Thomas v. Commonwealth (CORRECTED) ( 2019 )

PRESENT: All the Justices
JACK HARVEY
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 180015 JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH
June 27, 2019
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF COLONIAL HEIGHTS
Steven C. McCallum, Judge
JOHN WESLEY THOMAS, II,
v. Record No. 180764
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
David B. Carson, Judge
The respondents, both previously adjudicated to be sexually violent predators, were
committed to the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services after a trial
court determined they had violated the terms of their conditional release. They argue that,
because they are indigent, the Due Process Clause requires the State to appoint a psychological
expert to assist them in a hearing. The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the
respondents violated the conditions of their release and whether these violations render them
unsuitable for conditional release. Hearings must occur on an expedited basis and a respondent
will subsequently be re-evaluated, upon request, within six months of his recommitment or
sooner depending on the scheduling of the annual review. We conclude that, in this specific
context, given the temporary, expedited nature of the hearing and the other protections afforded
to the respondents, including the right to counsel, the Due Process Clause does not require the
State to appoint an expert.
BACKGROUND
JACK HARVEY
Harvey was convicted of sexual battery in 1983. In 1995, he was convicted of indecent
liberties and solicitation to commit sodomy. According to the pre-sentence report, Harvey
sexually molested three young boys over a period of several months. The boys were 8 to 14
years old. One of the victims reported that Harvey engaged in oral sex with him every other
weekend, placing a pillow over his mouth and threatening to shoot him in the brain if he told
anyone. The second victim testified that Harvey would lock him in a room and participate in
“sex games” with him. The third boy testified that Harvey would take his clothes off but he
resisted. This boy reported that he was not molested as much as the other boys because he was
older.
Harvey was adjudicated to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) in 2011 and committed
for secure treatment to the Virginia Center for Behavioral Rehabilitation (“VCBR”). After
several years of treatment at VCBR, he was granted conditional release in November 2014. One
of the conditions of his release was that he “will follow the Probation and Parole Officer’s
instructions and will be truthful, cooperative, and report as instructed.” He was also instructed to
“not frequent places where children congregate.”
On March 11, 2016, Harvey was the subject of an emergency custody order for violating
the terms of his conditional release. His probation officer reported that:
On 8/4/15, Harvey admitted to using [a] phone service
“MegaMate” to solicit other males for oral sex. Reported meeting
up and exchanging oral sex with 2 different men. Harvey is
instructed to not use any form of social networks and that he must
disclose his sex offender/SVP status which he reported that he did
not do. He was instructed not to use this service. On 3/9/16,
Harvey admitted to calling [the phone service] 2-3 times since as
well as using another similar service at least 3 times. He admitted
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to attempting to solicit the exchange of oral sex, however, due to
technical difficulties with the system he was not able to set up
these meetings. He further admitted had he been successful in
meeting these men, he did not plan to advise them he is a sex
offender.
Three days later, Harvey’s probation officer submitted a “Major Violation Report” detailing
Harvey’s failure to abide by certain conditions of his release, notably failing to follow the
instructions of his probation officer and frequenting a place where children congregate.
On April 28, 2016, Dr. Glenn Rex Miller, a licensed clinical psychologist, issued a
ten-page report. In preparing his report, Dr. Miller reviewed court records, treatment notes, and
interviewed Harvey. Among other things, Dr. Miller detailed Harvey’s poor response to
community supervision and his disregard of his probation officer’s instructions. The report
concluded that Harvey did not meet the criteria for conditional release, and that outpatient
supervision and treatment “do not appear appropriate at this time.” Dr. Miller concluded that
Harvey “needs treatment in a secure environment to prevent his condition from deteriorating.”
Harvey filed a motion for the appointment of an expert, arguing that the Due Process
Clause required the state to provide him with a defense expert. The circuit court denied the
motion. 1 Following a hearing that included testimony from his probation officer, the circuit
court concluded that Harvey had violated the conditions of his release and that he was “no longer
suitable for conditional release.” The circuit court revoked his conditional release and
committed him to the custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental
Services (the “Department”). 2
1
Judge Edward A. Robbins, Jr. entered an order to this effect on August 29, 2016.
2
Judge Steven C. McCallum entered this order on October 4, 2017.
3
JOHN WESLEY THOMAS, II
Among other things, Thomas was convicted of carnal knowledge of a 13-year-old girl.
He was also convicted of breaking and entering and sexual battery. While incarcerated, he
received four institutional infractions for inappropriate sexual behaviors, including exposing
himself while masturbating.
Thomas was adjudicated as an SVP in 2012. He was granted conditional release status in
May 2015. Thomas was required to comply with numerous detailed and onerous conditions in
order to be placed on conditional release:
II. Supervision: Persons placed on conditional release will be supervised
by the DOC Office of Community Corrections, probation and parole. As
such, Mr. Thomas, having been found a sexually violent predator, will be
subject to the following DOC conditions.
