Commonwealth v. Burns , 273 Va. 14 ( 2007 )


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  • Present:   All the Justices
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.
    OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
    v. Record No. 060774                January 12, 2007
    KAREN BURNS, ET AL.
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
    J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge
    In this interlocutory appeal, filed pursuant to Code
    § 8.01-670.1, we consider whether plaintiff's claims for
    negligence and gross negligence against an employee of the
    Virginia Department of Transportation and the Commonwealth of
    Virginia are barred by the public duty doctrine.
    Plaintiff, Karen C. Burns, administrator of the estate of
    Dennis E. Burns, filed her motion for judgment against the
    Commonwealth of Virginia, the Virginia Department of
    Transportation, and William D. Wright.   Plaintiff alleged in
    her motion that the defendants were guilty of simple and gross
    negligence in the performance of maintenance work on a public
    highway in the Commonwealth and that her husband died as a
    result of their acts and omissions.
    The defendants filed a demurrer, asserting that they are
    immune from the claims pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign
    immunity, that the plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth
    are limited to $100,000 pursuant to the terms of the Virginia
    Tort Claims Act, and that the public duty doctrine bars the
    claims against Wright.
    The circuit court permitted Cincinnati Insurance
    Companies to intervene in this proceeding.   The insurance
    company had made worker's compensation payments to the
    decedent's estate as required by Virginia's workers'
    compensation statutes, and the insurer has a lien on any
    wrongful death proceeds collected by the decedent's estate.
    The circuit court dismissed the Virginia Department of
    Transportation from this proceeding.   The circuit court held
    that the public duty doctrine did not bar the plaintiff's
    claims against the defendants and, therefore, denied the
    remaining portions of the demurrer.
    We granted the litigants an interlocutory appeal limited
    to the issue whether the public duty doctrine bars plaintiff's
    claims against the defendants.   In our resolution of this
    issue, we will rely upon the material facts and inferences
    from those facts set forth in plaintiff's motion for judgment.
    Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, 
    265 Va. 127
    , 130, 
    575 S.E.2d 858
    , 860 (2003); McMillion v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 
    262 Va. 463
    , 465, 
    552 S.E.2d 364
    , 365 (2001).
    On April 14, 2003, a Virginia Department of
    Transportation work crew was engaged in maintenance work in
    Campbell County on U.S. Route 460.    William D. Wright, an
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    employee of the Virginia Department of Transportation,
    supervised the crew.
    While performing maintenance work on Route 460, the crew
    created "a trench" approximately two inches below the adjacent
    road service.   The trench was 108 feet long and "approximately
    three feet wide in the left portion of the right-hand
    westbound lane of Route 460 in an area not lighted by street
    lights."   The crew ceased its work that evening, but did not
    place barricades or otherwise prevent access to that portion
    of the highway containing the trench.   The crew failed to
    place lights in the area or take "reasonable and appropriate
    steps to warn members of the traveling public of the nature,
    location and existence of [the] trench [in order] to give them
    an opportunity to avoid encountering [the trench] while
    traveling on the highway."
    Approximately 11:29 p.m. that evening, Dennis E. Burns
    operated a motorcycle on U.S. Route 460.   While operating the
    motorcycle in the left-hand portion of the right westbound
    lane of the highway, he drove into the trench and lost control
    of the motorcycle.   He died as a result of injuries he
    sustained.
    The public duty doctrine has been described as follows:
    "[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes
    upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure
    to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous
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    performance, must be a public, not an individual
    injury, and must be addressed, if at all, in some
    form of public prosecution. On the other hand, if
    the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect
    to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an
    individual wrong, and may support an individual
    action for damages."
    2 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the
    Wrongs Which Arise Independently of Contract § 300 (D. Avery
    Haggard ed., 4th ed. 1932).
