Sheppard v. Junes ( 2014 )

Present: All the Justices
JASON H. SHEPPARD, JR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 130971 JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
April 17, 2014
LINDA JUNES, ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF JOHN WARREN SHEPPERD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
William T. Newman, Jr., Judge
In this appeal we consider the impact of a half-blood
relative on the distribution of the paternal side of an
intestate estate when all of the heirs are collaterals 1 and the
estate must be separated into paternal and maternal parts.
I. Facts and Proceedings
John Warren Shepperd died without having executed a will.
In life, John never married and had no children. At the time
of his death, John's parents and older sister had predeceased
him. John's older sister had no children.
Linda Junes was appointed administrator of John's estate.
Linda identified fourteen second cousins from John's maternal
side, including Linda herself, who survived John's death.
These fourteen second cousins stand in equal relation to John,
and they do not dispute that, among themselves, they are
1
A "collateral heir" is "[o]ne who is neither a direct
descendant nor an ancestor of the decedent, but whose kinship
is through a collateral line, such as a brother, sister, uncle,
aunt, nephew, niece, or cousin." Black's Law Dictionary 791
(9th ed. 2009).
entitled to equal 1/14 shares of whatever interest they
collectively have in John's estate. After certification by a
genealogical research firm, Linda also accepted Jason H.
Sheppard, Jr., as John's half-uncle from John's paternal side
who survived John's death.
Linda, in her capacity as administrator, filed a motion
for aid and direction in the Circuit Court of Arlington County.
Linda sought judicial assistance to determine the proper
distribution proportions of John's estate according to
Virginia's statutory scheme governing intestate succession
because Jason's half-blood status complicated the task. In
particular, Linda sought assistance to determine whether either
(1) Jason could take the entirety of John's estate that was to
pass to John's paternal side, because Jason was the only
relative on John's paternal side, or (2) Jason could only take
one-half of John's estate that was to pass to John's paternal
side, and the remainder was to be distributed to the fourteen
second cousins, because half-bloods can only take half of the
inheritance of whole-bloods.
After a hearing on the issue, the circuit court held that,
because of Jason's half-blood status, Jason could only take a
one-half share of John's estate that was to pass to John's
paternal side, and the remainder of John's entire estate was to
go to the fourteen maternal second cousins. The court then
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entered a final order memorializing that ruling, citing Code
§§ 64.2-202(B) and 64.2-203(B) in support of its decision.
Jason timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court.
We granted two assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred when it held that the sole
collateral heir on the paternal side of an intestate
estate is limited to only one-half of the paternal
share because he is a half-blood relative of the
decedent, and that the other half of the paternal
share shall be distributed to all other heirs on the
maternal side.
2. The trial court erred when it applied Virginia
Code Section 64.2-203(B), which prohibits "double
inheritance" by an heir who is related to the
decedent on both the maternal and paternal side, to a
situation where a half-blood heir is only related to
the decedent on the paternal side.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
This appeal requires us to construe statutory language.
That task requires a de novo review because it involves a
purely legal issue. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. 163, 176, 736
S.E.2d 711, 718 (2013).
B. Virginia Law Governing Intestate Succession
Well established principles guide our analysis. We
construe statutes to "ascertain and give effect to the
intention" of the General Assembly. Rutter v. Oakwood Living
Ctrs. of Va., Inc., 282 Va. 4, 9, 710 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Typically, this only
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requires applying the plain meaning of the words used in the
statute because the General Assembly's intent "is usually self-
evident from the statutory language." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227,
623 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (2006). However, we look beyond the
words of the statute to help ascertain what those words mean if
the statutory language is ambiguous. Virginia Broad. Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 286 Va. 239, 249, 749 S.E.2d 313, 318 (2013).
Also, we construe the statute's plain language in a manner that
avoids absurdity. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116,
597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004).