 Standard DOC conditions of supervision as a sex offender.
 Mr. Thomas shall abide by the laws of the Commonwealth of
Virginia; conditions of his probation/parole and be of good
behavior; he will follow all probation/parole/supervising officers’
instructions and will be truthful, cooperative and report as
instructed once released from parole/probation.
 Warrantless searches of person, vehicle, computers, or real
property by law enforcement officers based on “reasonable
suspicion.”
 Will register as a sex offender in Virginia and or the state of
residence.
 Have no contact with his victims or their families, either directly or
by third party, without the permission of his supervising officer.
 Participation in and successful completion of any sexual offender
assessment, treatment, technological monitoring to include GPS or
other electronic methods, and polygraphs for treatment use as
directed by the DBHDS Office of SVP Services and the
supervising probation and parole officer.
 Report to his assigned supervising officer on the day he is released
from custody.
 Be seen in person by his supervising officer or designee at least
once per week for at least six months from his release date. After
his six month review, the number of contacts may be reduced with
the approval of OSVP Services.
 Receive a minimum of one home visit per month from his
supervising officer or designee.
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 Maintain a landline phone for the purpose of GPS supervision if
required by his supervising officer.
 Payment for any fees related to these services is the responsibility
of the individual. The Commonwealth may or may not be able to
provide some financial support for treatment.
 Have no unsupervised contact with minors, defined as persons
physically or mentally younger than 18 years old, unless by prior
approval of his supervising officer, the OSVP, and the court.
 Keep a log of incidental contact with any minors to be surrendered
to his supervising officer and polygrapher upon request; he will
answer polygraph questions about the accuracy of his entries.
* * *
At a minimum, any home plan should meet the following minimum
conditions.
(1) Mr. Thomas will reside at the address approved by his supervising
officer, any moves will be approved by his supervising officer,
who will immediately notify the office of SVP and OAG of the
changes.
(2) He shall live in a home in which no minors are residents, overnight
visitors, or are left under his supervision for any period of time.
(3) He shall not view or possess any sexually explicit or suggestive
materials, either print, photo, or electronic in any format.
 He shall not establish nor visit any electronic networking sites.
 He shall not access pornographic or otherwise sexually explicit
sites.
 He shall, upon instruction from his supervising officer, submit any
and all electronic devices with data storage capability, including
but not limited to; computers, cell phones, mp3 devices, cameras
and gaming systems to his supervising officer for forensic
examination.
 Mr. Thomas will have privileges to use a computer for job search,
work, or applying for disability, banking, etc.
* * *
Treatment needs:
Sex offender treatment: To assist Mr. Thomas in maintaining abstinence
from sexual aggression, if granted SVP conditional release he will:
(1) Mr. Thomas will participate fully with all requirements of sex
offender treatment including attending all scheduled appointments
and successful completion of the program, with a practitioner or
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group practice certified by Virginia as a Sex Offender Treatment
Provider. He shall sign a release giving his supervising officer full
permission to communicate with the practitioner or group practice
providing this treatment.
(2) Mr. Thomas will be responsible for the costs of his treatment and
medications.
(3) He shall neither use nor possess any item which his supervising
officer and/or sex offender treatment provider determines to be
counter-therapeutic or possibly related to offending behaviors.
(4) He shall comply with any recommended assessments including but
not limited to a penile plethysmograph and/or visual reaction time
testing.
(5) He shall sign a release giving his supervising officer full
permission to communicate with the practitioner or group practice
providing this treatment.
Substance abuse treatment
(1) He shall abstain completely from using or consuming any and all
illegal controlled substances and alcohol.
(2) Mr. Thomas shall receive any and all prescribed psychoactive
medications through one physician and one pharmacist. His
supervising officer will have access to this individual or group.
(3) Mr. Thomas will participate in laboratory assessment for non-
approved substances in accordance with instructions from his
assigned supervising officer. He shall sign a release giving his
supervising officer full permission to communicate with the person
or agency administering this testing.
(4) Mr. Thomas shall enter into, actively participate in, and
successfully complete a substance abuse evaluation and treatment
with a practitioner or group practice certified by Virginia. He shall
sign a release giving his supervising officer full permission to
communicate with the practitioner or group practice providing this
treatment.
(5) Mr. Thomas will participate in AA meetings, attending his first
meeting within 24 hours of release. He will attend a minimum of 2
meetings per week for the first six months. Once he has completed
six months of meetings he will attend a minimum of 3 meetings
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per month until his supervising officer determines that these
meetings are no longer necessary. He shall sign a release giving
his supervising officer full permission to verify his attendance.
Mental health treatment: Mr. Thomas has a history of anxiety and
stress; he was prescribed Vistaril, a mild anxiolytic to help him sleep.