    The Commonwealth and Wright, relying upon our decisions
    in Marshall v. Winston, 
    239 Va. 315
    , 
    389 S.E.2d 902
     (1990),
    and Burdette v. Marks, 
    244 Va. 309
    , 
    421 S.E.2d 419
     (1992),
    argue that plaintiff's claims against Wright are barred by the
    public duty doctrine.    We disagree.   This Court has only
    applied the public duty doctrine in cases when a public
    official owed a duty to control the behavior of a third party,
    and the third party committed acts of assaultive criminal
    behavior upon another.
    In Marshall, we considered whether a sheriff and a jailer
    owed a special duty of care to protect a member of the general
    public from harm by a third person.     Lois Marshall,
    administrator of her husband's estate, filed an action against
    the sheriff of the City of Richmond and the chief jailer of
    the City's jail for the wrongful death of her husband.    Her
    husband was murdered by an inmate who was negligently released
    from the jail before the expiration of his sentence.
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    Rejecting the plaintiff's claims, we held that these
    defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiff.      Applying the
    public duty doctrine in Marshall, we stated:
    " '[T]here is no such thing as negligence in
    the abstract, or in general. . . . Negligence must
    be in relation to some person.' Kent v. Miller, 
    167 Va. 422
    , 425-26, 
    189 S.E. 332
    , 334 (1937); see
    generally Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts
    § 53 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, in negligence claims
    against a public official, a distinction must be
    drawn between a public duty owed by the official to
    the citizenry at large and a special duty owed to a
    specific identifiable person or class of
    persons. . . . Only a violation of the latter duty
    will give rise to civil liability of the
    official. . . . To hold a public official civilly
    liable for violating a duty owed to the public at
    large would subject the official to potential
    liability for every action he undertook and would
    not be in society's best interest."
    239 Va. at 319, 389 S.E.2d at 905 (citations omitted).
    We also discussed the public duty doctrine in Burdette.
    In that case, we considered whether a plaintiff alleged
    sufficient facts to establish that a deputy sheriff owed a
    duty to the plaintiff to protect him from the acts of a third
    party.   James C. Burdette observed Gary D. Hungerford attack a
    woman and seriously injure her.       When Burdette intervened to
    assist the woman, Hungerford attacked Burdette and began to
    beat him with a shovel.   Eventually, Arty Marks, a deputy
    sheriff in Westmoreland County arrived upon the scene, and
    even though he witnessed the attacks, he failed to intervene
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    to protect Burdette from Hungerford's attack.   244 Va. at 310-
    11, 421 S.E.2d at 419-20.
    We held in Burdette that generally a person has no duty
    to control the conduct of third persons in order to prevent
    physical harm, but that the general rule does not apply when a
    special relationship exists "(1) between the defendant and the
    third person which imposes a duty upon the defendant to
    control the third person's conduct, or (2) between the
    defendant and the plaintiff which gives a right to protection
    to the plaintiff."   Id. at 311-12, 421 S.E.2d at 420.
    In Burdette, we held that the public duty doctrine did
    not bar the plaintiff's claim against deputy sheriff Marks
    because he was on duty as a deputy sheriff at the time of the
    attacks, and Marks knew or should have known that the
    plaintiff was in great danger of serious bodily harm.    Id. at
    312-13, 421 S.E.2d at 421.
    We decline the defendants' invitation to extend the
    public duty doctrine.   We hold that the expansion of the
    public duty doctrine is unnecessary because Virginia's
    sovereign immunity doctrine provides sufficient protection to
    these employees in the discharge of their public duties.    See,
    e.g., Niese v. City of Alexandria, 
    264 Va. 230
    , 240, 
    564 S.E.2d 127
    , 133 (2002); City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael
    Dev. Co., 
    259 Va. 493
    , 499, 
    527 S.E.2d 778
    , 781-82 (2000);
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    Stanfield v. Peregoy, 
    245 Va. 339
    , 
    429 S.E.2d 11
     (1993);
    Messina v. Burden, 
    228 Va. 301
    , 307-08, 
    321 S.E.2d 657
    , 660
    (1984).
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the public duty
    doctrine does not bar a claim of negligence or gross
    negligence against employees of the Virginia Department of
    Transportation under the facts and circumstances in this case.
    Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is affirmed and
    the case is remanded for further proceedings.
    Affirmed and remanded.
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