Further, "we do not read statutes in isolation." L.F.,
285 Va. at 180, 736 S.E.2d at 720. Thus, we must consider "a
statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating particular
words or phrases." Small v. Fannie Mae, 286 Va. 119, 127, 747
S.E.2d 817, 821 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, "statutes dealing with a specific subject must be
construed together in order to arrive at the object sought to
be accomplished." Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 769,
652 S.E.2d 456, 462 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Code § 64.2-200
We start with Code § 64.2-200(A), which states: "The real
estate of any decedent not effectively disposed of by will
descends and passes by intestate succession in the following
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course." If a decedent fails to effectively dispose of his
personal estate by will, the decedent's personal estate, "after
payment of funeral expenses, charges of administration, and
debts, and subject to the provisions of Article 2 . . . of
Chapter 3," is distributed in the same manner as set forth in
Code § 64.2-200. Code § 64.2-201(A). Code § 64.2-200
therefore governs to whom a decedent's estate passes if that
decedent failed to execute a will and therefore died intestate.
Code § 64.2-200 provides a sequential list of hierarchical
classes of people to whom the decedent's estate may pass, set
up by the General Assembly in descending priority. Each class
on the list is defined by that class's relationship with the
decedent, and the further down the list one goes the more
distant the relation becomes. It is clear from the sequential
nature of Code § 64.2-200's plain language that each subsection
of that statute must be assessed in the order listed. Only if
a subsection does not apply because no person qualifies as a
member of that particular class may the next subsection be
considered.
Accordingly, because John had no surviving spouse, no
children, no surviving parents, and neither a surviving brother
or sister nor a brother or sister who had descendants, the
first subsection of the statute applicable to John's estate is
Code § 64.2-200(A)(5).
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The preamble to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) states that "[i]f
there is none of the foregoing, then one-half of the estate
descends and passes to the paternal kindred and one-half
descends and passes to the maternal kindred of the decedent in
the following course." When a decedent's estate is separated
in this manner, each separate portion of the estate is commonly
referred to as a "moiety." See Black's Law Dictionary 1096
(9th ed. 2009). We have previously explained, in the context
of the predecessor to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5), what effect this
separation has on the distribution of a decedent's estate:
[After a decedent's estate is separated into
moieties], each moiety goes to the proper kindred as
a class, on the paternal and maternal side
respectively, and there is no further division into
moieties as between the branches of paternal and
maternal kindred. And each moiety keeps on its own
side, regardless of the other, so long as there are
any kindred, however remote, on that side.
Williams v. Knowles, 178 Va. 84, 99, 16 S.E.2d 316, 322 (1941)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis
omitted).
Given that Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) applies in this case,
John's estate must be divided into two different, but equally
valued, moieties. One moiety passes to John's paternal kindred
and the other moiety passes to John's maternal kindred. These
moieties are treated as entirely separate so long as each
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passes to statutorily-identified kindred. See Code § 64.2-
200(B); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23.
We now turn to the subsections of Code § 64.2-200(A)(5),
and address those subsections in sequential order. For each
moiety, the statutory provisions in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a)
through (e) are applied separately and independently. See,
e.g., Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23.
John's paternal side moiety does not pass under Code
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) because John had no surviving grandparent
on his paternal side. Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) states that
"[i]f there is none of the foregoing, then to the decedent's
uncles and aunts, and their descendants." Jason was an uncle
on John's paternal side, and therefore John's paternal side
moiety passes to Jason pursuant to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b).
Linda sought judicial aid and direction only for the
proper distribution of John's paternal side moiety. Thus, we
would typically not address to what class John's maternal side
moiety passes. However, Code § 64.2-200 requires a
determination as to how John's maternal side moiety passes
because if no maternal side kindred survived John's death, the
moieties are rejoined and treated once again as a single
estate. See Code § 64.2-200(B); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16
S.E.2d at 322-23. Neither moiety would independently exist if
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the moieties are rejoined, and instead the entire estate would
pass according to the terms of Code § 64.2-200(B) or (C).
For this limited purpose, we recognize that fourteen
maternal second cousins survived John's death. The record is
unclear how these fourteen second cousins are related to John.