He will be referred to a local psychiatrist to follow him and prescribe
medications if deemed necessary.
Regular examination: To prevent his use of illegal or other controlled
substances that can disinhibit him to sexually abusing, and to
encourage him to recognize and fully disclose any and all sexually
abusive or victim-focused “grooming” behaviors:
(1) He shall complete a clinical polygraph on questions prepared by
his treatment provider in coordination with his supervising officer
six months after being placed on conditional release and thereafter
at the request of his treatment provider, supervising officer or the
Department. He shall sign a release giving his treatment provider
and supervising officer full permission to communicate with the
person or agency administering this testing, with reports forwarded
to his treatment provider, supervising officer and the Department.
Employment: To reduce his free unsupervised time Mr. Thomas will
seek viable employment and/or appropriate leisure time activities. Mr.
Thomas is pursuing social security benefits. If employed his
attendance will be verified on a regular basis and any changes will be
reported immediately to his supervising officer. Prior to beginning or
engaging in new activates he will consult with his supervising officer.
Social support network: The conviction that made him SVP-eligible
was for sexual aggression towards an adolescent and an adult female.
To protect family, friends, and associates from his aggressive
tendencies:
(1) Mr. Thomas will receive approval from his supervising officer to
attend functions where minor children will be or where his risk
factors would be escalated. Mr. Thomas will also avoid functions
where alcohol or drugs or other criminal activities are present,
(Restaurants and family approved functions are excluded).
In June of 2016, Thomas was subject to an emergency custody order after he was arrested
for driving while intoxicated. Dr. Miller conducted an SVP Conditional Release Evaluation. He
concluded in his report that, despite “a number of issues that are of concern,” Thomas may
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remain an appropriate candidate for conditional release. In August of 2016, the Commonwealth
and Thomas agreed to amend his conditional release plan and release him under this modified
plan.
Following another violation of the terms of Thomas’ conditional release, Dr. Miller
issued a second report in which he opined that Thomas was not appropriate for conditional
release. On March 30, 2017, the court again found that Thomas had violated the conditions of
his release. In April 2017, over the objections of the Commonwealth, the court again ordered
Thomas released, provided he first completed a substance abuse program. In August 2017, after
he completed this program, the court ordered Thomas conditionally released.
In October 2017, after he submitted a urine screen that tested positive for cocaine,
Thomas was, for the third time, the subject of an emergency custody order for violating his
conditional release plan. Thomas, invoking the Due Process Clause, filed a motion asking for
the court to appoint Dr. Craig S. King to act as his psychological expert. The court denied the
motion for a psychologist, but granted the motion allowing him $1,000 to secure a toxicologist.
The court ultimately concluded that Thomas had violated the conditions of his release and that
his conditional release should be revoked. Accordingly, the court committed him to the custody
of the Department.
ANALYSIS
I. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE APPOINTMENT OF A DEFENSE
EXPERT IN EXPEDITED HEARINGS TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN SVP VIOLATED THE
CONDITIONS OF HIS RELEASE AND SHOULD CONTINUE ON CONDITIONAL RELEASE.
Both Harvey and Thomas argue that, because they are indigent and cannot afford to hire
an expert, the Due Process Clause requires the government to provide them with an expert to
assist them in a hearing, the purpose of which is to determine whether they violated the
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conditions of their release and whether they are no longer suitable for conditional release. Code
§ 37.2-913(D). 3
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that a state cannot
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “[D]ue process,
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Rather, it is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The core of
due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal. See, e.g.,
Pappas v. Virginia State Bar, 271 Va. 580, 587 (2006). In some circumstances, however, due
process requires more. For example, an indigent criminal defendant facing incarceration is
entitled to court appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976), the Court articulated a three-factor
framework to determine the scope of due process protections:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest,
including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedures would entail.
3
Thomas perplexingly argues that we should apply the demanding “strict scrutiny”
standard in interpreting the statute and hold that the statute is “facially invalid” if we do not
interpret it to offer a respondent a psychological expert. He did not raise these arguments at trial.
Under Rule 5:25, we generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal.
This rule of procedural default applies to constitutional claims. Townsend v. Commonwealth,
270 Va. 325, 332 (2005). Although Rule 5:25 permits the Court to exercise the discretion to
consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal “to enable [it] to attain the ends of justice,”
we see no reason to apply the ends of justice exception in this case and, therefore, we do not
address the argument.
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See also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-80 (1985) (applying the Mathews three-factor
framework).
Harvey and Thomas analogize their case to Ake v. Oklahoma. In Ake, a capital murder
case, an indigent defendant asked the court to provide him with a psychiatrist for the purposes of
making an insanity defense. Id. at 72. He also requested the services of an expert to oppose the
prosecution’s expert on the question of “future dangerousness,” one of the factors relevant to a
death sentence. Id. at 72-73.
