Drucker and Faulk, Inc. v. Raymond Earl Holt, Jr. ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Clements and Senior Judge Coleman
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    RAYMOND EARL HOLT, JR.
    v.   Record No. 2349-01-2
    DRUCKER AND FAULK, INC. AND
    MONGOMERY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY      MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
    APRIL 23, 2002
    DRUCKER AND FAULK, INC. AND
    MONTGOMERY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
    v.   Record No. 2456-01-2
    RAYMOND EARL HOLT, JR.
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Louis D. Snesil (Louis D. Snesil, P.C., on
    briefs), for Raymond Earl Holt, Jr.
    Jimese Pendergraft Sherrill (Christine A.
    McKee-Clark; Siciliano, Dyer, Ellis &
    Boccarosse, on briefs), for Drucker and
    Faulk, Inc. and Montgomery Mutual Insurance
    Company.
    Drucker and Faulk, Inc. and its insurer (hereinafter
    referred to as "employer") appeal a decision of the Workers'
    Compensation Commission awarding medical benefits to Raymond
    Earl Holt, Jr. (claimant).   Employer contends the commission
    erred in finding that claimant proved he sustained a compensable
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    injury by accident to his right leg on June 16, 2000.    On
    cross-appeal, claimant contends the commission erred in finding
    he failed to prove that his disabling headaches were causally
    related to his June 16, 2000 injury by accident.    Finding no
    error, we affirm the commission's decisions.
    I.   Injury by Accident
    "In order to carry [the] burden of proving an 'injury by
    accident,' a claimant must prove that the cause of [the] injury
    was an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event and
    that it resulted in an obvious sudden mechanical or structural
    change in the body."   Morris v. Morris, 
    238 Va. 578
    , 589, 
    385 S.E.2d 858
    , 865 (1989).     Factual findings made by the commission
    will be upheld on appeal if supported by credible evidence.      See
    James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).
    The commission ruled that claimant proved he sustained a
    compensable injury by accident to his right leg, finding that
    his evidence proved an identifiable incident while in the course
    of his employment, on June 16, 2000, that caused or resulted in
    a sudden mechanical or structural change to his body.    In so
    ruling, the commission found:
    [T]he claimant felt a sting and noticed
    blood on his ankle while in the course and
    scope of his employment. We find that his
    inability to prove what caused the puncture
    marks on his right ankle is not dispositive
    - 2 -
    of this matter. Although the claimant
    cannot positively identify the source of the
    sting or the cause of the wound, he has
    presented sufficient evidence to causally
    connect the wound with the employment.
    While his physicians are unable to
    definitively conclude that a snake bit him,
    no physician disputes that the wound on his
    right ankle was caused by a bite of some
    sort. We find that as a maintenance
    technician and grounds man, the claimant was
    required to maintain and upkeep the area in
    and around the employer's drainage ditch,
    and therefore, the employment included the
    risk of insect, rodent or snake bites.
    The commission's factual findings are supported by credible
    evidence, including claimant's testimony and the medical records
    of Drs. H. Thompson Mann and James W. Brooks, Jr.
    Claimant testified that while he was collecting trash from
    a drainage ditch on June 16, 2000, he "noticed a little sting"
    on his ankle.   He looked down and saw blood, but did not see
    what had caused his ankle to bleed.    He saw fleas on his sock.
    Claimant sought medical treatment four days later at Patient
    First, where he reported he had been bitten by fleas.
    On June 20, 2000, Dr. Mann treated claimant at the
    St. Mary's Hospital emergency room.    Dr. Mann reported that
    claimant had brushed fleas from his lower extremities while
    cleaning an apartment.   Claimant also reported that he had
    walked through grass that was above his ankles, and when he
    walked away from that area, he felt a stinging sensation and saw
    some blood on his ankle.   Dr. Mann's examination showed two
    - 3 -
    puncture wounds about one centimeter apart on claimant's lower
    extremity.    The area was mildly discolored, mildly swollen, and
    tender.   Although claimant stated that he did not see a snake,
    Dr. Mann opined that most likely a snake had bitten claimant.
    On June 26, 2000, Dr. Mann reported that the claimant "has what
    looks like a snake bite (in Hospital last week) and he will be
    out of work probably thru rest of this week."
    On July 5, 2000, claimant saw Dr. Brooks, an infectious
    disease specialist.   Dr. Brooks also concluded that claimant's
    history and the appearance of the wounds suggested a venomous
    snakebite.    Dr. Brooks later opined in a letter to Dr. Mann that
    he believed claimant's symptoms were suggestive of a copperhead
    snakebite.
    Based upon this credible evidence, the commission, as fact
    finder, could reasonably infer that claimant sustained a bite
    from either an insect, rodent, or snake, while working for
    employer on June 16, 2000, which caused the sudden mechanical or
    structural change in his body - i.e. the puncture wound and
    swelling.    "Where reasonable inferences may be drawn from the
    evidence in support of the commission's factual findings, they
    will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal."    Hawks v.
    Henrico County Sch. Bd., 
    7 Va. App. 398
    , 404, 
    374 S.E.2d 695
    ,
    698 (1988).   As fact finder, the commission was entitled to
    resolve any inconsistencies between claimant's testimony and his
    - 4 -
    co-workers' testimony in favor of claimant.    It is well settled
    that credibility determinations are within the fact finder's
    exclusive purview.   Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va.
    App. 374, 381, 
    363 S.E.2d 433
    , 437 (1987).
    II.   Headaches
    Here, on this issue, we also view the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this instance
    the employer.   R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).    Unless we can say as a
    matter of law that claimant's evidence sustained his burden of
    proving that his headaches were causally related to his
    compensable injury by accident, the commission's findings are
    binding and conclusive upon us.     See Tomko v. Michael's
    Plastering Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835 (1970).
    Claimant relies upon Dr. Mann's office notes and Dr. J. Kim
    Harris' opinion to support his argument that his disabling
    headaches were causally related to his snakebite.    Claimant
    argues that the only disabling aspects of the injury were the
    headaches and Dr. Mann's report of June 26, 2000, that claimant
    would "be out of work probably thru rest of this week," was
    sufficient to establish the causal relationship between the
    snakebite and headaches.   However, as the commission noted,
    although Dr. Mann specifically attributed claimant's right leg
    wound to the snakebite, he never stated or rendered an opinion
    - 5 -
    that claimant's chronic, severe headaches were caused by the
    snakebite or the right leg wound.   In addition, although
    Dr. Harris attributed claimant's headaches to the snakebite, he
    did so based solely upon a temporal connection.   Dr. Harris
    admitted that he was not a snakebite expert.   Furthermore,
    because Dr. Harris did not treat claimant until almost three
    months after the injury, he would not have had an opportunity to
    view claimant's wound.   Dr. Brooks opined, that even if a snake
    had bitten claimant, headaches would be an unusual consequence.
    The commission, as fact finder, was entitled to weigh all
    of the medical evidence.   It did so and concluded that claimant
    failed to establish a causal relationship between his headaches
    and his compensable injury.   We do not reweigh the evidence.
    Based upon this record, we cannot find as a matter of law that
    claimant's evidence sustained his burden of proof.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    - 6 -