Lonnie James Breeding v. Clinchfield Coal ( 2001 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Benton, Humphreys and Retired Judge Cole*
    LONNIE JAMES BREEDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION **
    v.   Record No. 1134-01-3                          PER CURIAM
    SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
    CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY/
    THE PITTSTON COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Ginger J. Largen; Morefield Kendrick Hess &
    Largen, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
    (Ramesh Murthy; Lisa Frisina Clement;
    PennStuart, on brief), for appellee.
    Lonnie James Breeding contends the Workers' Compensation
    Commission erred in finding that (1) Breeding was not totally
    disabled due to a psychiatric condition causally related to his
    compensable June 28, 1998 injury by accident; and (2) Breeding
    unjustifiably refused selective employment offered by
    Clinchfield Coal Company.       Upon reviewing the record and the
    briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
    merit.     Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
    decision.     See Rule 5A:27.
    *
    Retired Judge Marvin F. Cole took part in the
    consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code
    § 17.1-400(D).
    **
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    I.
    "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is
    subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."
    Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 
    11 Va. App. 675
    , 677, 
    401 S.E.2d 213
    , 215 (1991).   Thus, "[q]uestions raised by
    conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission."
    Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    , 318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236 (1989).   Unless we can say as a matter of law that
    Breeding's evidence sustained his burden of proving that he was
    totally disabled as a result of a psychiatric condition causally
    related to his compensable injury by accident, the commission's
    findings are binding and conclusive upon us.    See Tomko v.
    Michael's Plastering Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835
    (1970).
    In ruling that Breeding's evidence failed to sustain his
    burden of proof, the commission accepted the opinions of
    Drs. Paul R. Kelley and Richard G. Salamone and rejected the
    contrary opinions of Drs. Neil Dubner and B. Wayne Lanthorn, a
    licensed clinical psychologist.    The commission found as
    follows:
    The record reflects that Dr. [Neal] Jewell,
    [Breeding's treating orthopedist,] evaluated
    [Breeding] on a consistent basis throughout
    the relevant period[, i.e., from July 1999
    forward]. Neither before nor after July
    1999 did Dr. Jewell note any signs of any
    disabling psychiatric condition, or, in
    fact, any psychiatric signs or symptoms of
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    any kind. We note that Dr. Jewell never
    requested a referral for psychiatric
    treatment at any stage. In July 1999,
    contemporaneous with Dr. Dubner's first
    evaluation, [Breeding] independently sought
    an evaluation from Dr. [Ken] Smith. As part
    of his evaluation Dr. Smith performed a
    mental status examination from which he
    concluded that [Breeding] did not suffer
    from any psychiatric condition, whether
    disabling or not.
    A careful reading of Dr. Dubner's
    treatment records reveal that his diagnosis
    and opinion is based primarily on
    [Breeding's] reports of incapacitating pain
    of such severity that [he] must spend a
    significant portion of the time lying down.
    Dr. Dubner noted by history that [Breeding]
    "frequently will lie down to give himself
    relief" and "a number of months ago he spent
    probably half his time lying around just
    trying to gain some relief." We contrast
    this history with the contemporaneous
    medical reports from Dr. Jewell, Dr. Smith,
    Dr. [Earl K.] Wilson, Dr. [Charles] Bolick,
    and that of the evaluator for the Functional
    Capacity Evaluation [("FCE")]. None of the
    physicians noted complaints to this degree.
    Dr. Jewell as well as the therapist who
    performed the [FCE] noted signs of symptom
    magnification. Likewise Dr. Kelley and
    Dr. Salamone noted test results consistent
    with symptom magnification. Dr. Salamone's
    opinion that it would require a "fairly
    severe depression" to preclude engagement in
    gainful employment, was not specifically
    rebutted.
    Further, we note that Dr. Jewell
    evaluated [Breeding] in January and March
    2000. During neither visit did he document
    any complaints of psychiatric impairment nor
    signs and symptoms thereof independent of
    any subjective complaints. The emergency
    room physician did not record by history any
    complaints regarding psychiatric symptoms or
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    disability flowing therefrom [on February
    22, 2000].
    The commission, as fact finder, was entitled to weigh the
    medical evidence.   In doing so, the commission accepted the
    opinions of Drs. Kelley and Salamone, while rejecting the
    contrary opinions of Drs. Dubner and Lanthorn.     Thus, viewed in
    the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, see R.G.
    Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990), the evidence demonstrates an absence of any
    significant psychiatric symptoms or complaints by Breeding to
    Drs. Jewell, Smith, Wilson, and the FCE evaluator during the
    relevant time period.   The evidence also supports the reports of
    Breeding's symptom magnification.     Moreover, in light of the
    opinions of Drs. Kelley and Salamone, the evidence does not
    establish as a matter of law that Breeding's evidence proved he
    was totally disabled due to a psychiatric condition causally
    related to his compensable accident as of February 25, 2000.
    II.
    "To support a finding of refusal of selective employment
    'the record must disclose (1) a bona fide job offer suitable to
    the employee's capacity; (2) [a job offer that was] procured for
    the employee by the employer; and (3) an unjustified refusal by
    the employee to accept the job.'"      James v. Capitol Steel
    Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 489 (1989)
    (quoting Ellerson v. W.O. Grubb Steel Erection Co., 1 Va. App.
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    97, 98, 
    335 S.E.2d 379
    , 380 (1985)).   "When the employer
    establishes that selective employment was offered to an employee
    that was within the employee's capacity to work, the employee
    bears the burden of establishing justification for refusing the
    offered employment."   Food Lion, Inc. v. Lee, 
    16 Va. App. 616
    ,
    619, 
    431 S.E.2d 342
    , 344 (1993).
    Breeding failed to prove that as of February 25, 2000, he
    was totally disabled due to a psychiatric condition causally
    related to his compensable accident.   Furthermore, Dr. Jewell's
    March 6, 2000 opinion indicated that Breeding's physical
    condition had not changed since January 17, 2000 and that
    Breeding could perform the selective employment previously
    approved.   Therefore, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that
    Breeding proved he was justified in refusing selective
    employment as of that date.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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