Vaughan's Landscaping & Maintenance v. Dodson , 262 Va. 270 ( 2001 )

Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, S.J.
VAUGHAN'S LANDSCAPING & MAINTENANCE,
ET AL. OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING
v. Record No. 001740 June 8, 2001
TIMOTHY JASON DODSON
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this workers' compensation case, we consider whether the
worker's injuries arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
The following evidence was presented by the worker and his
employer at a hearing before a deputy commissioner of the
Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission).
Timothy Jason Dodson (Dodson), a manual laborer who was 19 years
old at the time of his injuries, worked for David Vaughan, the
owner of Vaughan's Landscaping & Maintenance (Vaughan). Dodson,
a passenger in the employer's pickup truck, was injured on
Saturday, June 24, 1995, when the truck, driven by Vaughan,
sideswiped a tree.
The two men mowed lawns on the morning of the accident.
When they completed the last job between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m.,
Vaughan drove his truck and trailer, loaded with lawn
maintenance equipment, to Bentonville where he purchased beer
and wine.
While the two men proceeded toward Page County where both
lived, they began drinking Vaughan's beer and wine. As they
were driving, they noticed friends pitching horseshoes in a yard
beside the road. The two men stopped and spent some time there
pitching horseshoes and continuing to drink alcohol. While
there, one of the owners of the property talked to Vaughan about
doing some yard work in the future.
Vaughan testified that when they left this location, Dodson
was "[p]retty drunk." Dodson admitted that he was drunk and
that probably drinking a little more alcohol would have caused
him to "pass out." While Vaughan was driving toward Page County
on what he described as a one-lane gravel road, he "took [his]
eyes off the road" to glance back at a bottle that Dodson had
thrown out the window. According to Vaughan, this "caused me to
get off the road . . . [j]ust enough that the truck skinned down
the side of the tree." When the truck "skinned" the tree,
Dodson's arm was injured.
Dodson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits
with the Commission, which Vaughan and his insurance company
contested. After a hearing, the deputy commissioner, citing
American Safety Razor Co. v. Hunter, 2 Va. App. 258, 261, 343
S.E.2d 461, 463 (1986), denied the claim on the ground that
Dodson had abandoned his employment by reaching an advanced
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stage of intoxication that rendered him incapable of engaging in
his work-related duties.
On Dodson's appeal, the Commission reversed the deputy
commissioner's decision and awarded Dodson benefits. The
Commission ruled that the principle set forth in American Safety
Razor Co. was inapplicable because Vaughan had obviously
encouraged and condoned Dodson's conduct by illegally providing
the alcohol and facilitating its consumption by the then under-
age claimant. For those reasons, the Commission concluded that
Vaughan "will not now be heard to assert the claimant's
intoxication as a defense to his claim for benefits."
On Vaughan's appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Commission because the Court
concluded that Dodson's injury did not occur in the course of
his employment and was therefore not compensable. The Court
reasoned that Dodson's self-induced, severe intoxication was
unrelated to any work-related duty or function, and that it
rendered him incapable of performing his job duties of operating
yard maintenance equipment and other strenuous activities.
Vaughan's Landscaping & Maintenance v. Dodson, 30 Va. App. 135,
141, 515 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1999).
Upon a rehearing en banc, the decision of the Commission
was affirmed without an opinion by an evenly divided Court, the
panel's opinion was withdrawn, and its mandate was vacated.
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Dodson v. Vaughan's Landscaping & Maintenance, 32 Va. App. 667,
667-68, 529 S.E.2d 854, 854-55 (2000). Because the case has
significant precedential value, see Code § 17.1-410, we granted
an appeal to Vaughan.
Vaughan contends that Dodson's severe level of intoxication
rendered him incapable of performing his duties and, therefore,
removed him from the course of his employment under the
principle articulated in American Safety Razor, 2 Va. App. at
261, 343 S.E.2d at 463. The evidence indicates, however, that
Vaughan did not expect Dodson to work any more that day after
finishing the job and starting back to Page County. Under these
circumstances, we do not think the principle articulated in
American Safety Razor is applicable. Hence, we reject this
contention.
Here, the evidence was that Dodson's injuries were incurred
while Vaughan was taking him to Luray, which is in Page County,
at Dodson's request. The evidence also showed that when Dodson
finished his work, Vaughan usually returned Dodson to Dodson's
home after work. However, Vaughan sometimes took Dodson to
Luray when Dodson requested, as he had on the day of his
injuries. If an employer furnishes an employee transportation
to and from work, injuries that occur during such transportation
are compensable as arising out of and in the course of
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employment. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company v.
Barnard, 236 Va. 41, 45, 372 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1988).
Vaughan recognizes that this accident would normally be
considered to have occurred in the course of Dodson's
employment. Nevertheless, Vaughan argues that the accident did
not arise out of and in the course of Dodson's employment for
two reasons.
First, Vaughan contends that when he was driving Dodson to
Luray, he was not doing so as Dodson's employer but as his
friend after "they had opted to get drunk after work, an
activity that was in no way connected to the employment." We
disagree.
The Commission made a factual finding that Vaughan
discussed future business while they were pitching horseshoes
with his friends and that Dodson was under Vaughan's control
during the trip to Luray in Vaughan's truck. The Commission's
conclusion that the accident occurred in the course and scope of
Dodson's employment implicitly incorporated a factual finding
that Vaughan was acting as Dodson's employer when he resumed the
trip to Luray. We do not review the Commission's factual
findings unless they are unsupported by credible evidence. See
Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Kremposky, 227 Va. 265, 269,
315 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1984). In this case, we cannot say that
this evidence was not credible or was insufficient to support
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the Commission's implied finding that Vaughan was taking Dodson
to Luray in his capacity as Dodson's employer.
Vaughan's second reason why the accident did not occur in
the course of employment is that the period of drinking and
pitching horseshoes was such a deviation "from the business
purpose of the ride home, that it effectively broke the nexus to
the employment before the return trip home was resumed." In
support of this argument, Vaughan cites cases stating that if an
employee so materially deviates from the employment–related
purposes of his trip as to constitute a "frolic of his own," any
accident occurring at that time is not considered to have
occurred in the course of employment. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Robertson Chevrolet Co., 177 Va. 289, 295, 13 S.E.2d 326, 329
(1941).
Here, however, we are not considering an employee's
deviation, but whether the employer's resumption of the trip to
transport Dodson to the location of his choice was a trip in the
course of his employment. In taking Dodson to Luray, Vaughan
was fulfilling his agreement as Dodson's employer to provide
transportation to and from work. Accordingly, we hold that
Dodson's injuries arose out of and in the course of his
employment and that the Commission's award of benefits should be
upheld.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be
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Affirmed.
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