Upon reviewing the three factors, on the question of an expert to assist the defendant in
mounting an insanity defense, the Court held that
when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at
the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and
assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.
This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a
constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or
to receive funds to hire his own.
Id. at 83. On the question of an expert to address “future dangerousness,” the Court held that a
defendant is entitled to expert assistance to present an alternative viewpoint. Id. at 84.
Ake, of course, was a criminal prosecution, where a defendant is presumed innocent and
where constitutional protections reach their apex. Harvey and Thomas are not defendants in a
criminal case. They are adjudicated SVPs who were released subject to certain conditions. The
Supreme Court has noted that “a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a
criminal prosecution.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979). The fact that a respondent
in a proceeding under Code § 37.2-913 is provided “some of the safeguards applicable in
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criminal trials cannot itself turn these proceedings into criminal prosecutions requiring the full
panoply of rights applicable there.” Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986).
Harvey and Thomas were provided with, among other due process protections, notice and
the opportunity to be heard as well as court appointed counsel. The question before us is
whether due process also requires the government to provide them with expert assistance.
Applying the three-part framework above, we conclude that the Due Process Clause does not
require the Commonwealth to provide an expert for a hearing under Code § 37.2-913.
A. An SVP respondent possesses a recognized, yet diminished, liberty interest.
Turning to the first factor under Mathews, there is no question that Harvey and Thomas
have a liberty interest at stake. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980); Addington, 441 U.S.
at 425. Even in civil commitment proceedings, “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been
at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental
action.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
The liberty interest in this case, however, differs materially from the liberty interest at
stake in a criminal case. A defendant in a criminal case faces the prospect of a potentially
lengthy term of incarceration or even, as in Ake, capital punishment. The potential deprivation of
liberty in a hearing under Code § 37.2-913 is not a fixed term of incarceration or death, but a
revocation of conditional release and short-term civil commitment. Even when an SVP is
committed, the commitment only lasts until the next hearing or annual review. See Code
§ 37.2-913(D) (allowing an SVP to petition for re-release no sooner than six months from his
return to custody); Code § 37.2-910 (providing for annual review). At their annual review, if
they request discharge, Harvey and Thomas are entitled to be evaluated by a second expert.
Code § 37.2-910(B).
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Further contrasting a civil commitment under the SVP statute with a criminal
prosecution, a defendant in a criminal case is presumed innocent. See Coffin v. United States,
156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”). In contrast, Thomas and Harvey have
already been found, by clear and convincing evidence, to be “sexually violent predators.” Code
§ 37.2-908. A “sexually violent predator” is
any person who (i) has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense, or has been charged with a sexually violent offense and is
unrestorably incompetent to stand trial pursuant to § 19.2-169.3;
and (ii) because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder,
finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior, which makes
him likely to engage in sexually violent acts.
Code § 37.2-900. Although they were conditionally released, their release subjected them to
onerous terms of release, noted above. These terms of release limit an SVP’s liberty, and thus
diminish the liberty interest at issue in Code § 37.2-913 proceedings.
We also make note in this context of a countervailing interest. A respondent facing a
civil commitment, or recommitment to a secure facility, has an interest in receiving restorative
treatment. A respondent also benefits from not harming, or threatening to harm, third parties,
which could in turn lead to prosecution and incarceration as well as acts of self-defense or
reprisal by victims or their families.
We recognize the respondents’ liberty interest in avoiding commitment to a secure
facility, but there is no question that an SVP’s liberty interest is a diminished one when
compared to the liberty interests under review in capital cases, like Ake, and other criminal
proceedings.
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B. The State’s interest weighs against the appointment of an expert.
The next factor in the Mathews framework is an evaluation of “the Government’s
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedures would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321. The cost of providing an expert, of course,
is involved, but more is at stake. We must also examine the administrative burdens that the
procedure would entail.
The Commonwealth’s interest in a proceeding under Code § 37.2-913 is protection of the
public from individuals who have already been adjudicated as SVPs. The General Assembly
plainly contemplated expedited proceedings when an SVP has allegedly violated the conditions
of his release. The statutory framework calls for an “emergency custody order” to take a
respondent into custody “immediately.” Code § 37.2-913(B). Thereafter, an expert must “as
soon as practicable, perform a mental health examination of the respondent.” Code § 37.2-
913(B). After the expert submits a report, “the hearing shall be given priority on the court’s
docket.” Code § 37.2-913(C). Entitling an SVP respondent to his own expert would
significantly alter this dynamic. Continuances to locate and produce an expert will cause delay
where resolution of a matter is intended to be both expeditious and temporary.
