Horner v. Department of Mental Health, 
    268 Va. 187
    , 193,
    
    597 S.E.2d 202
    , 205 (2004); City of Portsmouth v. City of
    Chesapeake, 
    232 Va. 158
    , 163, 
    349 S.E.2d 351
    , 353 (1986).
    Additionally, when a trial court grants a demurrer, we
    likewise review the court's action de novo.    In so doing, we
    apply the same standard the trial court applied, i.e., "whether
    4
    the facts . . . pleaded, implied, and fairly and justly inferred
    are legally sufficient to state a cause of action" against SPSA.
    See Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 
    261 Va. 121
    , 128, 
    540 S.E.2d 123
    , 126-27 (2001).
    IV
    Holland contends that the purpose of Code § 15.2-5121(A) is
    to protect the private sector and to require a waste authority
    like SPSA to make the requisite findings before entering into a
    new service.   Holland further contends that, if the General
    Assembly did not intend to require that such findings be made,
    then "there would have been no reason for" Code § 15.2-5121(E),
    which, it asserts, provides for the grandfathering of services
    existing as of July 1, 1983. 2
    SPSA contends that Code § 15.2-5121(A) applies only to the
    initial decision to operate a system, and it points out that
    nowhere in the statute does the term "new service" appear.     SPSA
    further contends that Holland's argument regarding Code § 15.2-
    5121(E) "rest[s] on its assumed meaning of [Code] § 15.2-
    5121(A)" and that this Court need only interpret Code § 15.2-
    5121(A).
    2
    Code § 15.2-5121(E) provides that the requirements and
    restrictions of Code § 15.2-5121 "shall not apply in any
    political subdivision wherein refuse collection and disposal
    services are being operated or contracted for by any sanitary
    district located therein, as of July 1, 1983."
    5
    V
    We agree with SPSA and reject Holland's contentions.     Code
    § 15.2-5121(A) provides, in pertinent part, that no authority
    shall "operate . . . a refuse collection and disposal system"
    unless certain findings are made regarding, among other things,
    the private availability of "refuse collection and disposal
    services."   Code § 15.2-5101 defines a "[r]efuse collection and
    disposal system" as a "system, plant or facility designed to
    collect, manage, dispose of, or recover and use energy from
    refuse," or solid waste.   Therefore, no authority can operate a
    solid waste collection and disposal landfill unless the
    authority determines, among other things, that the collection
    and disposal services are not privately available.   Neither Code
    § 15.2-5121(A) nor Code § 15.2-5101, however, distinguishes
    between types of services or refuse.   All Code § 15.2-5121(A)
    requires is that an authority makes the findings before
    undertaking to operate its system. 3
    In the present case, SPSA had long been operating its
    landfill when it expanded its services to include CDD.    Nothing
    in Code § 15.2-5121(A) required SPSA to make any findings before
    doing so.    Therefore, upon our de novo review, we determine that
    3
    Our interpretation of Code § 15.2-5121(A) is not
    inconsistent with Code § 15.2-5121(E). Thus, we reject
    Holland's "grandfathering" argument.
    6
    Holland cannot state a cause of action against SPSA.
    Accordingly, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Record 061085.

Citation Numbers: 643 S.E.2d 187, 273 Va. 716, 2007 Va. LEXIS 62

Judges: Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Agee, Stephenson

Filed Date: 4/20/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024