These second cousins may be descendants of John's maternal side
uncles or aunts, or they may be descendants of the brothers or
sisters of John's maternal side grandparents. For purposes of
this appeal, we need not discern how these second cousins are
related to John. Instead, because John had no surviving
grandparents or great-grandparents on John's maternal side, we
recognize that John's maternal side moiety passes to the
fourteen second cousins under Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(d).
Thus, Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) requires John's estate to be
divided into two separate, equally valued moieties. Code
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) establishes that John's paternal side
moiety passes to Jason. Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(d) establishes that John's maternal side
moiety passes to John's fourteen second cousins.
2. Code § 64.2-202
We now turn to Code § 64.2-202, which governs the
distribution of a decedent's estate among all persons who
qualify as part of the class to whom the decedent's estate
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passes under Code § 64.2-200, 2 and addresses when persons take
per capita, 3 when persons take per stirpes, 4 and the treatment
of collaterals of the half blood. In particular, under Code
§ 64.2-202(A) the decedent's estate must be divided into equal
shares based on the number of "heirs and distributees" who
qualify as part of the relevant class, so long as such persons
either survive the decedent's death, or, if they did not
survive the decedent's death, such persons left descendants who
did survive the decedent's death. Once the number of shares is
calculated, one share is distributed to each "such heir and
distributee" on a per capita basis and to "such descendants" on
a per stirpes basis. See also Ball v. Ball, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.)
325, 327 (1876) ("Whenever those entitled to partition are in
the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take
per capita or by persons; and where a part of them being dead
and a part living, the issue of those dead shall take per
stirpes.").
2
Code § 64.2-202(A) expressly exempts Code § 64.2-
200(A)(1) from its distribution scheme because Code § 64.2-
200(A)(1) sets forth its own distribution scheme if a
decedent's estate passes to a surviving spouse.
3
"Per capita" means to "[d]ivide[] equally among all
individuals . . . in the same class" and to "tak[e] as an
individual and not as a representative of an ancestor."
Black's Law Dictionary at 1250.
4
"Per stirpes" means "[p]roportionately divided between
beneficiaries according to their deceased ancestor's share."
Black's Law Dictionary at 1260.
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Code § 64.2-202(A) states clearly that this division of
the estate among equally positioned relatives applies either to
the decedent's entire estate, or to "each half portion of such
estate when division is required by subdivision A 5 of § 64.2-
200." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the provisions of Code
§ 64.2-202(A) independently apply to each moiety of John's
estate created pursuant to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5). Code § 64.2-
202(A); see also Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23.
Jason, who is the only member of the class to which John's
paternal side moiety passes under Code § 64.2-200, takes the
entirety of John's paternal side moiety. Code § 64.2-202(A).
Because that paternal side moiety is one-half of John's entire
estate, Jason takes one-half of John's estate. 5
This concludes our review of the applicable statutory
provisions that properly determine how John's paternal side
moiety should be distributed. The circuit court erred to the
extent it held otherwise.
5
Although we are required to determine to what class
John's maternal side moiety passed under Code § 64.2-200,
determining how John's maternal side moiety is distributed
proportionally among members of that class under Code § 64.2-
202(A) is not in dispute and, therefore, unnecessary for
purposes of this appeal.
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3. Other Statutory Provisions
We now address those statutory provisions which Linda
argues require a different result, or which the circuit court
cited in support of its incorrect application of law.
Citing Code § 64.2-202(B), Linda argues that, because
Jason is a half-blood collateral, he can only take half of
John's paternal side moiety that he would otherwise be entitled
to receive. Citing Code § 64.2-200(B), Linda argues that the
portion of John's paternal side moiety that Jason is deprived
of should instead pass to the maternal heirs. We disagree.
a. Code § 64.2-200(B)
Code § 64.2-200(B) applies if "there are either no
surviving paternal kindred or no surviving maternal kindred,
[or] there are neither maternal nor paternal kindred." As
already established, Code § 64.2-200 is a sequential listing of
potential, legislatively prioritized classes to whom a
decedent's estate passes. When reviewing the Code § 64.2-200
categories in sequential order, if a subsection applies because
a member of the identified class exists, a court must conclude
its analysis at that point in applying Code § 64.2-200.