Hearings under Code § 37.2-913(B) are more akin to bail hearings or to a civil
emergency custody order under Code § 37.2-808, under which a magistrate acts on an expedited
basis to determine whether a person should be placed into temporary custody based, in part, on
“the recommendations of any treating or examining physician or psychologist licensed in
Virginia.” That initial decision will then be revisited at a future date. We are aware of no
authority extending Ake to situations like bail hearings or routine emergency civil commitment
13
proceedings. We conclude that the State’s fiscal and administrative burden does not favor an
extension of Ake to situations like this one.
C. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty through the procedures used is
minimal, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards is
slight.
The final factor to consider is the “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the private]
interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321. The procedure under Code § 37.2-913 differs from the
insanity plea or the challenge to future dangerousness that were at issue in Ake. In a criminal
case, the Commonwealth will seek out an expert for the purpose of presenting evidence
favorable to the prosecution’s theory. Under Virginia’s SVP framework, however, the
Department designates an expert “skilled in the diagnosis and risk assessment of sex offenders.”
Code § 37.2-913(B). Significantly, the Attorney General’s Office, the entity responsible for
handling SVP cases, does not select the expert. The expert appointed by the Department must
“perform a mental health examination of the respondent, including a personal interview,” Code
§ 37.2-913(B), and, considering the statutory criteria, “opine whether the respondent remains
suitable for conditional release.” Id. The expert is not the prosecution’s expert or the defense’s
expert. That expert may conclude, over the objections of the Attorney General, that the
respondent is, in fact, amenable to conditional release. For example, in Thomas’s case, after
Thomas violated the terms of his conditional release, the expert initially concluded that Thomas
could continue on conditional release. There is no reason to believe that the experts employed
by the Department will not give an honest and unprejudiced assessment of a respondent’s
suitability for conditional release. This non-adversarial model for selecting experts reduces the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of a liberty interest.
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Unlike the defendant in Ake, who was required to shoulder the burden of proving the
affirmative defense of insanity, the Commonwealth bears the burden in a hearing under Code
§ 37.2-913 of proving “that the respondent . . . has violated the conditions of his release and that
the violation of conditions was sufficient to render him no longer suitable for conditional
release.” This allocation of the burden of proof further reduces the need for a separate expert for
the respondent.
Furthermore, the respondent is entitled to other protections. Pursuant to Code
§ 37.2-901, a respondent in any SVP hearing, including a hearing to determine whether the SVP
should be conditionally released following a violation, is entitled to the following rights:
1. To receive adequate notice of the proceeding.
2. To be represented by counsel.
3. To remain silent or to testify.
4. To be present during the hearing or trial.
5. To present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.
6. To view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file.
At the hearing, court-appointed counsel can challenge the factual basis for the revocation and can
challenge the expert’s conclusions. These due process protections further mitigate against the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.
Finally, the risk of error is significantly mitigated by subsequent reviews. Unlike a
defendant in a criminal case, who faces a fixed term of incarceration subject to limited challenge
on appeal or on collateral review, an SVP respondent has the opportunity to revisit his
commitment. An SVP can petition for re-release no sooner than six months from his return to
custody, Code § 37.2-913(D), or earlier if the date of his annual review is less than six months.
Code § 37.2-910. At their annual review, if they request discharge, Harvey and Thomas are
entitled to be evaluated by a second expert. Code § 37.2-910(B). In Thomas’s case, the Court
15
appointed Dr. King for Thomas’s annual review hearing. Dr. King is the same expert Thomas
sought in the hearing held under Code § 37.2-913(D).
Applying the Mathews framework to this specific context, we conclude that the Due
Process Clause does not require the State to provide an SVP with an expert. The SVP possesses
a recognized but diminished liberty interest. The expert who issues the report is not selected by
the entity responsible for prosecuting SVP cases but rather by the Department. The SVP is
afforded other due process protections, such as the right to counsel. The outcome of the hearing
will determine whether the SVP should be recommitted or remains suitable for conditional
release. The SVP, however, can petition for re-release within six months or sooner, depending
on the date of the petitioner’s annual review. These circumstances, in combination, lead to the
conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not require the appointment of an expert for a
hearing under Code § 37.2-913.
D. Little v. Streater does not compel a different outcome.
Harvey and Thomas point to Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), in support of their
argument that the Due Process Clause requires the court to provide them with an expert in a
hearing under Code § 37.2-913. That case offers them no support. In Little, the Supreme Court
held that due process required the state to pay for a blood test to establish paternity when the
putative father cannot afford one. Id. at 16. Parenthood, once established, carries with it a
number of weighty obligations, including the obligation to financially support a child. The fact
that due process requires the state to provide a simple and relatively inexpensive test that can
conclusively answer the question of paternity for an indigent person sheds little light on what due
process protections are due in entirely different contexts.
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II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE EXPERT’S REPORT.
