Greenan v. Solomon ( 1996 )

Present: All the Justices
MICHAEL V. GREENAN, ET AL.
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 951683 June 7, 1996
RICHARD SOLOMON, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY
Joshua L. Robinson, Judge Designate
In this appeal, we consider whether a landowner has an
easement to use a right-of-way described in a deed recorded among
the land records in Fauquier County.
Michael V. and Sandra J. Greenan, husband and wife, filed
their amended bill of complaint against Richard A. and Elinor H.
Solomon. The Greenans, who own a 10-acre parcel in Fauquier
County, alleged that they have an easement to use a way to travel
across a parcel of land, consisting of approximately 50 acres,
owned by the Solomons. The Solomons filed responsive pleadings,
denying that the Greenans have an easement to travel across the
property. The chancellor conducted an ore tenus hearing, and the
Greenans adduced the following relevant facts.
Jonathan Taylor Burke acquired approximately 100 acres of
land in Marshall District, Fauquier County, by deed recorded
April 28, 1882. This tract, rectangular in shape, was referred
to as the Burke Farm. Jonathan Burke died intestate, and the
farm was divided among his heirs by a partition deed. Susan E.
and John Hall, Burke's daughter and son-in-law, acquired the
northern 40 acres.
In March 1936, Allie B. Hall and his wife, Lillie V. Hall,
acquired 50 acres of the former Burke Farm, which was sold by the
clerk of the court for payment of delinquent taxes. This 50-acre
parcel is located immediately south of the 40-acre parcel that
John and Susan E. Hall acquired in the deed of partition.
The remainder of the former Burke Farm consisted of a 10-
acre parcel immediately south of the 50-acre parcel owned by
Allie and Lillie Hall. Although there is no deed of record
conveying the land to Taylor Hall, Allie Hall's father, Taylor
Hall had possession of, and paid taxes on, this 10-acre parcel.
He also devised this parcel of land in his will dated August 23,
1955.
Taylor Hall and Allie and Lillie Hall executed the following
deed:
"THIS DEED made this 27th day of July, 1957,
between Allie B. Hall and Lillie V. Hall, his wife,
parties of the first part; and Taylor Hall, party of
the second part:
WITNESSETH; that for the sum of $1.00 and natural
love and affection between son and father, the parties
of the first part do hereby grant and convey, unto the
party of the second part, a right-of-way and easement
of travel 2360 feet more or less in length over the old
existing private roadway by the edge of the woods near
the western fence line between the property of the
grantors and the Eric and Lois Sevareid place. The
easement hereby granted is over and across a tract of
land owned by the said Allie B. Hall near Selone in
Marshall District, Fauquier County, Virginia, described
as containing 51 Acres, 2 roods [sic] and 10.8 poles
which was conveyed to him by T. E. Bartenstein, Clerk
of the Circuit Court by deed dated March 6, 1936 and
recorded in Deed Book 142, page 386. A plat and survey
of said property will be found recorded in Deed Book
141, pages 377 and 378. The right-of-way hereby
granted will afford an easement of travel to the said
Taylor Hall from his home-place to another 10 Acre
parcel owned by him."
(Emphasis added).
After this deed was recorded among the land records in
Fauquier County, the Solomons acquired the 50-acre parcel that
had been owned by Allie and Lillie Hall. The Greenans acquired a
quitclaim deed to the 10-acre parcel, and they filed a suit to
quiet title. The Greenans obtained fee simple title to the 10-
acre parcel as a result of their suit to quiet title.
Subsequently, the Solomons refused to permit the Greenans to use
the right-of-way that extended over the Solomons' property.
At the conclusion of the Greenans' evidence, the chancellor
granted the Solomons' motion to strike. The chancellor held that
the Greenans failed to prove that Taylor Hall was the owner of
the 10-acre parcel at the time the easement was recorded and,
therefore, they did not establish that Hall had, or could have
acquired, a property right in the easement. We awarded the
Greenans an appeal.
The Greenans observe that they are the successors in
interest to Taylor Hall and that the Solomons are the successors
in interest to Allie and Lillie Hall. The Greenans contend that
the Solomons are legally precluded from asserting that Taylor
Hall had no interest in the 10-acre parcel because Allie and
Lillie Hall recited in the above-referenced deed that Taylor Hall
was the owner of the 10-acre parcel. Thus, the Greenans assert
that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Solomons, however, argue that the trial court properly
granted their motion to strike. The Solomons point out that the
Greenans failed to trace their title to Taylor Hall and that the
Greenans could identify no deed which named Taylor Hall as the
record owner of the 10-acre parcel. Thus, the Solomons assert
that the Greenans failed to prove that Taylor Hall was the owner
of the dominant tenement when the deed creating the easement was
executed and, therefore, the Greenans failed to establish that
the deed created an easement.
