Craver-Farrell v. Anderson , 251 Va. 369 ( 1996 )


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  • Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and
    Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice
    LYNN CHERYL DALE CRAVER-FARRELL,
    ADMINISTRATRIX C.T.A. OF THE ESTATE
    OF DORIS M. DALE, DECEASED
    OPINION BY
    v.   Record No. 950793            SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING
    March 1, 1996
    GLADYS C. ANDERSON AND RALPH L. ANDERSON
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
    L. Cleaves Manning, Judge
    In this appeal, we consider whether the presumption of
    survivorship provided in Code § 6.1-125.5(A) applies to funds
    formerly held in joint bank accounts, but no longer so held at
    the time of the death of one of the parties to those accounts.
    Since the survivors to the former joint accounts in issue
    prevailed in the trial court, we consider the evidence in the
    light most favorable to them.    That evidence appears in the
    following summary of their testimony.
    Ralph L. Anderson and Gladys C. Anderson, his wife, were
    close friends of Harvey LeRoy Dale, Jr., and Doris M. Dale, his
    wife, for a number of years before Mr. Dale's death in August
    1990.    The Dales had a daughter, Lynn Cheryl Dale Craver-Farrell,
    a resident of western Canada, from whom they were estranged.
    Six or seven months before his death, Mr. Dale asked Mr.
    Anderson to "look out for [Mrs. Dale]" after his death.       Shortly
    after Mr. Dale's death following a lengthy illness, Mr. Anderson
    told Mrs. Dale that her husband had asked him "to assist her as
    well as [he] could," and Mrs. Dale "was very well pleased about
    this situation."
    Although the Andersons never gave Mrs. Dale any investment
    or financial advice, they provided substantial assistance to her
    for more than a year while Mrs. Dale was living at home following
    her husband's death.   During this period, Mrs. Dale converted her
    four individual bank accounts and a bank certificate of deposit
    into multiple party accounts aggregating over $260,000 in her
    name and that of Mrs. Anderson, each of them being authorized
    signatories (the Dale-Anderson joint accounts).   Mrs. Anderson
    testified that this was done to assist Mrs. Dale "in whatever she
    wanted me to do."   Although Mrs. Anderson filled out checks drawn
    on these accounts, Mrs. Dale signed each one.   Later, Mrs. Dale
    added Mr. Anderson's name to one of the Dale-Anderson joint
    accounts.
    Mrs. Anderson testified that Mrs. Dale had repeatedly
    advised her that the money in the Dale-Anderson joint accounts
    was to be used for Mrs. Dale's benefit during her life, and that
    at Mrs. Dale's death, the funds "were to be used by my husband
    and myself, they were to go to us."
    Mrs. Dale fell and injured her leg in January 1992.
    Thereafter, Mrs. Dale was hospitalized or living in a nursing
    home until her death in December 1992.   After Mrs. Dale was
    injured, Mrs. Anderson began filling out and signing all checks
    drawn on the Dale-Anderson joint accounts.   The Andersons also
    took charge of Mrs. Dale's house and caused Mrs. Dale's mail to
    be sent to their house.
    From January 14 through May 4, 1992, Mrs. Anderson
    -2-
    transferred the balances in four of the five Dale-Anderson joint
    accounts (the transferred Dale-Anderson joint accounts) to three
    joint bank accounts and one joint bank certificate of deposit,
    all solely in the Andersons' names (the Anderson joint accounts).
    Mrs. Anderson testified that Mrs. Dale had asked her to make
    these transfers "because she figured there was still some way
    that [Craver-Farrell] could get her money and she wouldn't have
    any money."
    There was no question in the Andersons' minds that these
    funds belonged to Mrs. Dale during her lifetime. 1   Neither the
    funds, nor interest accumulating thereon, were used while Mrs.
    Dale was alive, either for the benefit of Mrs. Dale or the
    Andersons.    Instead, the Andersons paid Mrs. Dale's expenses from
    the remaining Dale-Anderson joint account.
    On January 16, 1992, Mrs. Dale executed a general power of
    attorney naming Mrs. Anderson as her attorney in fact.      On
    February 3, 1992, Mrs. Dale executed a will leaving all her
    property to Craver-Farrell and nominating Mrs. Anderson as
    executor of her estate.    In both instruments, Mrs. Dale
    designated Mr. Anderson as Mrs. Anderson's successor.
    Using the general power of attorney, the Andersons sold Mrs.
    Dale's car for $7,200 on August 31, 1992, and deposited the
    1
    In the absence of clear and convincing evidence of Mrs. Dale's
    intent to give these funds to the Andersons during Mrs. Dale's
    lifetime, the funds would have belonged to Mrs. Dale during her
    lifetime under the provisions of Code § 6.1-125.3(A).
    -3-
    proceeds in one of the Anderson joint accounts.   Claiming that
    Mrs. Dale had given her a number of articles of personal
    property, Mrs. Anderson removed items from Mrs. Dale's house both
    before and after her death.
    Upon the Andersons' refusal to qualify as the executor or
    successor executor of Mrs. Dale's estate, Craver-Farrell
    qualified as administratrix c.t.a. of the estate.   In that
    capacity, Craver-Farrell brought this action against the
    Andersons to recover the proceeds from the sale of Mrs. Dale's