Finally, Harvey argues that the expert’s report should not have been admitted into
evidence without a live witness to authenticate the report. He asserts that “there is nothing in the
SVP statute to suggest that, because the evaluator’s report is part of the record, its contents are
admissible as evidence.” We disagree. Under Code § 37.2-913(B), once the expert has
conducted an evaluation of the SVP, “[t]he evaluator shall report his findings and conclusions in
writing to the Department, the Office of the Attorney General, counsel for the respondent, and
the court in which the petition was filed. The evaluator’s report shall become part of the record
in the case.” The General Assembly did not order the report to “become part of the record in the
case” simply to adorn or thicken the file for no purpose. It ordered the report to be part of the
record in the case so the court could consider it in determining whether to return the SVP to
conditional release or order that he remain in the custody of the Department. This reading is
confirmed by Code § 37.2-913(D), which provides that
The evaluator designated in subsection B may be permitted to
testify at the hearing as to his diagnosis, his opinion as to whether
the respondent remains suitable for conditional release, his
recommendation as to treatment and supervision, and the basis for
his opinions.
If the expert were functionally required to testify in every case, that passage would be entirely
superfluous.
It is true that the General Assembly did not craft an express exception in this statute to
the general rule excluding hearsay. Nevertheless, the most logical interpretation of Code
§§ 37.2-913(B) and (D) is that the General Assembly intended for the report of the expert to be
admissible and for it to be considered by the trial court. With respect to presentence reports,
Code § 19.2-299 contains similar language, mandating that such reports “shall be filed as a part
17
of the record in the case.” Presentence reports are routinely considered in criminal cases.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial courts did not err in considering the expert’s report.
CONCLUSION
The decisions below will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE MIMS, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN and JUSTICE POWELL join, concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority that the circuit court properly considered the expert’s report in
Harvey’s proceeding. However, I must write separately because I disagree with the majority’s
conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not require the appointment of a mental health
expert on behalf of a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) in any proceeding to revoke his or her
conditional release.
The fundamental criterion in determining whether to revoke the conditional release of an
SVP is “whether the [SVP] remains suitable for conditional release.” Code § 37.2-913(B). In
other words, the decision turns not on the mere fact that an SVP has violated the terms of
conditional release but “on the meaning of the fact[,] which must be interpreted by expert
psychiatrists and psychologists.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (emphasis in
original). That is because—unlike revoking probation or a suspended sentence under Code
§ 19.2-306, for example—the commitment of an SVP to inpatient treatment is neither punitive
nor retributive. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) (noting that the absence
of punitive, retributive, and deterrent motives are essential to upholding a state’s statutory SVP
civil commitment scheme from constitutional attack on double jeopardy or ex post facto
grounds); see also Senate Doc. No. 30, Virginia State Crime Commission, Report on the Civil
18
Commitment of Violent Sexual Offenders at 6-7 (1999) (stressing the necessity that Virginia’s
then-pending statutory SVP commitment scheme comply with this requirement).
That does not mean that the fact or the nature of the violation are irrelevant. The fact that
the SVP has violated the terms of conditional release is a mandatory element for which there
must be probable cause before an emergency custody order may be issued. Code § 37.2-913(A).
The circuit court may not revoke conditional release without finding that the terms were indeed
violated. Code § 37.2-913(D). However, the decision to revoke conditional release must be
based not on the fact that the SVP violated the terms of release, but whether the violation is a
symptom of a relapse in the SVP’s mental health requiring that he or she be recommitted for
inpatient treatment. The nature of the violation is relevant to that inquiry, as reflected in at least
three of the statutory criteria the court may consider when answering it: the SVP’s response to
therapy or treatment; his or her present mental condition; and his or her response to treatment
while on conditional release. Code § 37.2-912(A)(iv)-(vi). But the fact of the violation is simply
one of several indicators that inpatient treatment is again necessary, because of the then-current
state of the SVP’s mental health.
Having thus established that the outcome of a conditional release revocation proceeding
depends on a mental health expert’s evaluation of the SVP, I am not persuaded that Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), is so readily distinguishable as the majority holds. In Ake, the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized that mental health may be determinative in cases
where it is in question and the role mental health experts play in evaluating it is critical:
when the State has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal
culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist
may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense. In this role,
psychiatrists gather facts, through professional examination, interviews, and
elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the
information gathered and from it draw plausible conclusions about the defendant's
19
mental condition, and about the effects of any disorder on behavior; and they offer
opinions about how the defendant's mental condition might have affected his
behavior at the time in question. They know the probative questions to ask of the
opposing party's psychiatrists, and how to interpret their answers. Unlike lay
witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe might be relevant to
the defendant's mental state, psychiatrists can identify the elusive and often
deceptive symptoms of insanity and tell the jury why their observations are
relevant. Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can translate
a medical diagnosis into language that will assist the trier of fact, and therefore
offer evidence in a form that has meaning for the task at hand. Through this
process of investigation, interpretation, and testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist
lay jurors, who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a
sensible and educated determination about the mental condition of the defendant
at the time of the offense.