The Solomons correctly observe that the easement would have
no legal efficacy if Taylor Hall had no legal interest in the 10-
acre parcel when the deed was executed. We have said that
"an easement [is] 'a privilege without profit, which
the owner of one tenement has a right to enjoy in
respect of that tenement in or over the tenement of
another person, by reason whereof the latter is obliged
to suffer, or refrain from doing something on his own
tenement for the advantage of the former.' Stevenson
v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. [77,] 87; Goddard on Easements,
2.
. . . .
An easement is a right which is appurtenant to the
dominant tenement, and imposed upon the servient
tenement; and it is important to mark that it is not
imposed upon the person of the servient owner;
therefore an obligation upon him to do something for
the benefit of the dominant tenement is not an
easement."
Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 556-57 (1886).
However, we have already stated that the Greenans have fee
simple title to the 10-acre parcel. They acquired their title by
proving adverse possession in a suit to quiet title against the
heirs of Jonathan Burke. "The ownership thus acquired includes
those things which would pass with a transfer by deed . . . .
Easements appurtenant to the possessed land are thus acquired."
7 Powell on Real Property § 1017 (1995). Without question, the
easement described in the deed is an easement appurtenant to and
runs with the land. See Coal Corp. v. Lester, 203 Va. 93, 97-98,
122 S.E.2d 901, 904-05 (1961).
The Solomons admitted below that they are the successors in
interest to Allie and Lillie Hall, and the Greenans are the
successors in interest to Taylor Hall. And, as we have said:
"It is well established that a party who purports
to convey an estate is estopped as against his grantee
from asserting anything in derogation thereof. That is
to say, a grantor cannot deny his title to the
prejudice of his grantee. See School Board v. Smith,
134 Va. 98, 104, 113 S.E. 868, 869 (1922). Similarly,
'"those who derive title from or through the parties,
ordinarily stand in the same position as the parties,
and are bound by every estoppel that would have been
binding on the parties."' Richmond Cedar Works v.
West, 152 Va. 533, 543, 147 S.E. 196, 199 (1929)."
VEPCO v. Buchwalter, 228 Va. 684, 688, 325 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1985).
Applying these principles, we hold that the Solomons, who
derived title ultimately from Allie and Lillie Hall, may not
assert any fact in derogation of the easement that Allie and
Lillie Hall conveyed to Taylor Hall. Simply stated, the Solomons
may not assert that Taylor Hall did not own the 10-acre parcel
when the deed creating the easement was executed because such
assertion would be in derogation of the easement that Allie and
Lillie Hall granted to Taylor Hall. We also note that the
Solomons had, at the very least, record notice of the existence
of the easement because it was recorded among the land records in
Fauquier County prior to the Solomons' acquisition of title. See
Porter v. Wilson, 244 Va. 366, 369, 421 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1992).
Alternatively, the chancellor held that even if the Greenans
established that Taylor Hall had owned the 10-acre parcel, the
Solomons are, nonetheless, entitled to judgment because the deed
was intended merely to grant access between the 40-acre and the
10-acre parcels of land, and the Greenans intend to use the
easement to access a public highway. The Solomons assert that
the Greenans' "only motivation for initiating this action
originally, and continuing it, is to obtain a right of way over
Solomon to the public highway."
We disagree with the Solomons. The second paragraph in the
above-referenced deed granted and conveyed to Taylor Hall "a
right-of-way and easement of travel 2360 feet more or less in
length over the old existing private roadway." This language
created a clear and unambiguous right to use the right-of-way
without any limitation on the ultimate terminus of the right-of-
way.
It is true, as the chancellor observed, that the last
sentence of the deed states that: "[t]he right-of-way hereby
granted will afford an easement of travel to the said Taylor Hall
from his home-place to another 10 Acre parcel owned by him."
However, we have held:
"It is a settled rule of construction, both in
deeds and wills, that if an estate is conveyed, or an
interest given, or a benefit bestowed in one part of
the instrument, by clear, unambiguous, and explicit
words, such estate, interest, or benefit is not
diminished nor destroyed by words in another part of
the instrument, unless the terms which diminish or
destroy the estate before given be as clear and
decisive as the terms by which it was created."
Smith v. Baptist Orphanage, 194 Va. 901, 908, 75 S.E.2d 491, 495-
96 (1953) (quoting Gaskins v. Hunton, 92 Va. 528, 531, 23 S.E.
885, 886 (1896)); accord Salley v. Burns, 220 Va. 123, 134, 255
S.E.2d 512, 518 (1979). Thus, the Greenans' motivations are
immaterial and cannot divest the Greenans of their property
rights in the right-of-way.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Greenans have a
right-of-way and easement as described in the above-referenced
deed. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment below, and we
will enter final judgment here in favor of the Greenans.
Reversed and final judgment.