Vincent v. Warden of Dillwyn Correctional Center ( 1999 )


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  • Present:   All the Justices
    CEDRIC VINCENT
    v.   Record No. 981998     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
    June 11, 1999
    WARDEN OF THE DILLWYN
    CORRECTIONAL CENTER, ET AL.
    UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
    In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we consider
    whether a certificate of discharge from probation supervision
    containing a prospective discharge date was superseded by a
    subsequent parole board warrant for the arrest and detention
    of the parolee pending a parole revocation hearing.
    The sequence of events is as follows.    On August 14,
    1997, Cedric Vincent was released from the Virginia Department
    of Corrections on mandatory parole, with a minimum parole
    supervision expiration date of February 14, 1998.    As part of
    the conditions of parole, Vincent acknowledged that his
    failure to obey all federal, state, and local laws and
    ordinances would subject him to arrest and revocation of
    parole.
    On August 21, one week after his release on parole,
    Vincent was arrested by the Fairfax County Police Department,
    charged with distribution of cocaine, and incarcerated in the
    Fairfax County Jail.     In September 1997, while incarcerated
    pending a hearing on the drug charge, Vincent was charged with
    and convicted of simple assault for an incident that occurred
    in the jail.   On January 21, 1998, Vincent pled guilty to and
    was convicted of the cocaine distribution charge.
    As a result of Vincent's convictions for simple assault
    and distribution of cocaine, his parole officer prepared a
    "Major Violation Report" charging Vincent with violating the
    conditions of his parole.   Based on this report, the Virginia
    Parole Board (the Parole Board) issued a Board warrant
    commanding his arrest for violation of his mandatory release
    and commanding his detention "subject to further action of
    said Board."   The Board warrant was issued on February 2, 1998
    and served on Vincent at the Fairfax County Jail on February
    11, 1998.
    Approximately one month later, March 12, 1998, a Fairfax
    County probation and parole officer gave Vincent an undated
    "Certificate of Discharge."   This undated certificate,
    generated sometime in early January 1998 by the Virginia
    Department of Corrections Information Systems, directed that
    "final Discharge be entered effective 2/14/98."   The same day,
    March 12, the probation and parole officer filed a presentence
    report in Vincent's pending sentencing proceeding for his
    cocaine distribution conviction.    In the presentence report
    the officer stated that
    [a]lthough a Parole Board warrant was issued for
    the above violations, the Parole Board elected to
    administratively discharge Mr. Vincent from
    parole on February 14, 1998.
    2
    On March 20, Vincent was sentenced on the cocaine
    distribution charge to eight years in prison with six
    years and six months suspended.
    On May 13, 1998, a Parole Board hearing was held to
    determine whether Vincent's parole should be revoked.   The
    Parole Examiner recommended that parole be revoked based on
    Vincent's admission of guilt to the charge of cocaine
    distribution and his conviction for simple assault.   The
    Virginia Parole Board revoked Vincent's parole by letter dated
    May 22, 1998.   The Parole Board denied Vincent's appeal and he
    filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pro se.      We
    ordered that counsel be appointed for Vincent and briefs be
    submitted by the parties.
    Vincent argues that his Certificate of Discharge became
    effective prior to the revocation of his parole and that,
    because he was no longer a parolee at the time of the
    revocation, the Parole Board did not have jurisdiction to
    revoke his parole.   Therefore, he concludes, his detention
    pursuant to the revocation is unlawful.   To hold otherwise, he
    asserts, is fundamentally unfair and violates his due process
    rights.   We disagree.
    A parolee's obligation to comply with the terms of his
    parole continues until the parolee is discharged from parole.
    Until that time, a parolee is subject to revocation of his
    3
    parole by the Parole Board.    In this case, Vincent violated a
    condition of the parole supervision prior to the effective
    date of his discharge from parole.      The Parole Board had the
    authority to institute revocation proceedings based on
    Vincent's violations up until the effective date of his
    discharge.    The Board exercised that authority by issuing the
    Board warrant for Vincent's arrest and detention on February
    2, 1998.     See Code §§ 53.1-136, and -161.
    Issuing a board warrant for a parolee's arrest and
    detention for an alleged violation of parole conditions is
    inconsistent with ordering discharge from parole.      Therefore,
    because the action of the Parole Board instituting parole
    revocation proceedings in this case occurred subsequent to its
    setting of a prospective discharge date, but before the
    discharge date, the subsequent action operated to nullify the
    Board's prior action.    The fact that Vincent received the
    Certificate of Discharge after he received the Board warrant
    does not alter this conclusion.       The operative event was the
    initiation of action by the Parole Board, not the subsequent
    receipt of notice of the Board's action.
    Vincent's reliance on Cook v. Commonwealth, 
    211 Va. 290
    ,
    
    176 S.E.2d 815
     (1970), and Vick v. Commonwealth, 
    201 Va. 474
    ,
    
    111 S.E.2d 824
     (1960), is misplaced.      Those cases involved
    probation revocation pursuant to former Code § 53-275, the
    4
    predecessor of Code § 19.2-306, which required that the
    revocation itself be completed within a statutorily prescribed
    period.   The provisions of Title 53.1 regarding revocation of
    parole do not contain such a time limitation other than the
    requirement that an individual is a "parolee" at the time of
    the revocation and has not been validly discharged from
    parole.   See Code § 53.1-136(3).   Further, unlike the facts of
    this case, the periods of probation or suspension in those
    cases had ended before the trial court took action to revoke
    probation.
    Finally, Vincent argues that because he, the probation
    and parole officer who filed the presentence report in the
    drug distribution charge, and the trial court sentencing him
    for the drug distribution charge all relied on the validity of
    the Certificate of Discharge, it is fundamentally unfair to
    allow the Parole Board to revoke his parole. *   Vincent asserts
    that the sentence he received reflected the trial court's
    inclination to allow him to seek a drug treatment program and
    he contends that had the trial court known of his true parole
    *
    Vincent argues that the Parole Board is bound by the
    representations of the parole and probation officer as
    reflected in the presentence report that the Board had
    discharged Vincent from parole. He cites no cases in support
    of this proposition, and, to the extent he is asserting a
    claim of estoppel, we have said that estoppel does not apply
    to the government in the discharge of its governmental
    functions. Gwinn v. Alward, 
    235 Va. 616
    , 621, 
    369 S.E.2d 410
    ,
    413 (1988).
    5
    status, it might have made adjustments to accommodate that
    status while allowing entry into the drug treatment program.
    This argument falls short of raising due process
    considerations.
    What accommodations the trial court might have made in
    Vincent's sentence had it known that the Parole Board might
    revoke Vincent's parole is speculative at best.    Indeed,
    Vincent may have received a shorter sentence in light of the
    erroneous statement that he had been discharged from parole.
    More importantly, Vincent's discharge from parole was within
    the discretion of the Parole Board.   Code § 53.1-136(4).    A
    parolee does not have a fundamental or liberty interest in a
    discretionary final discharge from parole.    See James v.
    Robinson, 
    863 F. Supp. 275
    , 276 (E.D.Va. 1994), aff'd 
    45 F.3d 426
     (4th Cir. 1994), citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
    Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 
    442 U.S. 1
    , 7 (1979).
    For the above reasons, we conclude that the Parole Board
    had jurisdiction to revoke the parole of Vincent on May 22,
    1998 and, therefore, that his detention pursuant to the
    revocation is lawful.    Accordingly, we deny the petition for a
    writ of habeas corpus.
    Petition denied.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Record 981998

Judges: Lacy

Filed Date: 6/11/1999

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2024