Psychiatry is not, however, an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree
widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate
diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment,
and on likelihood of future dangerousness. Perhaps because there often is no
single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a given case, juries
remain the primary factfinders on this issue, and they must resolve differences in
opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the evidence offered by
each party. When jurors make this determination about issues that inevitably are
complex and foreign, the testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and a virtual
necessity if an insanity plea is to have any chance of success. By organizing a
defendant's mental history, examination results and behavior, and other
information, interpreting it in light of their expertise, and then laying out their
investigative and analytic process to the jury, the psychiatrists for each party
enable the jury to make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue
before them. It is for this reason that States rely on psychiatrists as examiners,
consultants, and witnesses, and that private individuals do as well, when they can
afford to do so. In so saying, we neither approve nor disapprove the widespread
reliance on psychiatrists, but instead recognize the unfairness of a contrary
holding in light of the evolving practice.
The foregoing leads inexorably to the conclusion that, without the
assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues
relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable,
to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State's
psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is
extremely high. With such assistance, the defendant is fairly able to present at
least enough information to the jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit it to
make a sensible determination.
Id. at 80-82 (internal citation quotation marks, and footnotes omitted). ∗
∗
Although the Court noted that “[a] defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at
issue in every criminal proceeding” and required “an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court
20
The majority discounts Ake’s relevance here, noting that it was a criminal case where the
defendant was presumed innocent until convicted, but SVPs have already had their classification
adjudicated. That is true, but it is important to emphasize that the question of whether an SVP
must be committed or recommitted for inpatient treatment does not—and cannot—flow from his
or her criminal conviction, but from the civil proceeding that led to the classification. In that
respect, adjudicated SVPs on conditional release are similar to anyone who has been determined
to be in need of involuntary admission under Code § 37.2-814 and later discharged under Code
§§ 37.2-837 or -838: the only question to be decided is whether there has been a relapse in their
mental health from the improvement that justified their release from inpatient treatment. There
are three reasons why Ake should apply in this context.
First, Code § 37.2-901 affords SVPs the right to counsel and the right to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses in a conditional release revocation proceeding. Ake explains why
mental health experts are critical for both purposes. An attorney’s legal training and experience
does not qualify him or her, without more, to evaluate a client’s mental health. Only mental
health experts may (1) “analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible conclusions
about the defendant's mental condition;” (2) “offer opinions about how the [SVP’s] mental
condition might have affected his behavior at the time in question;” and (3) “organiz[e] a[n
SVP’s] mental history, examination results and behavior, and other information, interpret[] it in
light of their expertise, and then lay[] out their investigative and analytic process to the” fact-
finder. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80-81.
that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor” before he accrues the right to an appointed
mental health expert, an SVP’s mental condition is at issue in a conditional release revocation
proceeding, so, as with a criminal defendant who has met the threshold, “the need for the
assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 (italics omitted).
21
Similarly, an attorney’s legal training and experience alone are no guarantee that he or
she will be able (1) to understand the Commonwealth’s mental health examiner’s report or
“translate a medical diagnosis,” (2) to “know the probative questions to ask of the opposing
party's psychiatrists” “to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense” or
“prepar[e] cross-examination,” or (3) “to interpret [the Commonwealth’s expert’s] answers.” Id.
at 80-82. Thus, the appointment of a mental health expert is essentially an extension of the right
to counsel. See id. at 83 (“[T]he State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense.”) (emphasis added).
Although the majority stresses that the Commonwealth’s expert is independent—“not the
prosecution’s expert or the defense’s expert,” ante at 14—because he or she is designated by the
Department of Behavioral Health and Development Services, rather than the Office of the
Attorney General, that fact does not support its holding in my view. An independent expert
cannot satisfy the role Ake requires because his or her independence limits what the SVP’s
counsel may discuss, thereby diminishing the utility of having an expert to assist the SVP in the
first place.
In Turner v. Thiel, 262 Va. 597, 599-600 (2001), we considered a relevant scenario in the
context of reviewing a trial court’s refusal to disqualify a witness who had been designated as a
defense expert after he had reviewed a medical malpractice plaintiff’s records and discussed
treatment and care with the plaintiff’s counsel, with a focus on the questions of negligence and
proximate causation. The expert declined to serve as the plaintiff’s expert and was subsequently
designated by the defendant.
22
On appeal, we reversed the trial court’s judgment. We held that the questions to
determine whether to disqualify an expert witness for a conflict of interest were (1) whether it
was objectively reasonable for the first party to conclude that a confidential relationship existed
between the party and the expert, and (2) whether the party disclosed any privileged or
confidential information to the expert. Id. at 601. In assessing what information was privileged
or confidential, we decided that it included “a party’s strategy in litigation, the kinds of experts
that the retaining party expected to employ, a party's views of the strengths and weaknesses of
each side's case, the role of each of the litigant's expert witnesses to be hired, anticipated
defenses, counsel's theory of the case, and counsel's mental impressions.” Id. at 603.
