Jett v. DeGaetani , 259 Va. 616 ( 2000 )

Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice
F. TALMADGE JETT, ET AL.
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 991589 April 21, 2000
PETER J. DEGAETANI
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY
Joseph E. Spruill, Jr., Judge
In this appeal of a judgment which ordered specific
performance of an oral agreement, we consider whether the
judgment is unenforceable because the chancellor ordered the
defendants to convey an interest in real property to a person
who is not a party to this litigation.
Plaintiff, Peter J. DeGaetani, filed a bill of complaint
seeking specific performance of an alleged oral contract. He
claimed that the defendants, F. Talmadge Jett and Annie May
Jett, husband and wife, agreed to convey a parcel of land with
improvements to him and his former wife, Joyce Lynn Jett, who
was not a party to this litigation.
The following relevant facts were adduced during an ore
tenus hearing. The plaintiff and Joyce Jett were married in
1968. F. Talmadge Jett and Annie May Jett (collectively the
Jetts) conveyed by deed of gift an unimproved parcel of land
in Northumberland County to DeGaetani and Joyce Jett
DeGaetani, then husband and wife, as tenants by the entirety.
In August 1974, DeGaetani and Joyce Jett borrowed $25,000 from
Franklin Federal Savings & Loan Association to finance the
construction of a house on the property. The loan was secured
by a first deed of trust on the property. In June 1975,
DeGaetani and Joyce Jett borrowed an additional sum of $10,000
from Franklin Federal Savings & Loan Association to complete
construction of the house. This loan was secured by a second
deed of trust upon the property. In 1976, DeGaetani and Joyce
Jett were deemed in default of the deeds of trust.
According to DeGaetani, a conversation occurred among the
Jetts, Joyce Jett, and DeGaetani. The Jetts agreed to pay the
amounts due under the deeds of trust, and DeGaetani and Joyce
Jett agreed to convey the property to the Jetts. Talmadge
Jett testified that he was not present when this conversation
occurred, but he was aware of the agreement and he was willing
to honor it. DeGaetani testified that the Jetts agreed to
convey the property to Joyce Jett and DeGaetani at a future
date for $36,300, the amount the Jetts paid to Franklin
Federal Savings & Loan Association. DeGaetani and Joyce Jett,
by a deed recorded in February 1977, conveyed the real
property, including the house constructed thereon, to the
Jetts.
DeGaetani and Joyce Jett divorced and DeGaetani
remarried. DeGaetani, who lives with his wife on the
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property, testified that he was ready, willing, and able to
pay the Jetts $36,300 for the property.
The chancellor held that DeGaetani proved with clear and
convincing evidence that he had a contract with the Jetts that
required them to convey the property to him and Joyce Jett for
$36,300. The chancellor entered an order which required,
among other things, that DeGaetani satisfy certain conditions
and pay the Jetts $36,300 before a date certain. DeGaetani
satisfied the conditions set forth in the order, and the Jetts
were ordered to "convey to the plaintiff, Peter J. DeGaetani,
and to Joyce Lynn Jett, as tenants in common, the property
which is the subject of this suit."
The Jetts argue that the chancellor erred by ordering
them to execute a deed conveying the property to DeGaetani and
Joyce Jett because Joyce Jett is a necessary party to this
suit, and DeGaetani failed to make her a party to the
proceeding. Responding, DeGaetani asserts that Joyce Jett is
not a necessary party and, therefore, he was not required to
include her as a party in this proceeding. We disagree with
DeGaetani.
We have held that a court cannot render a valid judgment
when necessary parties to a suit are not before the court.
Atkisson v. Wexford Associates, 254 Va. 449, 455, 493 S.E.2d
524, 527 (1997); Asch v. Friends of Mt. Vernon Yacht Club, 251
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Va. 89, 91, 465 S.E.2d 817, 818 (1996); Schultz v. Schultz,
250 Va. 121, 124, 458 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1995); Allen v.
Chapman, 242 Va. 94, 99, 406 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1991); McDougle
v. McDougle, 214 Va. 636, 637, 203 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1974).
We have also stated the following principles which are
equally pertinent here:
" 'Necessary parties include all persons,
natural or artificial, however numerous, materially
interested either legally or beneficially in the
subject matter or event of the suit and who must be
made parties to it, and without whose presence in
court no proper decree can be rendered in the cause.
This rule is inflexible, yielding only when the
allegations of the bill state a case so
extraordinary and exceptional in character that it
is practically impossible to make all parties in
interest parties to the bill, and, further, that
others are made parties who have the same interest
as have those not brought in, and are equally
certain to bring forward the entire merits of the
controversy as would the absent persons.
'This cardinal principle governing as to
parties to suits in equity is founded upon the broad
and liberal doctrine that courts of equity delight
to do complete justice by determining the rights of
all persons interested in the subject matter of
litigation, so that the performance of the decree
rendered in the cause may be perfectly safe to all
who are required to obey it and that further
litigation touching the matter in dispute may be
prevented.' "
Kennedy Coal Corp. v. Buckhorn Coal Corp., 140 Va. 37, 49, 124
S.E. 482, 486 (1924) (quoting The Buchanan Company v. Smith's
Heirs, 115 Va. 704, 707-08, 80 S.E. 794, 795 (1914)); accord
Atkisson, 254 Va. at 455-56, 493 S.E.2d at 527-28.
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We have also stated that "'[necessary parties'] interests
in the subject matter of the suit, and in the relief sought,
are so bound up with that of the other parties, that their
legal presence as parties to the proceeding is an absolute
necessity, without which the court cannot proceed. In such
cases the court refuses to entertain the suit, when these
parties cannot be subjected to its jurisdiction.'" Bonsal v.
Camp, 111 Va. 595, 597-98, 69 S.E. 978, 979 (1911) (quoting
Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280, 284 (1867)).
We hold that the chancellor lacked the power to proceed
with DeGaetani's bill of complaint because Joyce Jett was a
necessary party to that litigation. The chancellor's order
directed the Jetts to execute and deliver a deed that conveyed
the property to DeGaetani and Joyce Jett as tenants in common.
The chancellor's order made a determination that Joyce Jett
has an interest in the real property as a tenant in common.
This order, without question, imposed certain duties and
obligations upon her because of her property interests as a
tenant in common. Yet, she was not before the court even
though she had a material legal interest in the subject matter
of the suit.
Contrary to DeGaetani's assertions, no exception exists
which would have permitted the chancellor to enter a valid
judgment in this suit without Joyce Jett's presence. We held
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in McDougle that a court may adjudicate a suit when it is
practically impossible to join all parties in interest and the
absent parties are represented by others having the same
interest or when an absent party's interests are separable
from those of the parties before the court so that the court
may enter an order without prejudice to the rights of the
absent party. 214 Va. at 637, 203 S.E.2d at 133. Here, it
was not practically impossible to join Joyce Jett as a party,
and her interests are not separable from DeGaetani's interests
to the extent that the chancellor could enter an order without
prejudice to her rights. Indeed, the challenged final order
conferred upon her the real property rights of a tenant in
common with the related duties and obligations.
Accordingly, we will reverse the chancellor's order, and
we will remand this proceeding to the circuit court with
instructions that it issue an order requiring that DeGaetani
convey the property to the Jetts. The Jetts shall be required
to return the $36,300 to DeGaetani. The remand will be
without prejudice to the rights, if any, that DeGaetani may
have to join Joyce Jett as a party to any further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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