Traveyan Lee Chambliss v. Commonwealth of Virginia , 62 Va. App. 459 ( 2013 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Huff and Senior Judge Coleman
PUBLISHED
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
TRAVEYAN LEE CHAMBLISS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0983-12-2 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
OCTOBER 22, 2013
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAROLINE COUNTY
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge Designate
David B. Hargett (Hargett Law, on brief), for appellant
Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli,
II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Traveyan Lee Chambliss (“appellant”) appeals his conviction of conspiracy to elude
police, in violation of Code §§ 46.2-817(B) and 18.2-22(a)(2). Following a bench trial in the
Circuit Court for the County of Caroline (“trial court”), appellant was sentenced to five years’
incarceration in the Virginia Department of Corrections, with three years, nine months
suspended. On appeal, appellant contends that 1) the trial court erred in failing to strike the
evidence because the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
committed a conspiracy to elude in Caroline County, and 2) the trial court erred in finding
sufficient evidence based on a theory that the agreement in Spotsylvania County continued into
Caroline County and that there was a joint operation.
For the following reasons, this Court affirms the conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
On appeal, “‘we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing from that
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’”
Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442, 642 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2007) (en banc)
(quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004)). So viewed,
the evidence is as follows.
On August 11, 2011, appellant was arrested at the Spotsylvania County probation and
parole office for violating parole. Spotsylvania County Sergeant Tim Buta (“Buta”) handcuffed
appellant’s hands behind his back and escorted him outside to be transported to jail. During the
transit, appellant broke free and ran toward a white Chevy Impala. Upon approaching the
vehicle, appellant exclaimed, “Open the door! Open the door!” The door opened, and appellant
entered the vehicle through the driver’s side door.
At trial on March 19, 2012, Buta testified that as appellant entered the vehicle appellant
instructed the passenger, Carolyn Henderson (“Henderson"), to put the car in gear. Henderson
then put the car in reverse. Buta chased down the vehicle and shattered the driver’s side window
with his baton but failed to prevent appellant and Henderson from escaping. The vehicle lurched
backwards and bounced over a curb into a parking lot, which allowed Buta to regain pursuit. As
Buta approached, he heard appellant again telling Henderson to put the car in gear. Henderson
put the car in gear, which allowed appellant to drive down an eight-foot embankment onto an
access road.
From the parking lot above, Buta observed the car driving slowly and erratically until it
stopped, and after a fifteen-second pause, the car resumed its escape and “appeared to be driving
with a normal driving person behind [the wheel].” Buta testified that the car was in Spotsylvania
County during his pursuit.
Shortly after the escape originating in Spotsylvania County, Sergeant Craig Heywood
(“Heywood”) of the Caroline County Sheriff’s Department pulled over on the shoulder of Route
301 in response to a radio call regarding the pursuit. Heywood testified that he activated his
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emergency equipment and placed spike strips across the road. Soon thereafter, Henderson drove
over the strips going between 120 and 130 miles per hour while appellant was seated in the
passenger seat in handcuffs. Henderson continued to drive on three flat tires at 90 miles per hour
even as sparks flew from the rims.
Henderson began to swerve into multiple lanes of traffic causing approaching motorists
to take evasive maneuvers to prevent a collision. Eventually, Henderson lost control of the
vehicle, crossed a sidewalk, and hit a fence in the Town of Bowling Green. Despite the
collision, appellant and Henderson got out of the car and attempted to flee, but both were
immediately apprehended.
On March 18, 2012, Henderson and appellant were tried together in Caroline County.
Henderson pled guilty to felony eluding, and both pled not guilty to conspiracy to commit felony
eluding in Caroline County. Appellant stipulated that the evidence was sufficient to prove that
the conspiracy to elude police occurred in Spotsylvania County, but asserted it was insufficient
to prove that the conspiracy to elude police occurred in Caroline County. The trial court then
found appellant guilty of conspiracy to elude police. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to strike the evidence
because the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed a
conspiracy to elude police in Caroline County. Specifically, appellant argues that the evidence
was insufficient because there was no evidence once the car entered Caroline County – direct or
circumstantial – of anything that occurred in the vehicle or of any new agreement amounting to a
new conspiracy. The Commonwealth asserts, however, the evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion that there was one overall, ongoing conspiracy to elude police in both Spotsylvania
and Caroline Counties.
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A. Standard of Review
On appeal, “we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the Commonwealth, and the reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that
evidence support each and every element of the charged offense.” Haskins v. Commonwealth,
31 Va. App. 145, 149-50, 521 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1999).
In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we ‘presume the judgment of the trial
court to be correct,’ and ‘will not set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.’” Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002)
(quoting Broom v. Broom, 15 Va. App. 497, 504, 425 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1992); Dodge v. Dodge, 2
Va. App. 238, 242, 343 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1986)). The reviewing court, under this standard, does
not “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (citation omitted). Instead,
the reviewing court asks whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319.
“‘Circumstantial evidence [presented during the course of the trial] is as competent and is
entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.’” Salcedo v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 525,
535, 712 S.E.2d 8, 12 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57
Va. App. 658, 665, 705 S.E.2d 510, 513 (2011)). “‘The statement that circumstantial evidence
must exclude every reasonable theory of innocence is simply another way of stating that the
Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 535, 712 S.E.2d at
12-13 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003)).
Furthermore,
[w]hether the hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is itself a
question of fact, subject to deferential appellate review. Merely
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because defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by
the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable
hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded.
By finding the defendant guilty, therefore, the factfinder has found
by a process of elimination that the evidence does not contain a
reasonable theory of innocence.
Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 572-73, 673 S.E.2d 904, 910 (2009) (en banc)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Insofar as venue is concerned, “the Commonwealth must ‘produce evidence sufficient to
give rise to a ‘strong presumption’ that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the
court, and this may be accomplished either by direct or circumstantial evidence.’” Foster-Zahid
v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 430, 442, 477 S.E.2d 759, 765 (1996) (quoting Cheng v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990)).
B. Continuing Offense, Sufficiency of the Evidence, and Venue
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to strike the
Commonwealth’s evidence because the evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy in
Caroline County as there was no evidence of any overt acts by appellant from which a
conspiracy could be inferred, except for those actions which took place in Spotsylvania County.
Furthermore, appellant argues that the “conspiracy in Spotsylvania was complete the moment the
agreement was made, and no conspiracy in Caroline County was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . [and] [t]here is no legal support for any claim of an ongoing or continuing offense
. . . .”
“Conspiracy is defined as ‘an agreement between two or more persons by some concerted
action to commit an offense.’” Wright v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 502, 505, 297 S.E.2d 711,
713 (1982) (quoting Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 542, 544, 189 S.E. 326, 327 (1937)).
Moreover, the crime of conspiracy is complete when the parties agree to commit an offense;
Virginia does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Stevens v.
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Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 238, 241, 415 S.E.2d 881, 883 (1992). The existence of a
conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Wright, 224 Va. at 505, 297 S.E.2d at
713.
Appellant stipulated that he committed a conspiracy to elude the police in Spotsylvania
County. On this point, there is no dispute. Although the assignments of error were couched as
questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant of conspiracy, the real issue
presented is whether the crime of conspiracy could be tried in Caroline County under the facts of
this case. “[P]roof of venue is not a part of the crime . . . [and] the prosecution need not prove
where the crime occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, since venue is not a substantive element of
the crime.” Bonner v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 206, 210, 745 S.E.2d 162, 165 (2013) (en
banc) (citations omitted). Moreover, venue can be proven merely with “evidence sufficient to
give rise to a ‘strong presumption’ that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the
court, and this may be accomplished by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Cheng, 240
Va. at 36, 393 S.E.2d at 604 (citations omitted). In the current matter, venue is proper because
appellant’s conspiracy continued into Caroline County.
“A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or
series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
intermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Where
such an act or series of acts runs through several jurisdictions, the
offense is committed and cognizable in each.”
Morris v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 459, 467, 658 S.E.2d 708, 712 (2008) (quoting United
States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)).
In Barber v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 172, 177-78, 360 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1987)
(citing United States v. MacDougal, 790 F.2d 1135, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986)), this Court adopted the
“totality of circumstance” test in determining whether the prosecution has demonstrated a single
conspiracy or multiple conspiracies. In Barber, the defendant argued that the Commonwealth
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had improperly merged two transactions for distributing marijuana in separate counties into one
conspiracy to distribute. The Barber Court employed the five-part test articulated by the Fourth
Circuit in MacDougal. The Fourth Circuit considered the following factors as probative: 1) the
time periods in which the activities occurred; 2) the statutory offenses as charged in the
indictments; 3) the places where the activities occurred; 4) the persons acting as co-conspirators;
and 5) the overt acts or other descriptions of the offenses charged that indicate the nature and
scope of the activities to be prosecuted. Id.
In applying these factors to the present case, this Court finds no error in the trial court’s
determination that the facts demonstrated a single conspiracy continuing from Spotsylvania
County into Caroline County.
Applying the first MacDougal factor, the entire agreement between Henderson and
appellant lasted only a short period. Secondly, while the initial conspiracy began in Spotsylvania
County, appellant and Henderson committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in Caroline
County by continuing to evade the police in Caroline County. Under the third factor, the escape
and subsequent chase occurred in a limited area, overlapping two contiguous counties, “set on
foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force . . . through several
jurisdictions.” Morris, 51 Va. App. at 467, 658 S.E.2d at 712. Additionally, Henderson and
appellant worked in close cooperation both in the agreement and acts to elude. Lastly, both
parties formed an agreement to elude the police, without regard to county boundaries, when
appellant entered the vehicle and informed Henderson to put the car in gear. Accordingly, all
five MacDougal factors support the finding of a single conspiracy under the totality of the
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circumstances.1 Therefore, appellant’s claims fail in that there was sufficient evidence to prove a
continuing conspiracy in Caroline County.
Furthermore, Code § 18.2-22(c) states “jurisdiction for . . . conspiracy . . . shall be in the
county or city wherein any part of such conspiracy is planned or in the county or city wherein
any act is done toward the consummation of such plan or conspiracy.” The facts in this case
demonstrate “a strong presumption” that appellant committed the continuing offense of
conspiracy which included acts done in Caroline County “toward the consummation of [the]
conspiracy.” Id. Sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant of the crime of conspiracy was
established by stipulation. As a continuing crime which may be heard in any jurisdiction where
an act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, venue was appropriately found in the
Circuit Court of Caroline County.
Accordingly, this Court finds that the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant’s
actions in Spotsylvania and Caroline Counties were acts in furtherance of a single, continuous
conspiracy and that venue for such trial was appropriate in the trial court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the trial court did not err in denying
appellant’s motion to strike and in finding the evidence sufficient to establish a continuing
conspiracy cognizable in Caroline County. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
1
Appellant relies on Gray v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 675, 680, 537 S.E.2d 862, 865
(2000), for the proposition that a conspiracy is complete when the parties agree to commit an
offense. While a conspiracy is complete once the parties agree to commit the offense,
“jurisdiction for . . . conspiracy shall be in the county or city wherein any part of such conspiracy
is planned or in the county or city wherein any act is done toward the consummation of such plan
or conspiracy.” Code § 18.2-22(c).
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