John's paternal side moiety passed to the class identified
in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b). John's maternal side moiety
passed to the class identified in Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or
Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(d). Code § 64.2-200(B) is listed
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subsequent to Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) through (e) and, by its
terms, only applies if Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(a) through (e) are
inapplicable to either or both moieties. Thus, Code § 64.2-
200(B) does not apply and cannot affect distribution of John's
paternal side moiety under Code § 64.2-202(A).
b. Code § 64.2-202(B)
Code § 64.2-202(B) provides that "collaterals of the half
blood shall inherit only half as much as those of the whole
blood." Code § 64.2-202(B) begins with the phrase
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection A." This
phrase indicates that the half-blood rule of Code § 64.2-202(B)
operates to modify only the application of Code § 64.2-202(A).
Moreover, by its terms, Code § 64.2-202(B) does not alter the
division of the moieties required by Code § 64.2-200(A)(5).
Thus, once the application of Code § 64.2-202(A) to each moiety
is separately established, the extent to which Code § 64.2-
202(B) modifies the Code § 64.2-202(A) distribution of John's
paternal side moiety must be determined.
It is clear that Code § 64.2-202(B) does not modify the
Code § 64.2-202(A) distribution in this case. John's paternal
side moiety passes to a class comprised of only one heir:
Jason. Even though Jason is a half-blood collateral heir, no
whole-blood collateral heir exists as part of that class to
which John's paternal side moiety passes. See Code § 64.2-
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200(A)(5)(b). Without such a whole-blood collateral, no whole-
blood inheritance exists to provide a statutory basis for
applying Code § 64.2-202(B) to reduce John's inheritance.
Thus, Code § 64.2-202(B) does not affect distribution of John's
paternal side moiety as provided under Code § 64.2-202(A).
Moreover, it is of no consequence that John's fourteen
second cousins are whole-blood collaterals. These fourteen
second cousins take pursuant to John's maternal side moiety,
and have no interest in John's paternal side moiety. Code
§ 64.2-200(A)(5). Their existence does not affect the class to
which John's paternal side moiety passes, they are not a part
of that class, and they do not alter the distribution of shares
among the heirs within that class. Code §§ 64.2-200(A)(5);
64.2-202(A); Williams, 178 Va. at 99, 16 S.E.2d at 322-23.
c. Code § 64.2-203(B)
Code § 64.2-203(B) provides that "[a] person who is
related to the decedent through two lines of relationship is
entitled to only a single share based on the relationship that
would entitle him to the larger share." The circuit court
cited this provision as limiting Jason's distribution to one-
half of John's paternal side moiety. This was error.
Code § 64.2-203(B) is implicated when an individual is
related to a decedent in more than one way. The record
reflects that Jason is related to John by only one line of
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relationship. That is, Jason relates to John only by being
John's half-uncle on John's paternal side. Thus, Code § 64.2-
203(B) is not implicated and cannot affect distribution of
John's paternal side moiety under Code § 64.2-202(A).
III. Conclusion
The circuit court erred in distributing John's estate so
that Jason took only a one-half share of John's paternal side
moiety and therefore received only 1/4 of John's total estate.
A correct application of the relevant statutory provisions
requires a different result.
Code § 64.2-200(A)(5) requires separation of John's entire
estate into two moieties, each valued at one-half of John's
estate. One moiety passes to John's maternal kindred, and Code
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) or Code § 64.2-200(A)(5)(d) requires that
maternal side moiety to pass to John's fourteen second cousins.
The other moiety passes to John's paternal kindred, and Code
§ 64.2-200(A)(5)(b) requires that paternal side moiety to pass
to Jason. Further, Code § 64.2-202(A) requires John's paternal
side moiety to be distributed entirely to Jason, and neither
Code §§ 64.2-200(B), 64.2-202(B), nor 64.2-203(B) affects that
distribution. We will therefore reverse the judgment of the
circuit court and enter final judgment in favor of Jason.
Reversed and final judgment.
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