North Ridge Apartments v. Ruffin ( 1999 )

Present: All the Justices
NORTH RIDGE APARTMENTS
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON
v. Record No. 981100 April 16, 1999
ALICE RUFFIN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
T. J. Markow, Judge
The question presented in this unlawful detainer action is
whether the trial court erred in finding that the lessee had
been constructively evicted from the demised premises.
Appellant C. G. II L.C., trading as North Ridge Apartments,
the lessor, filed this action against appellee Alice Ruffin, the
lessee, seeking judgment for possession of the leased premises,
for unpaid rent, and for damages arising from a written lease
between the parties. Following a bench trial, the court entered
judgment in favor of the lessee. The lessor appeals.
The facts are undisputed and are set forth in a Rule 5:11
written statement. The lessee entered into an "Apartment Lease"
with the lessor for a term beginning August 1, 1996 and ending
July 31, 1997 for designated premises in the City of Richmond.
The lessee failed to pay rent for June 1997 and this action was
filed.
At trial, the court heard testimony from the lessee and a
representative of the lessor. The lessee testified "she desired
to terminate her lease . . . due to her fear of crime and
because she did not feel safe in the premises." She stated
that, during the tenancy, "she became aware of drug sales and
criminal activity in and around the apartment building." She
said her "car was vandalized and broken into while parked on
plaintiff's premises provided for tenant parking."
In addition, she testified that "[o]ther tenants were
unruly and threatening, and left trash in hallways which were
common areas" of the three-floor, six-apartment building. Also,
she said "[d]og litter was . . . found in the hallways." She
complained that "[o]ther tenants regularly propped open the
[building's] security door, allowing unauthorized persons into
the common hallways."
The lessee further testified that she had made verbal
complaints to the lessor about the conditions. She admitted,
however, that she had not put those complaints in writing as
required by the apartment rules and regulations that were
incorporated in her lease. She said "she was fearful that
written complaints would result in retaliation from the
offending tenants."
The lessor's rental manager testified that each time the
tenant made verbal complaints, "she or her staff acted to
address and rectify the situations." Stating she was aware of
the security doors being propped open, the manager said that
apartment staff closed the doors when they found them open.
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Also, she said that notices were sent to residents who left the
doors open, advising them of the necessity to leave the doors
closed and locked.
The manager also testified that the lessor employed
security patrols, which "came to the premises at random times
and walked and drove through the grounds. They specifically
looked for open front doors and would close those doors when and
if they were discovered open."
In ruling for the lessee Ruffin, the trial court stated "it
appeared that plaintiff had responded to Ruffin's complaints;
however, due to the criminal activity on the grounds and
Ruffin's fear of retaliation, Ruffin was constructively
evicted." This ruling was erroneous.
Ordinarily, to constitute constructive eviction there must
be intentional conduct by the lessor that permanently deprives
the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises,
and the lessee must completely abandon the premises within a
reasonable time after the lessor's conduct. Cavalier Square
Ltd. Partnership v. Virginia ABC Board, 246 Va. 227, 231, 435
S.E.2d 392, 395 (1993). The burden of proving the affirmative
defense of constructive eviction rests upon the lessee. Id.
The evidence in the present case fails to support a finding
that the lessor was guilty of any intentional conduct that
permanently deprived the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of
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the leased premises. Generally, a lessor has no common-law duty
to protect the lessee from a criminal act by an unknown third
party. Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445,
448, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1987); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers,
215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1974).
And the record fails to show that the lessee claimed, or
that the trial court ruled, there was a statutory duty upon the
lessor regarding third-party acts under these circumstances.
Thus, we do not consider whether the provisions of the Virginia
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Code §§ 55-248.2 to -
248.40, require the lessor to protect the lessee from
foreseeable criminal acts.
Therefore, because there was no duty on the lessor in this
case to control third parties' criminal conduct, the failure of
the lessor to protect the lessee from such conduct cannot be
deemed an intentional act of omission.
In addition, the lessee's evidence regarding the non-
criminal acts suffers from the same deficiency on the issue of
intentional conduct as her other evidence. The record shows
that the lessee's complaints about unruly tenants, trash in the
hallways, and open security doors all were promptly addressed by
the lessor. Indeed, the trial court said "it appeared that
plaintiff had responded to Ruffin's complaints."
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Consequently, because the trial court erred in holding that
the lessee had been constructively evicted, we will reverse the
judgment below and enter final judgment here in favor of the
lessor.
Reversed and final judgment.
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