Collins v. Fuller , 251 Va. 70 ( 1996 )


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  • Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell,
    and Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice
    JIMMY R. COLLINS, ET AL.
    v.     Record No. 950648       OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
    January 12, 1996
    BILLY FULLER, ET AL.
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY
    James C. Roberson, Judge
    In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court
    erroneously restricted the method of using an express right of
    way.
    This case involves the interpretation and location of an
    express right of way contained in a deed for land purchased by
    Jimmy R. and Maggie S. Collins (collectively, Collins).
    Collins' property was part of a tract partitioned in 1883 into
    two lots, Lot 4 and Lot 5.     The partition order granted Lot 4
    to Bettie V. Edwards.      The grant included an express right of
    way described as follows:     "with right of way to the spring."
    The spring was located on Lot 5.
    Collins purchased approximately 10 acres of Lot 4 in 1983.
    The deed recited that the purchase also included "all water
    rights and privileges and right of way which was assigned to
    Bettie V. Edwards in connection with the said tract of land in
    the division of the real estate of her father, James S.
    Edwards."   The portion of Lot 4 purchased by Collins was
    adjacent to Lot 5.   At that time, Lot 5 was owned by J.C. and
    Bonnie Fuller.
    In 1992, J.C. and Bonnie Fuller conveyed a .75 acre
    portion of Lot 5 adjacent to Collins' property to their son
    Billy.   The portion conveyed did not include the spring but did
    include a house.   Billy and his wife, Gina, began renovating
    the house by extending the back of it.   At the same time,
    Collins sought to utilize the right of way, crossing Billy's
    land just behind his house to get to the spring located on J.C.
    and Bonnie Fuller's land.
    Billy and Gina Fuller filed a bill of complaint alleging
    that Collins was engaged in a continuing trespass.   The Fullers
    sought an injunction prohibiting Collins from traveling across
    the property and requiring Collins to lay a pipeline across
    land owned by J.C. and Bonnie Fuller to access the spring.
    After viewing the property and considering the evidence and
    arguments of counsel, the trial court entered a final decree
    holding that Collins had a right of way to the spring "no
    greater than (20) feet north of the J.C. Fuller and Billy
    Fuller boundary line then in a straight line to the spring."
    The trial court also limited the use of the right of way to
    "laying and maintaining a water line to the spring with a
    right-of-way of 10 feet to make the necessary repairs on said
    water line."   Collins' motion for reconsideration was denied.
    We awarded Collins an appeal.
    The parties agree that Collins' 1983 deed expressly
    granted the right to use the water from the spring and a right
    of way to access the spring.    The issue here is whether the
    trial court could limit the method of using the right of way to
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    laying and maintaining a water pipe to transport water from the
    spring to Collins' property.   We conclude that the limitation
    imposed by the trial court was error.
    The applicable legal principle was stated in Cushman Corp.
    v. Barnes, 
    204 Va. 245
    , 253, 
    129 S.E.2d 633
    , 639-40 (1963):
    When a right of way is granted over land . . .
    and the instrument creating the easement does not
    limit the use to be made thereof, it may be used for
    any purpose to which the dominant estate may then, or
    in the future, reasonably be devoted. This rule is
    subject to the qualification that no use may be made
    of the right of way, different from that established
    at the time of its creation, which imposes an
    additional burden upon the servient estate.
    In this case, the only limitation on the right of way contained
    in the granting language is that the right of way be used to
    access the spring.   There is no evidence of prior use of the
    right of way.   Therefore, we find no basis to impose a
    limitation on the method which may be used in accessing the
    spring. *
    Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the trial
    court's decree restricting the use of the right of way to the
    laying and maintaining of a water line and remand the case for
    *
    Collins also assigned error to the location of the right
    of way because it "is extremely rocky terrain, and will require
    the defendants to spend approximately $10,000.00 to install" a
    water line. At oral argument, however, counsel for Collins
    clarified this issue, stating that the trial court "has
    discretion as to the location of the easement" and "[t]he error
    in the location is only an error if it's tied into the water
    line." In light of this clarification, we will not address the
    location of the easement.
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    any further proceedings that may be required consistent with
    this opinion.
    Affirmed in part,
    reversed in part,
    and remanded.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Record 950648

Citation Numbers: 251 Va. 70, 466 S.E.2d 98, 1996 Va. LEXIS 9

Judges: Carrico, Compton, Stephenson', Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Poff

Filed Date: 1/12/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2024