County of Henrico Police v. James Isaac Medlin, Jr. ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Clements
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
COUNTY OF HENRICO POLICE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1891-01-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
MARCH 26, 2002
JAMES ISAAC MEDLIN, JR.
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Ralph L. Whitt, Jr. (Michael P. Del Bueno;
Whitt & Associates, on briefs), for
appellant.
Malcolm Parks (Maloney, Parks, Clarke &
Nathanson, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
The Henrico County Police Department ("employer") appeals a
decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission awarding James
Medlin, Jr. benefits for incapacitation resulting from
work-related heart disease. The employer contends: (1) that
our holding in Medlin v. County of Henrico Police, 34 Va. App.
396, 542 S.E.2d 33 (2001) (Medlin I), excluding from evidence
expert opinions that are inconsistent with the statutory
presumption set forth in Code § 65.2-402, is an incorrect
statement of the law; (2) that the commission exceeded its
authority and our remand instruction by re-examining the
evidence; (3) that the commission violated the law of the case
by reversing itself; and (4) that the preponderance of credible
evidence overcame the Code § 65.2-402 presumption. We affirm
the commission's decision.
I. BACKGROUND
On appeal, "[d]ecisions of the commission as to questions
of fact, if supported by credible evidence, are conclusive and
binding on this Court." Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13
Va. App. 227, 229, 409 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991) (citing Code
§ 65.1-98; McCaskey v. Patrick Henry Hosp., 225 Va. 413, 415,
304 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1983)). 1 "The fact that contrary evidence may
be found in the record is of no consequence if credible evidence
supports the commission's finding." Id. (citing Russell
Loungewear v. Gray, 2 Va. App. 90, 95, 341 S.E.2d 824, 826
(1986)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the party prevailing below. Creedle Sales Co. v. Edmonds, 24
Va. App. 24, 26, 480 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1997).
A. THE INJURY
On or about May 2, 1997, Medlin, a fifty-three-year-old
police officer with the Henrico County Police Department, began
experiencing tightness in his chest and shortness of breath. He
consulted his family physician, who ordered a cardiac stress
test and then referred him to a cardiologist. Significant
coronary artery blockages were found and on May 5, 1997, Medlin
underwent three-vessel coronary artery bypass surgery. He was
1
Code § 65.1-98 was recodified in 1991. The present
provision can be found at Code § 65.2-706.
- 2 -
incapacitated from May 2, 1997 until January 21, 1998, when he
returned to work.
In 1976, Medlin underwent a required department physical
examination which established that at that time he was free of
heart disease or hypertension. However, his medical background
showed a history of elevated cholesterol and hypertension, and a
family history of premature heart disease.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 16, 1998, a deputy commissioner awarded Medlin
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The employer
sought review and on April 7, 2000, the full commission reversed
the deputy's award. Medlin appealed the commission's decision
to this Court.
Code § 65.2-402(B) provides, in pertinent part:
Hypertension or heart disease causing . . .
any health condition or impairment resulting
in total or partial disability of . . .
members of county, city or town police
departments . . . shall be presumed to be
occupational diseases, suffered in the line
of duty, that are covered by this title
unless such presumption is overcome by a
preponderance of competent evidence to the
contrary.
Medlin contended that the foregoing presumption was unrefuted
and carried his burden of proof. The employer contended that
the presumption was rebutted by competent evidence. It cited
the testimony of Dr. Michael Hess that, as a general matter, no
link exists between stress and heart disease. Specifically,
- 3 -
Dr. Hess testified, "[t]here is no evidence in the literature
that stress or work-related factors play any primary cause in
the development of coronary artery disease. Further there is
absolutely no evidence that employment as a police officer is a
factor in causing the coronary artery disease."
Holding that medical opinion that merely contradicted the
Code § 65.2-402(B) presumption generally lacked probative value
to overcome the presumption and should be rejected, we reversed
the commission's decision and remanded the case with direction
to reconsider the evidence in the light of our ruling. See
Medlin I, 34 Va. App. at 407-08, 542 S.E.2d at 39. On June 25,
2001, the commission reversed its earlier denial of Medlin's
claim, holding that the evidence failed to overcome the
presumption. The employer appeals that decision.