Obviously, if the mental health expert designated by the Commonwealth for the
conditional release revocation proceeding is not the SVP’s expert, even if he or she is
independent, the SVP’s counsel cannot objectively reasonably conclude that a confidential
relationship exists between the two of them. Consequently, counsel cannot pose the questions or
solicit the information necessary to fulfill the purpose of the expert required in Ake, because
doing so would reveal confidential information.
Second, a non-indigent SVP would, under Code § 37.2-901, have the right to retain a
mental health expert both (1) to assist counsel with formulating litigation strategy, identifying
defenses, and assessing the strength and weaknesses of the Commonwealth’s expert’s report and
testimony; and (2) to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s expert and adduce alternative
evidence to rebut his or her credibility or evaluation. In Ake, the Court recognized the right to a
court-appointed expert expressly because failure to do so would result in unconstitutionally
disparate treatment that disadvantaged the indigent criminal defendant solely because of his or
her relative poverty. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81-82 & 82 n.8 (noting “the unfairness of a contrary
23
holding”). The same disparity would exist here between proceedings to determine the
confinement of an indigent SVP versus a non-indigent one.
Third, while the liberty interest implicated by commitment to inpatient treatment is
certainly different from the interest implicated by incarceration, it is not entitled to less weight
for Ake purposes. To the contrary, in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489, 493 (1980), the Supreme
Court acknowledged that transferring an inmate between prisons does not infringe a liberty
interest when it is within the discretion of corrections officers, but a transfer from a prison to a
mental health facility does. Id. at 493-94. This is not to say that being committed is worse than
being imprisoned, but the consequences of involuntary commitment “are qualitatively different
from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime.” Id. at 493. “A
criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual's right to freedom
from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize the State to classify him
as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him
additional due process protections.” Id. at 493-94.
Viewed in this light, my analysis of the three factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 321 (1976) differs from the majority’s. First, the private interest affected by revocation of
conditional release is significant. Although the SVP has previously been adjudicated to be an
SVP, he or she has also been found to be suitable for conditional release because, in part, he or
she “does not need secure inpatient treatment.” Code § 37.2-912(A)(i). The SVP therefore is in
the same position as immediately after having been adjudicated to be an SVP under Code § 37.2-
908(C), but before the court initially determined whether he or she needed to be committed for
inpatient treatment under Code § 37.2-908(D), or whether alternative treatment options were
adequate under Code § 37.2-908(E).
24
Code § 37.2-907(A) entitles an indigent SVP to a court-appointed expert in a Code
§ 37.2-908(C) proceeding, so, by the time of the Code §§ 37.2-908(D) and (E) inquiry, the
SVP’s counsel has had the benefit of that expert’s assistance in interpreting the Commonwealth’s
expert’s report, preparing a defense, and cross-examination. Any evidence adduced from the
SVP’s court-appointed expert is also in the record for the court’s consideration when it decides
whether inpatient treatment is necessary. Thus, the statutory scheme recognizes and addresses
the Ake concerns about the uniqueness of mental health experts for the initial treatment decision,
and it must also do so at later stages when the issue arises again.
Second, the Commonwealth’s countervailing interest is minimal. The Supreme Court in
Ake determined that the financial burden of providing a single mental health expert is
insubstantial, and it was “difficult to identify any interest of the State, other than that in its
economy.” Id. at 78-79. Although the majority succeeds where Ake failed by identifying an
additional, administrative burden, that, too, is insubstantial. Although Ake requires that the SVP
have access to a mental health expert who may provide confidential assistance to counsel, the
Supreme Court expressly stated that this right does not include a “right to choose a psychiatrist
of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own.” Id. The due process concern is that
the SVP have an expert in whom counsel may confide to obtain objective assistance. The time it
takes to identify and appoint such an expert, and to allow him or her to collect the necessary
information to discharge the function envisioned in Ake, should not be substantially longer than
the time it takes the Commonwealth’s expert.
Third, the risk of error if the SVP does not have an expert is not slight, and the value of
the added procedural safeguard of appointing one is not minimal. As Ake illustrates, depriving
the SVP of a mental health expert impairs the right to counsel. Although the independence of the
25
Commonwealth’s expert may insulate the proceeding from bias, independence is no guarantee
that the professionally-uncritiqued evidence adduced from a single expert will be untainted by
oversight or mistake, and counsel cannot reliably identify such oversight or mistake, if it exists,
without the aid of an expert.
For these reasons, I conclude that the Due Process Clause may require the appointment of
a mental health expert on behalf of an SVP in a conditional release revocation proceeding. I
therefore respectfully dissent.
26