    car, the items of personal property Mrs. Anderson had removed
    from Mrs. Dale's house, and the funds traceable to the
    transferred Dale-Anderson joint accounts and now held by the
    Andersons.
    The Andersons filed an answer denying the substance of the
    plaintiff's claims and also filed a counterclaim seeking to
    recover the amounts of Mrs. Dale's funeral bill and other bills
    they had paid from the remaining Dale-Anderson joint account
    following Mrs. Dale's death.
    After hearing the evidence and argument of the parties in a
    bench trial, the trial court advised the parties that it would
    dismiss the counterclaim and require the Andersons to pay the
    plaintiff the proceeds from the sale of Mrs. Dale's car and to
    return certain items of the personal property Mrs. Anderson had
    removed from Mrs. Dale's house.    After receiving briefs on the
    issue of the Dale-Anderson joint accounts, the trial court later
    -4-
    entered judgment "in favor of [the Andersons] on the Central
    Fidelity Bank account . . . , the Dominion Bank money market
    account . . . , the Cenit Bank certificate of deposit . . . , the
    Commerce Bank savings account . . . , and the Dominion Bank
    checking account . . . ."    These accounts are the transferred
    Dale-Anderson joint accounts and the Dale-Anderson joint account
    that remained on the date of Mrs. Dale's death.   The plaintiff
    appeals that portion of the judgment dealing with the transferred
    Dale-Anderson joint accounts.
    Code § 6.1-125.5(A) provides in pertinent part that "[s]ums
    remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account
    belong to the surviving party . . . as against the estate of the
    decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a
    different intention at the time the account is created."
    (Emphasis added.)   Since the transferred Dale-Anderson joint
    accounts had been closed prior to Mrs. Dale's death, the
    plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in applying the
    statutory presumption of survivorship.
    On the other hand, citing Higgins v. Bowdoin, 
    238 Va. 134
    ,
    140, 
    380 S.E.2d 904
    , 907-08 (1989), in which we applied the
    statutory presumption to an account subject to the statutory
    provisions, the Andersons claim that the trial court correctly
    applied Code 6.1-125.5(A).   We agree with the plaintiff.
    Higgins is inapplicable to this case because the amount in
    the Higgins joint account remained on deposit at the death of one
    -5-
    party to the account.    Instead, the principles of Bennet v. First
    & Merchants National Bank, 
    233 Va. 355
    , 360, 
    355 S.E.2d 888
    , 890-
    91 (1987), apply here.   In Bennet, the contested funds no longer
    remained on deposit in a joint account subject to Code § 6.1-
    125.5(A) when one of the parties thereto died.      For that reason,
    we refused to apply the statutory presumption in Bennet.
    The Andersons assert that Bennet can be distinguished on its
    facts.   First, they note the evidence in Bennet of the decedent's
    good relationships with the parties who would have received the
    funds if the statute did not apply.      The Andersons then contrast
    that evidence with Mrs. Anderson's testimony of Mrs. Dale's
    estranged relationship with Craver-Farrell and of Mrs. Dale's
    intent that Craver-Farrell receive none of the funds traceable to
    the Dale-Anderson joint accounts on Mrs. Dale's death.
    We do not think that this distinction affects the question
    whether Code § 6.1-125.5(A) applies in this case.      Our discussion
    of those relations in Bennet was material only in considering
    whether the survivor had sustained her burden of showing a gift
    2
    of the joint investment.       Id. at 361, 355 S.E.2d at 891-92.
    2
    Without citation of any authority, the Andersons make a
    passing reference in their brief to Mrs. Dale's intention "to make
    a gift of the funds to Mr. and Mrs. Anderson." However, our
    review of the entire record fails to disclose a contention at
    trial by the Andersons that Mrs. Dale made an inter vivos gift of
    the funds traceable to the former Dale-Anderson joint accounts.
    Accordingly, we will not address this contention, made for the
    first time on appeal. Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 
    249 Va. 376
    , 381, 
    457 S.E.2d 36
    , 39 (1995); Eason v. Eason, 
    204 Va. 347
    ,
    351-52, 
    131 S.E.2d 280
    , 283 (1963).
    -6-
    Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in
    applying the presumption provided in Code § 6.1-125.5(A).
    Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment awarding the Andersons
    the principal amounts of the transferred Dale-Anderson joint
    accounts held by the Andersons at the time of Mrs. Dale's death.
    We will remand the case with instructions to determine the
    interest that has accrued on these amounts since Mrs. Dale's
    death and to enter a new order awarding judgment in favor of the
    plaintiff for the principal amounts and accrued interest.
    Reversed and remanded.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Record 950793

Citation Numbers: 251 Va. 369, 467 S.E.2d 770, 1996 Va. LEXIS 32

Judges: Carrico, Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Whiting

Filed Date: 3/1/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024