II. ANALYSIS
A. MEDLIN I
The employer first contends that our holding in Medlin I
erroneously mandates the complete exclusion of all expert
testimony and opinion that is inconsistent with the Code
§ 65.2-402 presumption. Based upon this misreading, the
employer asks us to reverse Medlin I. We decline the
invitation. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430, 478
S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996).
The obligation to follow precedent begins
with necessity, and a contrary necessity
marks its outer limit. . . . [W]e recognize
- 4 -
that no judicial system could do society's
work if it eyed each issue afresh in every
case that raised it. See B. Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law
underlying our own Constitution requires
such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is, by definition, indispensable.
See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial
Restraint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court
History 13, 16.
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992). The doctrine of stare decisis carries such persuasive
force that a departure from precedent requires support by some
special justification. United States v. International Business
Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996). The employer's
misinterpretation of Medlin I's holding warrants no such
departure.
The employer argues that Medlin I requires exclusion of
expert testimony and opinion that is inconsistent with the Code
§ 65.2-402 presumption. That contention misreads Medlin I.
Medlin I holds only that "evidence that merely rebuts generally
the underlying premise of the statute, which establishes a
causal link between stress and heart disease, is not probative
evidence for the purposes of overcoming the presumption."
Medlin I, 34 Va. App. at 407, 542 S.E.2d at 39 (emphasis added).
Under this holding, expert opinion that merely discounts the
presumption is non-probative and irrelevant to refute the
presumption. To refute the presumption, evidence must deny that
work was a cause or risk factor of the claimant's heart disease,
- 5 -
see Bristol City Fire Dep't and Virginia Mun. Group Self-Ins.
Ass'n v. Maine, 35 Va. App. 109, 117, 542 S.E.2d 822, 826
(2001), and must attribute the claimant's heart disease to a
specific, non-work-related cause.
In this case, Dr. Hess's expert opinion lacked such
probative value. He testified that "[t]here is no data that
emotional stressors contribute[d] to the development of
[Medlin's] significant disease, which was very significant." He
testified further, "there is no evidence in the literature that
stress or work-related factors play any primary cause in the
development of coronary artery disease." Because this testimony
was nothing more than a general attempt to refute the statutory
presumption, it lacked probative value to overcome the
presumption.
B. THE COMMISSION'S RE-EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE
The employer next contends that the commission exceeded its
authority by re-examining the evidence on remand. Our direction
in Medlin I refutes this argument. Holding that the commission
erred in relying on Dr. Hess's testimony, we gave the following
instruction:
Because the weight the commission assigned
to Dr. Hess's . . . opinions in reaching its
decisions is unclear, we remand . . . to the
commission to determine whether the employer
has sufficiently rebutted the presumption in
light of the remaining probative evidence
. . . .
Medlin I, 34 Va. App. at 408, 542 S.E.2d at 39.
- 6 -
Thus, we instructed the commission to determine, based on
the remaining probative evidence, whether the employer had
sufficiently rebutted the statutory presumption. This required
a re-examination of the remaining evidence. The commission did
as we instructed and did not exceed its authority.
C. VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF THE CASE
The law of the case doctrine provides that "[w]here there
have been two appeals in the same case, between the same
parties, and the facts are the same, nothing decided on the
first appeal can be re-examined on a second appeal." Uninsured
Employer's Fund v. Thrush, 255 Va. 14, 18, 496 S.E.2d 57, 58-59
(1998). This doctrine does not apply to the case before us. No
determinations from the first case carried forward to this case.
The commission's original factual determinations were not
addressed in Medlin I. The case was remanded because those
factual determinations were based on an erroneous application of
law. Thus, the law of the case doctrine does not apply.
D. CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AS TO QUESTIONS OF FACT
The employer asks us to reverse the commission's finding
that the Code § 65.2-402(B) presumption was not rebutted. We
will not.
Medlin was free of heart disease and hypertension when he
began working for the Henrico County Police Department in 1976.
Expert testimony that his May 2, 1997 attack and his heart
disease were stress-related supports the presumption and the
- 7 -
commission's decision to award him benefits. "Decisions of the
commission as to questions of fact, if supported by credible
evidence, are conclusive and binding on this Court." Manassas
Ice, 13 Va. App. at 229, 409 S.E.2d at 826. "The fact that
contrary evidence may be found in the record is of no
consequence if credible evidence supports the commission's
finding." Id.The decision of the commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.
- 8 -